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Summary 
This thesis deals with the issue of financial development in Egypt at the sectoral, 
macroeconomic and household levels over the period 1960-93. The thesis is organised in 
ten chapters, including a summary of the main results in chapter (10). 
Chapter (1) provides an introduction of the topics treated in the thesis and an overview of 
the main developments in the Egyptian economy during the study period. 
Chapter (2) reviews the theoretical literature and empirical studies on the main issues 
concerning financial development. 
Chapters (3) and (4) derive stylised facts from the discussion of the evolution of the 
financial system in Egypt. Chapter (3) assesses the structure, regulation and performance 
of the banking sector. Chapter (4) focuses on the Egyptian securities market, exploring its 
development since its establishment in 1883. Further it analyses the performance of the 
market using the main published indicators and highlights the impediments to its progress. 
Chapter (5) is concerned with the growing role of Islamic finance in both the formal and 
informal sectors in Egypt. After constructing a model to illustrate the distinctive 
characteristics of Islamic banking, the chapter investigates the role of Islamic banks and 
Islamic branches of conventional banks. The chapter also provides an analysis of the 
Informal Islamic Investment Companies which flourished in Egypt during the 1980s. 
Chapter (6) analyses the causes, measures and impact of financial repression in Egypt over 
the period 1960-90. The findings of this chapter indicate that financing the budget deficit 
was the main reason for repressing the financial sector. The chapter discusses the impact 
of the different repressive methods used including inflation tax, interest rate ceilings, high 
reserve requirements, directed credit schemes, regulation on the portfolio composition of 
banks, and government ownership of financial intermediaries. The government revenues 
from particular repressive measures such as inflation tax, seigniorage and interest rate 
ceilings were estimated for the whole study period and were substantial by most 
international standards. There follows a discussion of the main consequences of financial 
repression including capital flight, money substitution, the excessive use of inflation 
hedges and the thriving of informal financial transactions. 
Chapter (7) presents an econometric analysis of the impact of the real interest rate on 
saving, investment and economic growth in Egypt. The results of this analysis indicate that 
the real interest rate had a positive impact on financial saving, possibly through a portfolio 
shift. However its impact on total saving, investment and economic growth was 
insignificant. 
Chapters (8) and (9) are concerned with the issue of the coexistence of formal and informal financial sectors in rural Egypt. The analysis is based on a survey, of 200 households undertaken by the author in four Egyptian villages in the Nile delta. The 
methodology adopted and the description of the surveyed region are reported in chapter (8). The findings provided in chapter (9) suggest that informal financial transactions in our 
sample can be classified as intermittent. There was no evidence of the existence of 
professional money lenders. Loans, with very few exceptions, were interest free. Most loans were undertaken without contract or collateral. However default cases were low 
thanks to societal governance. Moreover the chapter analyses the characteristics of RoSCA in Egypt and its role in financial intermediation. The determinants of formal and informal borrowing are estimated using Tobit analysis. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the implications of financial liberalisation on household credit decisions. 
This thesis highlights the importance of a liberalised financial system for economic development in Egypt. However it argues that financial liberalisation, on its own, is not 
a sufficient remedy for the problems encountered in the financial sector. Macroeconomic 
stability and prudential regulation are considered to be essential prerequisites for liberalisation. In addition the thesis strongly emphasises the need for the restructuring of the financial system and the ensuring of its compatibility with the cultural environment to 
enable the full realisation of the benefits of financial liberalisation. 
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Chapter (1) 
Introduction 
"It is melancholy to contrast the present poverty 
of Egypt with its prosperity in ancient times, 
when the variety, elegance, and exquisite finish 
displayed in its manufactures attracted the 
admiration of surrounding nations, and its 
inhabitants were in no need of foreign commerce 
to increase their wealth or to add to their 
comforts. " Edward W. Lane (1836) 
(1.1) The issues: 
When Egypt gained independence, in 1952, the prevailing economic wisdom was that 
state intervention, economic planning, physical capital accumulation and inward 
orientation could enhance economic development. Meanwhile the bulk of economic 
literature considered the effect of financial sector on economic development as negative 
or at best neutral. ' However circumstances have changed and the advice given to the 
developing countries, including Egypt, has become completely different. 
In 1973 McKinnon and Shaw, in two separate studies, challenged the conventional 
wisdom regarding the role of the financial system in economic development. They argued 
that 'financial repression" resulted in a reduction of the real rate of economic growth and 
halted, or retarded, the development process. They suggested that financial liberalisation, 
by the removal of repressive measures that distort the financial market, may improve the, 
1Fry 
(1989), p. 13. 
2McKinnon 
(1989), p. 29 states that when governments tax and otherwise distort their domestic capital markets, the economy is said to be financially repressed. " 
2 
mobilisation of domestic savings, maximise investment, raise the average efficiency of 
capital investment and hence improve real economic growth. ' 
Financial liberalisation policy, based on the influential models of McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973) has become an integral part of the reform programmes endorsed by the 
Bretton Woods institutions. These programmes commonly include five main components 
that directly involve the financial sector, namely': 
1. Reduction of the size of fiscal deficit and a change in the method of its finance. 
2. Deregulation of interest rates. 
3. Elimination, or at least reduction, of the use of directed credit schemes and 
preferential interest rates. 
4. Restructuring of financial intermediaries to raise their efficiency. 
5. Liberalisation of external financial policies, to reduce entry barriers against 
foreign intermediaries and deregulate international lending and borrowing. 
Egypt provides an interesting case study for the analysis of an emerging financial system, 
and examining the conduct of financial policy and its role in economic development. 
Egypt has a fairly sophisticated financial system for its stage of development. It has a 
banking network consisting of the Central Bank, 44 commercial banks, 33 investment and 
business banks, 22 branches of foreign banks, and 4 specialised banks (2 real estate 
banks, an industrial bank, and an agricultural bank with 17 affiliates). The formal 
financial system also includes a securities market and 7 insurance companies. Islamic 
financial institutions are represented by two private Islamic banks and a public one all are 
registered with the central bank. In addition there has been more than 100 informal 
Islamic investment companies. 
3See 
Park (1991), p. 345. 
4See World Bank (1989), chapter 9, our summary is based on Roe (1993), p. 7. 
3 
Since 1960 Egypt has adopted two distinct financial policies: financial repression during 
1960-74, partial financial liberalisation over the period 1974-91. A policy of financial 
reform has been initiated in 1991. A thorough understanding of the impact of these 
different policies on financial and economic development should be based on analytical 
investigation undertaken at the sectoral, macroeconomic and household levels. 
The objectives of this thesis are as follows: 
First, it aims to analyse the structure, regulation and performance of the banking system 
and the securities market in Egypt from the start of the introduction of interventionist 
measures in the early 1960s until 1991 which marks the beginning of the current financial 
liberalisation programme. 
Second, it attempts to investigate the structure, significance and mechanisms of the 
informal financial sector in rural and urban Egypt. 
Third, the study also addresses the issue of Islamic finance and its role in the Egyptian 
formal and informal financial sectors. . 
Fourth, the thesis seeks to determine the causes, measures and impact of financial 
repression that prevailed over the study period in Egypt. 
Fifth, it attempts to test the hypotheses of the neo-liberal school regarding the impact of 
real interest rates on saving, investment and economic growth in Egypt over the period 
1960-90. 
Sixth, based on a survey of 200 households in four Egyptian villages, the study aims to 
examine the direct impact of financial measures on the household's lending and borrowing 
decisions in the formal and informal credit markets. 
4 
(1.2) Key developments in the Egyptian economy: 
The Egyptian economy over the period 1960-91 has passed through four main 
developments, namely, the nationalisation measures and heavy state intervention 
implemented during the 1960s; the infitah, open door, policy adopted during the 1970s; 
an attempt at economic reform as a response to external shocks during the 1980s; and the 
initiation of a comprehensive economic reform and structural adjustment programme in 
the early 1990s. While the implications of these developments on the Egyptian financial 
sector are analysed in detail below, in this section we discuss their main aspects. 
(1.2.1) Nationalisation and state intervention: 
At the time of the 1952 revolution of the Free Officers, which overthrew the monarchy 
in Egypt, the economy was predominantly based on the private sector. The private sector 
was responsible for 87% of the economy's value added and accounted for 95% of total 
civilian employment. Public sector activities were limited to the provision of public 
services such as electricity, water supply, railways and civil administration. ' 
The Free Officers did not appear to have a particular commitment to any economic 
ideology. 6 Thus no major changes in economic policy were apparent during the first five 
years of the revolution, 1952-1956, and the economy remained predominantly private. ' 
However the Suez Crisis of 1956 initiated a series of government interventions, starting 
with the Egyptianisation laws of 1957, de facto nationalisation, which sequestrated the 
British and French properties. ' 
5See World Bank (1987), p. 2 and Mabro (1974), pp. 124-6. 
6See O'Brien (1966), p. 68. 
7The 
only significant change in economic policy before 1957 was the first stage of 'agrarian reform' in 1952, which was politically 
motivated to limit the power of the advocates of the old regime and gain some popular support from the recipients of the redistributed land. 
8For 
further discussion of the economic developments during the 1950s, see Hansen and Marzouk (1965), Mabro (1974), Mead (1967) 
and O'Brien (1966). 
5 
In 1961 the government implemented an economy wide nationalisation measures which 
marked the adoption of a public-sector-led and inward-oriented development strategy? As 
experienced in other countries, the nationalisation of major enterprises in one sector led 
to the nationalisation of other enterprises in the same or other sectors. Thus by 1963 the 
public sector ownership covered all financial institutions, transport, all significant 
manufacturies. External trade and a significant amount of internal trade were also 
controlled by the state. The only sectors of the economy left outside complete government 
ownership, were agriculture and urban real estate, but they were overwhelmingly 
regulated by laws and decrees. '° 
The 1967 war resulted in the loss of the revenues of oil fields and mines of the Sinai 
desert and the dues of the Suez Canal. On the other hand there was also a critical need 
for resources to rebuild the army. " During the war period 1967-73, military expenditure 
in Egypt reached an average of 25 % of its GDP, sacrificing investment and growth in the 
economy. 12 As a result, the government found it necessary to relax some of the restraints 
that had been imposed on the economy and encourage foreign investment. 
Thus in 1968 the government attempted to reduce the heavy restrictions of the foreign 
exchange system and, in 1971, tried to provide foreign investment with assurances against 
confiscation and sequestration and also granted tax concessions. " Although these reform 
attempts were not significant, they marked the start of a change in economic policy which 
9For 
an analysis of the Egyptian economy during the 1960s see Abdel-Fadil (1980), Mabro (1974), El-Kammash (1968), and Hansen and 
Marzouk (1965). 
10 
On the role of the public sector in the economic development of Egypt during the 1960s, see Mabro (1974), pp. 124-140 and Sultan 
(1968), pp. 41-73. 
11 
As noted by Amin (1982) pp. 96-7, it was hard after the defeat in this war to demand more sacrifices from the people for the sake of 
economic development or to impose more measures to redistribute income and wealth, or to disparage the Arab regimes which became 
an important source to rebuild the Egyptian army or to continue in criticising the USA that seemed then with a great influence in the 
Middle East. 
12See 
Handoussa and Shafik (1993), p. 20. 
13These 
measures are covered by law 65/1971, see Abdel-Khalek (1982), p. 36. 
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led to a major shift in the development strategy by the adoption of infitah, 14 open door, 
policy in 1974. 
(1.2.2) The infitah policy: 
It was not only the war effort which put pressure on the government to change its 
socialist economic orientation of the 1960s. The infitah policy was a response both to 
internal economic problems related to the heavy state intervention and to major changes 
in the international economic and political environment. By the early 1970s, the economy 
suffered from severe problems maladies including, sluggish productivity in the industrial 
sector dominate by publicly owned enterprises, slow growth in the agricultural sector, a 
large fiscal deficit and a prolonged imbalance of trade. " 
Arab petrodollars, western technology and abundant Egyptian labour were the main 
pillars of the infitah policy. The stated objective was . to increase exports, but the 
underlying strategy of import substitution16 remained without significant change. " The 
government endeavoured to attract foreign capital. Foreign investors were granted a five 
to ten years tax exemption, immunity from sequestration and unrestricted repatriation of 
profits according to law 43/1974 and law 32/1977. Most of tax privileges granted to 
foreign investors were extended, after strong pressure, to cover indigenous firms in 
1981. '8 A partial liberalisation of external trade was also achieved through law 118/1975 
140n 
the background, measures and short run impact of the infitah policy, see Abdel-Khalek (1981) and (1982), and Amin (1981). 
isRichards 
and Waterbury (1990), p. 240. 
16On 
the relation between import substitution and industrial isation in LDCs see Kirkpatrick (1989), pp. 56-81. 
17See 
Springborg (1993), p. 147 and Ikram (1980), pp. 25-27 for a discussion of the economic philosophy of infitah. 
18See 
Handoussa and Shafik (1993), p. 43. 
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which allowed the private sector to import goods, '9 except those identified as 'strategic' 
which include essential food imports, such as wheat. 20 
However these measures only achieved a partial liberalisation of the external sector of 
Egyptian economy, leaving the 'internal sector' paralysed with an array of restrictive 
regulations and the dominance of the public sector. Although the real growth rate of the 
GNP during the early years of the infitah, 1975-79, averaged 8.6%, 11 which was 
remarkably high by international standards, most of this growth was in the external 
sector, or in activities closely related to it. Namely oil revenues, Suez Canal dues, 
tourism and remittance of Egyptian workers abroad. Meanwhile the real growth rate in 
the agricultural sector, for example, was 1.9% over the period 1974-79.22 This disparity 
in economic growth between different sectors and the relative decline in the non-booming 
sectors, i. e. agriculture and manufacturing, was symptomatic of a Dutch disease problem 
in the economy. 23 
Stimulated by the infitah policy accompanied with a favourable external environment the 
Egyptian economy continued to grow, with an average of 8.5 % per annum until the mid- 
1980s. However the infitah policy failed to produce a sustainable growth in the economy 
or to generate sufficient employment for the growing labour force. The oil sector and 
Suez Canal, for example, employed less than 1% of the labour force whereas they formed 
16.5 % of the GDP. Twelve years after the launching of infitah measures, state-owned 
enterprises were still dominating non-agricultural production activities. They owned two- 
19It is worth noting that this law implicitly encouraged the use of black market foreign exchange through the so called 'import by the use 
of own exchange system', according to which the official foreign exchange were not responsible for providing importers with their foreign 
exchange requirements. 
20For 
a discussion of infitah measures and their economic implications, see Abdel Khalek (1982), op. cit., pp. 37-64 and Richards and 
Waterbury (1990), pp. 240-246. 
21Zaytoun 
(1982), p. 129. 
22ibid., 
p. 139. 
23On 
Dutch disease see the survey by Corden (1984) and for a discussion of Egyptian case see Dervis, Martin and Wijnbergen (1984) 
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third of the stock of fixed capital, absorbed 45 % of total fixed investment, accounted for 
40 % of the GDP and produced 83 % of total exports. However the private sector impact 
in the labour market was relatively higher than the public sector, as the former absorbed 
59% of the labour force. 24 
(1.2.3) The 1986 external shock and reform attempts: 
When the price of oil, the main export of Egypt, declined by 50% between January and 
June 1986, the economy was not prepared to absorb this external shock, especially when 
the rest of the sources of foreign exchange, mentioned above, were predominantly oil 
related. The Real GDP growth slowed down to 2.7% per annum in 1986-88 and the 
economy rapidly experienced serious difficulties. " The deficit of the fiscal budget reached 
23 % of GDP in 1986, excluding debt amortisation. The current account deficit exceeded 
10 % of GDP. The external debt accumulated to reach 119 % of GDP in 1987 with a debt 
service ratio of over 40 % of total exports. Inflation accelerated to 25 % in 1987 from an 
average of 17% during the preceding five years. 26 
Thus towards the end of the 1980s, the economy suffered from several structural 
weaknesses including: 
"., widespread price/cost distortions, attributable in large part to extensive 
price controls and subsidies; negative real interest rates; a weakly 
structured budget, characterised in particular by a highly inelastic and 
narrowly drawn revenue base; a balance of payments suffering from a 
limited non-oil export base, a sizable imbalance between total export 
receipts and import payments, heavy dependence on worker remittances, 
and a mounting debt service burden; and complex exchange and 
inefficient trade systems. "Z' 
24 Notice that the employment impact as well as the contribution of the public sector to the GDP were limited relative to the resources 
invested because of the higher capital-labour and capita-output ratios in this sector compared with the private sector. See World Bank 
(1987), pp. 5-8. 
25 Dailami and Dinh (1991), p. 3. 
26ibid., 
p. 4. and World Bank (1988), pp. i-ii and pp. 10-11. 
27 IMF (1988), p. 2. 
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These distortions did not appear suddenly in the economy, they were present for long 
period but masked by the remarkable increase in external resources and capital inflows. 
These resources enabled the government to expand its expenditure, financed investment 
programmes and funded rising imports. With the sudden and steep shortage of external 
resources in 1986, it became harder to cover these distortions. At this stage a critical 
need for stabilisation measures and adjustment efforts became apparent. 
The government started a macroeconomic reform programme coordinated with the IMF 
and the World Bank in 1987 aimed at reducing external and internal imbalances. As a 
result there was some improvement in the multiple exchange rate regime as the 
government managed to reduce the exchange rates from at least five different rates to 
three. The Egyptian pound was gradually devalued by 25 % in nominal terms and a free 
exchange market was established. Moreover quantitative restrictions on imports were 
reduced, and exports were increasingly liberalised. 28 
The budget deficit was also reduced, despite the depressed external revenues, by 
significant cuts in consumer subsidies, bringing the prices of goods and services more 
closely in line with their production costs, and increasing the price of energy to become 
close to its international levels. Some measures were also taken to reduce government 
intervention in the pricing of agricultural products. 29 In addition a programme to reform 
the public sector enterprises and encourage the private sector was initiated. " 
However, the pace of reform under this programme was rather slow as the government 
faced difficulties in applying particular measures included in the programme. As a result, 
28Dailami 
and Dinh (1991), op. cit., pp. 4-5 and World Bank (1990), p. 4. 
29 
For an analysis of the impact of government intervention in agricultural prices and recent reform attempts, see Dethier (1991), pp. 33- 
74. 
30 ibid. 
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the 1987 reform programme was short lived as it was terminated after few months of its 
implementation when the IMF refused to advance further drawings against the stand-by 
agreement after an initial disbursement in May 1987.31 
The failure of this reform programme can be explained by four main factors that have 
also hindered other reform attempts in the past. 32 
1. The magnitude of effort required to reform the macroeconomic imbalances and 
microeconomic distortions accumulated over three decades of mischievous 
policies. 
2. The difficulties arising from the reform programme itself regarding its negative 
impact on the vulnerable lower-income-groups, and the associated social and 
political instability. " It was not possible for the government to implement the rest 
of austerity measures included in the programme, especially since there were few 
adequate compensatory measures for the negatively affected segments of the 
population. " 
3. This reform programme, like other ones in the past was confronted with interest 
groups "who were able to block or subvert reforms which threaten their short-run 
interests". 35 
4. Egypt also relied on its strategic position and special role as a stabilising power 
in the Middle East to extract 'strategic rent' from the western donors. By 
31IMF 
(1988), p. 2 states that the 1987 reform programme "was not completed because understandings could not be reached on policy 
actions in the areas of exchange system, interest rates, energy prices, and agricultural procurement prices, and on corrective steps relating 
to the 1987/88 budget and to departures in the exchange rate management from agreed commitments'. 
32An 
example of these attempts is that of 1965 when the government faced a shortage of foreign exchange and tried to engage in a stand- 
by agreement with the IMF, and increase the prices of some goods. These attempts were unpopular and the government had to resign, 
few months later. See Springborg (1993), p. 146. 
33The 
food riots of January 1977 were a strong example of the likely impact of applying austerity measures without adequate provisions 
to accommodate their negative impact on the poor. 
34 
See World Bank (1991), pp. 2-3. 
35See 
Richards (1991), p. 1721. For a further discussion of the role of interest groups in policy making in Egypt see Awad (1991), pp. 
275-94 and Hinnebusch (1993), pp. 159-170. 
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exploiting its strategic status along with "a habit of living on the future"36, Egypt 
did not take several reform programmes seriously and often managed to postpone 
the implementation of hard economic measures. Successive Egyptian governments 
have long adopted this delay strategy37 in a way that Richards (1991) describes 
as "successful disaster". This strategy resulted in modest, mainly political, 
achievements in the short run and has had disastrous repercussions in the long 
run. 
(1.2.4) The economic reform and structural adjustment programme: 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, resulted in massive returns of Egyptian workers 
from the conflict zone, losses of workers remittances, a decline of tourist receipts and 
Suez Canal dues and a worsening of investment climate. However Egypt received 
significant financial assistance from the Gulf states and the USA which cancelled US$ 13 
billion of its total external debt of US$ 51 billion. Egypt was also granted, in 1991, a 
debt/debt service relief by the Paris Club creditors equivalent to 50% of the outstanding 
debt over three phases through mid-1994 conditional upon implementing an IMF 
agreement. 38 
This financial assistance, accompanied with higher oil export prices and a decrease in 
main import prices, especially foodstuffs, offset the losses incurred as a result of the Gulf 
crisis. The balance of payments' experienced a surplus of around US$ 0.9 billion in 
1990/91, the debt forgiveness and rescheduling reduced the debt service from 46% of 
36 Hansen (1991), p. 4. 
37For 
example the calls for the reform of the inefficient public sector and attempts for improving the pricing policy date back to the mid- 
1960s. Moreover Mabro (1974), p. 131 reports some moves towards liberalisation but describes them as being timid. However it took 
the government almost three decades to apply some effective measures to achieve these objectives. 
38IMF 
(1991), pp. 7-8 and World Bank (1992), p. xxv. 
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exports to approximately 16.5 % and permitted an increase in the net international 
reserves from only US$ 1.7 billion to US$ 6.1 billion. 39 
These developments improved the creditworthiness of the Egyptian economy and 
improved its capacity to embark on a comprehensive Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ERSAP) in 1991. This reform programme has been supported 
by a stand-by arrangement from the IMF and a structural adjustment loan from the World 
Bank, in addition to the bilateral debt forgiveness/debt service relief of the Paris Club. 
The primary objective of ERSAP is summarised by the IMF (1991) as 
"to create, over the medium term, a decentralized market based, outward- 
oriented economy where private sector activity will be encouraged by a 
free, competitive, and stable environment with autonomy from 
government intervention. For this purpose, controls on economic activity 
and investment are to be dismantled and primary reliance placed on 
market forces for resource allocation. "40 
This reform programme has involved the financial sector in four main ways. 4' First, 
channelling loanable funds into budget deficit, in a way that reduces the reliance on 
inflationary finance until the deficit itself can be controlled. Second, advancing finance 
to the existent and emerging private sector activities. Third the financial sector, in its own 
right, is subject to an array of liberalisation and institutional restructuring measures 
included in the programme. Hence the financial sector is considered as being in the 
forefront of the reform programme as an 'agent of change'. 42 
39 ibid. 
40See 
IMF (1991), p. 8 and for the details ERSAP, see World Bank (1991) and (1992), and IMF (1991) and (1992). 
41Harvey 
and Jenkins (1994), p. 1. 
42See Wijnbergen (1993), p. 9. 
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(1.3) The scope and methodology of the thesis: 
The thesis is organised in ten chapters including an introduction, in chapter (1) and a 
summary of main results and conclusions of the research in chapter (10). 
Chapter (2) provides a review of the theoretical literature and empirical studies on the 
main issues of financial development. The chapter starts by outlining the McKinnon-Shaw 
theoretical framework and its main hypotheses. Theoretical extensions of the McKinnon- 
Shaw analysis are then considered by highlighting the models of Kapur (1976), Galbis 
(1977), Mathieson (1980) and Fry (1988) in addition to the recent studies that adopt the 
approach of endogenous growth. 
The chapter continues by discussing the arguments of the Neo-Structuralist school, 
reflected in the works of van Wijnbergen (1982), (1983a) and (1983b), Taylor (1983), 
and Buffie (1984) with emphasis on the role of informal financial markets. The views of 
Post-Keynesian school are also highlighted. 
Given that these schools provide several, conflicting hypotheses regarding the effects of 
financial liberalisation on saving, investment and economic growth, the last section is 
devoted to the discussion of empirical studies that support or reject the theoretical 
propositions. The chapter concludes by considering the prerequisites of financial 
liberalisation, which unlike liberalisation itself, are not subject to serious dispute. 
Chapter (3) discusses the different phases of development of the Egyptian banking system 
since its early stages in the mid 19th century until the application of the 1991 reform 
programme. In addition to the overview of the historical evolution of the banking 
industry, the chapter assesses the structure of the banking system using the indicators of 
financial widening and deepening. The chapter continues by discussing the difficulties that 
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face the banking system, including the regulatory problems. Then the performance of the 
banking system is analysed by using specific operating ratios. 
In this chapter as in chapters (4) and (6), in order to provide a deeper perception of the 
analysis, some comparisons are drawn between the Egyptian experience and those of 
selected countries, mainly less developed. The basis of selection are first the significant 
similarity, or difference, in economic conditions and policies. Second the availability of 
reliable and comparable data for the concerned issues. 
The analysis presented in this chapter and chapters (4) and (5) has benefited from a series 
of interviews undertaken by the author with Egyptian experts and officials in the financial 
sector. Due to the reserved nature of bank reports, including those of the Central Bank, 
these interviews were of invaluable importance as a useful source of information on the 
important developments in the financial system and views on different measures of the 
financial policy. 
Chapter (4) continues the analysis of the formal financial sector by exploring the 
development of the Egyptian securities market (ESM). The chapter starts by discussing 
the role of securities markets in LDCs and highlights their advantages and disadvantages. 
Moreover it provides a critical appraisal of the market-based versus bank-based debate 
and its relevance to the LDCs. Then it analyses the development of the ESM by dividing 
it into three phases starting with the establishment of the Alexandria Stock Exchange in 
1883 and ending in 1993 by the application of the new Capital Market Law. Further it 
provides an analysis of the performance of the ESM using the main published indicators. 
The chapter is concluded by an examination of the impediments facing the progress of 
the ESM. 
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Chapter (5) is concerned with the growing role of Islamic finance in both the formal and 
informal sectors in Egypt. The chapter starts by discussing the concept of usury and its 
evolution in economic thinking. Then it outlines the Islamic stand regarding the 
prohibition of usury and its economic implications. the chapter provides a model, 
constructed by the author, to illustrate the distinctive characteristics of Islamic banking. 
After determining the sources of funds and their allocation according to the Islamic 
principles, the chapter examines the case of Islamic banks in Egypt. In analysing the 
performance of the formal Islamic intermediaries, the chapter distinguishes between the 
public and private banks and also highlights the case of Islamic branches of conventional 
banks. In doing so the analysis relies on the relevant published data of the intermediaries 
in addition to several interviews with experts in Islamic banking. 
In addition to the different formal Islamic intermediaries, more than 100 informal 
financial institutions, claiming to be based on Islamic principles, were set up in Egypt in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. These institutions were called "Sharikat Tawzeef Al- 
Amwal AI-Islamiyyah" that crudely translates as Islamic Investment Companies (IICs). 
The chapter provides an analysis of the IICs as regard to their activities, size and adopted 
mechanisms in the mobilisation of resources and the reasons of their quick rise and 
sudden fall during the 1980s and its repercussions. The chapter concludes by discussing 
the main problems of Islamic finance and its prospects. 
Chapter (6) analyses the causes, measures and consequences of financial repression in 
Egypt over the period 1960-90. This chapter provides the evidence that government 
intervention in the financial sector in Egypt is not of regulatory or corrective nature but 
mainly repressive. This chapter highlights the different reasons for repressing the 
financial sector such as the condition of the financial system after independence, the 
impact of dominating ideologies during the 1950s and 1960s and the implementation of 
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anti-usury laws. Moreover it gives a particular emphasis to financing the budget deficit 
as the main reason for financial repression. 
The chapter discusses the impact of different methods of financial repression including: 
ceilings on interest rates, high reserve requirements, directed credit schemes, ownership 
of banks, intervention in the portfolio composition of banks in addition to extracting 
excessive revenues from the inflation tax. The chapter analyses the impact of these 
adopted methods and estimates the Egyptian government revenues generated from 
particular repressive measures, such as inflation tax, seigniorage and interest rate ceilings. 
Moreover it discusses the main consequences of financial repression like capital flight, 
money substitution, hoarding gold as an inflation hedge, and the thriving of informal 
financial transactions. 
Chapter (7) presents an econometric analysis of the impact of real interest rate on saving, 
investment and short run economic growth in Egypt. As mentioned above, Egypt in 1991 
started an economic reform programme with financial liberalisation as one of its central 
components and freeing interest rates as a main reform measure. While it is still early 
to judge the outcomes of this reform programme, an analysis of the financial repression 
period of 1960-90 would help understanding whether the country is proceeding with the 
right model. 
This chapter examines, using econometric methods, the determinants of financial and total 
saving, investment and economic growth. Moreover as regard to the investment function 
a switching regime model was also applied to calculate the net impact of real interest rate 
on investment. In order to allow for this analysis a specifically written programme, in 
FORTRAN language, is used. The chapter is concluded with the policy implications of 
the analysis. 
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Chapter (8) provides an essential prelude to the analysis of the rural credit market 
undertaken in the chapter (9), which deals with formal and informal credit markets in 
rural Egypt with respect to the liberalisation programme of 1991. The analysis is based 
on a dataset specifically collected by the author for this purpose, between December 1992 
and April 1993, from a sample of four Egyptian villages. Thus the chapter starts with a 
discussion of the reasons of adopting a microeconomic focus in the analysis. 
These reasons can be summarised in four ' issues. First the unavailability of 
macroeconomic data on the impact of the so recent liberalisation programme of the formal 
sector. Second, the possibility of obtaining more reliable and systematic evidence on 
informal financial transactions through the use of household survey. Third a household 
survey data can provide direct measures of the impact of changes in economic policy and 
highlight the household's reactions to these changes. Fourth, in such an under-researched 
area, particularly in the Egyptian context, a household-based analysis may reveal some 
important aspects and explore new areas for research. 
The chapter then discusses the methodology adopted, including the procedure of the 
selection of the sample and questionnaire43 design. Then it provides a description of the 
surveyed area and the socio-economic characteristics of the four sampled villages. The 
chapter continues by considering the general characteristics of both formal and informal 
credit markets and provides a taxonomy of the latter. Then the structure of the household 
portfolio is examined with an emphasis on the relative importance of different saving 
instruments. 
Chapter (9) presents, in four sections, the analysis of the rural credit market based on 
the survey data. The first section determines the relative size of informal credit and the 
43See 
a detailed description of the questionnaire in appendix (3) and the list of variables in appendix (4). 
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socio-economic characteristics of borrowers and lenders. Then the chapter analyses the 
sources, purposes and main attributes of informal credit with emphasis on the role of 
collateral and problems of default. 
As informal finance can take a form of collective arrangements, the second section in the 
chapter analyses one of its widely found examples in Egypt, that is Rotating Savings and 
Credit Association (RoSCA). First the main features of RoSCA are assessed with a 
highlight of its merits. Then by using our survey results, RoSCAs in Egypt are 
considered, assessing their structure, purposes, design and rotation. The section is 
concluded by further remarks on RoSCA and its viability in the future in the light of 
financial development in Egypt. 
In the third section two models are constructed in order to estimate the determinants of 
formal and informal borrowing in the four sampled villages by using a Tobit analysis. 
The fourth section is devoted to the examination of the initial impact of the financial 
liberalisation programme of 1991 on household's financial decisions and its asset and 
credit positions. 
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Chapter (2) 
On Financial Liberalisation in LDCs: 
A Review of the Literature 
"Our opinion is correct but subject 
to error, other opinions are 
incorrect but could be right. " 
Al-Shafi'1, The eminent Imam and 
scholar (767-820) 
(2.1) Introduction: 
The recognition of the important role of finance in economic development can be traced 
back to Adam Smith who reports that "the trade of the city of Glasgow, doubled in about 
fifteen years after the first erection of the banks there; and the trade of Scotland has more 
than quadrupled since the first erection of the two public banks at Edinburgh. "' In 1911 
Joseph Schumpeter argued that "the banker ... authorizes people, in the name of society 
as it were, to... innovate"2. He identifies the role of financial intermediaries as mobilising 
savings, evaluating projects, managing risk, monitoring managers and link these services 
to technological innovation and economic development. ' 
Nevertheless since the Second World War, the literature has been dominated by views 
that consider finance as having, at best, neutral effects on growth. ' Development 
economists in the post-war period generally considered finance as being fundamentally 
as an issue of government mobilisation of resources to support an increased rate of capital 
accumulation. ' Financial development was seen as simply following economic growth, 
1Smith (1776), p. 315. 
2Cited in King and Levine (1993), p. 735. 
3These 
services of the financial system, identified by Schumpeter in 1911, were among the ones highlighted by Shaw (1973) and Long 
(1983) which include: provision of medium of exchange; mobilisation and allocation of capital, transformation and distribution of risk, 
transformation of the size of financial transactions; transformation of maturities; provision of professional management; risk reduction 
through diversification; stabilisation of economic fluctuations through financial policies. Listed in Kumar and Tsetsekos (1993), p. 57. 
4See Fry (1989), p. 13 and (1993), p. 8. 
5Fitzgerald 
and Vos (1989), p. 19. 
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which was the argument of Joan Robinson (1952) as she wrote "By and large, it seems 
to be the case that where enterprise leads finance follows"6. 
However, the writings and empirical work of Patrick (1966), Cameron et al (1967), 
Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) began to challenge the dominant 
wisdom and provided important findings and insights on institutional aspects of finance 
in LDCs and the links between financial development and economic growth. These 
studies induced a revival of interest in the issues of financial development. Recent studies 
have benefited from the current advances in economic and quantitative analyses. Greater 
availability of data and information on LDCs, especially after the inclusion of financial 
reform measures in the structural adjustment and stabilisation programmes supported by 
the World Bank and the IMF, allowed for extensive applied studies and the development 
of empirical evidence. 
This chapter is organised as follow. In the following section we discuss the main causes, 
measures and effects of financial repression in LDCs. Then we analyse the McKinnon- 
Shaw framework and its theoretical extensions. The neo-structuralist critique and the post- 
Keynesian response are then discussed. The review of literature proceeds by considering 
the issues of prerequisites and sequencing of financial liberalisation. The chapter 
continues by providing a review of the empirical evidence on financial liberalisation and 
its hypothesised impact on saving, investment and economic growth. The chapter ends 
by concluding remarks in the light of some developing countries' experience with 
financial liberalisation. ' 
6Cited in King and Levine (1993), op. cit., p. 730. 
7As 
parts of the background literature of this thesis do not fit directly in this chapter, e. g. Islamic finance and particular aspects of informal 
finance, they are included in the relevant chapters. 
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(2.2) Causes, measures and consequences of financial repression in LDCs: 
The financial markets of LDCs have always been subject to substantial government 
intervention in both the structures and mechanisms of these markets. This intervention is 
not of regulatory or corrective nature but mainly repressive, if one uses the terminology 
of the Stanford School. We can distinguish between five main reasons for government 
intervention in the financial sectors of LDCs, namely: ' 
1. The condition of the LDCs' financial markets after independence. Financial 
markets in LDCs suffered from different problems attributed to market failure9. 
These problems include: 
a. Financial markets in LDCs suffered from a segmented and shallow 
structure, in the sense that either some financial services and instruments 
did not exist at all, or they existed but were in an inadequate form. 
b. Encouraged by segmentation and shallowness, operating financial 
institutions behaved in an oligopolistic manner which was allowed in the 
absence of effective regulatory authorities. 
c. Asymmetric information, regarding both the services of the financial 
sector and * potential borrowers, was a result of such oligopolistic 
environment and a cause of other problems, such as adverse risk selection 
and the application of non-price criteria for credit allocation. " 
2. Regulations against usury: The enforcement of anti-usury laws was widespread 
in LDCs as a result of religious and political objections to high interest rates. " 
8While 
chapter (6) in this thesis discusses in details the causes of repressive state intervention in LDCs with emphasis on the Egyptian 
case, we provide here a concise summary. 
9See Killick (1993), pp. 254-258. 
10On 
the issue of asymmetric information and its implications to credit markets, see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), pp. 393410. 
11 On the impact of usury laws on credit markets, see Blitz and Long (1965). 
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3. During the 1950s and 1960s policy makers in LDCs were influenced by 
Keynesian arguments during its heyday. According to Keynes, excessive 
liquidity preference pushes real interest rates above the full employment 
equilibrium level. " As a solution for this problem Keynes proposed interest rate 
ceilings in accordance with his advocacy of the Gesellian stamp tax on money. 13 
4. The impact of the dominating ideology: The repression of the financial sector was 
one of the components of an overall interventionist strategies embraced by the 
governments of developing countries after independence. During the 1960s state 
intervention became the conventional wisdom according to which widespread 
market failure could be corrected and social welfare would be enhanced. 14 
5. Financing budget deficit: Deficit finance was considered, for a long time, an 
acceptable financing tool for development. " This was justified by the 
insufficiency of private investment for several political, economic and institutional 
factors. Therefore augmenting the rate of net investment and executing 
development plans relied on governments' efforts. However a typical LDC's 
government lacked sufficient resources and hence resorted to deficit finance. " 
Consequently repressing the financial sector was considered as necessary to 
provide 'cheap' funding to finance the fiscal deficit and priority projects. " 
12See Fry (1988), pp. 5-6. 
13This 
stamp tax was suggested by Silvio Gesell in 1929 in order to discourage the demand for liquidity. Accordingly banknotes were 
stamped each week at post offices. Keynes (1936) advocated the idea and purposed that the stamp tax should be equal to the difference 
between the actual and equilibrium rates of interest. ibid., p. 5. 
14On 
the issue of the changing role of the state in development strategies and its implications, see Addison and Demery (1989), pp. 1-37 
and Bardhan (1990), pp. 3-7. 
15On 
the role of budget deficits in development strategies see Harris (1992), pp. 2-5 and Kulkarni (1966), pp. 16-37. 
16See 
Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993). 
17Roe (1993), p. 10. 
23 
Financial repression has been implemented in LDCs through an array of interventionist 
measures, including: 18 
" Administered interest rate controls through imposing ceilings on nominal deposit 
and lending rates. 
" Subsidised loan rates for particular projects. 
" Intervention in the allocation of credit in favour of priority sectors and projects. 
0 The imposition of high ratios of required reserves against banks liabilities that 
goes beyond their use as a prudential measure. 
0 Regulations on the portfolio compositions of banks by requiring banks to hold a 
minimum of low-yielding government securities. 
0 Direct state ownership of financial intermediaries. 
" Excessive barriers to entry in the financial market, mainly to protect state-owned 
banks from competition. 
The consequences of financial repression are extensively discussed in country studies. 19 
We attempt here to summarise the main deleterious effects of financial repression which 
are emphasised in the financial development literature, and in the writings of McKinnon 
and Shaw, in particular: 
0 Ceilings on interest rates, in countries with high and variable inflation rates, have 
resulted in negative real rates of interest which were not adequately adjusted to 
changes in economic conditions. 
" Low real interest rates have caused a bias in favour of current consumption at the 
expense of saving, resulting in a shrinking of the volume of loanable funds. 
18See Hanson and Neal (1986) for an analysis of these interventionist methods in ten LDCs over the period 1970-82. Chapters (3) and 
(6) deals with these measures in the Egyptian context. 
19See for example World Bank (1989), Morris (1990). Hanson and Neal (1986) and Page (1993). 
24 
" Potential lenders (savers) often engage in relatively low yielding projects instead 
of depositing their funds in financial intermediaries to channel them to higher 
yielding investments. 
" The low cost of bank funding, under interest rate ceilings, has encouraged the 
choice of relatively capital intensive projects. 
" When inflation accelerates, interest rate ceilings cause destabilising portfolio shifts 
from financial assets to tangible assets, foreign assets and/or durable consumption 
goods which would magnify the initial inflationary shock. 2° 
" The repression of the financial sector encourages the emergence or resurgence of 
informal financial sector, activities which substitutes for the formal sector by 
providing 'depositors' with a financial instrument with higher yields than those 
repressed in the formal sector. It also allows borrowers to obtain their required 
credit, though it may be at a higher cost. 21 
" Government direction of credit and the use of non-price criteria in its allocation 
may result in the accumulation of non-performing loans mainly granted to public 
sector enterprises and priority sectors. 
" High reserve and liquidity requirements reduce the intermediation efficiency of 
banks and result in high spreads. The problem worsens when there is a lack of 
competition in the financial system, which is frequently the case in LDCs. 
Thus it has been suggested that a sustained financial repression would result in a 
continued inefficiency of the financial market in terms of both the quantity and quality 
of financial intermediation and would have adverse consequence for macroeconomic 
22 management. Moreover, it has been argued that financial liberalisation through the 
20See 
Fry (1988), p. 15 and see chapter (6) for a discussion of this point in the Egyptian case. 
21On 
the issue of informal finance in Egypt see chapters (5), (8) and (9). 
22See 
McKinnon and Mathieson (1981) and Roe (1993), pp. 3-4. 
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removal of repressive measures would promote financial development, increase savings, 
enhance the quantity and quality of investment and promote economic growth. We discuss 
below the McKinnon-Shaw framework which provide the theoretical rationale for 
financial liberalisation. 
(2.3) McKinnon-Shaw framework: 
It is worth noting that the McKinnon-Shaw framework is not unitary as it consists of two 
different convictions regarding the role of the financial system and its mechanisms. 23 
While McKinnon considers money and physical capital as complementary24, due to the 
indivisible technology and poor access to external finance, Shaw deals with money and 
capital as substitutes. Moreover Shaw's debt intermediation analysis is based on an inside 
money model, developed in Gurley and Shaw (1955), which suggests an increase of 
lending potential of financial intermediaries, through an increase of available deposits to 
them, generated by a rise in interest rates. On the other hand McKinnon's analysis is 
based on an outside money model in which the role of deposits in encouraging self- 
financed investment is emphasised. According to his analysis, savings in the form of real 
balances are facilitated through increases in real deposit rates and when these real 
balances accumulate and reach a minimum required amount they can be invested. 
These different views are reflected in the demand for money functions obtained from the 
analyses of McKinnon and Shaw. Thus McKinnon's demand function can be shown as25: 
M/P= f (Y, I/Y, d-ir*) 
where M/P = the real money balances, broadly defined; 
Y =- real GNP; 
1/Y = the ratio of gross investment to GNP; 
d-, r* = real deposit rate of interest. 
23See 
Zephirin (1990), pp. 11-16 and Studart (1991), pp. 8-9. 
24 McKinnon (1973), pp. 57-61. 
25 See Ghatak (1981), pp. 62-65 and Fry (1982), pp. 731-734 for a detailed illustration of these models. 
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On the other hand Shaw's money demand function can be characterised as: 
M/P= f (Y, v, d-ir*) 
where v is a vector of opportunity cost, in real terms, of holding money. 
Despite these differences in transmission mechanism by which real interest rates affect 
savings they agree on the general impact of financial repression in LDCs and the need 
to liberalise their financial markets. Moreover Molho (1986) argues that the two different 
approaches of the models of McKinnon and Shaw regarding the process of financial assets 
and liabilities can be considered as "complementary" to each other rather than 
incompatible or competing. 26 However in this thesis we place stress on the common 
elements of the McKinnon-Shaw models which are illustrated in figure (2.1) below. 
Source: Fry (1982), p. 733. 
26Molho 
(1986), p. 102 and Fry (1988), p. 22. 
Figure (2.1) 
Saving and Investment under Interest Rate Ceilings 
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The McKinnon-Shaw model (henceforth M-S) illustrated in figure (2.1) uses inside money 
created as loans to the private sector. Saving Sy0 at a rate of economic growth yo is a 
positive function of the real interest rate (nominal interest rate i minus inflation rate Pe, 
all expressed in proportions). RR represents financial repression in the form of fixed 
nominal interest rate. Savings of households are distributed, for simplicity, between 
inflation hedges, e. g. tangible assets, earning ýP° and deposits with a return of i. 
Investment I is a negative function of the real rate of interest. 
Assume that a ceiling RR has been imposed on nominal deposit interest rates which keeps 
the real rate below its equilibrium level. This would produce a bias towards current 
consumption, and hold saving and hence investment below their socially optimal levels. 
Moreover potential savers may engage in relatively low-return direct investment, instead 
of depositing the funds in formal intermediaries for subsequent lending to higher yielding 
projects. 27 ` 
As risk premia cannot be charged when ceiling on loan rates are effective and binding, 
which is the case in the financially repressed economies, this results in two problems. 
First credit is allocated according to non-price criteria, i. e. lending according to loan size, 
quality of collateral, political pressure, 'reputation' of clients, and 'benefits' obtained by 
credit officers. Second bank borrowers who are able to obtain credit at low cost, i. e. low 
loan rate, will tend to choose relatively capital intensive projects. Projects financed 
according to these conditions yield returns almost above the interest rate ceiling RR and 
represented by the dots in the area rl ro b a. Thus the M-S analysis suggest that interest 
rate ceilings, as one of the widely used measures of financial repression, stifle savings 
by encouraging current consumption, reduce the quantity of savings below its optimal 
level and reduce the quality of investment. 
27See 
Fry (1989), pp. 15-16. 
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A partial financial liberalisation, by shifting the interest rate ceiling from RR to R'R', 
increases savings and investment as the changes of real interest rate trace out the saving 
function. The rise in interest rate ceilings prevents borrowers from engaging in low 
yielding investments as they become unprofitable at the higher interest rate r,. As a 
result, the efficiency of investment rises and hence economic growth increases from yo 
to y, and the savings function shifts to the right and, consequently, the quantity of 
investment increases from 10 to I. Full financial liberalisation, by abolishing interest rates 
ceilings, produces an optimal result of maximising investment and increasing its average 
efficiency, illustrated in figure (2.1) by higher investment I2 at a higher rate of real 
interest r2 and higher economic growth y2. 
(2.4) Theoretical extensions of the McKinnon-Shaw framework: 
The McKinnon-Shaw framework has been theoretically developed by formal 
macroeconomic models, mainly those of Kapur (1976), Galbis (1977), Mathieson (1980) 
and Fry (1988). One common feature of these models is the use of deposit rate of 
interest, fixed below its free-market equilibrium level as a key instrument of financial 
repression. 28 
The macroeconomic model of Kapur (1976)29 assumes a labour-surplus economy with 
unused fixed capital in a closed developing economy. The model assumes an aggregate 
production function: Y= a K, Where Y is real output, a is the output/capital ratio and K 
is total fixed and working capital. As a is constant30, financial conditions can affect only 
the quantity of investment eK through the credit availability effect. Mathieson (1980)31 
28Fry 
(1989), p. 16 notes that same results can be obtained when the loan rate of interest rather than deposit rate is set below its 
equilibrium level. 
29See Kapur (1976), pp. 779-793 and Fry (1988), pp. 29-37. 
30In 
the models of Galbis (1977) and Fry (1988), real deposit rate of interest is allowed to influence o. 
31See 
Mathieson (1980), pp. 361-383 and Fry, op. cit., pp. 37-43. 
29 
adopts Kapur's production function but assumes that fixed capital is fully utilised and that 
a fixed proportion 0 of all investment is financed by bank credit. He also models the rate 
of capital accumulation by firms' savings behaviour s determined by a fixed real return 
of capital r' and real rate of interest 1-a`, i. e. &K= s(r'- (1-ir`)). However the two models 
of Mathieson and Kapur share the same result that financial liberalisation raises 
investment and the rate of economic growth. 
Galbis (1977)32 develops a two-sector model, based on McKinnon's choice of technique 
approach, 33 to analyse the effect of financial repression on the average efficiency of 
capital, i. e. the quality of investment. Sector A is the traditional sector in the economy 
with a low constant return to capital, while sector B is the modern one with a higher 
return to capital. The duality in the economy maintained by the coexistence of the two 
sectors is a symptom of inefficiency caused by financial repression. Total output of the 
economy can be shown as: Y= YA + YB= 'rAKA + wALA + rBKB + wBLB. 
where r is the return on capital K and w is the wage to labour L. 
Galbis shows that the lower the real deposit interest rate is, the higher the, self-financed, 
investment in the traditional sector A. Higher real interest rate increases demand for 
money in sector A and reduces their relatively less efficient investment. A greater money 
stock held by sector A enables an increase in the investment of sector B, which relies on 
the banking system for funding. Thus the increase in real deposit rate of interest augments 
the average rate of return on aggregate investment, which lends support to the M-S 
argument outlined above. 
32See 
Galbis (1977), pp. 60-69 and Fry, op. cit., pp. 43-46. 
33See 
McKinnon (1973), op. cit., pp. 19-21. 
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Fry (1988)34 constructs a model designed specifically for empirical testing. As in the 
models of Kapur and Galbis and Mathieson, Fry also uses the labour surplus Harrod- 
Domar model but allows the capital/output ratio a to be affected by financial conditions. 
The effect of real institutional interest rate3S in the steady state affect the rate of economic 
growth through saving and both the quantity and quality of investment. In an open 
economy national saving may increase as a result of portfolio shifts possibly through a 
reduction of illegal capital flight as a response to an increase in domestic deposit interest 
rate. The impact of real interest rate on the efficiency of investment in Fry's model is 
illustrated as in figure (2.1) above. 
Moreover, the dynamic models of Mathieson (1979), Kapur (1983) and Fry (1988) are 
concerned with the effect of financial liberalisation during stabilisation programmes. This 
reflects the fact that most LDCs have engaged in liberalisation while adopting stabilisation 
measures to reduce inflation and control balance of payments deficits at the same time. 36 
Kapur and Fry use expectations-augmented Phillips curves, under adaptive expectations, 
in order to model the dynamic behaviour of the economy. Mathieson uses adaptive 
expectations of the inflation rate and a declining stock of fixed-interest bank loans to 
allow for dynamic adjustment. On the other hand Kapur and Mathieson introduce the 
exchange rate as an instrument to open their models, while Fry uses simulations of export 
promotion and import compression policies. These dynamic models have found benign 
effects of incorporating financial liberalisation measures in stabilisation programmes. 
They show that coordination between liberalisation and stabilisation would assist in 
containing "the contractionary effects of deflation produced solely through monetary 
deceleration"37. 
34See Fry (1988), op. cit., pp. 46-62. 
35Fry 
(1988) mentions that real deposit interest rate can be used as a proxy for all institutional interest rates. 
36See 
Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994), pp. 588-9. 
37 See Fry (1989), op. cit., p. 18. 
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The recent introduction of endogenous growth approach38 in theoretical modelling of 
financial development brings important insights to the analysis. One of the main 
improvements to the M-S, by using the endogenous growth approach, is the ability to 
change the constant returns to scale assumption in the aggregate production function. 31 
The aggregate production function in an endogenous growth model takes the form: KI XI, 
where K represents a combination of physical capital and knowledge, « >_ 1 and X is a 
factor like land or labour with a fixed supply per capita. Endogenous growth models deal 
with the role of finance through the functions of financial institutions in evaluating, 
selecting and funding entrepreneurial activities that lead to growth in productivity. 
Levine's (1990) model attempts to explain how specific financial institutions affect the 
growth rate of per capita output. The model draws on the endogenous growth literature 
to analyse how liquidity risk, productivity risk, transactions costs, and economies of scale 
in information and resource coordination create incentives for the emergence of financial 
intermediaries and contracts. The model shows that the resulting financial structure does 
influence the steady state growth rate of per capita output in real terms. The influence of 
financial structures works through providing some form of insurance against liquidity 
shocks and enabling agents to hold portfolios designed against idiosyncratic productivity 
shocks. Hence financial structures such as banks, stock markets and mutual funds, 
through their management of risk, increase investment in firms and their efficiency. 
Moreover these financial structures improve the allocation of resources by exploiting 
economies of scale in information gathering. 40 
38Models 
of the new growth theory, known as endogenous growth, were stimulated by the works of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) which 
rely on Arrow's (1962) study on the mechanism of learning-by-doing and on Uzawa's (1965) analysis of the role of human capital. These 
models attempt to explain why, over long periods of time, economic growth accelerates and why some countries perform better and grow 
faster than others. The main contribution of the new growth theory is the endogenisation of the sources of unbounded economic growth, 
which is an improvement over the neoclassical growth theory that rely on exogenous factors such as population and technical progress. 
Models of endogenous growth emphasise the importance of investment in technology and human capital as the main sources of growth. 
For a discussion of the literature of new growth theory see Helpman (1992), Sala-i-Martin (1990) and Andersen and Moene (1993), and 
on its main implications for economic development, see Barros (1993). 
39Fry 
(1993), p. 19. 
40 See Levine (1990), pp. 23-37. 
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Bencivenga and Smith (1991), by employing the bank liquidity model of Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), and benefiting from the contributions of the endogenous growth theory, 
develop a model of intermediation and growth. Their main finding is that the development 
of financial intermediation will increase real growth rates through spill-over externalities 
leading to social increasing returns to scale in production. 41 King and Levine (1993) 
develop an endogenous growth model in which they establish the connection between 
finance, entrepreneurship and economic growth. 42 Financial institutions in this model 
influence investment decisions through four mechanisms. First financial institutions 
evaluate the prospective entrepreneurs. Second they mobilise resources to fund the 
promising ones. Third they allow investors to diversify the risk associated with innovation 
activities. Fourth they reveal the advantages and rewards of engaging in innovation. 
Hence a more developed financial structure accelerates the rate of productivity 
enhancement and stimulates economic growth. 43 
(2.5) The neo-structuralists' critique of financial liberalisation: 
One of the limitations of the M-S framework and its theoretical extensions is the absence 
of informal credit markets. This absence is considered a "serious lacuna" in the 
analysis". Informal credit markets are prevalent in developing countries. "' Informal 
financial intermediation is carried out through moneylenders, merchants, pawnbrokers, 
loan brokers, money guards, landlords, friends and relatives and Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations (RoSCAs). Chapter (8) of this study provides a taxonomy and 
discusses the different forms of informal finance in detail. 
41See 
Bencivenga and Smith, pp. 195-202 and p. 207. 
42King 
and Levine (1993), pp. 4-14. 
43ibid., 
p. 28. 
44 Fry (1989), op. cit., p. 19. 
45On 
the role of informal finance in LDCs see, for example, World Bank (1989), chapter 8, Adams (1991), pp. 29-42 and Ghate, et al 
(1992). 
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One of the most important contribution of the neo-structuralists46 to financial development 
analysis is the introduction of informal credit markets their macroeconomic models. The 
neo-structuralists' view is based on the proposition that informal credit markets are more 
efficient than the formal ones. They argue that informal credit markets provide full 
intermediation, whereas banks provide partial intermediation as some of their funds are 
absorbed in the form of reserve requirements. 47 
The neo-structuralist models use Keynesian adjustment mechanism. Prices are determined 
by a mark-up over costs and wages are exogenously determined through class conflict ä 
la Kalecki. They use a cost-push inflation model where relative power of workers and 
capitalists determines inflation rates. Profits, not wages, determine savings. Moreover the 
neo-structuralists adopt the Yale-portfolio allocation model developed by Tobin (1969). 
Under these assumptions van Wijnbergen's model48 analyses the effect of financial 
liberalisation. Instead of using two assets, as in M-S models, the model assumes that 
households distribute their wealth between three assets, namely, currency C, time deposits 
7D and informal loans to business sector Lf.. 
C=f (PI i, rtd, Y) W. 
ID =fd (p, t, rtd, y) W, 
Lsh = fh . is 
rid, y) W, 
where p is the inflation rate, i is the nominal rate of interest in the informal credit 
market, rid is the real rate of interest on time deposits and y is income. 
46,1. 
he views of neo-structuralist school on financial development are manifested in the studies of Taylor (1983), Van Wijnbergen (1982), 
(1983a) and (1983b), Buffie (1984), Kohsaka (1984). 
47The 
assumption of the informal market's full intermediation has been subject to criticism and described as not consistent with widely 
held views of informal [credit markets] work" see Owen and Solis-Fallas (1989), p. 353. Cho (1990), p. 478 argues that informal lenders 
may hold reserve funds, as banks do, in order to provide intermediation. 
48van Wijnbergen (1983b), pp. 435-441. 
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The real supply of loans by banks to borrowers L 1, depends on the level of deposits, 
required reserve ratio and the demand for excess reserves. 
Lb= b(p, rJ q. 7D. 
where rL is the real lending rate and 1-q is the required reserve ratio. 
The real demand for loans by firms is inelastic with respect to the interest rate in the 
informal credit market and takes the form: 
V= L (w, Y), 
where w is the real product wage. 
Equilibrium in the informal credit market can be shown as: 
fh (P" 1, rd, y) W=L (W, y) -b (P, r1) q. f°(p, i, rd, y)W, 
This equation can be differentiated to give the LM curve in figure (2.2) below, while the 
IS curve is obtained by differentiating a Keynesian output equation of the form: 
y=A (i-p, y) ; Al < 0,0 < Ay < 1. 
Source: van Wijnbergen (1983b), p. 439. 
Figure (2.2) 
Informal Credit Market 
in van Wijnbergen's Model 
35 
As shown in figure (2.2), an increase of time deposit interest rate, leads to an increase 
in money demand and shifts the LM curve upwards. At the same time, substitution out 
of currency to time deposits increases the money supply as a result of an increase of its 
multiplier when the currency-deposit ratio decreases. This causes a downward shift of the 
LM curve. The net impact depends on the required reserve ratio and the assets of the 
informal credit market. The neo-structuralists argue that the substitution of deposits for 
curb market loans is much more important than the substitution of deposits out of 
currency. As a result, the supply of informal loans falls. Under the neo-structuralists' 
assumption that informal credit markets provide full intermediation and are "often 
competitive and agilei49, the total supply of working capital falls. Thus the LM curve 
shifts to the left, the informal credit market interest rate increases and output decreases. 
The neo-structuralist models produce predictions regarding the effects of financial 
liberalisation, which are completely different from those obtained from the M-S models. 
Consequently the two schools have opposing policy recommendations. S° However it may 
be argued that the predictions of financial liberalisation effects depend on the initial 
assumptions' made regarding which financial market is more efficient, the formal one 
or the informal? 
The message of the neo-structuralists is to reduce the size of the relatively more 
inefficient and repressed market, which incidently is exactly the same argument put 
forward by the M-S school. Hence, in essence, the two seemingly opposing schools agree 
on financial liberalisation but disagree on what to liberalise . 
51 However it may be the case 
that "formal and informal financial markets have complementary roles to perform in fully 
49Taylor (1983), p. 92. 
50Cho 
(1990), p. 477. 
51Fry 
(1989), op. cit., p. 19. 
52Cho 
(1990), op. cit., p. 478. 
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liberalized financial systemsnS3. Whether the informal credit market is more efficient, or 
has a bigger role than the formal market remains a subject of empirical investigation. In 
this study we attempt to analyse the characteristics and mechanisms of both financial 
markets in Egypt by using a dataset specifically collected for the purpose. 54 
(2.6) The Post-Keynesian response to financial liberalisation: 
The M-S framework on' financial liberalisation has been subject to a Post-Keynesian 
challenge mainly on three grounds which focus on the institutional structure of the 
financial system. " First, the Post-Keynesians are sceptical about the importance given to 
private savers as a source of investment finance in M-S models; the former consider the 
banking system as the main source of finance . 
16 Moreover the Post-Keynesians reject the 
priority of saving over investment in the M-S models and hence reject the functioning of 
financial markets as pictured in these models. Second, they are concerned with the neglect 
within M-S models of the possible impact of interest rate changes on effective. demand 
and financial stability. " Third, the Post-Keynesians argue that the M-S framework 
overlooks the differences in the institutional characteristics of LDCs' financial systems. 58 
The implications of financial liberalisation are examined in a study by Burkett and Dutt 
(1991) which develops a Kaleckian model of interest rate policy. In a closed economy 
with excess capacity they show that a rise in the deposit interest rate results in two effects 
in the short run. First an increase in the supply of deposits and loans. Hence the 
equilibrium interest rate falls and investment and output increase. Second the rise in 
53Kapur 
(1992), p. 76. 
54See 
chapters (8) and (9). 
55See 
Studart (1991), p. 9. 
56See Davidson (1986), pp. 104-106. 
57On 
the issue of financial stability see Minsky (1986). 
58Studart, 
op. cit., pp. 23-25. 
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interest rates may increase the marginal propensity to save. They argue that the second 
effect outweigh the first effect in a way that reduces the aggregate demand. As a result 
output falls and the rate of profit drops and entrepreneurs being pessimistic about future 
profits, reduce investment, which would fall substantially. If the acceleration effect is 
included the impact of financial liberalisation on investment, through the rise in interest 
rates, would be more negative. ' Thus using figure (2.1) above, the Post-Keynesians reach 
completely different results, as the savings and investment functions shift to the left as 
a response to the fall in output, income and the rate of profit. S9 
Dutt (1991) extends the analysis to cover the long run effect of financial liberalisation by 
rejecting the loanable funds approach and adopting the principle of effective demand. 60 
The long run impact of liberalisation is found to be more adverse than in the short run 
as the rise in interest rates increases firms' borrowing costs, and by applying mark-up 
pricing, this causes a rise in the inflation rate. This in-turn reduces real wages, and hence 
aggregate demand and long run economic growth will fall. Moreover in an open 
economy, financial liberalisation may lead to overvaluation of the real exchange rate. This 
would have a negative effect on the tradeable sector and reinforce the adverse effects of 
liberalisation on aggregate demand. 61 
(2.7) Prerequisites and sequencing of financial liberalisation: 
Despite the strong disagreement between the advocates and critics of financial 
liberalisation, it emerges that they agree on the need to satisfy certain conditions before 
undertaking any financial reform programme. The critics of financial liberalisation 
emphasise the need to achieve "realistic exchange rates, balanced budgets and a 
59See Burkett and Dutt (1991), pp. 137-144 and Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994), pp. 606-607. 
60 Dutt (1991), p. 228. 
61 Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994), op. cit., p. 607. 
k 
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favourable investment climate"62, which is not significantly different from the advocates' 
conditions for a successful financial liberalisation that include "price stability, fiscal 
discipline, and policy credibility "63" 
Price stability should be the main target of monetary policy before liberalising the 
financial market. High and volatile inflation rates destroy existing financial markets and 
hinders the emergence of potential ones. - Nevertheless, price stability cannot be achieved 
through monetary control alone but it also requires fiscal discipline in a consistent 
macroeconomic framework and a credible political environment. ' 
Fiscal discipline should be accomplished before implementing financial liberalisation 
measures. Revenues extracted from measures of financial repression, e. g. interest rate 
ceilings and financial restriction, e. g. inflation tax, would be lost upon the removal or 
reduction of these measures. Thus the tax system should be reformed to compensate for 
such losses. Public spending as well aught to be controlled to help achieve fiscal 
discipline and strict budget balance which has now become more necessary than in the 
past. The current need for tighter fiscal discipline is explained by less favourable 
expectations on the part of domestic and foreign creditors of the LDCs' governments as 
a result of several domestic and international debt crises. 65 
Macroeconomic stability goes hand in hand with prudential regulation as prerequisites for 
financial liberalisation. 66 McKinnon (1986) emphasises that "successful liberalisation is 
62Dornbusch 
and Reynoso (1989), p. 209; cited in Thornton (1991), p. 15. 
63Fry (1989), p. 26; cited in Thornton, op. cit., p. 15. 
64 Fry (1995), p. 454-5. 
65 
McKinnon (1991), pp. 4-6. 
66Villanueva 
and Mirakhor (1990), p. 521-522 and Khan and Sundararajan (1991), p. 3. 
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not simply a question of removing all regulationsn67. Adequate supervision of the financial 
intermediaries is required under any type of financial system be it repressed or 
liberalised. Financial intermediaries are subject to moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Hence investors must undertake a variety of monitoring functions such as screening, 
auditing,.. etc. However these functions are complex and expensive and their duplication 
by different agents is a form of waste. Therefore there is a need for a representative body 
to undertake the regulation and supervision functions. Moreover depositors of banks, i. e. 
holders of banks' debts are often not able or have little incentive to undertake monitoring 
functions. This, again, emphasises the need for a neutral and professional representative 
agency to implement the tasks of prudential regulation. 68 
The need for prudential regulation however increases if the financial system is going to 
be liberalised. Financial liberalisation implies greater freedom for individual bank 
managers and credit officers in the allocation of loanable funds and the determination of 
the cost of lending. The role of financial supervision is to detect the weak financial 
intermediaries and identify fraudulent and unscrupulous credit officers early enough 
before the start of the liberalisation process. Failure to do so in Chile, as an example, 
resulted in the engagement of bank managers in perverse behaviour and the adoption of 
Ponzi scheme69 during the early years of its liberalisation programme. 7° 
It is worth noting that economic theory suggests that complete liberalisation is superior 
than partial liberalisation, in terms of efficiency, if the economy is free from market 
distortions. But given that real economies are not free from various distortions, thus there 
is a need for liberalisation, as a second best approach, to be partial, instead of full, and 
67Quoted in Fry (1995), p. 458. 
68Dewatripont 
and Tirole (1994), pp. 29-33 
69For 
a discussion of Ponzi scheme see chapter (5) below. 
70 ibid. 
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gradualist rather than simultaneous or abrupt. Even in the absence of distortions, it might 
be the case that there are some sectors in the economy that respond faster to reform 
programmes than others, which add further support to the gradualist approach. Moreover 
gradualism can be advocated with respect to income distribution issues, as this approach 
would allow more time for the economic factors, which maybe negatively affected as a 
result of structural adjustment in their particular sectors, to adapt to alternative uses in 
the same sectors or in other ones. " 
Despite the fact that the literature on the issue of sequencing is still inconclusive72, there 
is however a wide agreement, based mainly on Latin American experience, that the 
domestic financial sector should be liberalised after the reform of the domestic real 
sector. It is also widely accepted that controls on capital movements should be maintained 
until the domestic financial sector and the external trade sector are liberalised and until 
the stabilisation programme is implemented. "' 
Figure (2.3) 
Sequencing of Economic Liberalisation 
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71Greenaway 
and Morrissey (1993), pp. 256-7. 
72Williamson 
(1993), p. 25. For a survey of the literature on the sequencing of economic liberalisation see Edwards (1992), pp. 1-24. 
73ibid., Greenaway and Morrissey, op. cit., p. 257, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994), p. 591, Hanson (1994), p. 337. 
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Thus the capital account should be the last in the liberalisation sequences as shown in 
figure (2.3). Several reasons have been put forward in support of this recommendation: 
1. It is argued that capital markets adjust in a faster pace than goods and labour 
markets and hence need a shorter period to respond to the liberalisation 
measures. 74 
2. If the domestic financial sector is liberalised before the liberalisation of the real 
domestic sector then loanable funds will flow to the projects that only considered 
profitable because relative prices are distorted. 75 
3. If the liberalisation of the domestic financial sector is undertaken before 
liberalising the trade sector this would result in allocating credit into tradeables 
sector which may happen to be profitable because of the existence of trade 
barriers. 76 
4. If capital controls are removed before the full liberalisation of the domestic 
financial sector then capital flight would be inevitable which was the case of 
Argentina in the early 1980s. " 
5. Further to the previous point, capital flows into an economy that lacks an efficient 
and a liberalised-financial system may, be inefficiently allocated. 78 
74Greenaway 
and Morrissey, op. cit., p. 258. 
75Gibson 
and Tsakalotos, op. cit., p. 591. 
76 ibid. 
77Edward 
(1990), p. 2. 
78Williamson, 
op. cit., p. 26. 
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6. If, the capital account is liberalised before the external trade sector then capital 
inflows into the economy would result in an exchange rate appreciation. This, in 
turn, would, undermine the competitiveness of tradeables goods and add more 
difficulties to trade liberalisation attempts. 79 
7. If the inflow of capital preceded fiscal discipline, normally included as an integral 
part of stabilisation programmes, this would lead to further complication of the 
budget deficit problem. 8° 
However the suggestion outlined above for sequencing of liberalisation should not be 
considered a panacea. The initial economic condition, political environment and 
credibility of government have important contributions to sequencing decisions as well 
as the extent of success or failure of the liberalisation programme. 
(2.8) Empirical evidence: 
A body of empirical studies has developed over the past two decades to investigate the 
main components of the transmission mechanisms in the M-S framework and assess the 
impact of liberalisation measures on the main macroeconomic variables. Thus empirical 
evidence examines the effects of financial liberalisation on savings, quantity and quality 
of investment, and economic growth. 
2.8.1 The impact of financial liberalisation on saving: 
The first key link in the M-S proposition is that financial liberalisation, through an 
increase in the real rate of interest will increase savings. The issue of real interest effect 
on savings in LDCs was studied well before the establishment of the theoretical 
79Greenaway 
and Morrissey, op. cit., p. 257-258. 
90 Williamson, op. cit., p. 26. 
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foundations of financial liberalisation. In a study by Williamson (1968) on the 
determinants of personal savings in 6 Asian countries, the interest elasticity of savings 
was negative in 5 countries. Moreover, with the exception of the case of Japan the 
coefficients were not statistically significant in the regressions that used permanent and 
transitory disposable income as independent variables. In a study by Gupta (1970), 
personal saving in India had a positive interest elasticity which was significant at 1% level 
when per capita disposable income was used as an independent variable. " 
Encouraged by the M-S proposition that liberalisation has a positive effect on saving and 
the inclusion of interest rate reform measures in the stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programmes, several empirical studies have recently been undertaken to test the effects 
of the real interest rate on saving. Table (2.1) provides a summary of these studies, 
highlighting their methods of analysis, main findings and implications. 82 
81See 
Balassa (1989), p. 6. 
82The design of the table is adapted from Arrieta (1988) and Kitchen (1993). 
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Table (2.1) 
Summaries of the empirical studies on the impact of financial liberalisation on savings 
Author(s) Test Method Main findings Implications 
for financial 
liberalisation 
Fry (1978) Impact of real interest rate Estimates a national saving An increase in the real interest rate Positive 
on national savings in 7 equation by 2SLS using pooled by 10% would increase the national support 
Asian countries. time series data with country saving/GNP ratio by 1.4% to 2.1 %. 
dummy variables. 
Giovannini Impact of real interest rate Estimates a Keynesian-type The coefficient for real interest rate is Negative 
(1983) on domestic savings in the 7 domestic saving equation. not significant. 
Asian countries used in Fry 
(1978) but for different time 
periods. 
Gupta Impact of real interest rates Estimates private and The coefficient of real interest rates is Limited 
(1984) on aggregate and private real aggregate savings functions by the aggregate savings function is support 
savings functions in 12 Asian OLS method. significant only for 4 countries. In 
countries. the private savings equation the 
interest rate coefficient have a 
significant effect, in quantitative 
terms in 4 countries. 
Yusuf & Impact of real interest rate An aggregate savings function The coefficient of real interest rates Positive 
Peters on gross national savings in is estimated by OLS, and on deposits is positive and support 
(1984) Korea during 1965-81, serial correlation was corrected significant. A 10% increase of real 
by GLS. interest rate increases gross national 
and domestic savings by 11.6% and 
5% respectively. 
Giovannini Impact of the expected real Estimates consumption growth The real interest rate coefficient is Negative 
(1985) rate of interest on the growth rate as an increasing stochastic positive and significant for 5 out of 
rate of consumption in 18 function in expected real 18 countries. 
LDCs interest rate by using 
instrumental variables method. 
de Melo & Impact of real interest rate Estimate aggregate savings Real interest rates has a positive but a Very limited 
Tybout on aggregate domestic function similar to Fry (1978) weak relation with aggregate savings support 
(1986) savings and domestic private and Giovannini (1983) and a rates and it has an insignificant 
savings in Uruguay during private savings function using impact on domestic private savings. 
1962-83. annual data. 
Gupta Impact of real interest rates Estimates an aggregate real A positive & significant interest rate Little 
(1987) on savings in 22 Latin savings function, by OLS and coefficient is found in the Asian support 
American and Asian 2SLS using pooled time series countries while it is insignificant in 
countries during 1967-76. cross sectional data. the Latin American case. The study 
asserts that pooling across counties is 
inappropriate. 
Rittenberg Effect of positive real Estimates several national and The impact of the change in real Limited 
(1988) interest rates on savings in private savings during different interest rates is more effective on support 
Turkey during (1961-1985). sub periods. savings when deposit rate is raised 
from substantially negative levels and 
less effective when the deposit rate 
becomes increasingly positive. 
Fry (1988) Impact of real interest rate Estimates pooled time series Real deposit interest rate exerts a Positive 
on national savings in 14 national savings equation in a positive and significant effect on support 
Asian countries over the life cycle model. national savings. 
period 1963-83. 
Warman & Impact of real interest rate Estimate three different The rate of interest has a strong Negative 
Thirlwall on financial, total and private savings functions (financial, effect on financial savings but its 
(1994) savings in Mexico over the total and private) using OIS effect on total and private savings is 
period 1960-90. method and annual data. insignificant. 
source: individual studies as shown under eau ors . 
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As shown in table (2.1), there is a mixed evidence regarding the effect of real interest 
rate changes on saving, nevertheless the sceptical findings are more significant than those 
in favour. It has been emphasised that arguments which take as axiomatic that saving 
responds positively to interest rates have no theoretical basis. 83 Interest rate changes yield 
income and substitution effects. The substitution effect causes deposit accounts holders 
to increase their savings but the income effect implies that fewer savings need to be held 
in order to maintain the same level of expected income. 84 The income and substitution 
effects are very likely to offset each others and hence the net impact on saving is 
ambiguous. 85 
The differences in the findings of the empirical studies reported in table (2.1) can be 
attributed to two main problems, first the quality of data and second models specification. 
The dearth of reliable data is one of the main constraints that hinder empirical research 
and undermines its credibility. When it comes to the issue of savings and its measurement 
the problem becomes more severe. 86 
Data on savings in LDCs is subject to considerable error. 87 Such data is mainly. derived 
from national accounts, as a residual, by calculating the difference between domestic 
investment and foreign savings or by calculating the difference between national product 
and consumption expenditure. 88 Taking the difference between two terms that are 
estimated with error would magnify the problems in each and hence the bad quality of 
83 Deaton (1989), p. 87. 
94 Deaton and Muellbauer (1988), pp. 101-102. 
85 Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989), p. 205. 
86Kotlikoff 
(1989), p. 34 emphasises that even with the best data answering some savings questions seems quite difficult and the question 
of what determines savings remains like a good jigsaw puzzle. 
87Balassa 
(1989), op. cit., p. 17 
88ibid., 
and Arrieta (1988), pp. 592-3. 
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savings data. Moreover there is a problem associated with the measurement of interest 
rates used. Most studies use interest rates on financial savings which are not necessarily 
relevant for the non-financial component of aggregate savings estimated in the studies. 
Further in the calculation of real interest rates, most studies attempt to use estimates of 
the expected rate of inflation which is not directly observed. Hence the statistical 
significance of the real interest rate coefficient may be reduced in the estimation 
process 89 
Empirical work on savings can be divided into two classes. First, studies that investigate 
the direct effect between real interest rates on savings and second, those studies which 
are concerned with the relation between consumption growth rate and interest rate 
following the Euler equation approach. 9° As mentioned above, the theory suggests nothing 
for the first case and predicts a positive effect for the second. 91 However most of the 
empirical studies reported in table (2.1) belong to the first class. Moreover constrained 
by the problem of data in LDCs, several studies specify their models in reduced forms 
in order to allow for testing, which casts further doubts on their findings. " 
2.8.2 The effects of financial liberalisation on investment: 
The second key link in the M-S framework, is the proposed positive impact of financial 
liberalisation on the quantity and the quality of investment. Regarding the quantity of 
investment, empirical studies tested the impact of financial liberalisation through two 
channels. The first channel is to test the effect of real interest rate increases, through 
domestic credit availability on the volume of investment. The second channel is to test 
89For further discussion of the problems associated with the quality of data see Balassa (1989), op. cit., pp. 17-20. 
9OThe 
Euler equation approach focuses on the relation between consumption growth rate and the interest rate. See Deaton, op. cit., p. 88. 
91 Which means a negative reaction between an increase in real interest rate and savings. 
92 Kitchen (1993), p. 89 and Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994), p. 596. 
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McKinnon's complementarity hypothesis between money and capital discussed above. As 
far as the quality of investment is concerned, the few empirical studies available focus 
on the effect of real interest changes on the efficiency of investment measured by the 
incremental capital/output ratio (ICOR). Table (2.2) summarises the empirical studies on 
financial liberalisation effect on the quality and quantity of investment. 
Table (2.2) 
Summaries of the empirical studies on 
the impact of financial liberalisation on investment 
Author(s) Test Method Main findings Implications 
for financial 
liberalisation 
Fry (1978) Relationship between money Estimates a demand for money Negative and significant Negative 
and capital in 10 Asian LDCs, equation by 2S LS and country coefficient between money and 
in order to test McKinnon's dummy variables. savings ratio, i. e. money and 
complementarity hypothesis. capital are not complementary. 
Fry (1979) Impact of real interest rate on Regresses the incremental An increase in the real deposit Positive 
the quality of investment in capital/output ratio on real rate is associated with an support 
Turkey during 1950-77. deposit interest rate by OLS increase in the 10CR. 
method. 
Fry (1980) Impact of real interest rate on Estimates, separately, 8 The credit ratio is significant in Positive 
investment in 61 LDCs during investment equations, with and 6 equations out of 8, while the support 
1965 -1975 through the real without country dummy change of credit ratio, in 
credit availability mechanism. variables, by 2SLS. logarithmic form, is significant 
in 7 equations. 
Gupta Tests McKinnon's A simultaneous equation model Complementarity is not a widely Very limited 
(1984) complementarity hypothesis in is estimated by 2SLS. pervasive phenomenonin the support 
25 Asian and Latin American sample countries. 
countries. 
Fry (1986) Impact of the availability of Estimates an investment The private sector domestic Positive 
private sector domestic credit equation, using a flexible credit variable exerts a support 
on investment in 14 Asian accelerator model, and including significant and positive influence 
countries during the period the ratio of private sector credit on the investment rate. 
1962-83. to GNP as an independent 
variable. 
de Melo & Impact of real interest rates on Estimate four separate equations Real interest rate has a negative Negative 
Tybout privates investment for of private investment which and weak effect on private 
(1986) Uruguay during the period include a regime dummy investment. 
1962-83. variable and using annual data. 
Jansen Effect of real lending rate on Estimate the ratio of private The coefficient of the real Negative 
(1989) private investment in Thailand investment to GDP as a function lending rate is significantly 
during the period 1962-84. of real lending rate, lagged negative. 
corporate savings and lagged 
real growth rate of GDP. 
Gelb (1989) Effect of real interest rate on Estimates an 10CR (incremental Real interest rate coefficient has Positive 
the efficiency of investment output capital ratio) function by a significant and positive support 
for 34 countries over the OLS using the pooled-sample coefficient, indicating a 
period 1965-85. data of Hanson and Neal (1987). favourable effect of 
liberalisation on the quality of 
investment rather than its 
quantity. 
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Rittenberg Impact of real interest rate Estimates three equations of Private non-housing investment Negative 
(1989) policy on investment spending investment, using a switching is highly sensitive to interest 
in Turkey over the period model. In the first the real rate changes. In the 
1964-86. deposit rate is exogenous and in liberalisation period interest 
the second is endogenous. In the rates were too high to foster 
third equation the real GNP and foster investment. 
exchange rate are also assumed 
endogenous. 
Demetriades Effect of real interest rate on Estimate an investment model in Domestic real interest rate has a Negative 
& Devereux investment in a panel of financial repression conditions, negligible and statistically 
(1992) aggregate data for 63 countries in an economy with an official insignificant influence on 
over the period 1961-90. market and an unrestricted investment. Moreover interest 
market with higher rates of rate ceilings may reduce the 
interest. overall cost of capital and lead 
to higher rate of investment. 
Voridis Impact of interest rate ceilings Estimates 3 flexible accelerator Rises in private sector domestic Positive 
(1993) on private fixed investment in investment specifications by the credit lead, after a delay, to a support 
Greece over the 1960-1985. OLS method. significant increase in private 
fixed investment. Declines in 
real interest rate are associated 
with reductions in investment. 
The crucial role of the market 
structure of the banking industry 
is emphasised 
Morriset Relationship between real Estimates private investment The increase of real interest Negative 
(1993) interest rates and private equation by 3SLS and using a rates does not necessarily 
investment in Argentina (1961- modified version of the flexible involve a positive effect on 
82). accelerator model. private investment. 
Warman & Real rate of interest effect on Estimate two gross fixed In the two equations, holding Negative 
Thirlwall gross fixed investment in investment equations, using a the supply of credit constant, 
(1994) Mexico 1960-90. switching model in the first. real investment is negatively 
affected by the rate of interest. 
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Table (2.2) shows that while the positive effects of financial liberalisation on the quantity 
of investment are not satisfactorily supported by econometric evidence, its impact on the 
quality of investment is significant. It is worth noting, however, that these findings are 
based on the assumption that the quality of investment is monotonically related to the 
improvements in the ICOR. Moreover there is a problem of omitted variables as the 
reported studies, again because of data availability problems, often use a reduced form 
of the models. Thus the policy implications derived from such studies should be carefully 
interpreted. 
2.8.3 Effects of financial liberalisation on economic growth: 
The third key link in the M-S framework is between financial liberalisation and growth 
via the savings-investment effects analysed above. The early empirical studies test the 
relation between financial liberalisation and growth by regressing the latter on real interest 
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rate changes for a single country or a cross sectional sample of LDCs. Recent studies 
adopt a more sophisticated approach by using an endogenous growth model and resort to 
larger datasets than the ones used in earlier studies. Table (2.3) provides a summary of 
the main empirical studies on financial liberalisation and growth, in which it is shown that 
positive relationship between financial liberalisation and economic growth is more 
established when other financial indicators than real interest rates are used. 
It is worth noting however that whether the causal relationship runs from financial 
development to growth, the reverse, or both ways still in need for further evidence. For 
example in the comprehensive study of King and Levine (1993), the partial correlations 
between growth and the indicators of financial development remain significant even after 
controlling for core variables such as the level of GDP. This means that the correlations 
are robust and there is a need to consider policy variables that affect the financial market 
but are not themselves affected by growth. 93 
Table (2.3) 
Summaries of the empirical studies on financial development effects on economic 
growth 
Author(s) Test Method Main findings Implications 
for financial 
liberalisation 
Fry (1978) Impact of real interest rate Estimates a model that captures As a result of financial recession, Positive 
of deposits on economic the short run and long run effects 0.5 percentage points is forgone support 
growth in 7 Asian of real interest rate changes on for every I percentage point by 
countries over the period economic growth. which real interest rate is set 
1961-72. below its equilibrium level. 
Lanyi & Effect of real interest rate In the estimated equation, a value The real interest rate coefficient is Tentative 
Saracoglu on the rate of growth of of I is given to countries with positive and significant but they support 
(1983) real GDP IN 21 LDCs. positive real interest rates, 0 to describe their results as tentative. 
the ones with modestly negative 
rates and -1 to those with highly 
negative real interest rates. 
Fry (1986) Effect of real deposit OLS estimates of pooled time The real deposit rate coefficient is Positive 
interest rate on real series data with country dummy positive and significant. support 
economic growth in 12 variables. 
Asian countries over the 
period 1961-82. 
93For 
a further discussion of this issue see Pagano (1993), p. 620. 
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Khatkhate Impact of real interest LDCs are classified into two No difference with any statistical Negative 
(1988) rates on the average real groups; above-mean and below- significance is found between the 
GDP growth in 64 LDCs mean real interest rate. Mann- 2 groups, regarding the impact on 
during the period 1971-80. Whitney non parametric test is the rate of real GDP growth. 
used in the analysis. 
Gregorio & The relationship between The adopts the endogenous Positive effect of financial Positive 
Guidotti the degree of financial growth approach and uses 2 development, proxied by private support 
(1993) development and long-run different data sets. A sample of credit ratio, and long run 
economic growth. 98 countries and a panel data set economic growth. In the case of 
for 12 Latin American countries. Latin American countries the 
effect is negative due the extreme 
experience with liberalisation. 
Roubini & The relation between The estimation uses an Financial repression affects Positive 
Sala-i-Martin financial repression and endogenousgrowth model in growth negatively. support 
(1992) long term growth for 98 which indices of human capital, 
countries during the 1960- political stability, economic 
85 period, distortion and financial repression 
are included as independent 
variables. 
King and The empirical link between The study adopts endogenous Real economic growth is Positive 
Levine financial development and growth model and includes positively correlated with support 
(1993) economic growth for 57 various indicators of financial indicators of financial 
countries over the period development, indices for political development such as the size of 
1960-89. liberty and stability and regions formal sector relative to GDP, 
dummy variables as independent percentage of credit to the private 
variables, sector and importance of banks 
relative to the central bank. 
Warman & Effect of real interest rate Estimate a growth equation by The real interest rate coefficient is Negative 
Thirlwall on real economic growth OLS method in which real negative and insignificant. 
(1994) in Mexico over the period interest rates, growth of exports, 
1960-90. public savings ratio and foreign 
savings ratio. 
Source: Individual studies as shown under the author(s). 
(2.9) Concluding remarks: 
The main findings of the empirical work discussed above are summarised by Fry (1993): 
"The real interest rate has virtually no effect on the level of saving.. An 
increase in the real interest rate towards its normal free-market 
competitive equilibrium level .. is associated with higher growth 
attributable to improved total factor productivity and increased incremental 
output/capital ratios. Less financial repression as measured by a variety 
of variables is associated with higher rates of economic growth. "" 
The adverse effects of financial liberalisation in Latin American countries and the relative 
success in few Asian countries has compelled a re-assessment of financial liberalisation. 95 
Financial liberalisation as applied in several countries has not led to an improvement in 
94 
Fry (1993), op. cit., p. 33. 
95See Diaz-Alejandro (1985) on the Latin American experience and Cho and Khatkhate (1989) on the lessons derived from financial 
liberalisation in Asia. 
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the market structure, its conduct or. performance and financial market continued to behave 
in an oligopolistic manner. 96 
Even in Korea and Taiwan, two celebrated examples of successful liberalisation, Park 
(1993) concludes his study by emphasising that it was difficult to identify any significant 
changes in the behaviour of financial institutions and markets that may indicate a response 
to the change in financial environment. Moreover there was not any discernible change 
in the two countries regarding the relationships between the government and financial 
institutions. 97 
The cost of financial intermediation and interest rate spreads in some cases remained as 
high as pre-liberalisation, and in other cases there have been evidence of deterioration. 
Galbis (1993), using a sample of 28 LDCs which, identifies four main causes for high 
real interest rates associated with the implementation of financial liberalisation 
programmes. They include inflationary expectations, exchange rate risk, wrong monetary 
and fiscal policy mix and malfunctioning of the financial sector. 98 
Moreover financial liberalisation in the case of southern cone countries has intensified 
rather than corrected the problems associated with financial repression. 99 In several 
countries, in the absence of macroeconomic stability and adequate prudential regulation, 
financial repression was substituted for financial crisis. For example in Chile, premature 
financial decontrol, bad banking practices and desperate borrowers, pushed interest rates 
amid their liberalisation in the mid 1970s to very high levels. This form of "repressive 
96Fry 
(1993), pp. 36-7. 
97 
Park (1993), p. 146. 
98See 
Galbis (1993), pp. 25-48. 
99 See for example Corbo, de Melo and Tybout (1986), pp. 628-9 and Moretti (1992), pp. 33-8. 
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liberalisation"10° undermined the profitability of projects which extended their borrowing 
to stay in business. '0' Eventually, widespread bankruptcies and massive increase of bad 
loans, including a significant size of consumption loans, signified a major financial crisis 
in 1981-82 and necessitated government intervention which put the financial system under 
tight control. 'o2 
Three main issues can be derived from the experience of financial liberalisation over the 
past two decades and from the empirical studies reviewed above. First, the empirical 
evidence suggest that the main channel of transmission from financial liberalisation to 
growth is the effect on the quality of investment rather than its quantity. Second, a 
successful financial liberalisation policy is dependent on maintaining sound 
macroeconomic policies, expedient fiscal practice and controlling the budget deficit. 
Third, financial liberalisation does not imply removing all regulations. There is a 
consensus among different financial development schools that adequate prudential 
regulation is one of the main prerequisites for a successful financial liberalisation. 
Accordingly, in this study we find that it is essential to distinguish between government 
intervention, e. g. by regulatory methods, in response to market failures of the financial 
system, and intervention that causes distortions and inefficiencies in the financial market 
through repressive measures. 
100 This is the description given for the Chilean reform experience by Araya-Gomez (1990). 
101 See McKinnon (1991), pp. 38-41 and Roe (1993), p. 9. 
102 See Edwards and Edwards (1991), pp. 53-56. 
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Chapter (3) 
Structure, Regulation and Performance of 
the Egyptian Banking System 
"Commercial activity on the part of the ruler is 
harmful to his subjects and ruinous to the tax 
revenue ". 
Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) 
(3.1) Introduction: 
In this chapter we analyse the development of the banking system since its early stages 
in the mid 19th century. We divide such development to three main phases. The first 
starts in 1856 with the establishment of the first bank in Egypt and ends in 1952 with the 
outbreak of the revolution which also marks the beginning of the second phase. In our 
analysis of this phase we attempt to provide an account of the key developments in the 
banking system. This review is essential for three reasons. First to understand the 
distinctive characteristics of the banking system in Egypt that shaped its structure and role 
before the 1952 revolution and after. Second most of the operating banks in the 
subsequent periods, including the central bank, were established during this phase which 
requires some discussion of their historical background. Third, many of the measures 
taken concerning banking activities in the 1950s and 1960s were, to a great extent, 
reactions to policies and practices adopted during this phase. 
The second phase 1952-74 was a period of heavy government intervention in economic 
activity and witnessed the Egyptianisation and then the nationalisation of banks. The third 
phase, which we consider to be a period of partial liberalisation for the reasons given 
below, starts in 1974 with the adoption of open door policy and ends in 1991 with the 
start of the application of a financial reform programme supported by the World Bank and 
the IMF. 
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Moreover, based on a series of interviews undertaken by the author in 1992 and 1993 
with bank officials and experts in the Egyptian financial sector, we discuss the main 
difficulties that have faced the development of the banking system. Then we analyse the 
state of prudential regulation and bank supervision, as one of the prerequisites for a 
successful financial liberalisation policy. Finally the performance of banks is analysed by 
considering main indicators of bank efficiency compared with those of other countries. 
This chapter is mainly concerned with the measures that affected directly the structure of 
the banking system and its regulation. Moreover the chapter combines an overview of the 
historical evolution of the banking system with some assessment of its present 
performance. Other measures with indirect impact on the structure and operations of 
banks grouped under financial repression, e. g. interest rate policy, reserve requirements, 
credit control.. etc, are analysed in chapter (6). 
(3.2) The first phase: 1856-1952 
3.2.1 The establishment of foreign commercial banks: 
Commercial banks were ý the first financial institutions to appear in the process 'of 
economic development in Egypt. Their establishment in the second half of the 19th 
century were closely associated with the needs of the extensive cultivation of cotton. 
Although cotton started to have an important role in the Egyptian agricultural sector from 
the beginning of the 19th century', it did not receive a considerable attention until the 
time of the American Civil War (1861-1865). American exports of cotton fell during this 
war, giving an immense motivation to cultivate it in Egypt. Cotton production doubled 
and its price increased four times during the 1860s. Cotton became the prime Egyptian 
product and the main source of exports revenue for the following decades, until oil started 
to take over its position in the 1970s. 
1 Cotton was introduced by Mohammed Ali the Ruler of Egypt (1805-1848). For an overview of this period see Owen (1981), pp. 64-82 
and Vatikiotis (1991), pp. 49-69. 
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Further the Suez Canal was opened in 1869 as an important waterway linking the east 
with the west and emphasised the potential importance of Egypt in international trade. 
The Egyptian trade was expanding, mainly due to the increase of cotton production. 
Foreign trade figures for the 19th century may not be accurate, but they can at least give 
a rough indication of the trend of foreign trade. The average export value was 
approximately £E 2.6 million per annum during the 1850s. In the subsequent decade, 
exports rose by an average of 23.5 % per annum to reach £E 8.85 million in 18702. 
The chronic shortage of capital was hindering further growth in the Egyptian economy 
and its trade. Agricultural borrowers were relying on village money lenders. Foreign 
trade was receiving insufficient funding from a few finance houses similar in their 
operation to the old merchant bankers of the City of London. There was a manifest need 
for an organised formal financial system. Developing such a system was hindered for 
several reasons. Among them was the inability of banks to introsuce financial services 
that do not break the Islamic ban on usury; high financial instability during this period; 
the modest per capita income, and hence lack of savings; and the limited experience in 
credit dealings. As shown below, these very reasons, after more than 100 years, still 
impede the development of the Egyptian financial system. However an attempt was 
undertaken to establish a government-owned commercial bank in 1830 with a capital of 
£300,000. This attempt failed, simply because the government could not raise the capital 
required. 
The dearth of finance in Egypt received the attention of foreign financiers who found in 
the country an attractive outlet for their capital. Foreign capital started to flow towards 
the country in the form of loans to the government. In 1862 Egypt had its first foreign 
loan in its modern history. The loan was for LE 3,292,800 million at 7% and redeemable 
2 See NBE (1948), pp. 8-9. 
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in 30 years;. Borrowing abroad continued by successive governments in order to finance 
the repayment of old debts and fund its projects. 
Foreign debt accumulated and the country was saddled by a debt burden which it could 
not manage. Foreign control was imposed on Egypt to manage the repayment of the debt. 
Thus the Caisse de la Dette Publique, was created in 1876 as an exchequer office for the 
government and was entirely controlled by a commission of foreign creditors. Its 
objectives were mainly to collect public revenue, service the public debt and engage, at 
the same time, in commercial transactions. 
Foreign financier's response to the growing need for capital in Egypt took also the form 
of establishing local financial institutions. Thus modern foreign-owned commercial banks 
were founded to fund the cultivation of crops, mainly cotton, and *finance foreign trade. 
Some of these banks were branches of European banks and a few of them were registered 
in Egypt. The first of these banks was the Bank of Egypt which was established in 1856 
with a head office in London, a main office in Alexandria and a branch in Cairo. There 
is no agreement between the sources on the size of the capital of this Bank. However it 
is variously reported to be between £500,000 -£1,000,000 and the paid-up capital was 
£250,0004. Its claimed aim was to encourage trade between Egypt and Britain. The bank 
was also involved extensively in the purchase of Treasury Bonds which were issued by 
the government to finance its current spending. 
Many foreign banks were established in the following years. Their main activity was the 
purchase of Treasury Bonds and meeting the increasing credit demands of the khedive. 
However the debt crisis of the 1870s, the associated establishment of the Caisse de la 
3 ibid., p. 10. 
4 See NBE, op. cit., p. 13. 
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Dette and, then, the putting of Egyptian finance under strict foreign control in 1879, 
made it difficult for several banks, especially the new ones, to continue. Thus many 'of 
these banks were short lived and were liquidated, the remaining ones limited their 
activities to small scale operations'. Table (1) below gives an account of the main banks 
established during the 19th century and before 1952. 
5 See Shafi'i (1985), pp. 183-185 and NBE (1948), op. cit., p. 13. 
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Table (3.1) 
Main Banks Established in Egypt before 1952 
Date Name of Bank Ownership Main activities Comments 
1856 The Bank of Egypt British Commercial Specialised in financing foreign trade and 
treasury bonds dealings. Closed down in 
1911. 
1863 Imperial Ottoman Bank Turkish and Anglo- Agriculture 
French 
1864 Anglo-Egyptian Bank British-French Foreign trade Amalgamated with other banks in 1925 to 
become Barclays Bank (D., C. and Overseas) 
1869 Comptoir National French Commercial Closed down in 1873, reopened in 1905. 
d'Escomptede Paris 
1874 Credit Lyonnais French Commercial Was bankers for the Caisse de la Dette until 
its abolition in 1940. 
1880 Banco di Roma Italian Commercial Became an Egyptian company in 1922, 
sequestrated in 1940 because of the War, 
reopened in 1948. 
1880 Credit Foncier Egyptien French Land mortgage 
1887 Cassa di Sconto e di Italian General commercial Closed down in 1907. 
Risparimo 
1889 National Bank of Egypt British Central bank activities & 
general commercial 
1902 The Agricultural Bank of British & Egyptian Agriculture Closed down in 1936. 
Egypt 
1906 National Bank of Greece Greek Commercial 
1907 The Ionian Bank Greek Commercial 
1911 Banque Beige pour Belgian Commercial 
l'Etranger 
1920 Bank Misr Egyptian Universal with emphasis 
on industry 
1920 Commercial Bank of Foreign Commercial 
Egypt 
1920 Banque de commerce Foreign Commercial 
1924 Banca Commerciale Italian Commercial Sequestrated in 1940 because of the War & 
Italiana reopened in 1948. 
1925 Barclays Bank British and Foreign Commercial 
1931 Credit Agricole d'Egypte Egyptian & Foreign Agricultural Became the Agricultural & Cooperative 
Credit Bank in 1948. 
1947 Industrial Bank Egyptian & Foreign Industrial 
1948 Agricultural and Egyptian, foreign & Agricultural 
Cooperative Credit cooperative societies 
Ocu«, c. wuwpucu LWIII l"DE ýtywa). 
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Towards the end of the 19th century, it was realised that the Caisse de la Dette, would 
disappear at some stage, after solving the debt problem6. On the other hand the financial 
development of the country was paralysed as there were few operating foreign banks and 
no Bank of Issue. Thus it was felt that "an institution of the nature of a State Bank would 
be necessary to carry on the Treasury business of the Government and the work done,.., 
by the Caisse in respect of the Public Debt"". Hence the National Bank of Egypt 
(henceforth NBE) was established in 1898 as a commercial bank with a capital of £1 
million, and the head office of the bank was based in Cairo. However the bank was 
owned and managed by British citizens and maintained close ties with England through 
what was known as the London Committee. This committee was supposed to be of 
consultative nature but it had a say on transactions exceeding £100,000 and other 
important decisions. 
According to the Khedival decree' the NBE was granted, exclusively, the privilege of 
issuing banknotes, which were introduced for the first time in the Egyptian monetary 
system. It is worth noting that before 1885 there was no uniform currency. The monetary 
system was based on gold and silver as a standard of value and medium of circulation, 
and several Turkish and European currencies were in circulation. In 1885, in accordance 
with the demands of the Caisse, a reform law was passed defining the currency unit in 
terms of gold only, allowing the British sovereign to be the chief instrument of circulation 
and preventing dealings in any other foreign currency'. The NBE participated as well 
6 As a matter of fact the NBE did not take over the responsibility of the Caisse de la Dette until 1940 when the government reached an 
agreement with the French and the British government regarding the abolishing of the latter. NBE (1948), op. cit., p. 69. 
7 Quoted in NBE (1948), p. 16. 
8 Decree of 25th June 1898. 
9Due 
to the fact that the public was not accustomed to paper money, the circulation of banknotes issued by the NBE was quite slow in 
the beginning as just 25 % of the issued notes went into circulation in 1899 which was the first year of issuance. Circulation gradually 
increased with growing familiarity of the public with the notes. However banknotes did not become legal tender until the outbreak of the 
First World War when the government found it necessary to "strengthen the financial situation of the country, by defending public credit 
against illegal speculation and unjustified panics.. [thus] all payments effected by means of banknotes, for whatever reasons and value, will 
be effective discharge as if they have been made in gold". (Khedival decree of the 2nd of August 1914, quoted in NBE (1948)). For further 
discussion of the development of the Egyptian monetary system during this period, see Shafi'i, (1985), pp. 175-207. 
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with the rest of foreign commercial banks to provide short term finance for big cotton 
cultivators. 
The operating banks benefited from the cotton-related boom of the 1902-1907 period. The 
value of exported cotton increased by 52% during these six years due to a sudden rise in 
the international market. This favourable shock was accompanied by political stability 
which stemmed from the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. Consequently the economy 
observed unprecedented inflows of capital mainly in the form of mortgages secured by 
agricultural and urban land. To sum up, this period started with excessive speculation in 
land, shares and cotton and ended with an inevitable crash". Further discussion of the 
developments during this period is provided in the following section. 
Many banks faced bankruptcy and closure in 1907 including the Cassa di Sconto. Others 
were left very vulnerable to any further shocks in the future. Thus the Bank of Egypt was 
forced into liquidation in 1911 when it faced further problems. It could not call in 
mortgages on land to pay short term bills borrowed from London. This was a result of 
the bank's unsound practice of short term borrowing and investing in long term loans 
secured on agricultural and urban properties". 
As shown in table (1) more commercial foreign banks were established in the following 
years. Many of these banks focused in serving some foreign communities like the Greek 
banks. However two aspects were shared by foreign banks. First geographic 
concentration, as these banks were located in the capital and main ports. Second they 
either financed large cotton cultivators or foreign trade. 
10 For further analysis of this period, see the following chapter. 
11 See NBE (1948), p. 34. 
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Effectively the country was still deprived of a banking system which would contribute to 
its broader development. Financing crops other than cotton was neglected. Advancing 
loans to small cultivators was considered either risky or technically difficult. Funding 
industrial projects was not compatible with the policy of short term financing adopted by 
foreign banks. Attempts to change this passive role of the operating banks were 
undertaken and took the form of government intervention and private initiatives inspired 
by the independence movement. These attempts, which marked the main developments 
of the banking system until 1952, are discussed below under their two main objectives, 
viz. extending agricultural credit and funding industrial projects. 
3.2.2 Agricultural Credit: 
Owing to the lack of acceptable collateral and high administrative costs, foreign banks 
generally abstained from lending to small cultivators who continued to borrow from 
private money lenders, usually brokers and merchants acquainted with local farmers. Due 
to the nature of informal transactions, it is not known exactly how high the interest rates 
charged were. 
The literature usually describes informal borrowing as being at high exploitive interest 
rates and at unfavourable terms, which necessitates intervention. We argue that there are 
two reasons that justify this argument in Egypt. First money lenders used to enjoy 
monopolistic positions in their respective villages, with the exception of some competition 
of cotton exporters, who used to advance credit to large cultivators, and the Sugar, 
Company in the south which financed the growers of sugar cane in upper Egypt. The rest 
of the credit market was left to money lenders. Second, many of these money lenders 
were actually working as intermediaries between the foreign banks and their clients in 
rural areas, which means that they added a margin on the bank interest rates. Further it 
is reported that such money lenders were charged higher interest rates than other bank 
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clients, e. g. cotton exporters. In a typical year they were charged 5-6.5 per cent while 
r 
cotton exporters were charged only 4.5 per cent. 12 
The Agricultural Bank of Egypt was established in 1902, by the collaboration of the 
government and the NBE. The establishment of the Agricultural Bank was based on an 
earlier successful experience when the government stepped in, during the 1890s, to 
provide peasants with loans at relatively low interest rates. The Agricultural Bank and the 
NBE maintained close links. Approximately one third of the capital of £1.25 million of 
the Agricultural Bank was subscribed by the NBE. The governor of the latter was also 
the president of the former's board. 
The Agricultural Bank's objective was to assist small cultivators, defined then as those 
who own 5 feddans of land or less. The bank progressed steadily in due course. Its 
capital increased three times in 10 years and its working capital was soon fully employed'. 
After the crisis of 1907 and the accompanying instability in the land market, the 
government intervened to protect small cultivators and enacted in 1911 the 'Five Feddan 
Law' that forbade the foreclosures of the owners of five feddan of land or less. Such 
immunity from seizure for debts did protect small landowners but, at the same time, it 
had a negative impact on their financing arrangements. They could not obtain credit from 
the Agricultural Bank as they were unable to provide the required collateral. Small 
cultivators and landowners again had to rely on local money lenders. " Moreover, the 
Agricultural Bank, as a result of the Five Feddan Law, lost 85% of its business. The 
bank struggled during the subsequent years with a continuing decline of its activities as 
12 See Issawl (1963), p. 260, footnote 1. 
13 See Hansen (1991), p. 52. 
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the total amount of loans fell from £E 7 million in 1911/12 to as low as £E 0.5 million 
in 1931/32. This led eventually to the liquidation of the bank in 1936" 
The predominance of small scale farming and the evident requirement for relatively cheap 
short term credit more than any other form, emphasised, again, the need for a financial 
institution which caters for small cultivators as well as agricultural cooperative societies. 
Thus the Credit Agricole d'Egypte was established in 1931 with a capital of LE 1 million, 
of which the government subscribed one half and the other principal banks the other. The 
bank was exempted from the Five Feddans Law and utilised the services of tax collectors 
to recover loans which enabled the bank to reduce costs and ensure repayment. Interest 
rates charged were quite modest ranging between 1% and 2.5 %. 15 The bank was able to 
charge such low interest rates thanks to a special appropriation of LE 9 million provided 
by the government at a low rate of 1 %. 
The credit granted by the bank was predominantly for short term. While total credit was 
steadily increasing, from LE 16.4 million in 1953, LE 17.4 in 1954 to 19.6 in 1955, 
medium term and long term credit did not exceed in any year LE 0.5 million16. Long term 
loans (3-10 years) were mainly for agricultural machinery and land improvement 
Nonetheless, the bank developed rapidly, and by 1940 it had over 100 branches and 500 
barns distributed all over the country. It extended its activities to supply fertilizers and 
collect grain and increased its advances to cooperatives from 5% in 1933 to 29 % in 1940. 
In 1948 the capital of the bank increased by £E 0.5 million, half of which was subscribed 
by the government and the rest by rural and consumer cooperatives. The bank's name 
14 NBE (1948), op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
15 
See Issawi (1963), p. 260-261. 
16 
See All (1958), p. 65. 
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changed to Agricultural and Cooperative Credit Bank to emphasise its cooperative 
function. This function developed as the bank gradually channelled its credit through the 
cooperative societies which increased from 38% in 1956 to 50% in 1958 and 84% in 
1960. " 
3.2.3 Industrial Credit: The case of Bank Misr 
As shown in table (1) above, until 1920 several foreign banks were operating in Egypt 
in addition to the NBE which was legally considered an Egyptian bank, despite the fact 
that it was founded with British capital. The conditions of the First World War and the 
outbreak of the Egyptian revolution in 1919 inspired a campaign to establish a pure 
Egyptian bank as a necessary element of economic independence. " 
Further it was realised that the operating banks with their concentration on short term 
financing for cotton and foreign trade did not cater for the growing needs for long term 
industrial credit. Hence Bank Misr was founded in 1920 with an initial capital of £E 80 
thousand raised to £E 1 million under a precise condition that only Egyptians could be 
shareholders and members of the board of directors. The capital of the bank was 
subscribed by 126 shareholders; mainly large landowners and big merchants who 
benefited from the economic boom which followed the World War 1.19 
In ten years the volume of deposits increased from £E 200 thousand to LE 7 million in 
1930 to an impressive total of £E 54 million in 1947 reflecting the confidence of the 
17 
Issawi, op. cit. p. 262. 
18 The idea of establishing a pure Egyptian bank dates back to the period following the crisis of 1907 and was discussed in the Parliament 
in 1911 which passed a recommendation of establishing such a bank but without success. It was Talat Harb Pasha, a leading economic 
figure who adopted the idea and started a campaign in 1919 to establish the first pure Egyptian bank which was officially inaugurate in 
May 1920. (see Deeb (1976), p. 70, and for a discussion of the main political developments of this period and its economic implications 
see Tignor (1976) and Davis (1983). 
19 Davis (1983), op. cit., pp. 108-109 and Deeb (1976), pp. 70-71. 
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public and the progressing function of the bank which became second only to the NBE20. 
It is worth noticing that the Bank received support from the government which took the 
form of annexing Post Office Savings accounts to it in 1927. By this move the 
contribution of small deposits in financing the activities of the bank increased remarkably 
till it reached a peak of approximately 75 % of total deposits in 1939. 
Bank Misr was influenced by the German banking system and its role in the rapid 
expansion of German industry and trade after 1880. The concept of a Grossbank or a 
universal bank inspired the founders of Bank Misr to apply this idea in Egypt21. However 
we can distinguish between two main methods adopted by Bank Misr in supporting 
domestic industry. 
0 First, it was able to take direct participation in the ownership of companies. 
Through its affiliated companies of Misr Group, the bank played an impressive 
role in the early industrialisation of the country. The number of these companies 
reached 27 in 1940 ranging from dairy products, fisheries to spinning and 
weaving, insurance to airlines covering the Middle East region. The aggregate 
paid-up capital of the affiliated companies was £E 20 million. 22 
" Second, it was able to provide loans and advances. In addition to participation in 
their capital, Bank Misr advanced credit to some of its affiliated companies. For 
example in 1936, seven Misr companies received LE 1.5 million. Further, the 
bank borrowed from the government from 1932 to 1939 an aggregate amount of 
LE 1.1 million mainly to finance its affiliated companies. 23 
20ibid., 
p. 145. 
21ibid., 
p. 97. 
221ssawi 
(1963), p. 274. 
23ibid., 
265. 
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However, the massive spread of Bank Misr's activities involved high risks and the bank 
started to face difficulties in the late 1930s. One of Bank Misr affiliated companies was 
the Societe Fonciere d'Egypte which was taken over by the bank in 1927. This financial 
company, following an agreement with the government in 1930, took over the debts of 
landlords who were faced with foreclosure as a result of their inability to pay mortgages 
secured on their lands. Due to the continuing drop in cotton prices, outstanding loans 
were not paid to the Societe Fonciere and Bank Misr, as a holding company, was held 
responsible. 
Moreover, due to the bank's continued practice of short term borrowing and long term 
lending, " the bank suddenly found itself facing a run by numerous depositors of the Post 
Office Savings accounts and other small depositors when the hostilities of World War II 
started in 1939. The problem was severe as small deposit accounts comprised 75 % of the 
Bank's total deposits of LE 12.7 million. However the government, under public 
pressure, intervened to alleviate the bank's difficulties by guaranteeing its deposits and 
ordering the NBE to provide Bank Misr with the required liquidity. 25 
The new management of the bank which took over after the crisis of 1939, for political 
reasons, was not keen to continue the support of the bank that was competing with 
foreign capital within the Egyptian economy. It was concerned mainly with extracting 
profit from the bank and its affiliated companies. The distinctive role of Bank Misr 
started to vanish and the bank effectively lost its raison d'etre. 26 
24 Issawi (1963), p. 265. 
u 
It worth noting that the NBE was reluctant at the beginning to assist Bank Misr as there was political conflict between the management 
of the two banks. The government under public pressure agreed to help Bank Misr out from this crisis with a condition that Harb Pasha, 
the founder of the Bank, should resign from his position as a managing director. See Shafi'i (1985), op. cit., p. 315 and Davis (1983), 
op. cit 166-169. 
26See 
Deeb (1976), p. 79. 
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However, after the end of the Second World War the need for industrial credit to small 
and medium size enterprises was again recognised, especially when Bank Misr ended up 
acting like the rest of commercial banks. Thus in 1947 the Industrial Bank was 
established with 51% of its capital owned by the government, 30% subscribed by the 
operating banks and 20% were in form of shares held by the public. The government 
guaranteed a minimum of 3.5 % of the nominal values of the shares as profits. The aim 
of the bank was to widen the industrial base by establishing small enterprises or advance 
credit to them. Until early 1950s the bank was not able to fulfil its objectives. It advanced 
credit to relatively big projects which were able, anyhow, to obtain credit from 
commercial banks and was reluctant to advance credit to newly established small projects 
because of high risk associated with their activities. 27 
3.2.4 The origins of central banking in Egypt: 
As noted previously the NBE, since its establishment in 1898, acted as the bank of the 
government, a private note-issuing bank, and financial adviser to the government. But the 
NBE was not fuiictioning as a bankers' bank, last resort lender or controller of credit 
supply through discount rates and open market operations28. 
The powers of the NBE as a central bank were not fully or legally defined. Because there 
was no law governing its central banking functions, most of the problems were solved 
through the so-called 'Gentlemen's Agreements' with the managements of the operating 
29 banks. 
27Doghaim 
(1989), pp. 135-137. 
28 See Issawi (1963), op. cit., p. 266. 
29 An example of these Gentlemen's agreements was the one reached with the clearing houses in Cairo and Alexandria in 1943 which 
resulted in keeping 15 % in cash or deposits with the NBE as a temporary arrangement during the war period. Hansen and Marzouk (1965), 
p. 215. 
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Part of Central Bank work was undertaken as well by the Conference des Banques. This 
association was created in Alexandria in' 1937 by an initiative of Credit Lyonnais3° to 
render several objects, among them: 
" Establishing and maintaining regular relations between the member banks. 
" Making the rules of the profession as uniform as possible. 
" Studying as a group the laws, decrees and regulations relating to the profession. 
" Exchanging information regarding the solvency and 'morality' of clients and 
traders. 31 
Moreover the Conference des Banques, in which the NBE was just an observer, was 
responsible for determining tariffs charged for banking services. 
The need for a fully-fledged central bank with clearly defined functions was reflected in 
a draft law prepared for issuance in 1940 giving the NBE officially the status of the 
Central Bank of the state and empowering it with more functions. 32 However, the 
developments of the Second World War and the occupation of the government with war- 
time problems postponed the issuance of the law. 
Further problems arose when post war difficulties of Britain raised some questions about 
the issue of linking the Egyptian pound with the sterling. After the war Britain was 
indebted to Egypt to a total of £430 million33. These sterling balances were a pressing 
issue as they could not be converted into goods. Converting debt to goods and financial 
services was the solution for the £100-£150 million accumulated for Egypt after the First 
30 
There were 16 founder banks of the association some of them disappeared because of sequestration during World War II and the banks 
were: the Ottoman Bank, Comptoir National, d'Escompte de Paris, Credit Lyonnais, Banco Italo Egiziano, National Bank of Greece, Bank 
of Athens, Ionian Bank, Banque Beige pour l'Etranger, Bank Misr, Commercial Bank of Egypt, Commercial Bank of Near East Ltd., 
Banca Commerciale Italiana, Barclays Bank, Dresdner Bank, Turkiye Is Bankasi and Yokohama Specie Bank. 
31 NBE (1948), op. cit., pp. 102-103 
32 Draft of the Royal decree of June 1940. 
33 
This debt was accumulated during the war as a result of the continuing increase in the difference between British troops spending, financed by the Egyptian government, than British exports to Egypt. 
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World War. Applying the same solution was not possible because of the magnitude of the 
balances of Egypt and other members of the Sterling Area on one hand, and the economic 
difficulties of Britain in the 1940s on the other. 
The sterling balances represented Egypt's main monetary reserves that would protect the 
economy from adverse trade shocks. Further the NBE held 30.5 %34 of these balances as 
a cover for the local note issue. Thus the attempts to scale down the debt, as proposed 
by the British government, were strongly refused because of fear of severe repercussions 
on the monetary stability and the economy. In an attempt to solve the problem several 
agreements were reached-but not applied. However, Britain blocked most of the sterling 
balances and suspended the convertibility of sterling. Confidence in sterling was shaken 
and provoked the Egyptian calls for leaving the Sterling Area. This eventually took place 
in 1947.35 
Thus the need for a fully-fledged central bank - with adequate monetary instruments 
emerged to take control of the new monetary system and to deal with inflation which was 
caused by the war and the problem of the sterling balances. These developments led first 
to the promulgation of Law no 119 of 1948 which authorised the issuance of Treasury 
bills of up to £E 50 million. These T bills were managed by the NBE and used for 
covering banknotes and the financing of cotton. Second, in 1951 Law no. 57 was passed 
to grant the NBE legal status as a central bank authorised to regulate the volume of 
credit, maintain monetary stability and supervise the banking units in the economy. 
34 
The distribution £430 million of sterling balances owed to Egypt was as follows: 30.5% for the note issuance department of the NBE; 
48.8% for the department of banking operations of the NBE; 10% for other banks; 10.7% for individuals and non financial institutions, 
see Shafi'i (1985), table (4) p. 205. 
35 
For an analysis of the Egyptian monetary system in the aftermath of World War II and the problem of sterling balances, see Shafi'i 
(1985), op. cit., pp. 189-227 and NBE (1948). op. cit. pp. 95-119. 
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As a result the NBE, which was increasingly Egyptianised since 1940 in terms of 
management and capital, remained a private commercial bank. However under the new 
law the NBE was prevented from undertaking small commercial operations and from 
making advances with the deposited funds with it that belong to other commercial banks36. 
The main instruments used by the bank for controlling the credit market in those early 
days setting of reserve ratios of the commercial banks along with the direct undertaking 
of some commercial business. 37 However the determination of deposit interest rates until 
1957 was left to the Conference des Banques38. 
(3.3) The second phase 1952-1974: 
3.3.1 Egyptianisation: 
During the early years after the 1952 revolution the new government, under General 
Muhammad Naguib, was trying to assure foreign investment about the stability of the 
economy. Thus the banking system did not observe any unusual changes regarding its 
structure, activities or the ownership of its institutions. 39 Nevertheless the Suez Crisis of 
1956 led to the subsequent radical measures of Egyptianisation by the government, under 
Nasser, in 1957. 
We have shown above that there were some Egyptianisation attempts in the past, even 
before the 1952 revolution. The most important of these were the establishment of Bank 
Misr in 1920 and the Egyptianisation of the management and capital of the NBE during 
36 See Issawi (1963), op. cit, pp. 266-267 and Ali (1958), op. cit., p. 69. 
37See 
Hansen and Marzouk (1965), op. cit, p. 215. 
38 All (1958), op. cit., pp. 62-62 reports that in 1955 the Egyptian Bankers Association reduced interest rates on notice deposits from 
2-2.5 percent to 1 percent and on time deposits from 3.75-4 percent to 2.5 percent. 
39 For an analysis of economic and institutional changes during this period see Mabro (1974), chapter (6). 
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the 1940s. 4° However the measures of Egyptianisation, established by Law 22/1957, were 
far more substantial than any thing that went before. The law stipulated that all operating 
British and French banks should be sequestrated. The rest of the operating banks had to 
take the form of joint stock companies, within five years. The paid-up capital of operating 
banks should not be less than £E 500 thousand, in the form of shares owned by 
Egyptians. 
Small banks which could not fulfil the capital requirements under the new law, either 
joined one of the Egyptian banks or closed down. As a result of these measures the 
number of banks decreased from 35 in 1957 to 27 in 1958.4' 
3.3.2 Enhancing the Central Bank's authority: 
Further the government felt that it had to assume more control over the credit market, so 
the NBE as a Central Bank was granted more power by the Law No. 163 of 1957. 
Determining interest and discount rates now became the right of the NBE42. We 
mentioned above that setting interest rates was left previously to the League of Egyptian 
Banks, which succeeded the Conference des Banques in 1953. The bank's supervisory 
authority was confirmed, as registration of banks, the opening of new branches and 
mergers were all put under its charge. The NBE was entitled as well to use reserve and 
liquidity ratios to control the credit market. 
40 On the 16th of July 1939 the Minister of Finance, sent an explanatory note included the following: '.. The government hopes to see the 
day when the majority of the share holders [of the NBE] will be Egyptians and trusts that this will come in the not too distant future... It 
would have been possible for the government to Egyptianise the capital of the bank by buying all or part of its shares. But it is evident 
that such an operation is beyond our financial resources... With regard to the Egyptianisation of the bank in other directions, ..., 
We have 
stipulated that the recruitment of the bank staff will be limited to Egyptians, except in special case... We have made likewise that the Board 
should have a majority of members of Egyptian nationality ... Foreign directors shall 
be replaced by Egyptians whenever a seat becomes 
vacant-Finally We have provided that the President of the Board shall be an Egyptian. " See the translation of this explanatory note in NBE 
(1948), op. cit., pp. 85-88. 
41 See NBE (1974), pp. 10-15 & p. 19 and Issawi (1963), op. cit., pp. 249-251. 
42 Issawi, (1963), p. cit., p 268. 
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It was recognised that some of the functions of the League of Egyptian banks conflicted 
with those of the NBE as a Central Bank. Hence the law tried to organise the structure 
and role of the former. First it made its membership limited to commercial banks only. 
Second, it put a condition that all the decisions of the league should be authorised by the 
NBE. Consequently the role of the new League of Commercial Banks in the operations 
of the banking system and monetary policy became a trivial one. It was left mainly with 
the role of undertaking banking studies through its technical committee. "' 
3.3.3 Nationalisation: 
Under Law 40 of 1960 both the NBE and Bank Misr were nationalised by converting 
their shares to government bonds44which could be redeemed after a minimum of 12 years. 
While the nationalisation of the NBE was justified by the fact that it was the State Central 
Bank, the nationalisation of Bank Misr was mainly because of the government's anxiety 
to obtain control over its affiliated companies. However, one year later, all banks were 
nationalised, under Law no. 117 for 1961 which was one of a group of laws nationalising 
the main economic establishments in the country to safeguard the creation of a centrally 
planned economic system as claimed at the time". 
In 1961 the NBE was divided into two banks; one kept the same name and carried on as 
a commercial bank and the other was called the Central Bank of Egypt (henceforth CBE). 
In 1963, a 'Public Organisation of Banks' was formed, replacing the League of 
Commercial Banks, to assist the CBE in controlling and supervising the banking units. 
To avoid dualism in activities, this organisation was later abolished and the CBE acquired 
43Doghaim 
(1989), op. cit., pp. 46-50. 
44 
Note that Law 263/1957 determined that distributed profits not to exceed 20% of the nominal value of the shares of NBE. Under the 
new Law 40/1960 shares were converted to bonds bearing just 5% interest. 
45 See Chapter (1) of this thesis for an analysis of the main changes in economic policy in Egypt. 
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its supervisory functions in 1964. However the Technical Committee which was 
established by the organisation was left intact to play a consultative role. 
3.3.4 The structure of the banking system after nationalisation: 
Figure (3.1) below shows the development of the Egyptian banking structure, in terms 
of the number of operating banks, between 1961 and 1974. After liquidating some of the 
small banks and merging others, by the end of 1963 the banking system consisted of only 
five public commercial banks: the NBE, Bank Misr, Banque du Caire, Bank of 
Alexandria and Port Said Bank; in addition to five specialised banks: an agricultural bank, 
an industrial bank and three real estate banks. 
Figure (3.1) 
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Source: The Economic Review of the CBE, several issues. 
In 1971 several banks were merged: the Industrial Bank into the Bank of Alexandria, Port 
Said Bank into Bank Misr and the Credit Hypothecaire d'Egypte into the Credit Foncier 
Egyptien46. By 1974 there was just four commercial banks and three specialised banks, 
in addition to 3 unregistered banks with the CBE, which were the only banks established 
during this period. The first of these unregistered banks was the Arab African Bank 
46 See NBE (1974), op. cit., p. 19. 
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which was established in 1964 in the form of a joint stock company, its dealings were 
confined to foreign currencies. The second bank was Nasser Social Bank which was 
established in 1971 with the aim of promoting social cooperation and solidarity. Nasser 
Social Bank is officially classified as an Islamic bank. One of its important functions was 
the collection of alms tax and charities to assist poor families by helping them to 
establishing small projects. The third unregistered bank was the International Arab Bank 
and its dealings were restricted to foreign currencies47. 
3.3.5 Sectoral and functional specialisation: 
Under central planning and the domination of public sector, most of loanable funds 
mobilised by banks had to be directed towards financing budget deficits and public sector 
projects48. However the government found it necessary to determine how this financing 
should be achieved. First in 1964 a system of sectoral specialisation among the 
commercial banks was put forward. Under this system each economic sector had to 
concentrate its transactions within one particular bank of the five nationalised commercial 
banks. 49 
The government believed that by concentrating the operations of a sector with a particular 
bank, the latter would gain a deeper knowledge about the requirements of the sector. This 
would help the planning institutions and the government in investigating the aspects of 
strength and weakness in the sectors concerned. It is worth noting too that due to the 
heavy seasonal financial requirements of main crops, such as cotton and rice, their 
47See 
CBE (1984) , p. 285 and note that exemption from registration with the central bank means exemption from banking, credit and 
exchange rate control laws. 
48See 
the following chapter (6) for an analysis of bank finance of public sector projects and budget deficit. 
49Under 
the sectoral specialisation system each bank was assigned some sectors to finance: 
Thus: Bank Misr specialised in textiles, weaving and light industries; 
the NBE was responsible for financing land reform projects , transportation, defence, 
Suez Canal, Railways and communications; 
Bank of Alexandria specialised in financing industrial companies and the Public Organisation of Petroleum; 
Bank du Caire financed foreign trade, housing and public utilities, information and tourism; 
Bank of Port Said was responsible for financing domestic trade, health and pharmaceutical industry. See Refaie (1989), p. 3. 
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financing was exempted from the sectoral specialisation system and all banks participated 
in covering their credit requirements. The system as well did not cover the private sector 
as its members were free to select the bank they wished to deal with, regardless of their 
activities" 
After -eight years of its establishment in 1964, the government realised that the sectoral 
system was not practical and replaced it with another controversial system known as a 
functional specialisation system in 1971. Under this system, each bank had to serve a 
specific economic activity. For example the NBE specialised in foreign trade in addition 
to issuing and servicing savings certificates; Bank Misr specialised in local trade and 
agricultural crops; and Bank of Alexandria, in which the Industrial Bank was merged, 
handled all the agricultural and industrial activities. Financing the services sector was the 
responsibility of Banque Du Caire, while the Credit Foncier Egyptien specialised in the 
construction and housing sectors'. 
This system, like its predecessor was not based on any theoretical framework or practical 
guideline. It was merely an artificial specialisation experiment. 52 Effectively, banks were 
granted monopolistic positions in providing credit to economic activities assigned to the 
respective banks. The banking system consequently suffered from lack of competition and 
there were calls from the public sector companies to be left free to choose their sources 
of credit. From the banking system side, there was also a demand for equal opportunities, 
as it was felt that some banks were allocated more profitable activities than others. As a 
50 CBE (1984) , p. 284. 
51 SEE CBE (1984), op. cit., pp. 286-287, and NBE (1989), pp. 241-242. 
52 
The two failing systems of sectoral and functional specialisation were two examples of similar ill fated economic decisions that were 
taken without careful study during this period. Hansen and Nashashibi (1975), p. 8, describe the economic system of the 1960s by 
highlighting that 'It is not clear, however, what the logic of this new system was. Behind the sweeping changes there was no carefully 
elaborated, coherent, economic and social philosophy'. 
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result this system had to be abolished few years later, in 1975, as part of the introduction 
of an open-door policy as discussed below. 
(3.4) The third phase 1974-1991 
3.4.1 Partial liberalisation of the banking sector: 
The period of war economy, 1967-1973, witnessed the cancelling of the second five year 
plan, as economic resources were directed to warfare. This period left the economy with 
a massive trade deficit and an immense shortage of financial resources needed for 
rebuilding what the two wars had destroyed and restructuring the malfunctioning 
economy. It was realised that an improvement in the structure of the banking system and 
an associated' reform of credit policy was essential in order to find new resources of 
finance and encourage the private and foreign capital to participate in the development 
process. Hence the government started to adopt in 1974 what has become known as the 
Infitah or open door policy. " 
The Infitah policy which was accompanied with a windfall of external resources stemming 
from oil exports, workers' remittances, tourism, the Suez Canal revenues and foreign 
assistance had a radical impact on the banking system and structure. Under the Investment 
Law 43 for 1974 and its amendments by Law 32 for 1977, banks were no longer subject 
to the exclusive Egyptian management rules of the 1960s. Foreign capital was allowed 
to participate in joint-venture commercial banks, under the no-less-than 51 % national 
ownership condition. 
In an effort to overcome obstacles and eliminate restrictions hindering the banks from 
achieving the targets of the open-door policy, Law 120 for 1975 was issued. It was 
promulgated with a view to defining the legal status of the CBE and its supervisory and 
53 See our discussion of this policy in Chapter (1). 
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regulatory powers over the banking system; giving the banking system more freedom in 
conducting its business; reinforcing the Central Bank's ability to manage monetary policy; 
freeing bankers from the laws, decrees and restrictions applicable to government and 
public sectors employees; and enabling the nationalised banks to compete with those 
established under Law 43/1974. 
According to Law 120/1975, the CBE's role was re-enforced by more provisions than 
those given to it by Law 163/1957. The Central Bank became an independent legal 
authority, vested with more powers for defining monetary and credit policies and 
supervising implementations in accordance with the national plan. S4 It is worth noting that 
as a result of a provision in the Civil Code banning the application of interest rates 
exceeding the rate of 7 %, the CBE had not been able to use effectively interest rates in 
its monetary and credit policies. But with the enactment of Law 120/1975, the CBE was 
enabled to determine discount rates as well as creditors and debtors interest rates. 
Consequently the CBE made successive and gradual increases in the interest rate structure 
ranging between 1% to 3% each time during this period. " 
After a series of undisciplined actions by some banks which embarked on rash 
competition to attract the biggest number of clients, along with the increase and spread 
of banking units, it became necessary to amend the two laws 163/1957 and 120/1975. 
Thus in March 1984 Law 50/1984 on the central bank and the banking system was 
promulgated. The law established explicit and firm rules to prevent exploitation of power 
by members of board of directors of banks and gave the Minister of Economy, on the 
recommendation of the governor of the CBE, the right to veto the appointments of 
54 
In order to reinforce the CBE independence and its stability Law 120/1975 stipulates that the CBE Governor shall not be dismissed 
during his term of office and an annual report has to be submitted by him to the People's Assembly within 3 months from the end of fiscal 
year. 
55 See our analysis of interest rate policy and its impact in chapters (6) and (7). 
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members of these boards. Also under this law no bank may grant any single client credit 
facilities exceeding 25% of its paid-up capital and reserves" 
3.4.2 The development of banking structure: 
As discussed above the Infitah laws encouraged the establishment of foreign and joint 
venture banks. Hence the number of operating banks increased rapidly from 7 banks in 
1974 to 101 banks in 1991. Figures (3.2) below show the development of the number and 
type of operating banks during this period. 
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As shown in figure (3.3), at the beginning of 1991 the banking structure consisted of 44 
commercial banks, four of which were public; 33 investment and merchant banks, of 
which 22 were branches of foreign banks. This was in addition to 21 specialised banks, 
which included one industrial bank, two real estate, and 18 agricultural banks based in 
governorates, including the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit. 
Three banks were not registered with the CBE57. 
56 This ban does not apply to governmental bodies public authorities or state owned companies. 
57 These three banks were: Arab International Bank; Nasser Social Bank and Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company. 
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Source: NBE (1991), p. 65. 
The increase in the number of banks also resulted in a rise of the number of branches 
which reached a total number of 1133 branches in 1991, including the 146 branches of 
the 17 affiliates of the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit. SB 
However the banking densityS9 was still quite modest. The average of banking density in 
Egypt in 1991 was 0.2 which is not remarkably better than that of 1967 in the peek of 
nationalisation and government control which was 0.1560. Moreover due to the 
concentration of branches in Cairo, Alexandria, and the Suez Canal Governorates, 21 of 
the 26 governorates had a bank density of less than 0.5. The bank density ranged from 
58See 
CBE, annual report 1990/91, p. 132 
59Bank 
density - (Number of branches *10000) /Total population. A density of 1 is high, . 
5-1 moderate and below .5 
is low, see 
Cameron (1967), p. 296. 
60 Number of branches from CBE (1968), p. 2 and population figure from CAPMAS. 
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a minimum of 0.09 in the Governorate of Beni-Suef to a maximum of 1.25 in the two 
governorates of North and South Sinai and was 0.48 in Cairo. 61 
Moreover branches of the public sector commercial banks dominate the banking system, 
as they accounted for 58.5 % of total branches. The dominance of the public sector is 
emphasised when we take into account public banks' participation in joint-venture banks 
which is enforced by bank laws. In terms of bank assets, public sector commercial banks 
account for 55 % and the public specialised banks account for 7 %. Other commercial and 
business banks account for 38%. Thus the share of the public sector reached 62% of total 
assets in 1991, excluding its part in joint-venture banks. 62 
This structure of the banking system and the geographic concentration of branches 
indicate a highly segmented market and lack of competition. The relatively large branch 
networks of a few public sector banks allow them to dominate the process of savings 
mobilisation from the public. Other banks target mainly big savers. Financial services are 
still basic with very limited innovation, though joint-venture banks were in a better 
position. Lack of innovation and limited instruments are attributed mainly to three factors: 
1. Lack of competition, and banks' control over different segments of the market 
according to an implicit distribution of activities; e. g. public banks serve public 
sector enterprises and cater for small savers in the Delta and Upper Egypt and 
other regions; private banks care for upscale customers and are allowed to have 
a share in the relatively active markets of Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said. 
2. Restrictive measures applied by the CBE regarding the charges for banking 
services did not make financial innovation viable or worthwhile. 
61See EI-Refaie (1989), p. 6. 
62See World Bank (1992), vol 2, p. 27. 
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3. The virtual absence of active money and capital markets, which is analysed 
further in the following section, has prevented banks from diversifying their 
instruments according to risk and maturity. 
Lending by public and other banks has been effectively controlled by the CBE through 
different measures such as ceilings on interest rate and credit control as discussed in 
chapter (6). The remaining amount of credit left to the discretion of banks was directed 
mainly to relatively large enterprises. Lending to small and medium-sized projects 
suffered from a lack of information and collateral. Further under financial repression, as 
discussed further below, there was a tendency to lend according to non-price criteria 
when interest ceilings are binding. Applied lending criteria in such conditions, included 
the reputation of the client, size of loan and political pressure making large enterprises 
more likely to obtain credit. 
3.4.3 Financial deepening: 
The hypothesised positive link between financial development and economic growth dates 
back to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations as he emphasised that the positive contribution 
of the establishment of banks to the increase of trade of the city of Glasgow. 63 Shaw 
(1973) argued that financial deepening' is a necessary prerequisite for economic growth. 
Financial deepening is usually measured as a ratio of domestic liquidity M2 to the GDP. 
Figure (3.4) gives an account of the development of financial deepening in Egypt over 
the period 1960-90. 
63Adam 
Smith (1976), p. 315. 
64 Financial deepening defined as the accumulation of financial assets at a pace faster than accumulation of non-financial wealth", Shaw 
(1973), p. vii. 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbooks, 1989-1992. 
Figure (3.4) shows that the quasi money65 component of M2 increased during the 1960-90 
period at the expense of M166. In 1960 quasi money as a percentage of M2 was as' low 
as 16.5%. However the ratio improved gradually after the mid-1970s and in 1982 it was 
half of M2 and in 1990 the ratio reached 68.2% of M2. The main reason explaining the 
steady decline of the share of M1 in M2 was the persistent inflation under which the 
components of Ml. i. e. currency in circulation and non-remunerated demand deposits 
cannot be highly desirable assets. 
On the other hand we realise that the M2/GDP ratio increased, showing an upward trend, 
from its modest levels of the 1960s and 1970s averaged 38.0% and 45.2, respectively to 
a high average of 91.95 during the 1980s. The ratio reached its highest level in 1990 at 
104.6%. The ratio is considered high in Egypt given its stage of development and 
compared with other LDCs in its income group. 
65 Quasi money comprises time and savings deposits; line 35 of the IFS. 
66 M1 is defined as money outside banks and demand deposits, line 34 of the IFS.. 
Figure (3.4) 
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Table (3.2) 
M2 as percentage of GDP in selected countries 
Country 1965 1970 1980 1985 1990 
Egypt 35.3 33.5 47.4 76.0 93.2 
Indonesia NA 7.8 13.7 22.7 36.2 
Sri Lanka 31.4 22.0 32.9 35.6 32.6 
Morocco 29.4 31.1 46.7 50.7 50.5" 
Turkey 23.0 27.9 16.7 24.4 21.3 
Brazil 20.8 23.0 17.3 21.8 NA 
Mexico 27.0 26.9 28.3 26.6 20.4 
France 54.5 57.8 70.7 69.9 76.2" 
Germany 46.1 52.8 60.3 63.6 66.6 
UK 49.0 49.2 46.4 61.0 NA 
USA 65.0 60.4 60.6 67.4 66.6 
Japan 98.9 94.7 134.0 157.3 183.1 
Source: World Bank, World Development Reports, 1987,1991,1992 and 1994 
* Data are for 1989. 
As shown in table (3.2), Egypt had high M2/GDP values compared with those reported 
for selected developed and developing countries. For all the selected years it had the 
highest M2/GDP among the developing countries group. In 1990 the ratio in Egypt was 
even higher than that of developed countries and only second to Japan. 
However some factors should be considered when figures for financial deepening in 
Egypt are considered. First, because of the high degree of money substitution, mainly 
dollarization, during the 1980s, the share of foreign currency deposits in M2 increased 
significantly. As shown in figure (3.5) the holdings of foreign currency deposits increased 
from 22.8% of M2 in 1980 to 46.1% by 1990. The issue of money substitution is 
discussed further below. 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbooks, 1989 and 1992. 
Second, the value of M2 denominated in Egyptian pounds increased dramatically because 
of the devaluation policy adopted in the 1980s. The exchange rate against the dollar, at 
which foreign deposits were valued, fell from 1.42 in 1980 to 0.5 in 1990. Accordingly 
the corresponding value of these deposits in Egyptian pounds increased and this was 
reflected in such high ratio of M2 to GDP. 
Figure (3.5) 
The importance of foreign 
deposits in domestic liquidity M2 
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(3.5) Main problems of the banking system: 67 
3.5.1 Preferential treatment of the public sector: 
In principal, all banks in Egypt were treated equally as they were governed by the same 
regulations, and supervised by the same authority. In practice there were various aspects 
of preferential treatment of public sector banks; we provide below some examples: 
1. Branch authorization during the 1970s and 1980s favoured the public sector. 
When the CBE in the late 1980s adopted a strict policy to control the number of 
branches, the number of branches per public bank was significantly higher than 
that of other banks. The biggest joint-venture bank had 20 branches while the 
biggest public bank had 342 branches. 68 
2. The design of credit ceilings favoured public sector banks as they were imposed 
on activities mainly undertaken by private banks, like credit to the commercial 
sector. However we argue that short-term credit for the commercial sector was 
excessive and concentrated in importing consumption goods. It required some sort 
of intervention at times when the balance of payment was in its worst condition 
during the mid-1980s. 
3. Public banks had close relations with public sector enterprises in the form of 
equity stakes and membership of managing boards. Moreover regulations in some 
public authorities and government institutions did not allow the depositing of 
funds, like pension and employees' funds, with non-public banks. 
4. Payment of interest on current accounts was prohibited, benefiting public sector 
banks in two ways. First, they did not bear any costs for keeping such deposits 
67The 
author is indebted to the following bank experts and executives for invaluable discussions and useful information: 
Mr Ismail Hasan, Governor of the CBE and former chairman of Bank of Alexandria. 
Mr All Negm, Chairman of the Delta Bank, 
Mr Abdel Monem Rushdy former Chairman of the NBE, 
Mr Abdel Salam Al-Anwar, General Director of the Hongkong Bank, 
Dr Faika El-Refaie Deputy Governor of the CBE, 
Mrs Madeeha Gaber, Manager, the Nile Bank, 
Dr Hazem Al-Beblawy Chairman of the Export Development Bank. 
Mr Motaz Mansour, Managing Director of the Misr-Iran Development Bank, 
Mr Hamdy Musa, Managing Director of the Export Development Bank. 
68World Bank (1992), pp. 33-4. 
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which mainly belonged to the public sector enterprises. Second, private banks 
were not able to compete for such accounts by offering higher interest rates to 
depositors. We found that a typical public sector bank like the NBE had 27.1 % 
of total deposits in a form of current account in 1991 while the ratio in the Delta 
Bank, a joint-venture bank, was only 9.7%. 69 
3.5.2 Entry barriers: 
It is argued that contestable markets and potential firms' freedom of entry promote 
efficiency, encourage innovation and give highly favourable welfare outcomes. 70 For a 
market to be contestable there should not be any significant entry barriers. In a 
contestable environment the only way for incumbent firms to prevent additional entry is 
to give no incentive for potential entrants to do so. This can be achieved by efficient 
pricing and allocation of production among incumbent firms to eliminate significant 
excess profits. However in practice there are different barriers to entry facing potential 
firms which prevent them from joining the market even in the presence of high excess 
profits. 
Large economies of scale and high sunk costs, in addition to other entry costs are 
examples of such barriers. " But in the case of banking, government regulations through 
permits and licenses are far more important than these other barriers. 
We argue that the Egyptian banking system has suffered from two main problems. The 
first was the application of financial repression measures, like interest rate ceilings and 
directed credit which virtually prevented competition among incumbent banks. The second 
69Annual 
reports of the NBE and the Delta Bank 1991. 
70For 
an analysis of contestable markets see Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982). 
71 On entry barriers see Bain (1956) and Tirole (1989), chapter (8). 
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was the use of restrictive regulations that prevented new entry and made the incumbent 
banks far from being contestable. The first issue is analysed is some detail in chapter (6). 
Here we 'address the second issue. 
As shown above the banking system, after a series of Egyptianisation and nationalisation 
measures in the 1950s and 1960s, was left with four publicly owned commercial banks 
and five specialised banks. The market was highly concentrated. Competition was limited 
further by the application of sectoral and, then, functional specialisation which made the 
system a sectoral based mono-bank one. 
The introduction of Infitah policy and the establishment of a large number of private and 
joint-venture banks resulted in an increase in the number of banking units without a 
significant decrease in market concentration. As mentioned above, according to the 
banking law, public banks had the majority of joint-venture banks, so we find that more 
than 90% of the assets of the commercial banks are publicly owned. 72 The domination of 
public banks in a highly concentrated market resulted in frail competition and limited 
innovation in spite of the infitah. 
The main reasons behind restrictive regulations regarding new entry can be summarised 
by five factors: 
1. Concerns about "cream skimming" by private and foreign banks. It is argued that 
the higher profits obtained by foreign banks in Egypt can be explained by cream 
skimming as these banks concentrated their activities in the low risk-high profit 
segments in the market. Whether high profits resulted from cream skimming or 
more efficient banking is debatable and requires evidence which cannot be 
obtained from bank reports. 
72See World Bank (1992), vol 2, p. 4. 
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2. Fear of acquiring dominant positions in the domestic market. This is a usual 
concern raised for political reasons and can be justified on these grounds. 
However we argue that preventing banks from entering the market is not a 
suitable solution, while applying anti-trust measures may be a better approach to 
this problem. 
3. Concern about hit and run activities. Foreign and, to some extent, private banks 
are accused of -a lack of commitment and that also they withdraw their activities 
at the first sight of problems. Further the withdrawal of large international banks 
from the market may be unjustifiably taken as a sign of problems and instability 
in the domestic market as a whole which in turn may have a devastating impact 
on the banking environment. The negative expectations and apprehension that 
followed the recent withdrawal of some American and European banks from the 
market lends support to this argument. In reality the problems in the home 
markets of the foreign banks are often behind their withdrawal rather than the 
difficulties in the Egyptian market. 73 
4. Protecting the interests of the incumbent banks, especially the public ones. Unlike 
other arguments, this one is hard to defend. The response to competition cannot 
be through protecting inefficient banks but rather by improving their efficiency 
and eliminating the restrictive intervention of the CBE in their decision making 
and activities. 
5. Concerns about allocating most of the domestically mobilised funds abroad. This 
argument is a widespread complaint in LDCs against foreign banks. 71 However 
in the case of Egypt we did not find that public banks were significantly different 
from foreign ones regarding the geographic allocation of resources. In 1990,60 % 
of foreign currency deposits in the banking system were allocated abroad, while 
73 Example of sudden withdrawal of foreign banks is that of Chase Manhattan Bank in mid 1980s and Bank of America in 1994. 
74For 
a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of the role of foreign banks see Drake (1980), pp. 158-165. 
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in 1992 the ratio was as high as 77 %. 's This finding does not defend foreign 
banks as much as it criticises the pattern of allocation of funds by the banking 
system as a whole including the CBE. 76 Again we do not find the prohibition of 
entry in the market a remedy for this problem which requires, among other 
things, improvement in investment opportunities in the domestic market and an 
enhancement of its stability. 
3.5.3 The absence of an adequate exit mechanism: 
We argue that an efficient market is not achievable in the absence of an adequate exist 
mechanism. In Egypt banks were not allowed to collapse. Alas this policy was given 
effect not through prudential policy or measures that enhance the efficiency of banks. 
Instead, weak banks were allowed to continue in business using support from the CBE 
and the rest of the banking system. Fear of a public misunderstanding that the failure of 
bank may imply that others will follow in the future, made the banking system adopt a 
form of collective self-preservation. According to this approach insolvent banks were left 
to operate through support from the banking system, while adequate measures like 
restructuring, merging or liquidation were not applied. This policy resulted in the 
following: 
" First, encouragement of inefficient banks to continue their violation of credit 
standards by indulging in high risk lending and bidding for deposits. Even under 
the application of interest ceilings, a bank like the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International, which was registered in Egypt as a joint-venture bank was paying 
a higher interest rate on deposits, than the rest of banks, by 0.5-1 percentage 
points, till its collapse in 1991. 
75See 
the CBE annual reports 1990 and 1992 and Al-Antary (1994), p. 13. 
76The 
CBE relies on the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to manage a significant part of its international reserves. Most of these 
reserves are in US T bills. The World Bank (1992), vol 1, pp. 80-81. 
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" Second, failure of the banks' clients to distinguish between an efficient bank and 
an inefficient one. This is because all banks are supported by an implicit rescue 
mechanism in which bad banks are cross subsidised by good ones. 
It is clear that Egypt has an implicit deposit protection scheme. Under this scheme the 
depositors of the collapsed BCCI were protected by transferring their accounts to Bank 
Misr at their full nominal values at the date of the BCCI's collapse. Registered banks 
were asked to contribute 0.5% of their deposits towards the funding of this operation in 
addition to a one billion pound interest-free loan to Bank Misr to accept the 'transfer' of 
BCCI accounts to its branches. " 
However under this implicit scheme the government is not obliged by law to protect 
deposits and the extent of coverage is left to its discretion. Moreover it is argued that a 
" well functioning [explicit] deposit insurance scheme is likely to produce faster, 
smoother, and more predictable resolutions of failing bank situations than an implicit 
system"78 Thus, it has been argued that it may be appropriate to convert this implicit 
deposit protection scheme in Egypt to an explicit one, and a deposit insurance fund is 
now under establishment. Nevertheless it is worth noting that the proposed deposit 
insurance scheme has its own drawbacks. For example explicit insurance is more costly 
than the implicit scheme. The former requires the establishment of a separate institution, 
with its own management and staff, and so high operating costs for monitoring banks and 
managing its funds. The explicit deposits insurance scheme may create a moral hazard 
problem79 and banks might be involved in riskier operations, which requires further 
771 
am indebted to Mr Ali Negm, chairman of the Delta Bank and former governor of the CBE for this piece of information. 
78 
Mal and Tally (1990), p. 44. 
79 
It has been argued that deposit insurance was largely responsible of the so frequent collapses of the S&L Institutions in the USA where 
there has been calls for reforming such scheme. See For example Jaff (1989) and White (1989) . 
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monitoring. Moreover it may discourage clients from making efforts to distinguish 
between a weak and a sound bank as both are covered by the same insurance scheme. 80 
To conclude this issue we argue that whereas it is important to remove barriers to entry, 
it is also crucial to maintain ýa reliable exit mechanism. Such arrangements are required 
along with the establishment of satisfactory prudential measures to improve the efficiency 
and the soundness of the Egyptian banking system. 
(3.6) Prudential regulation issues: 
Laissez-faire banking cannot provide a stable monetary framework or a sound financial 
system. 81 There are two arguments normally given to justify the regulation of the financial 
sector in general and the banking system in particular. 
0 First, it is argued that banks are inherently unstable and subject to interruption 
and failure. " Bank failures may generate externalities, in the form of additional 
losses born by the economic system as a whole. This requires either the 
intervention of the central bank as a lender of last resort or the establishment of 
a deposit insurance scheme, or both. Nevertheless such intervention may 
encourage banks to involve in riskier operations, which in turn requires further 
intervention to deal with this moral hazard problem, by monitoring banks and 
reducing excessive risk. 83 
" Second, the banking service is based on the acquisition of greater knowledge in 
a way that enables bankers to know much more than customers. In such cases of 
asymmetric information, conflicts of interest can frequently occur as the 
separation of the functions of bankers and customers is expensive because of the 
so For further discussion of the problems of deposit insurance and possible solutions see Dybvig (1993) and Flood (1993). 
81Park (1991), pp. 334-335. 
82ibid, 
p. 335. 
83Goodhart 
(1989), pp. 194-195 and pp. 203-204. 
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existence of high transaction costs. The customer has little power to assess the 
qualifications and monitor the performance of the professional, thus necessitating 
regulatory control. 84 
Prudential regulation, through its impact on innovation, market practices and transaction 
cost can have a far-reaching effect on the efficiency of the financial system. Prudential 
regulation differs from country to country according to its overall legal structure, social 
background, political structure and economic system. Nevertheless the claimed aim of a 
prudential policy can be summarised in preventing systematic risk and minimising 
financial instability, and assuring that intermediaries are adequately capitalised and 
professionally managed. 85 
However in financially repressed economies prudential principles and the quality of 
supervision might be sacrificed in the cause of channelling loanable funds to priority 
projects and funding budget deficit. Moreover in such circumstances prudential measures 
may be confronted with conflicting goals and the role of prudential policy may be ill- 
defined, which, in turn, would impair the safety and soundness of the banking system. 
i) Capital adequacy: 
In most LDCs banks are undercapitalised so that capital is insufficient for meeting actual 
and potential unusual losses. 86 There are two aspects of capital adequacy in the Egyptian 
case. First the minimum capital volume required from banks to start business, and 
second, the minimum capital ratio required to support given levels of operations. 87 
Regarding the first requirement normally referred to as the entry requirement, the CBE 
84 ibid., p. 195 and p. 207. 
85 
Polizatto (1990), p. 1, World Bank (1992b), p. 13. 
86Polizatto 
(1990), op. cit., p. 4. 
87See 
Morris (1990), p. 65. 
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imposes an initial capital of £E 100 million on banks as a criteria for their authorization. 
This is considered sufficient and comparable with international standards of US$ 15-30 
million (approximately £E 50-100 million). 
Considering the second requirement, Egyptian banks maintained capital adequacy ratios 
ranging between 6% and 7% of total assets, i. e. less than the Basle Committee (1988) 
standard of 8% of risk adjusted assets. Because of the assumption that public banks are 
by definition owned by the government which is assumed to come to their rescue if 
necessary, such banks lack incentives to minimise losses. However as a part of the 
financial reform programme started in 1991, all operating banks were required to raise 
their capital adequacy ratios up to the risk-based Basle Standard according to an agreed 
schedule. 
ii) Loan provisioning: 
Provisioning creates discipline in banks' operations and helps reflect their true financial 
conditions. We can distinguish between two forms of provisions: general provisions and 
specific provisions. Under general provisions it is assumed that even the highest quality 
loans in the bank's portfolio may incur some loss, hence a small percentage, say 1 %, of 
total loans is held by the bank. Specific provisions can be classified into four categories: 
current, sub-standard, doubtful and lost loans. Accordingly specific provision ranges 
between zero percent in the case of current loans to 100% in the case of lost loans. 88 
Banks in most LDCs fail to mandate realistic provisions to cover possible losses 
according to the classification of loans. As a result their balance sheets do not reflect their 
actual positions and profits are exaggerated and their solvency may be at stake. 89 It is 
88See 
Morris (1990), p. 60. 
89 Polizatto (1990). p. 6. 
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difficult in the case of Egypt to know how serious the issue of solvency is, as information 
on the non-performing loans and soundness of loan portfolios are not published. Further 
until 1992 banks did not apply international standards on their loan classification, possibly 
to avoid provisioning for the public sector nonperforming loans. The application of 
adequate classification and provisioning of loans still needs to be accompanied by an 
improvement in the functioning of the legal framework concerning bankruptcy procedure, 
liquidation of collateral and debt recovery. 90 
iii) Information disclosure: 
Publishing an adequate level of information is essential to help depositors and borrowers 
to distinguish between banks according to their performance and facilitate their scrutiny 
by relevant authorities and bodies, like rating agencies. Egyptian banks are reluctant to 
disclose information beyond what they supply in their annual reports. Moreover such 
reports are not uniform in the information they provide, which makes comparisons 
difficult. 
Some banks publish only balance sheets without income statements in a way that is 
difficult to determine their financial condition or whether they incurred a profit or loss. 
Banks faced with difficulties delay the publication of their annual reports and/or hid 
essential information in fear that the disclosure of negative outcomes might lead to a 
deposit run and/or to deny them the ability to raise fresh funds. 
If banks are to work according to market forces and competition, then their actual and 
potential clients should be able to choose rationally between them. This necessitates 
90 
See World Bank (1992), p. 36. 
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disclosure of adequate information on their activities. 91 We argue that bank reports in 
Egypt do not fulfil this objective and hence require extensive modification: 
1. Bank reports have to be published quarterly or, at least, biannually to ensure an 
up-to-date flow of information. 
2. It is normally expected to find in banks' reports information on the quality of 
bank portfolios, adequacy of provisions, detailed outcome. In practice such 
essential information is hardly to be found in these reports. In spite of the fact 
that they devote significant space to cover the so called current developments in 
the world, regional and domestic economies which can be found, in a more 
rigorous and extensive form, in specialised sources. We suggest that the CBE 
should provide some guidelines regarding the information published in these 
reports and ensuring their comparability. 
3. Third arrangements should be taken to prevent, or at least minimise, the problem 
of window dressing, defined as the manipulation of published information by 
banks to give a better picture than the reality of their condition. 92 
iv) Quality of supervision: 
The main objectives of financial supervision are monitoring bank activities and accounting 
procedures, assessing the quality of assets, and assuring that banks are professionally 
managed. Financial supervision is a delicate task as it should be undertaken in a way that 
promotes the soundness and stability of the banking system without hindering the 
efficiency and the managerial autonomy of banks. 93 
91See Morris, op. cit., p. 67. 
92 
See Allen (1992), for a theoretical and empirical analysis of bank window dressing. 
93 0n the role of prudential supervision in banking, see Pecchioli (1987). 
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Several conditions are required in order to achieve a sufficient quality of supervision: 
1. Supervisors must acquire adequate training and have adequate resources. 
2. Supervisors should have sufficient autonomy from political interference and 
bureaucratic pressures. 
3. The supervisory body must have enough power to enforce its decisions without 
the need to refer to higher authorities. For example, supervisors should be able 
to impose fines, restrict dividend payments, request administrative actions, force 
provisions,.. etc. 94 
In the case of Egypt, bank supervision is vested with the CBE. Such supervision is 
undertaken through off-site monitoring and surveillance of the performance of banks, in 
addition to on-site inspection of their financial condition. Public banks are also subject 
to further on-site monitoring by the Central Audit Organization (CAO) which coordinates 
its work with external auditors. 95 The CBE's supervision is concerned with the degree of 
compliance with credit controls, tariff schedules, interest rate ceilings and, to a lesser 
extent, the assessment of bank solvency. The CAO's supervision is more concerned with 
the compliance of the public banks with the rules that govern the public sector as a 
whole, rather than with portfolio quality and related aspects of performance. 
More generally bank supervision in Egypt suffers from various limitations: 
1. The CBE is not fully independent from the government as the selection of most 
of the members of the board of the CBE, since 1984, has been left to the 
discretion of the minister of the economy. 96 
94 
On this issue of quality of supervision see Morris (1990), pp. 54-57 
95World 
Bank (1992b), pp. 17-18. 
96Nour-El-Din 
(1987), p. 10. 
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2. The huge increase in the number of operating banks, from 7 in 1974 to 98 banks 
in 1991, was not matched by a corresponding increase either in the staff number 
of the Bank Control department of the CBE or its resources. As a result, on-site 
monitoring of several banks was not undertaken and the CBE was content with 
the periodic reports of such banks on their activities. " These reports were not 
necessarily adequate in terms of the quantity and quality of information provided 
in them. Moreover some of the operating banks, especially the foreign ones, were 
adopting some new banking techniques and computerised transactions which were 
not fully grasped by the members of the supervision committees, due to lack of 
training. 
3. In many cases the effective supervision of banks, especially the public ones, was 
compromised by political pressure. Loans to insolvent and ailing public sector 
companies were allowed under the pressure of their concerned ministries. An 
example of this problem, is that which took place after the Egyptian pound 
devaluation in 1985. It resulted in considerable foreign exchange losses even 
amongst the well-managed companies which were confronted with critical 
financial difficulties. "The Egyptian banks knew that they did not have the 
capacity to handle widespread bankruptcy, and also knew that the legal procedures 
for bankruptcy were unsatisfactory ... Hence, their management 
decision,..., was 
to provide additional credit facilities to keep distressed companies alive,..., the 
outcome was a substantially weaker financial sector"98. Hence it is not unexpected 
to find that the Egyptian banking system has suffered from a high ratio of non- 
performing loans, accumulated over the years because of similar practices. Exact 
97 ibid, p. 11. 
98Roe 
and Popiel (1987), p. 24. 
98 
figures for these loans are not available but they are estimated to range between 
30 %-45 %. 99 
4. Privileged private sector borrowers were also allowed to borrow despite their 
poor financial condition and insufficient collateral. In 1989 the so-called sick 
balances reached 26% of total advances to private and investment sectors. Of 
these 56.4% belonged to only 3% of total number of defaulters. ` Many 
defaulters fled the country to avoid any legal actions , while others managed to 
delay legal action against them for very long periods. 
5. Although the powers of the League of Banks are much less than those of its 
predecessor Conference des Banques, discussed above, it still has some functions 
that often cause conflict with the CBE. For example, the League of Banks is 
entitled to investigate and verify the complaints of individuals and institutions 
concerning the activities of any bank and according to its Banking Charter it can 
also resolves disputes. "' It also has the right to determine bank charges. Thus 
some of the bona fide functions of the CBE have also been undertaken by another 
organisation. 
We argue that to improve bank supervision the regulatory framework should be clearly 
defined, the CBE must be more independent, its supervisory teams should acquire 
necessary knowledge and be empowered with sufficient resources. Improvement in bank 
supervision should not be achieved at the expense of reasonable autonomy of banking 
units or interference with their decisions. Parallel reform in accounting and auditing 
practices, and enforcement of the law in the case of default are also required. 
99 The estimate of the World Bank (1992) is 30% while some bank mangers interviewed by the author argue that non-performing loans 
are as high as 40%-454% 
100 
NBE(1989), pp. 142-143. 
101Nour-El-Din (1987), p. 13. 
99 
(3.7) Performance of the banking units: 
Three different types of operating ratios are frequently used as indicators of the 
performance of banks and their efficiency, namely rate of return on assets (ROA); rate 
of return on income, i. e. the profit ratio (ROI); and rate of return on equity (ROE). ROA 
relates net income to total assets; ROI relates net revenues to the total of interest and non- 
interest income i. e. gross income; ROE is the ratio of net income to average equity. 102 
Three issues are worth emphasising: 
" First, these ratios should be considered only as rough indicators of efficiency as 
these ratios are significantly affected by differences in capital structure, adopted 
accounting principles and product mix both across countries and banking units. 101 
" Second, bank data in Egypt as in many other LDCs, should be treated with 
caution. As discussed further below, different banks have different accounting 
practices regarding their valuation of assets and depreciation. They differ as well 
in their classification of loans as bad or non performing. Accordingly their 
provisions and reserves may differ as well. 
" Third, some banks may indulge in some form of window dressing. Such practice 
distorts the quality of information and produces misleading indicators. 
In the case of Egypt essential data on operating ratios of banks that are used as 
performance indicators are not readily available. However the World Bank (1992c)104 
compiled data on a sample of 24 banks covering the period 1986-1990. The sample 
includes the four public commercial banks, five large joint-venture banks, eight small and 
medium size banks in addition to seven branches of foreign banks. 
102 See Brealy and Myers (1991), chapter (27) for an analysis of financial performance. 
103See 
World Bank (1992b), pp. 25-26 and Vittas (1991). 
104 
Although the World Bank (1992c) uses the term 'efficiency', the indicators used in the study are more to do with 'performance'. Tobin 
(1984) provides four different concepts non of them can be adequately measured by the operating ratios used in the World Bank's study. 
Tobin's four concepts of efficiency are information arbitrage efficiency. fundamental valuation efficient, full insurance efficiency and 
functional efficiency: see Tobin (1984), pp. 2-3. 
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Figure (3.6) 
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Source: World Bank (1992c), tables: Al, A3 and A5. 
As shown in figure (3.4) the before-tax return on assets ROA in the case of public sector 
banks, at 0.71 %, was lower than the rest of operating banks. The Joint-venture banks 
both the large and the small and medium size (S&M) ones had a quite high ROA at 
1.48 % and 1.13 % respectively. Large joint-venture banks had the highest pre-tax ROI, 
i. e. profit ratio which reached 38.5 %, while that of public sector banks was only 23.4 %. 
However public banks had the highest ROE at 37.6 %. Large joint venture banks, (S&M) 
banks and foreign ones had lower ROEs of 24.4%, 16.4% and 13.3% respectively. 105 
By comparing the four public Egyptian banks with other commercial banks in selected 
developed and developing countries, we realise that they did not perform badly as shown 
in figure (3.5). The Egyptian banks had the second highest ROE, the third highest ROI 
among the seven selected countries. However their ROA was low and ranked fifth. 
105 
World Bank (1992c), tables Al, A3 and A5. 
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Figure (3.7) 
Bank operating ratios 
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Source: World Bank, (1992c), tables Al-A6. Data on Egyptian banks are for 1986-90, on USA, UK, Portugal 
and Turkey are for 1985-89, on Morocco for 1980-90 and on Thailand are for 1986-88. 
It is worth noting however that the reported ratios on Egyptian banks are overestimated 
and produce a better picture than reality for the following reasons. 106 
1. All performance ratios are considered without an allowance for the high level of 
nonperforming loans. 
2. Egyptian data are not inflation rate-adjusted. If such adjustment is made Egyptian 
ratios would be significantly lower than reported when compared with those of 
other countries. For example, by using real values, in Egypt the nominal ROE of 
public sector banks of 37.6% becomes a real ROE of 14.7%. Real ROE in 
Turkey is only 2% while its nominal ROE is 22%. Real ROE in developed, low- 
inflation countries range between 10% to 20%. 
3. The high ROE of Egyptian banks, especially the public sector -ones is chiefly 
explained by their high leverage. The leverage of public sector banks, measured 
as long term debt to long term capital at approximately 53 % is three times higher 
106 See World Bank (1992c) annex II for further discussion. 
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than that of other operating banks in Egypt. The proposed increase in the capital 
of operating banks in Egypt is likely to reduce their leverage and hence reduce 
their ROE, unless measure are adopted to increase banks' profitability. 
4. Egyptian banks enjoy high non-interest income in the form of high services 
charges due to the uncompetitive nature of the market. Such high fee-income 
share in banks revenues is reflected in the relatively high ROI of Egyptian banks. 
Accordingly, nominal ratios may indicate, at their face value, an acceptable performance 
of Egyptian banks, but the allowance for inflation, nonperforming loans, high leverage 
and high non-interest income, produces a completely different picture. Egyptian banks 
in general, and the four commercial banks in particular, have to take measures to improve 
their performance and profitability. The usual advice for banks-in such circumstances is 
to improve their cost/income ratio in order to generate adequate returns on their assets, 
income and equity. However the absence of banks' managerial autonomy, dominance of 
public sector banks and hence the narrowness of the market, lack of competition and 
contestability were also responsible for the weak performance. 107 Hence reform at the 
level of banking units is unlikely to be achievable without undertaking necessary reform 
at the banking system level and its regulatory structure. 
0-8) Summary and conclusions: 
In this chapter we have shown that the development of the banking system in Egypt can 
be divided to three phases. The first phase 1856-1952 the banking system was highly 
deregulated and dominated with foreign commercial banks that offered short term credit 
mainly for the cultivation and trade of cotton. The close relationship between the 
operating banks and the cotton market made them highly vulnerable to the severe and 
sudden fluctuations in its trade due to external shocks, e. g. the American Civil War, the 
107 On the link between structure, competition and performance in the context of banking industry see Hannan (1991) and the extensive 
survey of Gilbert (1984). 
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great depression, the two World Wars,.. etc. The credit market was largely' unstable 
during this phase with large numbers of banks collapsing and the existence of hit and run 
banking. 
This phase witnessed also three important events as far as banking development is 
concerned, first the evolution of central banking since starting in 1898 with the issuance 
of banknotes by the NBE which was followed by several decrees enforcing its functions 
as banker and advisor for the government and, to some extent, bank of banks, although 
its regulatory power was not clearly established. The second was the establishment of 
specialised credit institutions in 1902 and then in 1931, to provide the agricultural sector 
with moderately priced credit and competing with commercial banks and money lenders. 
The third was the emergence of Bank Misr in 1920 as the first Egyptian-owned bank. The 
bank was a universal one but was more concerned with the establishment of a diversified 
industrial base. 
The 1952 revolution marked the end of the first phase and the beginning of the second 
phase 1952-74. This period is characterised by the Egyptianisation of foreign banks in 
1957 as a result of the Suez Crisis of 1956, and then the entire nationalisation of the 
banking system in 1961 which initiated the adoption of central planning. As a result of 
merging and liquidations of banks the number of operating banks declined from 27 banks 
in 1961 to ten banks. The functions of the central bank were enforced by the banking law 
of 1957 and the CBE was established as an independent institution in 1961. This period 
also observed unsuccessful sectoral and functional specialisation policies which had to be 
abolished. 
In the third phase 1974-1991, the banking system was partly liberalised according to the 
Infitah policy. Foreign and private banks were allowed to operate and the number of 
banks increased substantially from 7 in 1974 to 98 banks in 1991. Despite this increase 
104 
which was reflected in a rise of branches, the banking density at 0.2 is low by 
international standards and banks were highly concentrated in Cairo and the large cities. 
But on the other hand financial deepening, measured by the M2/GDP ratio, was 104.6 % 
in 1990 which is considered high given the stage of development of Egypt. Part of the 
increase of the M2/GDP ratio in recent years is attributed to money substitution 
accompanied with devaluation measure which result in an increase of the values of 
foreign denominated assets when measured in terms of the domestic currency. The 
financial reform programme which started in 1991 with extensive coordination with the 
IMF and the World Bank marked the end of the third phase. "' 
We have shown that the Egyptian banking system, despite the Infitah measures still 
suffers from various problems. Entry barriers, absence of an adequate exit mechanism, 
and preferential treatment of the public sector banks are the main difficulties that impede 
the development of the banking system. Moreover there are problems related to 
inadequate prudential regulation like the problems of capital adequacy, loan provisioning, 
disclosure of information and the quality of bank supervision. Accordingly performance 
indicators of the operating banks, especially the public ones, were not impressive. While 
the nominal values of ROA, ROI and ROE may indicate high performance of banks, 
adjusting them with inflation and allowance for nonperforming loans, high leverage and 
high non-interest income reveal a much weaker performance. 
We argue that the condition of the banking system requires reform at different levels. 
First at the banking units level by improving their management, granting them adequate 
autonomy in decision making, and encouraging training schemes and the acquisition of 
essential resources for efficient banking. 
108Main 
elements of the financial reform programme are discussed below. 
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Second at the banking system level, by encouraging competition and contestability, 
removing excessive barriers to entry and replacing them with an objective entry criteria, 
establishing a reliable exit mechanism accompanied with an efficient deposit protection 
scheme. 
Third at the regulatory level, by ensuring the independence of the CBE from political 
interference and enhancing the quality of its on-site inspection and off-site surveillance; 
providing a clear regulatory framework including guidelines for capital adequacy, loan 
provisioning; establishment of uniform accounting standards and disclosure of 
information. 
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Chapter (4) 
The Egyptian Securities Market 
(4.1) Introduction: 
The term securities is used as a generic term for financial instruments issued by 
companies and governments in the form of shares, debentures, stock, bills and bonds 
which are transferable by sale. ' Securities markets like the rest of financial intermediaries 
mobilise savings and allocate loanable funds. They serve four groups of participants: 
investors, speculators, hedgers and arbitragers. Investors, firms or individuals, purchase 
financial assets primarily for the income they receive from holding assets in the form of 
interest payments and dividends. If they are frequently willing to sell their holdings any 
time to maximise their profits, which constitute primarily their incomes, they are included 
in the category of speculators. Hedgers hold assets with the expectations that they will 
have offsetting price movements caused by non-random fluctuations. While an arbitrager 
holds a speculative inventory by which he is able to buy and simultaneously sell an asset 
at higher price. Although the four groups are separated conceptually, in practice 
individuals or institutions who fit one classification may also fit some or all of the other 
classifications. 2 
In this chapter we examine the development of the Egyptian securities market as an 
integral part of the study the Egyptian financial sector, started by the analysis of the 
banking system in the previous chapter. We begin by discussing the role of securities 
markets in LDCs, and highlight their advantages and disadvantages. Then, we provide 
a critical appraisal of the market-based versus bank based financial systems and its 
relevance to the LDCs. Then the development of the securities market in Egypt is 
1This definition is adapted from Drake (1980), p. 192 
2 See Auerbach (1988), pp. 265-266. 
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analysed by dividing it into three phases starting with the establishment of Alexandria' 
Stock Exchange in 1883 and ending in 1993 which marks the start of the application of 
the new Capital Market Law. An analysis of the securities market performance is 
provided using the main published indicators. Then we examine the main impediments 
facing the progress of the securities market which determine the sort of policy action 
required to revive the market. 
(4.2) Securities markets in LDCs 
For a long time the securities markets in LDCs were considered hard to establish, costly 
to manage, difficult to supervise and, above all, likely to contribute little to economic 
development. These views may partly explain the paucity of studies on securities markets 
in the literature of economic development. Arguments of passive function of the financial 
sector and the virtual absence of a role for the financial system in the early growth 
models were also responsible for such scarcity of studies and undermined the importance 
of building robust financial systems including capital markets. 
However a few important studies appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s emphasising 
that finance matters. Goldsmith (1969), Shaw (1973) and Mckinnon (1973) established 
strong arguments regarding a positive link between the . conditions of financial 
development and economic growth. 3 The studies of Patrick (1966) and Wai and Patrick 
(1973) highlighted the mechanisms and microeconomic aspects of capital markets as to 
their role in the mobilisation of capital and economic growth. " 
3See 
our review of the literature in chapter (2). 
4See Fischer and Papaioannou (1992), pp. 2.4 fora concise review of the evolution of academic interest in capital markets. 
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Supporters of the role of securities markets claim that they would, among other things, 
improve the quantity of real savings, increase net international inflow of capital, improve 
the allocation of investable funds and lower the costs of providing capital to projects. ' 
Arguments in favour and against securities markets are each evaluated in turn. 
4.2.1) Advantages of securities markets: 
(i) Improving real savings: 
It is argued that the provision of financial assets separate savings and investment 
decisions. Thus savings can be accumulated without indulgence in coterminous acts of 
low return investment. Promised yields may be great enough to attract saving that might 
be otherwise saved in lower return instruments. The securities market provide various 
returns on various risk bearing instruments, hence it enables investors to diversify risk'. 
However we argue that securities market may achieve that under a specific propensity to 
save, i. e. via reallocation given amounts of savings between different instruments 
according to their returns after adjustment for risks. Arguments which claim that 
securities markets may also increase savings from given incomes do not have theoretical 
or empirical support'. 
(ii) Encouraging capital inflows: 
Developing securities market may facilitate international flows of capital as they may be 
attracted by foreign portfolio holders and managers wishing to diversify internationally. 
Recently emerging securities markets in Latin America alone helped attracting $24 billion 
in 1990 and $40 billion in 1991. Even if they fail to attract significant foreign capital they 
may discourage a significant portion of capital outflow. 
5 See Drake (1977), pp. 74-77. 
6 See Kitchen (1986), p. 147. and Drake (1977), p. 74. 
7 See the analysis of this point in our discussion of the effect of changes of real interest rates on aggregate savings in chapters (2) and (7). 
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(iii) Funding investment: 
Given the generally high debt/equity ratio in LDCs, the securities market would enable 
companies to bypass this constraint by raising fresh equity capital if they wish to expand. 
The issuance of shares and debentures can be with relatively small administrative costs. ' 
(iv) Allocation of investible funds: 
Securities markets offer a hierarchy of rates of return between equities, bonds, etc.. 
which reflects the cost of capital for issuers which should pay such rate of return 
reflecting performance of alternative investments and their corresponding risk. Therefore 
the allocation of investible funds is improved. ' Securities markets do not undertake 
institutional assessment of claims for loanable funds, like those made by credit officers 
in banks. Thus the allocation of funds is made according to the apparent profits of 
companies which issue shares and debentures. In the absence of market imperfections, 
securities market would allocate investible funds efficiently. LDCs however suffer from 
different forms of market imperfection, e. g. monopolies, credit rationing, import 
restrictions. Hence the allocative effect of securities markets may be questionable. " 
(4.2.2) Disadvantages of securities markets: 
Among the criticisms of securities markets in LDCS, we highlight the following issues: " 
1. Securities markets can stimulate rash individual and institutional speculations 
leading to their collapse. History is full of financial crises caused by imprudent 
speculations. 12 
8 See Kitchen, op. cit., pp. 146-147. 
9ibid., 
p. 147. 
10 See Wal and Patrick, 1973, p. 328. 
11 
See Kitchen, op. cit.. p. 148. 
12 
See Kindleberger (1989) for a review of financial crises. 
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2. They may worsen the distribution of wealth and income. 
3. Being guided by financial profits of companies, which may not be necessarily 
profitable for the society, securities market may deteriorate the allocation of 
resources. 
4. They may host unacceptable activities like market-rigging, fraud, insider dealing, 
misleading offers, .. etc. 
5. As argued by Shiller (1993), "stock prices often double or fall in half in a space 
of a few years, when there seems to be no concrete reason why stock prices 
should have changed at all. Some times speculative prices change dramatically in 
a matter of days or even hours. On 19 October 1987, ..., the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average lost 16 percent of its value in the space of under three 
hours". " The volatility of asset prices can be explained mainly by what so called 
market psychology1'. Excessive euphoria and optimism or extreme anxiety and 
pessimism can result in high volatility, and as evident in the 1929 and 1987, 
might lead to an inevitable crash. " The high variability in stock prices would, 
inter alia, increase uncertainty in the economic environment, give rise to 
instability in the flow of capital, result in sudden losses in asset values, hinder 
investment and complicate economic decisions. 
Figure (4.1) shows that emerging stock markets in LDCs suffered, to various degrees, 
from high volatility measured roughly by percentage change in the local market indices. 
Over the period 1983-1992 the change in the local index of the Jordanian market ranged 
from (-24.6) to 92.9 and in Korea it ranged from (-23.5) to 92.6, showing relatively low 
variability. Whereas the indices of the stock markets of Brazil and Mexico show high 
13Shiller (1993), p. 762 in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, Vol 3. 
14Market 
psychology is defined as the change in public expectations, attitudes and theories about the market. See ibid. 
15For 
a survey of the circumstances of the 1987 crash, see Shiller (1989), chapter (23). 
variability as the change in local indices ranged between 21.8 to 320.6 and from 34.9 to 
2,549.5 respectively. In Taiwan which has the largest emerging market its TSE index 
rose by 1,163.2 % over the period 1983-89 reaching 9,624.2 but fell to 35 % of its value 
in 1992 (3,377.1). 16 
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In only two years the Brazilian market capitalisation" increased by three times, from US$ 
15.1 billion in 1983 to 42.8 in 1985, but it fell to US$ 16.9 billion in 1987 losing almost 
all what it gained in the previous four years. Market capitalisation increased again to 
reach US$ 44.4 billion in 1989 but fell to 16.4 in 1990.18 In Mexico the share price rose 
16See 
IFC (1993), op. cit., p. 153. 
17 Market capitalisation is "the market value of all listed companies at the end of the period. The market value of a company is the share 
price tines the number of shares outstanding". 
18 
See IFC (1993), p. 97. 
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six-fold in the nine months before Black Monday in 1987 but after the crash prices fell 
to only 10% of their pre-crash level. '9 
Figure (4.2) 
Means of % changes and standard deviations 
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Source: Singh (1991), p. 52. Data are for 60 months ending December 1989. 
Stock markets in LDCs, as shown in figure (4.2), are more volatile than those in 
developed economies. For example the figure suggests that share prices in the Brazilian 
and the Taiwanese markets rose by monthly average of 2.5% and 5.5% respectively 
during the 60 months ending December 1989. While the USA and UK share prices rose 
by 1.4% and 1.3% per month respectively. However, with standard deviation of 37.1 and 
15.15 respectively, the Brazilian and Taiwanese markets displayed more volatility than 
the USA and UK markets which had lower standard deviation of 5.2 and 5.9. 
Such higher volatility in LDCS' stock markets, compared with those of developed 
countries, is attributed to their segmentation and shallowness, in addition to the lack of 
adequate information on their activities and performance along with other imperfections. "' 
Moreover they are vulnerable to the variations and shocks in share prices in the 
19 
Singh (1991). p. 51. 
20See 
Singh (1991), op. cit., pp. 53-54. 
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international market. It is worth noting that these abrupt valuation changes can radically 
alter measures of financial depth. 
(4.3) Bank-based versus Market-based paradigms: 
Mainly because of the possible problems of the securities markets discussed above, 
arguments emerged inquiring whether developing a stock market is beneficial for LDCs. 
These arguments have revived with the application of financial reform programmes in 
LDCs and the restructuring of the Eastern European economies including their financial 
systems. Comparisons have been made between the two models on offer. The first is 
market-based ä la the Anglo-Saxon financial systems, and the second is bank-based and 
influenced by the German and Japanese financial structures. 21 Table (4.1) summarises the 
properties of the Market-based and Bank-based financial systems. 
Table (4.1) 
Characteristics of bank-based and market-based systems 
Bank-based Market-based 
Concentrated ownership and control Dispersed ownership 
Association of ownership with control Separation of ownership and control 
Control by interested parties (banks, related firms, and employees) Little incentive for outside investors to participate in corporate control 
Absence of hostile takeovers Costly and Hostile takeovers occur 
Other stakeholders are represented Interests of other stakeholders are not represented 
Interventionby outside investors limited to periods of financial failure Low commitment of outside investors to long term strategies of firms 
may encourage collusion 
Takeovers may create monopolies 
. ource: t-or ea ana Mayer (l ö ), p. o: ). 
The arguments in favour of bank-based financial systems mainly reflect the concern that 
market-based systems have an association with short termism. Hostile takeovers, mergers 
and leveraged buy-outs, relatively low investment in long run projects including training 
and R&D characterise the market-based system. These problems can be argued to have 
21See Corbett and Mayer (1989), Hellwig (1991) and Singh (1991) for a comparative analyses for the models. See Lewis (1994) for a 
discussion of the Japanese financial system and Edwards and Fischer (1993) for an analysis of the German financial system. 
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put the Anglo-Saxon economies at a competitive disadvantage compared with Japan and 
Germany economies described as bank-based. 22 
Moreover critics of market-based financial systems argue that despite their significant 
sizes in the US and the UK, securities markets do not contribute substantially to the 
financing of companies. This observation is also found in Germany and Japan which have 
smaller securities markets. As shown in table (4.2), with the exception of Japan retentions 
were the major source of finance. In the four countries banks were the dominant source 
of external finance. 
Table (4.2) 
Gross financing of non-financial enterprises, 1970-85 
(unweighted average %) 
Germany Japan UK USA 
Retentions 55.2 33.7 72.0 66.9 
Capital transfers 6.7 0 2.9 0 
short term securities 0 NA 2.3 1.4 
Bank loans 21.1 40.7 21.4 23.1 
Trade credit 2.2 18.3 2.8 8.4 
Bonds 0.7 3.1 0.8 9.7 
Shares 2.1 3.5 4.9 0.8 
Other 11.9 0.7 2.2 -6.1 
Statistical Adjustment 0 NA -9.4 -4.1 
Total 100 100 99.9 100.1 
ouuIýc. iviaycr I IYÖY), taoie p). 
Because of these findings and some highlighted characteristics of LDCs' corporate 
structure such as the small size of firms, imperfections in information systems and high 
costs of establishing primary and secondary markets, it is suggested that the bank-based 
systems may be better for LDCs. 23 
However we argue that these findings do not justify discouraging LDCs from establishing 
or promoting their securities markets, for the following reasons: 
22 See Corbett and Mayer, op. cit., pp. 64-66 and Singh, op. cit. pp. 9-10. 
23See Cobham (1992), p. 7. and Singh (1991), op. cit., pp. 66-71. 
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(i) Different choice problem: 
We argue that the choice facing a developing country is not between bank-based and 
market-based financial systems, but rather it is between inserting a sound securities 
market or not, into a traditionally commercial bank(s)-dominated financial system. An 
efficient securities market would complement the reform of financial systems, provide 
saving and investment instruments for individuals and banks and hence enhance the 
diversification of portfolios and improve the allocative efficiency of financial resources. 
(ii) Imperfections are found in both systems: 
Imperfections in securities markets do not imply perfection in the banking systems. 
Distortions and imperfections in the banking system are realised in developed and 
developing economies but discouraging or eliminating the banking system has never been 
the suggested solution. 24 As there are reform measures for the banking system as 
discussed in the previous chapter, so too there are measures which can be adopted to 
eliminate, or at least reduce, the drawbacks of securities markets. For example an 
effective tax policy can deal with the possible worsening of income distribution and 
possible conflicts of interest between corporations and society. Further a sound regulatory 
framework can help reduce the distortive practices and mischievous conducts in the 
market. 
(iii) Optimal allocation of financial resources: 
In some circumstances banks would be the optimal allocators of financial resources, in 
others securities markets would be. Allen (1993) argues that in the case of traditional 
sectors, such as agriculture, banks are better lenders and monitors by taking advantage 
of the relatively well-known technologies and production functions. When there is less 
24Singh 
(1991), p. 69 emphasises that in the absence of prudent and adequate government regulation, "banks has sometimes jeopardised 
the integrity of the financial system as a whole, however the advice given was to 'pay particular attention to questions of proper regulation 
and to the prevention of the monopolistic abuse by the banks. ' 
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consensus on how firms should be managed and how resources should be allocated, a 
securities market would be a better source of funding and, through its repeated 
evaluations, is a more efficient monitor and resource allocator than banks. " In other cases 
a combination of both banks and securities markets finance would be the optimal one. 
(iv) Positive effects of securities markets: 
Securities markets have positive effects on economic development which are hard to 
overlook, as shown by Atje-Jovanovic (1993) in an empirical study on 40 developed and 
developing economies. They applied the Greenwood-Jovanovic (1990) model to search 
for growth effects and the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) model to search for the level 
effects. The study finds that securities markets have a significant impact on subsequent 
economic development in terms of level and growth. However it did not find a similar 
effect of bank lending. 26 
(v) The impact of financial innovation: 
Traditionally capital market lending, excluding equities, was long term in maturity, at a 
fixed rate of interest and with an active secondary market. Bank lending was mainly short 
term, at a variable interest rate and without a secondary market. Moreover some laws and 
acts, such as the 1933 Glass-Steagall act in the USA, created a barrier segregating 
commercial banking from investment banking and separating firms selling brokerage 
services from banks. 27 
This distinction has diminished due to the advances in financial innovation and the 
encouragement of universal banking, and especially after the abolition of the Glass- 
25 See Allen (1993), pp. 101-102. 
26See Atje and Jovanovic (1993), pp. 632-36. 
27See Miller and Pulsinelli (1989), pp. 168-169. 
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Steagall act in 1987. Bank holding companies are now allowed to have brokerages and 
brokerage firms offer checking accounts. 28 Hence there is an overlap between the 
activities of securities markets and banks which are no longer strictly different in various 
respects. Both banks and securities markets can offer funding at fixed and floating rates, 
both for short term and long term. Also, through securitisation, loan swaps and 
transferable loan contracts, banks started to develop a secondary market for their loanable 
funds. 29 Thus it seems that LDCs are not facing two strictly different models to choose 
between them. 
(vi) Recent findings on the German financial system: 
The recent study by Edwards and Fischer (1994) establishes profound challenges to the 
conventional wisdom regarding the structure, mechanisms and role of the German-style 
financial system. In contrast with the theoretical claims for a bank-based financial system, 
outlined in table (4.1) above, the authors found that: 30 
1. The banking market is not dominated by a small number of banks. 
2. The majority of German banks do not have representatives on the boards of firms 
or proxy votes and hence banks do not affect corporate governance through these 
methods. 
3. Even when banks are represented on firms' boards there is no evidence to suggest 
that bank representation was used to make loan decisions and generally such 
representation was not associated with greater use of bank loans. 31 
4. There was a weak relationship between bank proxy voting power and supervisory 
board representation. Accordingly there is not strong support for the claim that 
28Auerbach (1989), p. 131. 
29 See Llewellyn (1992), pp. 19-21. 
30Edwards 
and Fischer (1994), chapter (5). 
31 
ibid., p. 232. 
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banks act in Germany as delegated exercisers of equity's power by using proxy 
votes. 
5. The previous findings cast doubt on the argument of exploiting economies of 
scope by German banks. 
6. Evidence on sources of finance in Germany and the UK over the period 1979-89 
shows that UK firms depended more on bank loans to finance investment than did 
the German ones. Moreover German firms did not acquire external finance at 
lower cost nor did they have greater access to external finance than in the UK. 32 
7. The value of equities supplied by German banks to firms is only 3% of the total 
value of loans advanced to these firms. Thus the majority of bank finance to 
banks was in the form of debt and not equity. 
8. Due to differences in the definitions of loan maturity it is difficult to suggest that 
German banks offer more long-term loans than the UK for example. Moreover 
it is not theoretically established that long-term lending is more efficient for 
investment than short-term lending. 
9. German banks do not have special technical expertise to help them make informed 
decisions regarding investment prospects. 
10. Evidence does not lend support to the theoretical claims which suggest that costs 
of financial distress are lower in Germany and banks are more supportive in 
difficult times. Given the extensive use of collateral, evidence on banks incentive 
to reorganise financially troubled firms rather than liquidate is limited. 33 
Thus, the widespread argument that higher investment and economic growth rates can be 
achieved by following the German financial model now seem questionable. 34 The 
32ibid., 
chapter (3). 
33ibid., 
pp. 232-233 and chapter (7). 
34ibid., 
chapter (1). 
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commonly held views on the role of banks in the German economic performance are not 
self-evidently correct. 35 
(vii) Recent changes in the Japanese financial system: 
The Japanese financial system is the second celebrated example of a bank-based financial 
system. The main distinctive feature of the Japanese financial system is the role of the 
Main Bank in financing industry. Under this system banks are the primary suppliers of 
external funding for projects and the main bank is normally the largest lender. Banks own 
significant portions of equities in the companies that they finance. The main bank and 
firms form a so-called enterprise group through which relations include financing 
purposes as well as the sharing of information, marketing, and R&D projects. 36 
However the process of financial liberalisation in Japan in the early to mid 1980s changed 
the financial system and corporate finance in Japan. Financial innovation and deregulation 
reduced the functional boundaries between different financial intermediaries and 
distinctions between city, regional, trust and long-term credit banks came under the 
pressure of competition. 37 Banks were assigned to securities houses and vice versa, new 
instruments were permitted resulting in a change in the pattern of capital flows in the 
domestic market. 38 
The Japanese firms, concerned with the rising cost of capital, began to prefer direct 
finance and raised funds by selling their securities in the market instead of passing them 
on to their main banks. 39 During the deregulation years 1981-85 issues of securities 
35 Edwards and Fischer (1992), p. 26. 
36LeWis (1994), p. 14. 
37ibid., 
p. 11. 
38The 
Economist (1993), p. 6. 
39The Economist (1992), p. 17. 
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accounted for more than 25% of manufacturing companies sources of funds, while in 
1989 they made up 70%. As a result the share of bank lending to manufacturing fell from 
50% of total funding to 16% in 1990. However total bank lending did not shrink but 
instead grew during the 1980s as banks found new borrowers from households whose 
share of bank loans was more than 16% in 1990 i. e. more than the share of 
manufacturing. Banks lent more to the service sector as its share increased from 5% of 
total lending in 1970 to 15 % in 1990.40 Loans to small and medium-sized enterprises also 
increased as their share in loan portfolios rose from 45% in the early 1980s to 70% in 
1992.41 
Thus, the recent changes in the Japanese financial system emphasise the importance of 
possessing an efficient securities market more than they suggest the opposite. Japan, one 
of the claimed strongholds of bank-based finance, maintained a securities market which 
enabled its companies to diversify their source of funding when they needed and allowed 
individuals to disperse their savings. The question which arises is why should LDCs 
eliminate these options, and deliberately limit their savings instruments and funding 
sources? 
According to our appraisal of the advantages and disadvantages of securities markets, we 
argue that the advice for LDCs, including Egypt, should be to encourage their securities 
markets to develop in an adequate regulatory framework, enabling them to compete freely 
with the other of financial intermediaries. 
40 See The Economist (1993), op. cit., p. 6 
41LeWis (1994), op. cit., p. 11. 
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(4.4) The case of Egypt: 
(4.4.1) The first phase: 1883-1958 
The Egyptian securities market (henceforth ESM) was established in 1883 in Alexandria 
and was then followed in 1890 by one in Cairo. The reason behind its establishment was 
primarily the need for a stock exchange market to cater for dealings in the deeds of the 
Egyptian debt42. 
A league of securities market dealers was established in 190343 to determine the rules for 
trading in stocks, organise the relations between the dealers and their customers and 
resolve the problems of the business. This almost voluntary organisational structure was 
the only authority available at the time. In 1907 the market had 328 companies and a 
turnover of LE 91 million. However native Egyptians had a very limited role in the 
market as most of shareholders and company managers were foreigners. " 
The ESM was disorganised and operated without a legal structure. But the need for 
government intervention to regulate the securities market was growing. In 1907 there was 
a fortuitous sharp increase in the price of cotton the main production of the country at the 
time. "This increase in cotton prices led to higher property values and land.., began to 
change hands from day to day at ever-mounting prices while speculation became rife in 
stocks and shares.., and when the speculative boom reached its height a veritable frenzy 
took possession of Cairo and Alexandria" . 
45 
Thus the financial crash of 1907 was inescapable. The crisis resulted in a"drop of the 
value of agricultural land by 70% and a heavy drop of the stock exchange values. It was 
42 See Ahmad, (1990), p. 30. 
43 See Central Bank of Egypt (1987) P. 252. 
44 See Hansen (1991), p. 102-4. 
45 National Bank of Egypt (1948), pp. 31-32 
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then obvious that the main reason that led to the crash is the fact that the market was full 
of reckless gamblers and irresponsible dealers who where helped by a glut of credit and 
the absence of regulation. The government intervened in 190746 to regulate the operations 
of the securities market and issued a law in that year and a general by-law in 1909.47 
However it took the market approximately ten years after the crash to recover. 
Except for a short interruption from 1914 to 1916, because of World War I, the market 
observed steady progress. The ESM activities fluctuated between the two world wars, in 
response to changes in the international market. After the end of World War II the private 
sector flourished and new products were manufactured ranging from household goods, 
including durable goods and intermediate goods48. Many of these companies raised funds 
through the ESM. 
In 1954 41 a law was issued aiming at expanding the ownership base by reducing the 
minimum value of issued shares and assuring that the capital of any listed company with 
capital of more than LE 50,000 should be listed on the stock market and be available to 
public offering. so 
Egyptianisation laws that followed the Suez Crisis in 1956 did not seem to have negative 
effects on the ESM, at least in the short run. These laws, which were enacted in 1957, 
attracted sufficient domestic investment to replace the foreign. Also in 1957 law number 
161 was issued by a presidential decree to put the first comprehensive regulations manual 
for the securities market. 
46 See Ahmad(1990), p. 30. 
47 This bylaw was amended four times in 1910,1912,1933 and 1940, see Central Bank of Egypt (1988), p. 252 and Ahmad, p. 31. 
48 See Mabro (1974), pp 142-3. 
49See 
table (4.3) below for an overview of the main laws and decrees which affected the securities market. 
50 See Ahmad, op. cit., pp 31-32, Fahmy (1993), p. 5 and National Bank of Egypt (1992), pp 8-9. 
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The market activities peaked during the period 1946-1959 with an average of 1000 
transactions daily and increased numbers of listed and floated companies annually. 
Turnover was approximately 30% of the market value of listed securities in 1955. 
In 1958 the number of joint stock companies had reached 925 of which 275 companies 
were listed. All of these companies offered shares to the public and most of the shares 
were actively traded51. The size of the market turnover in 1958 amounted to LE 111.4 
million, i. e. 9.1 % of GNP. During this period the ESM was one of the busiest markets 
in the world. 52 
(4.4.2) The second phase: 1959-1971 
Until 1959 government intervention in the securities market took the form of fixing 
minimum values of shares, ruling out certain operations, e. g. futures operations and 
enhancing the organisational structure. However in 1959 the government started a series 
of interventionist and nationalisation measures supported by several laws. The impact of 
these laws are summarised in table (4.3). 
Law 7/1959 had a devastating effect on the confidence of the public in the securities 
market. The Law determined that distributable profits per share, in any year, should not 
exceed that of 1958 in addition to a maximum of 10% of the nominal value of the traded 
security. Moreover any company which was established after the issue date of the law or 
the companies with profits less than 15% in 1958 were not allowed to distribute in the 
future more than 10% of the nominal value of the shares. " . 
51See World Bank (1992d) p. 15. 
52See 
World Bank (1992d), p. 3. 
53 See Central Bank of Egypt (1988), p. 255. 
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Naturally this caused general disappointment and pessimism amongst the investors. This 
resulted in a decline of the size of transactions from £E 111.4 million in 1958 to £E 71.5 
million in 1959, and the index number of share prices dropped from 124 points to 106 
points during the same period by a rate of 14.5 %54" 
To curb the negative reaction, a ministerial decree was issued in 1959 increasing the 10% 
ceiling on distributable profits to 20% but this was still subject to the approval of the 
Minister of the economy. Nevertheless, even after the abolishing of such approval by a 
presidential decree the conditions of the market did not improve. The size of transactions 
continued to decline, to only £E 62 million in 1960, and the index number of shares 
prices fell by an average of 17.9%. 
The subsequent legislations of the 1960s, which was started by a temporary closure of 
the market for two months, resulted in the complete destruction of the ESM. 1961 
marked the beginning of Egypt's nationalisation programme combined with sequestration 
and confiscation measures. " From 1961 to 1963 the government as shown in (table 4.1) 
managed to nationalise all financial intermediaries; cotton mills and cotton pressing 
companies; as well as chemical, engineering, metal and pharmaceutical and textiles 
companies. 
The government intervened directly in the operations of the ESM by imposing a 
maximum limit of £E 10,000 for the market value of shares per shareholder in 139 
companies. Amounts in excess of the limit were sequestrated. Moreover the ministerial 
54 ibid. 
55 See El-Kammash (1968) and Mabro (1974) for a review of the main economic developments during the 1960s. 
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decree (41/1969) fixed the maximum of distributable profits at 15 % of the nominal value 
of the shares, which was 8.4% in net56 terms. 
Nationalisation and interventionist measures created an environment of pessimism about 
the future of the private sector and the prospects of the securities market. Incentives to 
invest in the ESM vanished. There was totally no confidence in the market and no 
credibility of the financial authorities. 
Between 1961 and 1971, the primary market was effectively paralysed and only four new 
companies were established. 57 The number of private sector joint stock companies 
declined from 925 in 1961 to as low as 36 in 1971. Trading in the Cairo Stock Exchange 
dropped from £E 43.9 million in 1958 to £E 9.1 million in 1963 to LE 3.6 million in 
1971.58 Consequently the ESM effectively vanished. However in order to prevent its 
official closure, the Ministry of the Economy and the CBE agreed to assist the market by 
a modest annual financial subsidy to the brokerage offices, which remained private. This 
subsidy was mainly used to pay the salaries of the remaining brokers. S9 
Most of the trading at that time was in government bonds purchased by the Central Bank 
and commercial banks. The Banking system took almost full control of the mobilisation 
of savings. In addition to taxes, the financing of the ambitious investment plans of the 
state was coming from the nationalised banking sector, foreign assistance, the social 
insurance institutions, the nationalised insurance companies. 
56i 
e. after tax. 
57 See Mohamad (1986), p. 2. 
58 See National Bank of Egypt (1992), p. 11. 
S9With 
the decline of the volume of trading the number of brokers declined from 76 representing almost 47 brokerages offices in 1959 
to 12 in late 1960s. The remaining stockbrokers claimed their inability to work with continuing losses in their incomes. See World Bank 
(1992d), p. 16 and NBE (1992), p. 11. 
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The ESM had a trivial role to play in financing public spending. The ESM covered a 
small part of the public sector borrowing requirements. This took a form of dealings in 
development and housing bonds and other securities issued or guaranteed by the 
government. Public sector commercial banks were the main purchasers of these securities 
which did not attract the private sector. Thus at the end of the nationalisation period the 
function of ESM in development finance was insignificant. 
(4.4.3) The third phase: 1971-1993 
At the beginning of this phase the government felt that it had to remedy the negative 
impact of the nationalisation period and restore the confidence of foreign investment. It 
issued law 65/1971 which protected all new Arab and foreign investment from 
nationalisation and sequestration. 
Further the government issued Jihad Bonds in 1971 for covering part of its war expenses. 
There were two important aspects of these bonds, first tax exemption was used as an 
incentive for buyers. Second, in 1973 some of these bonds were denominated in foreign 
currencies which was a start for other issued bonds like the more widely issued 
Development Bonds. 
However the most important progress was the promulgation of law 43/1974 which 
marked the beginning of the open door policy, infitah. 6° In addition to providing all new 
foreign investments with immunity from sequestration, this law granted foreign investors 
a five to ten years tax exemption, unrestricted repatriation of profits and other incentives. 
This law was amended by law 32/1977 to grant investors more privileges and reduce the 
restrictions in the foreign exchange market to encourage foreign investment in the ESM. 
60 See chapter (1). 
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A General Capital Market Authority was established in 1979 to regulate and develop the 
primary and secondary markets, establish a code of conduct, monitor the operations of 
the market, and attempt to create a favourable environment for investment. Further it 
aimed at training securities market professionals and building an information system for 
securities. 61 
In 1981 two laws (157 and 159) were promulgated to grant shareholders tax exemptions 
and ease the establishment of new joint stock companies and facilitate raising fresh capital 
for the existent ones. 
Although Law 146/1988 aimed at regulating the Islamic Investment Companies (IICs)62 
and protecting the interests of their depositors, it actually tried to benefit from the IICs. 
It was realised that one of the reasons behind the ability of these companies in mobilising 
savings was their distribution of variable returns on deposits: an act which gave the 
impression that they were working under Islamic Law. The authorities found it may be 
appropriate to follow suit and issue a new instrument in the form of variable return 
certificates. 63 
The steps towards enhancing the role of the private sector, and hence the ESM continued 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. First there was a reform in the role of the Investment 
Authority by the issuance of Law 230/1989. The objective of the law was to facilitate the 
establishment of new investment projects, provide insurance and security against 
investment risks. It aimed as well at building up an information system and act as a 
coordinator between investors and different authorities. In 1991 Public Business Sector 
61 See NBE (1992), pp. 12-13 and CBE (1988), p. 257. 
62 For an analysis of the IICs see chapter (S). 
63See 
article 15 Law 146/1988 and chapter (5) below. 
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Law number 203 was promulgated The law transferred all public sector companies to 
public holding companies as a step towards full privatisation. TM It was argued that these 
two laws would have a stimulating effect on the capital market through increasing the 
number of dealt-in securities. 
A general capital market Law was approved by the parliament in 1992 and its executive 
regulations manual was issued in mid 1993. The main objective of the law was to 
improve the structure, regulations and performance of the ESM as a part of a general 
economic reform package supported by the World Bank and the IMF. 
The law replaced individual brokers by brokerage companies, permitted the establishment 
of private stock exchanges and fostered the organisation of investment funds for portfolio 
management. The law allowed as well the issuance of shares in the name of their holders. 
Moreover, it aimed to encouraging workers and trade unions to own equity shares in 
accordance with the privatisation programme. However it is still early to analyse the 
effect of this law. 
64 See CBE (1993), p. 54. 
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Table (4.3) 
A summary of the main laws which affected the securities market 
Law Impact 
26/1954 Reduced the minimum value of issued shares from £E 4 to £E 2. Made stock market listing compulsory for companies 
with capital of more than £E 50000. 
161/1957 Outlined the general regulations manual for securities market. 
7/1959 Determined the maximum of distributable profits per the nominal value of the share. 
11/1961 Amended law 26/1954. 
Allocated 25 % of net profits to workers. 
116/1961 Interrupted dealings in the two exchange markets of Alexandria and Cairo for two months. 
117/1961 All banks (18), insurance companies (12) and other companies (52) were nationalised. 
118/1961 Stated that 85 companies should have a minimum of 50% public ownership. 
119/1961 Determined that the maximum market value of owned shares not to exceed £E 10000 per shareholder in 139 companies. 
Amounts in excess of the limit were sequestrated. 
121/1961 Nationalised the four cotton pressing companies. 
38/1963 Nationalised cotton mills. 
65/1963 Nationalised the pharmaceutical companies. 
72/1963 220 companies specialised in chemical, metal, engineering, textiles products were nationalised. 
73/1963 Terminated mining and oil exploring contracts and nationalised mines and quarries. 
77/1963 25 of the companies governed by law 118/1961 were fully nationalised, including transport companies. 
78-81/1963 Added 20 companies to the list of fully or partly nationalised companies. 
65/1971 Aimed at restoring confidence of Arab and foreign investors in the economic system by protecting all new investment 
from nationalisation. 
43/1974& Granted incentives and privileges to foreign investors. Some of foreign exchange market restrictions were removed to 
32/1977 facilitate the purchase of securities. 
520/1979 This presidential decree established the General Capital Market Authority. 
157/1981 Granted joint stock companies tax incentives 
159/1981 Amended law 26/1954 to facilitate the establishment of new joint stock companies and raising funds for the existent ones. 
Extended most of the tax privileges of law 43/1974 enjoyed by foreign investors to indigenous ones. 
146/1988 Regulated Islamic Investment Companies. 
Allowed the issuance of variable return certificates by ESM. 
230/1989 Enhanced the role of the Investment Authority to encourage foreign and domestic investment.. 
203/1991 Transferred public sector companies to public holding companies as a step towards privatisation. 
95/1992 This comprehensive Capital Market Law aimed at stimulating the capital market under the reform programme supported 
jointly by the World Bank and the IMF. 
Source: compuea Dy me autnor from aitterent issues of the rest's economic Bulletin ana the ulit's tconomic 
Review. 
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(4.5) An analysis of the ESM Indicators: 
Despite official attempts throughout the 1970s to revive the ESM, they have not yet 
resulted in a meaningful improvement in the actual performance of the market. The ESM 
has been the source of less than 5% of new funding for both the public and private 
sectors during the period 1989-1991, with an annual average of 1.2%. Further, only 3% 
of £E 39 billion of savings were mobilised through the securities market channel during 
the 1989-91 period. These figures are in deep contrast to the performance of the market 
in the 1958-1961 period, when it provided 25% to 50% of new capital raised by the 
private sector alone. 65 Constrained by the availability of data, we evaluate the 
performance of the ESM by four indicators: Number of listed companies, trading value, 
market capitalisation and turnover ratio. We compare these indicators for the available 
years with those of other LDCs. 
Figures (4.3) and (4.4) below show the developments of the number of listed companies 
and the value of trading. Both indicators declined during the nationalisation period until 
the beginning of 1980s. The listing of new companies during the 1980s could be 
attributed, inter alia, to the Infitah laws discussed above, and also to the flow of 
remittances of Egyptian migrants in the Gulf states. The annual growth rate of listed 
companies was 28 % during the 1981-1990 period. Trading value increased gradually by 
an average annual change of 18.9% in during the 1980s and early 1990s. 66 However the 
turnover ratio67 averaged 7.98% during the 1983-199268 period which is significantly 
lower than the 1950s figures which ranged between 17.58% and 22.46%. 
65 See World Bank (1992c), p. 18, CBE (1988), p. 254 and CBE (1993), pp. 55-59. 
66 World Bank (1992c), op. cit., p 104. 
67 
Turnover ratio is defined as " the total value traded to average market capitalisation. Average market capitalisation is the average of 
end-of-period market capitalisations of the prior and current periods", see International Finance Corporation (1993), p. xi. 
68 Calculated from IFC data, ibid., p. 176. 
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Source: IFC (1993) and World Bank (1992d). 
The fact that ESM's current performance is still below that of the 1950s is confirmed by 
the market capitalisation indicator shown in figure (4.5). Market capitalisation as a 
percentage of GDP dropped from its highest level of 12.79% in 1958 to its lowest of 
0.84 % in 1980 and then increased to the modest level of 6.1 % in 1992. This indicator 
revealed what is disguised by the aggregate figures of number of companies and turnover 
which may give a misleading impression of a rapid growth of the ESM during the 1980s. 
Figure (4.5) 
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Source: World Bank (1992d) and JFC (1993). 
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Comparative figures for other developing countries support our argument that the 
activities of the ESM is small for a country with the economic potential of Egypt. In 1992 
the ESM had 656 listed companies. Although this is more than Brazil's 565 (Sao Paulo), 
the Brazilian market had capitalisation of approximately 45 billion dollars, i. e. 17 times 
bigger than that of Egypt. Further, ESM listed companies in Egypt were 5.6 times more 
numerous than those of Jordan and Turkey. Nevertheless each of the two countries had 
more market capitalisation by 30% and 280% larger respectively. Jamaica managed to 
achieve similar capitalisation to Egypt with just 48 companies. 69 Figure (4.6) gives a 
comparative view of the development of market capitalisation in Egypt and other I. DCs. 
Figure (4.6) 
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Source: IFC (1993). 
The evident contradiction between capitalisation and the number of listed companies in 
the Egyptian case can be attributed mainly to the dominance of closely held companies 
which formed 73 % of listed companies in 1990 and the limited trading in the securities 
of the rest of listed companies. Both issues are analysed below. 
69 
See World Bank (1992d), p. 26 and International Financial Corporation (1993). 
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Untraded securities also contribute negatively to the turnover ratio as an indicator of 
market liquidity. Figure (4.7) gives a comparison between the recent figures of the 
turnover ratio between Egypt and selected LDCs on one hand, and between the 1950s 
period and the recent years on the other hand. The two comparisons show that the 
turnover ratio is currently lower than its pre-nationalisation figures and is the lowest 
among the six countries compared. 
Figure (4.7) 
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It is considered that a turnover ratio below 10% is an indicator of a relatively shallow and 
illiquid market which is the case of Egypt throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The use 
of this indicator comparatively confirms, again, that the recent growth of securities 
market aggregates can give a misleading impression about the ESM, which, in reality, 
is still illiquid and shallow. 
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(4.6) Impediments facing the progress of the ESM: 
In spite of the reactivation attempts, since 1971, the performance of the ESM is poor. We 
would argue that its negligible role in savings mobilisation and its relative insignificance 
as a source of capital can be attributed to the following twelve factors. 
(i) Credibility problems: 
The consecutive measure of Egyptianisation in the 1950s and nationalisation, 
expropriation and sequestration in the 1960s, created a justifiable lack of credibility years 
after the start of these measures and despite successive government assurances of 
protecting ownership rights. In a number of interviews undertaken by the author with 
several Egyptian financial sector experts and bankers, they agreed that the credibility 
problem is still a main impediment after more than three decades. 7° It was fuelled over 
the years by several factors, among them: 
1. The heavy losses in the remaining joint stock-companies in the 1970s and the 
1980s which resulted in low or negative returns for shareholders. 
2. The hit-and-run activities which flourished in the early years of the Infitah policy 
capitalised on soft regulations and incomplete laws: investors in many companies 
never recovered their funds because of such activities. 
3. Inconsistent government policies, accumulation of foreign debt, expectations of 
further devaluation of the Egyptian pound, and fears of inflation created a general 
environment of uncertainty. This in turn reinforced savers' preference for the 
money market with its higher return in the short run, and foreign currency 
denominated instruments. Dollarisation, dealings in the informal financial market 
and depositing funds abroad were all extremely active in such environment, as 
discussed further below. 
70Interviews 
with Dr Ashraf Shams-Eldin, director of external relations department, CMA in (17 July 1991); Dr Sultan Abu Aly, former 
Minister of the Economy (16 March 1993); Mr Mohammed Samy, Director of An Underwriting Company, (17/3/1993). 
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4. The decline of the Islamic Investment Companies which collapsed in the late 
1980s resulting in immense losses to depositors' savings. " 
5. Dealing in the securities market is still considered by a large group of potential 
investors, as a form of gambling, which is prohibited by religion. Moreover the 
media has for a long time emphasised that heavy speculation, especially in the 
price of cotton, in the early years of the ESM was behind the bankruptcy of many 
wealthy families and the collapse of several businesses. It is claimed that the 
media has exaggerated this discouraging savers in participating in its activities. " 
It is not the lack of investors or shortage of capital that make the number of ESM's 
individual and institutional investors as low as five thousand. The Islamic Investment 
Companies depositors, numbered more than 500 thousand before the beginning of their 
collapse in 1988. This reveals that the problem lies principally in the supply side 71 as 
discussed further below. 
(ii) The prevalence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs): 
As discussed in chapter (1), economic indicators emphasise the continued dominance of 
the public sector in Egypt. The infitah policy launched in the mid 1970s did not change 
the dominant role of the public sector enterprises. Ten years after the start of infitah and 
attempts to encourage private and foreign investment, the 370 SOEs accounted for 82% 
of capital stock 70% of total investment, 90% of total exports and 54% of employment 
in 1985.74 
71See 
the analysis of these companies provided in chapter (5). 
72 This was emphasized in our interview with Mr Samy. 
73In 
an interview with Mr Motaz Mansour, Managing Director of Misr Iran Development Bank ( 5/5/1994), he strongly confirmed this 
point, mentioning that the main effort is needed in the supply side and it is just a matter of time to convince potential investors of the 
soundness of the ESM, if it is already there. 
74World 
Bank (1990b), p. 34. 
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Since their establishment in 1961, the SOEs relied on the banking sector in financing its 
capital requirements. The ESM was left to deal in a limited volume of government issued 
and guaranteed bonds used mainly to finance the budget deficit. 
On the other hand, despite the fact that small projects, i. e. those with less than 50 
workers, escaped nationalisation measures, the ESM did not serve them particularly well 
if at all. These projects specialised in services and light industry, with a scale of activity 
that did not require ESM financing. They were established by own-finance, mostly family 
finance, and retentions were used for their expansion. When necessary these projects 
obtained loans from the banking sector. 
(iii) Slow pace of the privatisation programme: 
The efficiency of the large SOEs has been deteriorating over the years since their 
establishment mainly in 196111 because of various factors, mainly, government 
interference in managerial decisions, administered pricing, overstaffing, absence of 
competition, and lack of accountability of top management. Moreover the overall deficit 
of the non-financial SOEs was over 8% of GDP by the mid 1980s. 76 The deteriorating 
economic conditions in the following years, oil price related external shocks in FY 
1986/87, and the increase in foreign debt services signified the problems of the SOEs. 
The government came under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank to control the 
budget deficit and reform the SOEs as one of the major causes of deterioration in the 
fiscal balance. 
75Although 
the role of public sector started to increase after the 1952 throughout the 1950s but it was mainly concentrated in financing 
infrastructure projects. The nationalisation measures of 1961 marked the official establishment of the public sector enterprises. 
76World 
Bank (1990b), op. cit., p. 34. 
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As an integral part of the economic reform and structural adjustment programme 
currently undertaken in Egypt, the government has adopted two approaches to reform the 
SOEs. First, separation of management from government and treating the SOEs and the 
private sector according to a unified law applied to both sectors. Thus a new SOE law 
was approved in July 1991 and most SOEs were separated from their ministries and 
regrouped under 27 new holding companies. More autonomy was given to the SOE as 
to management, pricing, obtaining their funding. However employment and suspension 
decisions were controlled by tight laws and regulations. " 
Second, the government adopted a programme of privatisation78 reflective of the 
international trend. According to this programme most of the SOEs are offered for sale 
according to a medium term schedule. 79 The government claimed that the privatisation 
programme is capable of improving the efficient use and allocation of limited resources 
and hence of contributing to more rapid economic growth. 8° Further it was argued that 
it would help to correct the fiscal imbalances through enhanced revenues. 81 
77See 
the NBE (1993), pp. 10-11. 
780n 
the concept of privatisation see Hartley and Parker (1991); on the relation between ownership and efficiency see George and Lynk 
(1992); on the economic implications of privatisation see Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and on the privatisation experience in LDCs, see 
the volume edited by Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988). 
79As described in the World Bank (1991) appendix IV, the first step of privatisation was taken in the FY 1990/91 by selling 2,000 small 
local government-owned enterprises and the start of selling large hotels. 
The second step was programmed for implementation in FY 1991/92 and includes the following: 
- Continuation of the sale of local government owned enterprises. 
- Sale of public sector shares in Law 230 companies. 
- Increase the private sector share in Law 97 companies which have private shareholders. 
- Lease of under-utilised production capacity and sale of surplus of assets. 
- Entire sale of small profitable public sector companies. 
The third step was to continue and reinforce the privatisation programme in FY 1992/93. 
For further details of the privatisation programme see the NBE (1994), pp. 9-23. 
80The 
distributional effects of privatisation in Egypt are adequately considered. The only issue addressed by the government in this respect 
is merely the compensation measures required for those who are likely to directly affected by the programme. It is argued that privatisation 
programmes are likely to generate more general distributional imbalances which have to be considered in a systematic manner. For an 
analysis of this issue see Cook and Kirkpatrick (1994). 
81The 
government in such claims is following the World Bank's view, expressed in the World Bank (1990b). 
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However because of the unpopularity of privatisation in Egypt, concerns of political 
instability, fears of worsening the severe unemployment problem (already 17.5%), 
privatisation of SOEs has been lagging behind its schedule. On the other hand evaluation 
of projects prepared for sale, taking sale decisions, methods of privatisation appeared 
problematic and practically difficult, especially in the absence of an active securities 
market which has been the backbone of the privatisation process in other countries. 
Although there are mutual benefits for the securities market and the privatisation 
programme, the authorities in Egypt have been trapped in a supply-leading or demand- 
following problem. Whether to develop first the ESM or privatise the SOEs, has been a 
main economic policy question since the start of the privatisation programme without a 
significant practical move in either direction. 
(iv) Relatively low costs of bank loans: 
The imposition of interest rate ceilings made the costs of the available loanable funds 
artificially low. Until 1991 the CBE was responsible for determining the interest rate 
structure according to which lending rates for different sectors were strictly applied. 82 
Such rates were generally below market levels and include. substantial subsidies for some 
borrowers. Under these circumstances it was difficult for the securities market to compete 
freely with the banking system. If ceilings on interest rates are lifted and the costs of 
borrowing become more realistic, there would be more of an incentive for companies to 
rely on the ESM to provide them with their capital requirements. 
v) The problem of closed companies: 
In 1993 of the total number of companies listed on the Cairo Stock Exchange of 654, 
76.2% of which were closely held companies. Closely held companies are defined as 
82See 
chapters (6) and (7) for an analysis of interest rate policy in Egypt. 
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those having 15 shareholders or less, usually members of the same family, whose shares 
are not normally offered for public dealing. These companies had approximately 70% of 
the £E 8.4 billion total capital of the market. 83 
As discussed above the legislators in the 1950s perceived the tendency towards a 
concentration of shares amongst a small number of holders, hence Law 26/1954 was 
issued demanding public offering of shares by prospectus to be entitled for listing. In the 
1980s tax and company laws 157/1981 and 159/1981 encouraged the establishment of 
joint-stock companies by offering tax incentives for listing and allowed listing of their 
securities provided that they had three or more shareholders. Consequently around 80% 
of the listed companies during the period 1981-1991 period were closely held. Shares of 
closely held companies are exclusively traded among the incumbent holders. The 
prevalence of such shares contributes very little to the supply of tradable securities. 
However, the problem will not be solved by mere legislation against the formation of 
closed companies. We argue that measures to promote the activities of the ESM and 
strengthen the investment environment would increase the number of registered companies 
with openly-traded securities and hence the relative importance of closely held companies 
will decline. Moreover the elimination of fiscal disincentives and a reduced cost of 
trading in securities, along with other measures, may encourage the existing closed 
companies to go public. 
(vi) Concentration of ownership 
If we look at the ownership structure of the publicly issued companies during the 1980s, 
we realise that more than 50% of the shares are owned by a small number of holders, 
83 Figures are calculated from the 1992/3 annual report of CBE. 
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usually the founders of these companies. Shares of the founders proved to be less likely 
to be traded. Only if necessary they are traded within the group of founders. 
The concentration of ownership structure and limited trading in the shares of founders 
along with the dominance of closely-held companies, did not help the attempts of 
widening the ownership base. 
(vii) Distortive incentives: 
We argued previously that the listing of joint-stock companies was encouraged by tax 
incentives. But we realise that such tax incentives resulted in a loss of budget revenue 
without widening the ownership base. Moreover they caused an "over-listing" of closed 
companies with untraded securities which affected adversely the performance and growth 
of the ESM. If such distortive incentives are to be abolished the ESM would witness an 
improvement in the long run. There may be a loss of ESM listing fees revenue but the 
ESM can compensate that from dealings-related revenue in the form of transactions costs. 
Such activity-related revenue will grow over time and be accompanied by a rise in market 
turnover. Neutrality of fiscal measure proves again to be necessary. 
(viii) Market illiquidity 
Because of the dominance of the shares of closed companies and their founders, the ESM 
suffers from a narrow base of tradeable securities. It is reported that in any given year 
during the 1980s, an average of just 20% of listed securities were traded. Table (4.4) 
shows that the average trading for listed shares was 19% and ranged from 7% in the 
tourism and forest products sectors to 50% in the insurance sector. 
Untraded securities deplete the administrative resources and do not contribute to market 
liquidity, adversely affecting the growth of the market. Shortage of adequate liquidity 
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prevents the ESM from serving potential investors and makes attracting funds of other 
financial intermediaries difficult. 
Table (4.4) 
Summary of Listed Securities in 1991 
Sector Number of 
Companies 
Number of 
shares 
% traded 
Banking 58 127 36 
Finance and investment 30 54 24 
Insurance 4 4 50 
Transport 15 16 25 
Tourism 42 70 7 
Real Estate 118 175 15 
Food Industries 66 121 18 
Metals and Engineering 49 83 12 
Chemicals and Paper 32 49 20 
Textiles & Clothing 24 37 22 
Construction 56 102 15 
Mining & Petroleum 13 19 16 
Publishing 5 9 22 
Retail Trade 44 53' 19 
Pharmaceutical 19 36 28 
Forest Products 8 14 7 
Information& Consulting 20 29 14 
Total 603 998 19 
Source: World Bank (1992d), Annex II. 4. 
(ix) Insufficient interest of banks in the ESM: 
It has been proposed that the banking sector with its excess liquidity problem, can help 
boost the ESM. For a long time banks and insurance companies were forced to buy 
government issued bonds, but this does not mean that they have sound portfolio 
management. There is only one bank, among the 100 registered banks at present, which 
has reasonable experience in portfolio management84. 
Public sector banks used to purchase securities upon their issuance and keep them without 
making any effort to manage them in order to maximise their return. Achieving this 
however would be difficult given the problems of inadequate information and financial 
disclosure mentioned above. 
84 
An interview with Mr M Samy, op. cit. and the bank is Bank Misr. 
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(x) Civil Code determination of return: 
A maximum limit of distributable profits of 7% per annum was set forth in the Civil 
Code. The banking sector managed to avoid compiling with this code since 1975 when 
the CBE was empowered to determine the discount rate as well as deposit and loan 
interest rate which granted some limited flexibility of interest rates in the banking 
sector. " However the ESM continued to be subject to the 7% ceiling. This further bias 
against the ESM makes the money market instruments, despite restrictions on them, more 
profitable than ESM securities. The financial sector liberalisation in Egypt which started 
with partial liberalisation measures in 1974, was unbalanced in the sense that it did not 
cover all financial intermediaries and instruments. We realise that in Egypt, as in most 
other LDCs, the speed of reform in the money market was always faster than that of the 
capital market. 
(xi) Tax treatment of securities: 
While interest on bank deposits are exempted from all forms of explicit taxes, securities 
continued to be subject to various taxes. These included taxes on earnings from moveable 
properties, annual stamp tax and duties on dealings in securities. Moreover a tax of 2% 
was levied on the difference between selling and buying prices, which combined with the 
1% fixed commission on both sides of transactions increased the costs of dealing in 
securities. 86 
Thus the tax code in Egypt was discriminatory in the sense that it favoured the banking 
savings instruments, where it should not, in principal, distort the relationship between risk 
and return. 8 - 
Under the Egyptian tax structure, income generated from the least risky 
85 See the previous chapter for an analysis of this point. 
86This 
tax was applied in June 1994 despite the repeated claims by the government for efforts to encourage the ESM. See Al-Abram 
Newspaper (16/6/1994). 
87 0n the discrimination against securities markets in LDCs see Van Agtmael (1984), pp. 2-8. 
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financial instruments, like treasury bills and bank deposits, is not taxed, while earnings 
from relatively higher risk instruments like corporate-issued shares and bonds are subject 
to different taxes. 88 Such a distortion prevented savers from making a rational selection 
for their portfolios from amongst freely competing financial instruments. 
Consequently, the net yield curve with regard to risk and maturity is a declining one. 
Table (4.5) shows that such tax discrimination makes corporate shares and bonds 
relatively unattractive instruments for potential savers. A hypothetical corporate bond, 
ceteris paribus, needs to offer a 23 % rate on a coupon in order to match the after tax 
yield on treasury bills, i. e. the hypothetical bond should offer 6% per annum above the 
medium term lending rate which cannot be acceptable to a corporate borrower. 
Accordingly the supply of corporate bonds would not be viable unless this rate is close 
to the cost of borrowing from the banking sector. On the other hand corporate bonds will 
not be attractive for individual and corporate investors (purchasers), unless their after-tax, 
risk-adjusted return is similar to the yields on T. bills and bank deposits. 89 Thus an 
improvement of the tax structure aiming at neutrality and non-discrimination is a 
necessary measure for any meaningful improvement of the ESM. 
-Table (4.5) ' 
After-Tax rates of return on different Financial Assets 
(percent) Bank T. Bills Development Bond Common Corporate Bond 
Deposits Stock (Hypothetical) 
Interest or Dividend 17.3 19 9.5 7.8 19.0 
(Individuals) 
Effective Tax Rate 0 0 0 21 16 
Effective Rate of Return 17.3 19 9.5 6.1' 16 
(Corporations) 
Effective Tax Rate 4 4 4 14 8 
Effective Rate of Return 16.5 18.2 9.1 6.7" 17 
ýVuiý-c. r. uapLcu ituui wunu rianK I1 ZQ), Annex iv. " bllectlve alviaena ylela 
- Bank deposits (7 months); Treasury Bills (90 days); Development Bond issue of 1985; Common Stock 
(Mohandes Insurance Company). 
88 See World Bank (1992d), op. cit., p. 41 and NBE (1992), p. 21. 
89See World Bank (1992d), pp. 41-46. 
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(xii) Inadequate regulatory and organisational structure: 
Adverse effects of imprudent regulation have not been the critical problem in the past, 
arguably because of the low profile of the ESM and its limited operations. However a 
more active market does require an adequate regulatory structure. The ESM suffers from 
several regulatory problems, the critical ones are discussed below: 
a) Multifarious supervisory bodies: 
The ESM has been suffering from a complex and incomplete legal framework. Four 
separate authorities have been involved in the supervision of ESM, namely the Ministry 
of the Economy, the Investment Authority, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) and, to 
a lesser extent, the Central Bank of Egypt. 90 Lack of coordination, overlapping of 
responsibilities and several cross relationships between these authorities left the ESM 
without an adequate supervision. 
The CMA is granted extensive and discretionary powers over the operations of the 
securities market without being properly accountable for its conduct. Moreover the CMA 
is effectively a division in the Ministry of the Economy. Its board and president are 
appointed by the minister of the economy which reflects the great extent of government 
involvement in the management of the CMA and hence the securities market. 91 We argue 
that in order to ensure the autonomy of the securities market, its supervisory body should 
be independent of any governmental affiliations and should be directly accountable to 
Parliament. 
90 See NBE (1992), op. cit., p. 22. 
91See 
the comment of Mahmoud Wahba on the responsibilities of the CMA, Al-Ahram Newspaper 13/2/1994. 
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b) Inadequate guidelines for information disclosure: 
Despite the smallness of the ESM the information system does not sufficiently cover its 
activities, while computation of its database and operations has not yet been introduced. 
Financial information barely exists. Prospectus disclosures are brief, regular financial 
reports are hard to be found, information on takeovers are kept in the domain of insiders' 
networks. 92 This lack of disclosure limits public confidence by conveying the impression 
that the ESM is an exclusive club 
C) Lack of measures to improve operational efficiency: 
The inactivity of the ESM over the last three decades is responsible for its undeveloped 
method of operation. New techniques and modern methods in the profession have not 
been applied. Transactions and the transfer of securities ownership are manually 
processed. Securities' documents move via a courier between respective agents seeking 
signatories. Authorisation of documents go through long bureaucratic procedures resulting 
in loss and delay costs. Moreover the market suffers from a scarcity of skilled staff, 
brokers and other professionals. " The CMA being primarily concerned with amendments 
in laws and regulations did not pay sufficient attention to the training of required 
personnel. 
d) Absence of a uniform standard of accounting: 
There does not exist a unified accounting standard to be followed. Public sector 
participants in the ESM follow the Code of Accounts supervised by the Central Audit 
Organisation. Private sector participants are simply required to follow any recognised 
standard of accounts. Hence there are vital differences between financial statements 
92 See World Bank (1992d), pp. 22-24. 
93An interview with Dr Shams-El-Din Director of international relations CMA (20/8/1991). 
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produced by different participants. Investors find it difficult to make any meaningful 
comparison given such differences. " 
e) Lack of anti-fraud measures: 
It is not clear from the new law 95/1992 and its executive bylaw that adequate provisions 
were made against possible fraud. Active securities markets normally have anti-fraud 
measures as they frequently discover various mischievous practices such as: insider 
trading, nondisclosure of the status of companies in times of trouble, publishing 
misleading statements, hiding important information e. g. risk involved, transaction fees. 
(4.7) Conclusion: 
In this chapter we have evaluated the role of securities markets in LDCs by comparing 
their advantages and disadvantages. We also examined the 'market versus bank' 
controversy. In the light of recent empirical studies, especially new findings on the 
German banking system and recent changes in the Japanese financial structure, we 
conclude that LDCs, including Egypt, should develop their securities markets within a 
sound regulatory framework and encourage their markets to compete freely with the 
banks. 
Then we analysed the developments in the Egyptian securities market since its 
establishment in 1883. We divided its development path to three phases. In the first phase 
(1883-58) the ESM grew rapidly and was remarkably active despite the heavy fluctuations 
in its performance when it was mainly dependent on the changes in the cotton market and 
largely exposed to international shocks. The 1959-71 phase was a period of government 
restriction and intervention in the mechanism of the ESM. As a result of the 
Egyptianisation and nationalisation measures of this period and the growing reliance of 
94 World Bank (1992d), op. cit, p. 24. 
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the dominant public sector on the banking sector for funding the ESM was in a state of 
near official closure. The third phase 1971-93 observed various reviving attempts, most 
of which were not successful for various reasons which we have documented. 
We have analysed the performance of the ESM compared with markets in selected 
emerging securities markets. Constrained by the availability of data we used the number 
of listed companies, trading value, market capitalisation and turnover ratio. These 
indicators suggest that despite the recent improvement in the ESM, since the mid 1980s, 
its performance is still lagging behind its pre-nationalisation level. Comparisons with 
other emerging markets accentuate that the ESM, given its potential, is in need of strong 
assistance to overcome the impediments facing its progress. We have analysed these 
impediments in turn and our analysis suggests that most of them are' supply side ones. 
However this does not imply that there is no demand side problems. Lack of confidence 
in the securities, their issuers and ways of distributing profits, fear of sequestration and 
concern of higher taxes are all examples of the demand side problems. These problems 
emphasise the need for effective policy measures to make the ESM viable and 
competitive, raise awareness of its services and restore public confidence in the market. 
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Chapter (5) 
An Analysis of Formal and Informal 
Islamic Finance in Egypt 
(5.1) Introduction: 
There has been a surge of interest since the early 1980s in the theoretical and practical 
aspects of Islamic banking. This has been a response to the revival of Islamic values, the 
Islamisation of the financial system in Iran, Pakistan and recently Sudan, in addition to 
the growing number of Islamic banks inside and outside the Muslim world. The first 
country to have an Islamic bank was Egypt in 1963. 
Islamic banking is centred around the principle of the abolition of interest rate which is 
considered a form of riba (usury). The alternative method for financing under the Islamic 
system is based on profit and loss sharing (PLS) approach. Recent theoretical analyses 
have established that not only PLS is viable but it has several advantages over the 
conventional banking system. 
In this chapter we discuss the concept of usury and its evolution in economic thinking. 
Then we outline the Islamic stand regarding the prohibition of usury and its economic 
implications. We analyse the economic framework of Islamic banking system and 
construct a model that illustrates its distinctive characteristics. Then we determine sources 
of funds and their allocation according to the Islamic banking framework. Under the case 
of Egypt we examine the performance of Islamic banks as we distinguish between public 
and private intermediaries. The case of Islamic 'branches of conventional banks is also 
considered. 
This section is concluded by a discussion of the problems of Islamic finance in Egypt and 
its prospects. 
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In addition to the Islamic banks and Islamic branches of conventional banks, more than 
100 financial institutions claiming to be based on Islamic principles were set up in Egypt 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These institutions were called "Sharikat Tawzeef Al- 
Amwal A1-Islamiyyah" that crudely translates as Islamic Investment Companies, 
henceforth IICs. We provide an analysis of the IICs as regard to their activities, size and 
adopted mechanisms in mobilisation of resources. We also discuss the reasons behind 
their rise and fall during the 1980s and its repercussions. 
(5.2) A note on the concept of usury in economic thought: 
Usury is a term whose meaning has undergone changes through time. It is clear, 
however, that usury signified originally the charge of any interest on loans. It is only 
recently that this meaning has been narrowed down to impute the lending of money at 
extortionate rates of interest'. Laws and moral codes regulating the charging of interest 
can be traced from the code of Hammurabi of Babylon, 1800 B. C., through the Old and 
New Testaments, to the variety of Medieval prohibitions, to the rules of the Quran and 
the contemporary regulations of the modern World? 
The issue of usury received a fair share of scholarly comment from Aristotle to Keynes. 
Aristotle pointed out that "the most hated sort of unnatural money making, and with the 
greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the 
natural use of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at 
interest. And this term usury, which means the birth of money from money, is applied 
to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of all 
modes of making money this is the most unnatural"3. The view of Aristotle on usury 
1See Brett (1945), p. 13. 
2Regarding 
regulations in the modern World, Blitz and Long (1965), p. 608 report that in the United States all but three of the states 
have laws governing interest charges.. and furthermore there is a federal law [which] prohibits a charge by banks in excess of 7 per cent". 
3 Quoted in Melitz and Winch (1978), p. 90. 
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along with that of Seneca the Roman philosopher, canon law, natural law and Scripture 
and authentic church teachings formed the sources of principles for Aquinas (1225-1274) 
and the Scholastics doctrine on usury. 4 
The Scholastic economic thought referred to a lender's intention to obtain more in return 
than the principal amount of the loan as usury. As a general rule any interest taking was 
usurious. Hence charging of interest was forbidden by law in the beginning of the 12th 
century and was effective throughout the Scholastic periods. As time went on, some 
pardons were made regarding the charge of interest, such as the case of charging it to 
political enemies; using it as a penalty on the borrower if he fails to return the principal 
on the agreed date; using it as a compensation for the lender if he suffered damage during 
the lending period; compensating the lender for loosing a gain because of the loan; using 
it in a form of gift as a reward provided by bankers to depositors in the early stages of 
deposit banking'. Such practices became numerous to the extent that they left interest 
prohibition an empty shell. 
With the start of the era of individualism and laissez faire the Scholastic doctrine was 
abandoned. The publication of Bentham's Defence of Usury in 1787, in which he 
emphasised absolute freedom in determining the terms of loans reflected the growing view 
of his time. Attempts to apply the old usury laws failed during the 19th century which 
witnessed, in 1854, the abolishment of Usury laws altogether in the UK. Moreover the 
Code of Cannon Law of 1917 permitted the creditor to accept the legal rate of interest 
and more than that rate in particular circumstances. 7 
4See 
Roll (1954), pp. 47-49. 
5See Spiegel (1971), pp. 63-65. 
6 See The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, vol 3, p. 745. 
7The Code of Cannon Law of 1983 went as far as making it a'duty' to pay interest on an administrator ecclesiastical goods incurs a debt. 
See ibid, p. 744. 
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However in accordance with his theory of liquidity preference, Keynes argued that the 
enforcement of ceilings on interest rates would increase investment'. This argument, 
despite the difference in the concept of usury, made him support the Scholastic view on 
usury control by moral laws and describe it as an "honest intellectual effort to keep 
separate what the classical theory has inextricably confused together, namely, the rate of 
interest and the marginal efficiency of capital"9. 
(5.3) The Islamic ban on usury: 
Until the early 1980s the literature on Islamic Economics focused on few topics. Writings 
were primarily on economic philosophy, principles of economic systems, Islamic critique 
of contemporary economic theories and systems and some modern readings of the 
contributions of some Muslim scholars; mainly the contributions of Abu Yusuf (731-798), 
Ibn Taimiya (1262-1328), Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), on different issues related to the 
operation of the economy according to Islamic principles and the role of the Islamic 
state. 10 
However the bulk of the literature on Islamic Economics and Finance has appeared since 
the early 1980s. Most of the work, which tackled practical issues with more appreciation 
of theories and tools of mainstream economics, was on the Islamic prohibition of interest 
rate, operational aspects of Islamic Banking and analyses of Islamisation experiments at 
institutional and country levels. " 
8More 
discussion of this argument is provided in Chapter (2). 
9Keynes 
(1939), p. 352. 
10See 
the extensive survey of Siddiqi (1981). 
11See for example the studies of Khan (1986) on Interest-Free Banking; Khan and Mirakhor (1990) on the experiences of Iran and 
Pakistan; Choudhury and Malik (1992) on the foundations of Islamic political economy; and Mannan (1986) on the theory and practice 
of Islamic economics. 
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The concentration on interest-free banking and the scarcity of studies on other aspects of 
Islamic Economics can be explained by the limited economy-wide applications of Islamic 
rules in the Moslem World. Apart from the cases of Iran, Pakistan and Sudan, where 
governments claim that Islamic economic principles are fully applied, the adoption of 
Islamic principles does not exceed the mere establishment of few financial institutions in 
the rest of Moslem countries. 
However recent writings on the issue of interest-free banking, as one of the harvests of 
Islamic revival were inspired by the Quran and the Sunnah (teachings and traditions of 
the Prophet Muhammad). They comprise the two main sources of Sharia (Islamic Law) 
and strongly condemn riba (usury). 
The prohibition of riba is referred to in the Holy Quran in four surahs (chapters)12: 
1) "That which you give in riba for increase through the property of other people, will have 
no increase with Allah: But that which you give for charity, seeking the countenance of 
Allah, will increase: it is these who will get a recompense multiplied" Surah 30, verse 39. 
2) "0 you who believe! Devour not riba, doubled and multiplied; but fear Allah; that you 
may really prosper" Surah 3, verse 130. 
3) "That they took riba, though they were forbidden; and that they devoured Men's wealth 
wrongfully. We have prepared for those among them who reject Faith a grievous 
chastisement" Surah 4, verse 161. 
4) "0 you who believe! Fear Allah, and give up what remains of your demand for riba, if 
you are indeed believers. If you do it not, take notice of war from Allah and his messenger: 
but if you repent you shall have your capital sums: deal not unjustly, and you shall not be 
dealt with unjustly. If the debtor is in a difficulty, Grant him time till it is easy for him to 
repay. But if you remit it by way of charity, that is best for you if you only Knew. 
And fear the day when you shall be brought back to Allah. Then shall every soul be paid 
what it earned, and none shall be dealt with unjustly" Surah 2, verses 278-281. 
Riba is a generic term which stands literally for all kinds of excesses above the value of 
a thing13. The technical meaning for riba is the premium, regardless how small or large, 
which must be paid by a borrower to a lender in addition to the principal as a condition 
12 The English translation of the Quran is that of Ali, Yusuf (1990). 
13Choudhury 
and Malik (1992), op. cit., p. 103. 
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for a loan or for an extension of its maturity14. It is established that all forms of 
predetermined fixed return which are tied with the size and the length of the loans, 
regardless of their purpose, are considered by Muslim scholars as ribals 
The prohibition of fixed predetermined interest rates can be explained by Islam's position 
regarding property rights. Islam recognises two groups of property rights. First those 
which are an outcome of the combination of individual's labour and natural resources. 
Second, property rights that are acquired through exchange, inheritance, grants,.. etc. A 
loan is just a transfer of some (or all) of these rights from a lender to a borrower and 
providing it should not entitle the borrower to an increase in his property rights. Such an 
increase violates the pivotal rule of transactions according to Islam that is justice. Thus 
interest on loans is unjustified as it indicates an instantaneous creation, of a claim for the 
lender on the borrowers property, once the contract is concluded and regardless of the 
outcome of the project for which the loan was provided". 
(5.4) A framework of Islamic banking: 
Islam permits a wide range of contracts which do not violate the regulations of Islamic 
law and its position on property rights. Any arrangement in which the returns of the 
parties involved are contingent with uncertain gains and the parties have symmetric 
information regarding the outcome of the project is permitted. " Thus sharing of risks and 
uncertainties is the main characteristic of Islamic financial transactions. 
The predetermined return on financial transaction is absolutely eliminated but an uncertain 
return represented by profits is not. Hence if the return of the use of money fluctuates 
14 Chapra (1985), pp. 56-57. 
15 See for example Al-Qaraddawy (1990), Al-Salous (1987) and (1991) and Chapra (1985). 
16 See Khan and Mirakhor (1992), pp. 15-16. 
17ibid., 
p. 16. 
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according to the actual profits made from such use, this would be consistent with the 
Islamic law. Under Islamic finance the depositor is not guaranteed a predetermined return 
on the nominal value of his deposit. Instead he is considered as if he were a shareholder 
of the financial institution and consequently he shares the profits, or losses, made by the 
institution. 
Hence the interest-free financial system can be viewed as a variant of equity participation 
systems that rely on profit and loss sharing (PLS). However it is worth noting that the 
Islamic PLS is not completely identical with conventional equity participation schemes as 
it differs from them in the following aspects. First speculativeI activities undertaken to 
maximise capital gains are not allowed hence, an Islamic bank has to allocate its funds 
in productive investment according to a one-to-one basis between the amounts of bank's 
funds and the financing of the activity. Second while under conventional equity 
participation there is a discretion of management to determine returns distributed to 
shareholders it is not the case with Islamic PLS as it ties the parties to pre-agreed shares 
of profits or losses. Third, PLS contracts are for a specified investment period and hence 
they are less liquid". Needless to say that funds of Islamic PLS cannot be used in 
financing the production of goods or services forbidden in Islam, e. g. alcohol, gambling. 
Due to the Islamic prohibition of predetermined fixed interest rates, Islamic banks have 
developed on the basis of profit and loss sharing either in the case of borrowing from 
depositors or lending to investors. Two conditions should be satisfied for a transaction 
to be Islamic. First net return on capital should not be predetermined. Second it is not 
only profit which is shared between the two parties of the transaction but loss as well. 
The distribution of profits is done according to bargaining between the depositor and the 
bank on one hand and the bank and the investor on the other. 
18See Khan (1987), pp. 326-327. 
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5.4.1) The distinctive characteristics of Islamic banking: 
We illustrate the difference between a traditional bank and an Islamic Bank by 
constructing the following model: 
In the traditional banking system a person deposits (D) with the bank in a point of time 
(t0) in return for a predetermined guaranteed nominal interest rate (rd > 0) at (t1). In 
contrast with the traditional bank, an Islamic bank offers its depositor a rate of return 
(sd) on his deposits (D) based on the profit of its operations (ir) which are distributed 
between the depositor and the bank according to mutually agreed share (a) fixed in the 
contract, then 
sd= a E(ir)/ D (1) 
where a>0, E is the expected value and a can either be >_ 0 or <_ 0. 
Thus the nominal value of (D) can increase or decrease by the amount of (sd) depending 
on the value of (ir) which can be positive or negative or zero. 
In the lending side of a traditional bank, if a person receives a loan 4a point of time 
to and agreed to return to the bank L, = La+r1 in t1. The difference between Ll and Lo 
is interest; 
r1 = LI-Lo (2) 
where r, > rd 
As in the case of borrowing from depositors, the Islamic bank lends according to profit 
and loss sharing scheme in which uncertainty is involved. The bank takes an agreed share 
6 in the profit or loss of the joint project and the investor takes (1-6). Thus if the bank 
funds the project by (F) in (to) it will receive in (t1): 
Sb =6 E(7r)/ F (3) 
while the investor receives: s; = (1-6) E(r)/ F (4) 
where (ir) >_ 0 or <_ 0 and E is the expected value. 
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5.4.2) Merits of Islamic banking: 
It is argued that an equity based interest free system would be more stable in the context 
of shocks that can result in banking crises. This argument is supported by Khan's IS-LM 
model". In this model there are no bonds and banks are pure intermediaries. Further 
there are no transaction deposits and banks do not hold reserves. As shown in figure (5.1) 
below, following an IS shock the real values of deposits (shares) held in Islamic banks 
adjust instantaneously. 
Point A represents the steady state equilibrium which yields the values of m* and r*. 
Following an IS shock, e. g. a fall in export volume, real income falls from y* to y'. A 
new steady state equilibrium is reached at point C, following an adjustment by shifting 
the schedules of ry, =0 downward and my. =0 upward respectively. The instantaneous 
short run equilibrium at point B occurs because of the decrease of. real rate of return from 
19 See Khan (1986), op. cit., pp. 10-18. 
Figure (5.1) 
Adjustment to shocks in an Islamic banking system 
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r* to rl in order to maintain equilibrium at the assets market at m* and rl. Given that 
there is excess demand for goods at point B, prices increase and real money balances will 
decrease. Thus the real rate of return increases to reach equilibrium in the money market. 
Such increase reduces excess aggregate demand. The process continues until the new 
steady state at point C is reached where r=r2 and m=m1. The reason behind the 
adjustment path from A to C through B is slow adjustment of prices in the goods market. 
A direct move from A to C in the economy is possible if the goods market adjust 
instantaneously. 
However the adjustment to the shock, as described above, is possible under the Islamic 
system as the nominal values of deposits are not guaranteed. Hence, the real values of 
assets and liabilities would be equal at all points in time. In contrast to the conventional 
system with guaranteed values of deposits, in the short run there would be a divergence 
between real assets and liabilities. While the Islamic system adjusts to shocks without the 
need for government intervention, the conventional system is in a need for such 
intervention in order to correct the disequilibrium between assets and liabilities. If this 
did not happen divergence will continue with a possibility of a banking crisis. 20 
Moreover from the previous-analysis we realise that the Islamic system is immune from 
the myopic behaviour of banks in times of crisis. Such behaviour can take the form of 
competing for deposits by bidding up interest rates, or the form of rapid reduction of 
loans to increase reserves at the expense of other banks. This behaviour may lead to 
insolvency and bankruptcies. 
20ibid., 
pp. 17-18. 
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5.4.3) Possible practical problems: 
PLS schemes may be compatible with the requirements of depositors who happen to be 
risk-lovers and apparently the requirements of those who are risk averse are not 
necessarily served by PLS. This problem, if not resolved by innovating less risky 
financial instruments, can result in negative impact on the ability of Islamic banks in the 
mobilisation of savings21 at given incomes and propensities to save. Our argument, 
however, does not imply that predetermined fixed interest rates are better measures than 
the ex-post determined rates of return provided by Islamic banks in improving the size 
of aggregate savings. Rather it indicates that in a society with significant percentage of 
risk aversion the distribution of a given amount of savings would be in favour of 
conventional banking instruments and at the expense of the Islamic ones. 
Moreover the establishment of Islamic banking implies changes in its relation with the 
government and the Central Bank, which may have practical difficulties. For example an 
Islamic bank cannot participate in financing budget deficits by lending to the government 
at interest, regardless how low its rate is. Moreover if the whole financial system become 
Islamic, the reliance on interest rate as an instrument of monetary policy has to be 
abandoned in favour of other measures, like direct credit control, a modified form of 
open market operations under PLS principle, liquidity ratio requirements (without interest 
bearing securities in banks portfolios). " 
Under profit and loss sharing the fractional reserve requirement system also has to be 
revised as depositors of the central bank are de facto investors who have to share the 
outcome of the operations of their banks. Further under an Islamic system, credit creation 
allowed under the fractional reserve system is considered inequitable for the society as 
21See Pryor (1985), pp. 208-210. 
22 On the functions of the Central bank in an Islamic system see for example the report of the council of Islamic Ideology (1983). 
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a whole, as only the banks and their customers benefit from it leaving the rest of the 
society suffering from the inflationary effect of credit creation. 23 
Some of these arguments are not alien to western economic thinking as we can realise 
some similarities in the writings that analysed financial crises and questioned the stability 
of the capitalist economies. Actually the argument of 100 percent reserve requirements 
was raised by Fisher (1945) and Simon (1948). According to their proposal for the 
maintenance of 100 percent reserves, the banks' power of creating or destroying effective 
money will disappear. This power granted to banks under the fractional-reserve system 
made the financial system inherently unstable as a result of switching from a high 
powered money to deposit money. Under a 100 percent reserve requirement such a switch 
will only change the composition of money supply leaving its total constant. This was 
reason behind Friedman's (1969) support of this argument as he found in it a way of 
reducing government intervention in the operation of banks and hence a way to increase 
economic freedom. 24 
(5.5) Sources of funds and their allocation under Islamic banking: 
5.5.1) Liabilities side of the Islamic bank: sources of funds 
Obtaining sources of funds and the acquisition of assets by an Islamic bank are 
undertaken according to the PLS. 
The sources of funds for a typical Islamic bank are: 
i) Bank's own capital and equity. 
ii) Transactions deposits which can be considered like demand deposits in the 
conventional system. Although the nominal value of such deposits is guaranteed, 
23See 
the comment of Zarqa on Al-Jarhy (1983), p. 98. 
24See Khan (1985), p. 8 and on the inherent'instability of the capitalist economies see Friedman (1969) and Minsky (1986). 
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there is no return on them. As such deposits cannot be used by the bank for its 
investments, usually a services charge for managing such accounts is imposed. 
iii) Investment deposits form the main source of funding and they are considered like 
shares. Investment accounts are held by depositors whose motives are not limited, 
theoretically at least, to transactions or precautionary purposes as in the case of 
transactions deposits. Investment deposits are normally subject to minimum 
deposit size and fixed duration determined by the Islamic bank. Moreover, in 
contrast with conventional banks, where the nominal value of deposits is 
guaranteed by the bank or the government explicitly or implicitly, such deposits 
with an Islamic bank are not guaranteed. The depositor in an Islamic system is 
considered a shareholder who receives an agreed proportion of pooled profit (or 
loss) incurred by all of the projects of the bank, net of administrative costs, taxes 
and reserves25. 
The Islamic bank can provide its clients with a special investment account as an 
instrument offered to relatively big depositors. In such accounts the depositor has 
the option to share the outcome of a particular project to which his contract is 
exclusively tied. The share can differ from a depositor to another according to the 
size of participation. 26 
5.5.2) Assets of the Islamic bank: allocation of funds 
In the absence of interest Islamic banks in generating their incomes resort to fees for 
services, profit sharing from equity participation, trading in commodities and foreign 
currencies, establishing and managing industrial, agricultural and services projects, in 
addition to real estates and rental businesses. An Islamic bank cannot keep fixed rate 
25 
Khan and Mirakhor (1987), p. 167. 
26See Kazarian (1991), pp. 74-76. 
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assets on its portfolio. Thus certificates of deposits, government bills and bonds and 
corporate bonds cannot be dealt in by an Islamic bank27. 
The three main forms of Islamic bank financing are mudarabah (trust finance) and 
musharakah (partnership or joint venture financing), both are versions of PLS, in addition 
to murabaha (markup contract or differed payment sale). 
i) Under mudarabah, funds are provided by the bank to an investor in return for a 
predetermined percentage of profits. If the project incurs loss, the bank bears the 
financial loss exclusively and the investor loses the reward for his time and effort 
but does not bear any financial loss given that he is not negligent. In the past, 
even before Islam, mudarabah provided the means of combining the owner of 
capital and the entrepreneur in common ground as it coordinates the interests of 
the two parties without a contradiction with the Islamic system. In modern times 
it has been applied to include the depositor as a financier, the bank as 
entrepreneur, if the bank invest directly in its own projects, and has been 
extended to include three parties if the bank acts as intermediary and provides the 
funds to an investor who requires funding. Practically the Islamic bank aggregates 
profits, and losses, from different direct and indirect investments and shares net 
profits, or losses, with the depositors in strict relation to their capital 
contributions. Mudarabah has been used in projects with short gestation periods, 
e. g. trade projects28. 
ii) In Musharakah two or more parties contribute, in equal or variable proportions 
to the joint capital of the enterprise. In contrast with mudarabah, this financing 
27 See Abdeen and Shook (1984), p. 185. 
28See Khan and Mirakhor (1990), p. 355, Kazarian (1991), pp. 69-73 and Abdeen and Shook (1984), pp. 188-189. 
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form is used in long term investments, like industrial and agricultural projects. 
In musharakah, profits are distributed between the parties according to their 
respective capital and as in the case of mudarabah, losses are born by all parties 
and not just by the lender alone29. Companies under this form of finance can raise 
funds by offering certificates, as transferable corporate instruments secured by the 
companies assets, in the market which would determine their price. 
iii) Murabaha financing implies that the bank purchases certain commodities for 
clients on a pre-agreed profit, under a cost-plus contract. The client may pay the 
price in instalments and the commodity is used, in this case, as collateral until the 
price is fully paid. This method of finance has recently become a popular method 
of finance at the Inter-Muslim Countries level as it has been adopted by the 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) since 1977. Member countries of the IDB 
purchase commodities, usually from other members and the IDB pays the costs 
on their behalf. The bank is paid subsequently in instalments and generates 
profits through the agreed markup3°. Although this form of finance is widely used 
by Islamic banks it does not have the same ecumenical acceptance under Islamic 
law that is enjoyed by mudarabah and musharakah. As discussed below, 
murabaha is considered by some Muslim scholars as a measure based on implicit 
riba. 
5.5.3) Other forms of finance: 
Although musharakah, mudarabah and murabaha are the dominant financial instruments 
employed by Islamic banks, there are some other instruments frequently used by such 
banks among them: 
29Khan 
and Mirakhor, op. cit., p. 355. 
30Abdeen 
and Shook (1984), op. cit., pp. 189-190. 
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" Bai' Salam (purchase with differed delivery). In this transaction the bank pays the 
seller in advance the full agreed price of a specified quality and quantity of a 
commodity that the latter promises to deliver in the future. This form of finance, 
that is similar to forward purchase, has been employed in the case of agricultural 
products as their seasonality signifies the need for such finance. It has been 
applied as well to purchase other goods, e. g. manufacturing products, when the 
producer require working capital before delivery time. 
" Ijarah (leasing). Under this form of finance the Islamic bank, 'as in the 
conventional system, purchases an asset and leases it to a client, for a fixed 
period, in return for a monthly or annual rent. An extension of this form is 
known as Ijarah wa iqtina which is similar to a lease-purchase contracts under 
which the ownership of the asset is transferred eventually to the client by making 
payments in instalments into a savings account over an agreed period of time. 31 
" Qard Hasan (beneficence loan). This form of finance is a solution to consumption 
loans from an Islamic perspective. These loans are provided by the bank at a zero 
return for those who need them. A service charge is paid by the recipient to cover 
only the administrative costs of providing the loan under the condition that this 
charge is not related to the size of the loan or its time length. 32 Part of the 
funding of such loans can be obtained by using of the revenues of zakat (alms 
tax)33 collected annually by the Islamic bank from its investors as one of the 
integrated functions of the bank. 34 In an Islamic financial system the revenue of 
31 ibid., pp. 190-191. 
32Khan 
and Mirakhor (1990), p. 355. 
33Zakat is the third of the five pillars of Islam which are: Believing that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger; 
performing prayers, paying zaknt; fasting the month of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mekah. Zakat is a compulsory levy imposed on 
all possessions, like cash, agricultural products, gold and silver,.. etc. The rate of such tax is 2.3 % per annum on the accumulated wealth 
and net income that exceed the minimum exemptible level. The aim of zakat is to achieve social justice. For a detailed analysis of the 
economic role of zakat see Choudhury and Malik (1992), op. cit., pp. 63-101. It is worth noting that the collection of zakat is the 
responsibility of the state not the bank under an Islamic system, and due to the absence of this system Islamic banks took over this 
responsibility. 
34For 
a discussion of consumption loans in an Islamic system see for example Siddiqi (1988), pp. 155-165. 
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the zakat should increase as the government under this system have to collect 
them according to the Islamic Law. Thus some of its revenues can be channelled 
through Islamic banks to fund the Qard Hasan. Moreover the very nature of 
transactions accounts held by the Islamic bank at zero return for depositors, as 
discussed above, justifies the proposed role of such a bank to extend zero-return 
loans for consumption. Further we argue that although transactions deposits are 
theoretically not used in banks' projects, in practice they are. Hence the return 
of transactions deposits can be utilised to fund such loans and cover the cases of 
default if they occur. 
In addition to the prohibition of transactions based on interest rates, the Islamic bank 
should avoid all activities that involve speculation and indulging in the production of any 
good or service that violate Islamic law. Further the objectives of the Islamic bank should 
not be limited to profit maximisation alone as it also has social and religious objectives. 
Needless to emphasise that most, if not all, of the proposed functions and operations of 
the Islamic bank cannot be suitably applied in the absence of a comprehensive application 
of Islamic law in all the aspects of the economic system. As shown below, the divergence 
in practice of many Islamic banks from the theoretical guidelines can be primarily 
attributed to the limited application of Islamic principles resulting in only a limited 
number of appropriate financial intermediaries in an incompatible economic system. 
(5.6) Islamic banking in practice: 
The resurgence of Islamic values in the 20th century, especially during the last two 
decades has been reflected recently in the economic sphere. There was scepticism and 
reservations regarding the activities of Interest-based banking systems in Muslim societies 
which was witnessing shifts towards applying Islam in all aspects of life including 
financial transactions. We argue that part of the slow pace of financial development in 
these societies can be attributed to the incompatibility of the western-style banking model 
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with the prevailing traditions and values. 35 However the establishment of financial 
institutions with Islamic features has been a response to changes in Moslem societies and 
has capitalised on them to attract those who were discouraged previously from dealing 
with the formal financial system. 
There have been two ways of forming Islamic financial institutions. The first was by 
restructuring the whole financial system in accordance with Islamic law. Such 
restructuring either took a gradualist form as in Pakistan which started a cautious 
programme in 1979/80 or a shock form like in Iran which adopted a rapid process of 
Islamisation permitted by its Islamic revolution in 1979.36 The government in Sudan has 
been also experimenting with the Islamisation of its banking system since 1984. However 
its attempt was not supported by adequate preparation as in Pakistan or by a revolution 
as in the case of Iran, so initially it did not achieve its objectives. Another attempt has 
been initiated recently. 37 
The second way of applying Islamic financial principles took the form of establishing 
Islamic financial units in countries which adopt otherwise 'conventional' financial 
systems. This way has been more widespread than the first as is shown in table (5.1). 
There are approximately 45 countries, including most of the Muslim countries, which 
now have some form of Islamic financial establishments. The majority of the Islamic 
financial institutions were a product of cooperative efforts between private entrepreneurs 
and financial authorities in the countries concerned. 38 
35 
This argument is discussed further in our survey of 200 households as we examined their views and opinions regarding the compatibility 
of formal institutions with their beliefs and moral stands. See chapter (8) and (9). 
36For 
a comparison between the experiences of Iran and Pakistan in Islamic banking, See Khan and Mirakhor (1990) and Iqbal and 
Mirakhor (1987). 
37See 
Ahmad (1993), pp. 22-23. 
380n 
the circumstances surrounding the establishment of Islamic Banks see Wohlers-Scharf (1983). 
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Table (5.1) 
The biggest Islamic banks 
Bank Location Year Capital (S million) 
Authorised Paid 
Al-Baraka Saudi Arabia 1982 183 
AI-Rajhi Saudi Arabia 1983 213 . 
Bahrain Islamic Bank Bahrain 1979 13 13 
Bahrain Islamic Investment Company Bahrain 1981 13 13 
Dar at Maal at Islami Bahamas 1981 1000 316 
Bank Islam Malaysia Malaysia 1983 206 33 
Dubai Islamic bank UAE 1975 14 14 
Faisal Islamic bank of Egypt Egypt 1977 40 38 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan Sudan 1977 77 44 
Islamic bank of Bangladesh Bangladesh 1983 19 0.7 
Islamic Bank International Denmark 1983 4 4 
Islamic International Holding Company Luxembourg 1978 100 26 
Islamic DevelopmentBank Saudi Arabia 1975 1960 1250 
Islamic International Bank for Investment & Development Egypt 1981 12 9 
Jordan Islamic Bank Jordan 1978 10 10 
Islamic Investment House Jordan 1981 10 10 
Kuwait Finance House Kuwait 1977 62 61 
Nasser Social Bank Egypt 1972 29 
Qatar Islamic Bank Qatar 1983 55 
Source: Roy, D. (1991), p. 440. 
(5.7) Islamic banking in Egypt: 
The process of applying Islamic financial principles took two forms in Egypt: 
establishment of Islamic banks, both private and public and setting up of Islamic branches 
of conventional banks; in addition to forming Islamic Investment Companies which 
belong, according to reasons given below, to the informal sector. In this section we start 
by examining first the case of formal Islamic banks, as we distinguish between the public 
and private ones. Second the case of Islamic branches of conventional banks is discussed. 
Third we discuss the main problems and prospects of Islamic banking in Egypt in the 
light of their recent experience. 
(5.7.1) Public Islamic banks: 
(a) Meet Ghamr Bank: 
The first experiment in Islamic banking, in the Muslim World, was undertaken in Egypt, 
in 1963, by the establishment of Local Savings Bank in the semi-rural town of Meet 
Ghamr, in the Dakahliyah province, in the Delta. The bank was an adapted model of the 
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German savings banks to comply with Islamic principles39. It was established by a 
German grant of DM 780,000 and an Egyptian government contribution of £E 60,000 
transferred from the Post Office Savings Fund40. During the five years of its operation 
the Government continued to subsidise the activities of the bank. The subsidies totalled 
LE 496,00041. Like the rest of the operating financial intermediaries in Egypt during this 
period the Meet Ghamr Bank (MGB) had to be publicly owned. The bank was not subject 
to direct supervision from the Central Bank but an especially constituted public authority 
assumed the supervisory role. 
The MGB provided three different accounts. First deposits accounts with a very small 
deposit minimum and without a maximum. There was no return whatsoever for the 
holders of such account which can be considered an equivalent of current account in the 
conventional system. The second type was called "investment with participation accounts" 
which accepted deposits with a modest minimum and had no maximum. These accounts 
provided a PLS return to depositors. The third account was the zakat and social services 
account. This account accepted alms taxes from individuals in addition to charities and 
donations. 42 
As shown in table (5.2) the number of depositors increased from 17,560 in the first year 
of its operation to 251,152 by 1966/76, by an impressive average annual rate of 538.3 %. 
Depositors were mainly from the small savers group as the average deposit ranged from 
£E 2.33 in 1963/64 to LE 7.28 in 1966/67. 
39The 
founder of the bank Dr. Ahmad A] Najar, who became the Secretary-General of the International Association of Islamic Banks, 
was impressed by the German savings bank while a graduate student in West Germany in the 1950s. When he returned to Egypt he felt 
that the German model can be modified to conform with the Islamic principles. However, in the socialist period of the 1960s, the Islamic ideas behind 
the establishment of the Meet Ghamr bank had to be hidden and was not advertised in its name. Instead the founder managed to convince the 
Egyptian authorities by the role of these banks in mobilisation of savings and catering for the poor. 
40 See Al Najar (1993), p. 38. 
41Mayer 
(1985), p. 37. 
42 See AI-Najar (1993), pp. 44-46 
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Table (5.2) 
Growth of Savings accounts in the Meet Ghamr bank. 
Year Number of depositors Amount (SE) Deposit Average Size (LE) 
1963/64 17560 40944 2.33 
1964/65 30404 191235 6.30 
1965/66 151998 879570 5.79 
1966/67 251152 1828375 7.28 
Source: Al-Ashker (1ý )9ý , p. 6L 
Loans were provided by the bank according to PLS principle to small entrepreneurs for 
periods ranging from one to five years43. The bank in its second year of operation began 
to establish small projects of its own. In general, projects financed by the bank were 
established in the same local area to assure the depositors of the contribution of the bank 
in the development of their community". In addition the bank provided interest-free small 
consumption loans, averaged £E 50 per borrower. Although these loans were provided 
without collateral, the number of defaulting borrowers was small45. 
The remarkable success of the bank convinced several governorates to apply for the 
establishment of similar banks. The number of applications exceeded seventy but the 
management of the bank was not able, due to shortages of trained staff, to open more 
than seven branches located in the Delta and in Cairo. "' 
Despite the success of the MGB the Government found it necessary to put the bank under 
direct control. The call for such control was a response to two main concerns. First, it 
was realised that the bank was operating under rules which contradicted those applied by 
the rest of financial intermediaries. The government was suspicious that such a 
contradiction might bring a dispute amongst the public regarding what should be 
43A1_Ashker 
(1990), p. 60. 
' The bank managed to establish several projects in the Meet Ghamr area for example: brick factory, semi-mechanised bakery, a dairy, 
a macaroni factory, a mechanised irrigation project and a private school. 
45See Mayer (1985), p. 38. 
46a_Najar 
(1993), p. 58. 
169 
considered as Islamic and what should not, which may affect the operations of the 
dominant conventional banks. Second, the government found in the bank a threat to its 
socialist ideology and its management of the economy which was based on central 
planning. In the socialist period, a bank being a mixture of a capitalist model and an 
Islamic character was naturally a target for government intervention. 
As a result the MGB lost its operational autonomy and eventually was closed down in 
1968. Its operations, which became interest-based, were assumed by the National Bank 
of Egypt and the Central Bank. 47 The Meet Ghamr bank, despite the difficulties it faced, 
provided an applicable model for other Islamic banks which were established 
subsequently. 
(b) The Nasser Social Bank: 
One of the Islamic banks that benefited from the experience of the MGB is the Nasser 
Social bank (NSB). This bank was formed in 1971 and began its operations in 1972. The 
bank has been established as a public institution for social welfare and its capital, which 
reached LE 20 million in 1990, was provided by the government. However the NSB is 
not registered48 with the Central Bank and hence it was exempted from its supervision and 
regulation. 49 The NSB has a wider functions, through its 23 branches, than the MGB as 
it operates at the national level but has applied almost the same rules as its predecessor. 
The annual collection of zakat constitutes the main source of funding for the bank in 
addition to an annual subsidy from the government. 
47For details of how the bank came to an end see AI-Najar (1993), pp. 59-66. 
48Its 
registeration with the CBE has recently been considered. 
49Law 
66 of 1971 stated that the operations of the Nasser Bank are not regulated by law 163 of 1957 regarding the Central Bank and its 
authorities. 
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In its early years the NSB was free to provide credit without the need to comply with the 
credit ceilings imposed by the government. Loans provided by the NSB took two forms; 
productive loans and social loans. It is worth noting that the NSB does not share the 
profits or losses of its borrowers. It requires them to return the principal in addition to 
1% charge. This charge is considered as 'cooperative insurance' . 
51 The NSB subsidise 
its loans from the zakat fund and, to some extent, from the profits it makes from its 
direct investment. 
Nevertheless the NSB has recurrently breached its own regulations. It is reported that the 
bank undertook several interest-based transactions with other financial intermediaries. 
Moreover it deposits some funds with conventional banks in return for interest. s'As 
discussed below, this problem can be attributed to the conditions of an Islamic bank 
which operates in a predominantly conventional system. On the other hand in the case of 
NSB, its management was not always convinced about the role of an Islamic bank and 
its distinctive rules. 
(5.7.2) Private Islamic banks: 
There are now two private Islamic banks in Egypt. The first is the Faisal Islamic Bank 
of Egypt (FIBE) which started its operations in 1979. The special act number 48 of 1977 
gave the bank independence from all governmental authorities but put it, however, under 
the supervisory role of the Central Bank. The bank was granted several privileges similar 
to those granted under the investment law 43 of 1974 and enjoyed more generous tax 
treatment than that already given by this law52. In 1993 the bank had 14 operating 
branches in the major cities. The authorised capital of the FIBE is $500 million and the 
50 Mayer (1985), p. 41. 
51A1-Najar 
(1993), pp. 117-118. 
52See 
our discussion of law 43/1974 in Chapter (1). Note that upon its establishment the FIBE was granted a fifteen years exemption from 
all taxes and was then reduced to two years. 
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paid-up capital is $100 million in 1993, with an Egyptian participation of 51 % and a 
Saudi Participation of 49%11. 
The second bank is the Islamic International Bank for Investment and Development 
(IIBID) which was established in 1980 in accordance with the investment law 43 of 1974 
and started its operations in 1981. In 1990 the bank had 7 branches located in the biggest 
cities and 4 branches were under construction. The authorised capital of the IIBID is $100 
million and the paid up capital is $60 million in 199254. Although the FIBE was 
established as a commercial bank and IIBID as a business and investment bank, in 
practice the difference between them is not significant as shown in Table (5.3) below. 
Table (5.3) 
A Comparison between the FIBE and the IIBID 
FIBE IIBID 
Current account Without overdraft facility Similar to FIBE 
Savings account Not available Offers a small return at the discretion of the bank 
but does not bear any losses incurred by the bank; 
less risky than investment accounts. 
Investment accounts Funds should be deposited for a specific period from Similar to FIBE, but has another account which is a 
6 months to 3 years with a PLS return. combination of investment and savings accounts as 
the depositor can withdraw up to 40% 
Main Methods of finance - Short term (Murabaha) Similar to FIRE 
- Medium and long term (Mudarabah) 
Social services Wide range of services funded through its zakat Similar to FIBS. 
account and from the bank in its own capacity. 
(a) Mobilisation of savings: 
As shown in Table (5.4) during the first five years of their business, the two Islamic 
banks achieved remarkably high rates of growth of deposits. The size of deposits in FIBE 
increased by 20 times to reach more than £E 2070 million while the IIBID managed to 
keep LE 535 million. During this period deposits' growth was higher in the two banks 
53Annual 
report of FIBE (1994). 
54 Annual report of IIDID (1993). 
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than the average growth achieved by the commercial bank as a group and by the National 
Bank of Egypt (NBE), the biggest commercial bank in Egypt. 
Table (5.4) 
Deposits and their growth in FIBE, IIBID, NBE 
& all Commercial Banks 
1980-1992 
Year FIBE' IIBID NBE All Commercial Banks 
Deposits Growth Deposits Growth Deposits Growth Deposits Growth 
1980 98.1 - - - 1796.1 6987.1 
1981 354.1 261.1 6.0 2161.2 20.3 9932.5 42.2 
1982 657.8 85.8 61.0 916.7 2364.2 9.4 12928.4 30.2 
1983 1009.9 53.5 256.0 319.7 3031.4 28.2 15864.3 22.7 
1984 1271.6 25.9 418.0 63.3 3625.2 19.6 18925.9 19.3 
1985 2073.5 63.1 535.0 28.0 4824.5 33.1 26124.6 38.0 
1986 2011.7 (-3.0) 596.0 11.4 6587.4 36.5 29065.2 11.3 
1987 2892.1 43.8 622.0 4.4 7327.0 11.2 36525.1 25.7 
1988 3210.3 11.0 654.0 5.1 9681.0 32.1 44637.0 22.2 
1989 3424 6.7 306.6 (-53.1) 11763.0 21.5 54053.1 21.1 
1990 4057 18.5 403.2 31.5 15004.0 27.6 70482.9 30.4 
1991 5059 24.7 406.9 0.9 23683.0 57.8 89558.9 27.1 
1992 4785 (-5.4) 484.9 19.2 30684.1 29.6 110999.2 23.9 
source: Annual repons or riet, ursili, Nrsr. ana me iNur- tconomic nwierm. 
* Figures for FIBE are converted from US$ to LE by using the annual banking sector exchange rate. 
However as shown in figure (5.2), after 1985, average growth rates in the two Islamic 
banks started to decrease and became lower than that of commercial banks. While the 
traditional banks continued to have a continued growth of their deposits, the FIBE had 
negative growth rates in 1986 and 1992. Even more seriously the IIBID suffered a loss 
of more than half of its deposits in 1989 as a result of difficulties analysed below. 
173 
Figure (5.2) 
Growth of Deposits in FIBE, IIBID & all 
commercial banks 
Growth of Deposits % 
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Year 
FIBE* IIBID " Commercial Banks 
Source: Calculated from the annual reports of the nepectlve banks and the NBE Economic Bulletin. 
Despite the growth of deposits in the Islamic banks in their early years, the total size of 
deposits in the two banks combined did not exceed, even in their peak years, 10 % of total 
deposits in the commercial banking sector. 
(b) Reasons for the growth of deposits:, 
The exceptional growth of deposits in the two Islamic banks in their early years can be 
attributed mainly to the following factors: 
1. High rate of return. As shown in figure (5.3) below, in the first four years of 
their operation the Islamic banks distributed relatively high rates of return on 
deposits ranging from 1 to 3 higher than the controlled interest rates offered by 
conventional banks. We argue that Islamic banks offered such high rate of return 
to attract depositors. 
2. The religious incentive. The sharp increase of deposits in the early years of the 
establishment of Islamic banks reflected the need for a significant group of 
depositors for banks that do not deal with interest in a period marked by religious 
revival: i. e. it was a one-for-all stock adjustment. The contribution to the welfare 
of Muslims through the zakat fund emphasised the Islamic character of these 
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banks. However it is hard to separate the religious effect from other factors 
contributed to the growth of deposits, especially the high rate of return mentioned 
above. 
3. Foreign currencies account. The two banks kept a high proportion of deposits in 
foreign currency, mainly US dollars. They distributed a return on these deposits 
quoted in the respective foreign currencies. This attracted more depositors in a 
time when the local currency interest rate was low and the Egyptian pound was 
facing gradual devaluation, as shown in figure (5.3). The massive devaluation of 
the Egyptian pound during the period 1980-1990 by approximately 350% 
contributed to the growth of deposits denominated in foreign currencies when they 
are accounted in Egyptian pounds. The Share of foreign currencies accounts in 
total deposits was 74% in the FIBE in 1990 and 68% in the IIBID in 1988.1' 
Figure (5.3) 
Rates of interest, return and foreign exchange 
Rates of interest, return and exchange 
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Source: Kazarian (1993), p. 148 and CBE annual reports. Exchange rates are obtained from the CBE annual 
reports. 
55 See Kazarian (1993), pp. 146-147. 
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(c) Reasons for the recent deterioration of deposits growth: 
1. The establishment of other Islamic financial institutions. This took the form of the 
informal Islamic Investment Companies (IICs)56 and the branches of formal 
conventional banks. The former claimed their compliance with Islamic law and 
were active in 1980s. They distributed high rates of return, almost the double of 
official interest rate. It has been reported that these companies attracted about 
22% and 30% of depositors of the FIBE and IIBID respectively. s'On the other 
hand Islamic branches of conventional banks were formed as a response to the 
early success of the Islamic banks. It is argued that they also deprived the Islamic 
banks from some of their depositors. 
2. The decline of rates of return: As shown in figure (5.3) above since 1984 rates 
of return distributed by the two banks began to be lower than interest rates 
offered by conventional banks and consequently rate of growth deposits declined 
in the former. The recent figures of the FIBE show a negative growth of deposits 
by 5.4% and 13.3%18 in 1992 and 1993 respectively which can be attributed, 
inter alia, to the relative low rate return in comparison with the prevailing 
nominal interest rates after the 1991 liberalisation programme. 59 
3. The impact of the recent controversial fatwa60: In 1989 a fatwa given by the 
Mufti" of Egypt stated that interest rate is not a form of riba. Thus dealings with 
conventional banks became lawful from an Islamic perspective for those who 
accept this fatwa. Despite strong opposition to this opinion from the majority of 
56See 
our analysis of these companies below. 
57Kazarian 
(1993), p. 149. 
58Annual 
reports of the FIBE (1993) & (1994). 
59See 
our analysis of interest rate determination in the following chapter. 
60 A fatwa is a formal religious opinion declared by an authoritative religious leader. 
61A 
religious leader appointed by the state in most Moslem countries and granted the authority of giving formal religious opinions to the 
state and the individuals. 
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Muslim scholars, Islamic banks lost further depositors who followed the opinion 
of the Mufti62. 
4. Irregular distribution of return: One of the major factors which contributed to the 
heavy withdrawal of deposits from the IIBID in 1989, approximately 53 % of total 
deposits, was the long delay in the distribution of returns in 1988 and 1989. This 
gave an impression that the bank was facing intense difficulties. 
5. The collapse of Islamic Investment Companies: The IICs affected negatively the 
Islamic banks twice. First during their rise as discussed further below and second, 
during their fall. After the collapse of the IICs, 'news'63 were spread associating 
Islamic banks with the IICs and that consequently the bank suffered heavy losses 
because of this relationship. Notwithstanding these news some of the customers 
were concerned that these banks might have been indulged in the same activities 
of the IICs, like heavy speculation abroad. These problems combined with- the 
IIBID's irregular distribution of returns led to the heavy withdrawal of deposits, 
as mentioned in the previous factor. 
(d) Growth of assets: 
The first four years of operation of the two Islamic banks saw an exceptional growth of 
total assets with an annual average of 103% for the FIBE and 254% for the IIBID, 
compared to 24% in the commercial banking sector. The high growth rates of Islamic 
banks can be partly attributed to the fact that their assets positions started from very 
modest levels; LE 155 million in the cases of the FIBE and Just LE 12 million in the case 
of the IIBID. Nevertheless this does not deny that the growth of total assets reflected the 
62The fatwa was given on the 8th of July 1989 regarding the interest rates of Investment Certificates and Post Office Savings Fund. It 
was extended afterwards to cover some more interest rates-based transactions. It is worth noting that the Imam of Al-Azhar and other 
distinguished scholars opposed this fatwa. The fatwa is published in Tantaway (1991) and for an example of opposing arguments see: AI- 
Salous (1991a) & (1991b), Al-Qaraddawy (1990). It is ironic to find that a similar farwa was obtained in the past under comparable 
circumstances with the present. In the 1920s when the government tried to encourage the establishment of rural credit societies it sought 
the assistance of the Mufti to overcome public scepticism. The government managed to obtain a favourable opinion from him in a form 
of fatwa which stated that there is a difference between interest and riba. See Von Pischke (1991), p. 195 and Davis (1983), pp. 100-101 
for further details. 
63The 
IIBID annual report for the financial year 1989 describes them as irresponsible 
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achievement of the two banks in the mobilisation of deposits and other liabilities in their 
early years of establishment. 
However since 1986 the growth rates of total assets started to decline and were negative 
in some years. As shown in figure (5.4) the growth rates of Islamic banks' assets were 
generally lower than that of the commercial banking sector after 1985. The financial year 
1986 was a bad one for all banks, as the growth rate dropped from its highest level of 
38 % in 1985 to its lowest level of 11 % in 1986. In the beginning of 1986 the economy 
suffered from an external shock amid the drop of oil prices which affected negatively the 
main revenues of the economy, namely the Suez Canal, the remittances of workers in the 
Gulf states, tourism and oil exports. 64 The 1986 external shock was responsible for the 
poor performance of banks generally, but as shown in the figure below, the Islamic banks 
were affected more by it arguably because of their closer links with the Gulf oil states. 
Figure (5.4) 
Growth of Assets in IIBID, FIBE & 
Commercial Banks (1981-1992) 
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The decline of the growth of assets of the Islamic banks after 1986 can be attributed also 
to the mismanagement problems more than anything else. In the case of the IIBID, the 
64 For more discussion of this point see chapter (1). 
178 
growth of assets suffered from the bank's 1989 problems, which eventually necessitated 
a Central Bank intervention, with the cooperation of the four public sector commercial 
banks in order to recapitalise the bank. "' On the other hand the FIBE was negatively 
affected by the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) which 
collapsed in 199166 The FIBE lost an amount of US $343.7 million, approximately 17.6 % 
of its assets67, deposited with the BCCI under especial arrangements. These deposits did 
not appear in the BCCI's records and it was difficult to prove their existence to the 
liquidators. These problems were reflected in the Islamic banks assets as shown in figure 
(5.4). 
(e) Allocation of funds: 
Figure (5.5) reveals that the FIBE had a significant percentage of its assets, ranging from 
33.4% to 60% of total funds, deposited in banks abroad in return for a LIBOR on these 
deposits, despite its claimed compliance with Islamic law68. Recently the FIBE reduced 
the size of funds deposited abroad and allocated them domestically. However this shift 
towards the domestic market was in the form of deposits with the Central Bank and 
commercial banks. As shown in figure (5.6) from 1980 to 1990 deposits with the banking 
sector averaged 46.1 % of the domestic allocation of funds, while the average of deposits 
with other banks for all commercial banks was just 39% during the same period. Again 
the FIBE received interest as a return on such deposits. 
65 See the annual reports of the IIBID for 1991 and 1992. It is reported that the four public commercial banks own 79.83 `%o of the capital 
of the IIBID as a result of their intervention to help the IIBID out from its problems. This, we argue changed the status of the IIBID from 
being a private and Islamic bank to become a publicly owned conventional bank, despite its Islamic title. 
66 The Bank of England stopped the BCCI's appertains on 5/7/1991 and was liquidated by a court order issued on 14/1/1992. 
67See 
the Annual reports of the FIBE of 1991 and 1994. 
68Kazarian 
(1993), p. 162. The problem of Islamic banks' indulgence in interest-based transactions was highlighted by Al-Najar, the 
former Secretary General of the International Association of Islamic Banks in his (1993) lecture in Asseala (Morocco). 
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Figure (5.5) 
Allocation of funds of the FIBE and HBID 
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Source: Annual reports of the FIBE and the IIBID. 
The IIBID differed from the FIBE in terms of the share of funds deposited with foreign 
banks as this share did not exceed 32% in any year from 1981 to 1988. As shown in 
figure (5.6), the IIBID had a lower share of its funds deposited with the CBE and other 
banks as its annual average was 30.1 % during the studied period, but, like the FIBE it 
did receive interest on these deposits. The IIBID differed from the FIBE in another aspect 
as it allocated a share of its fund, ranging from 4.3 % to 31.3 % to speculative operations 
in foreign currencies, precious metals and other goods in the domestic and foreign 
markets. 69Due to heavy losses, the bank has recently stopped its speculation in precious 
metals and reduced the size of the other operations. 7° 
69Kazarian 
(1993), p. 164. 
70Speculation 
activities are forbidden in Islam and the bank was advised to stop such activities. It is worth noting that the word mudarabah 
has two meanings in the Arabic language, the first is trust finance which is adopted in this thesis, the other means speculation. While the 
first is religiously allowed the second is not. Thus its often to find that the first is described by the shay iah (legitimate) to distinguish 
between the two of them. Some banks however do not distinguish between them in their reports, possibly to grant their speculation 
activities with legitimacy. 
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Figure (5.6) 
Pattern of the domestic allocation 
of funds of the FIBE and IIBID 
v.. r 
1980 I1II__ 
sl 
es 
93 
84 
84 
  Murabaha 
® Musharakah 
97   Metals,.. etc 
as Q CBE & bank 
e9 iI 
90 
Ems 
120 100 80 60 40 20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 
IIBID FIBS 
Source: Author's own calculations from the annual reports of the FIBE and the IIBID. 
Beside depositing its funds with domestic and foreign banks, the FIBE's main activity was 
providing murabaha (markup) and ijarah wa iqtina (lease-purchase) finance. These two 
forms of finance comprised, on average, 51 % of the bank's domestic funding from 1981 
to 1990. In the case of the IIBID, lease purchase and markup financing comprised 53 % 
of the bank's domestic funding from 1981 to 1988. These two forms of finance were for 
short term purposes with a period ranging from three months to one year. Costs of funds 
were determined by the bank in advance according to the size and duration of funding. 
Funds were secured by collateral which was the asset, usually a durable good or a real 
estate, purchased by the bank for the client. 
While mudarabah (trust finance) was completely absent from the portfolios of the IIBID 
and the FIBE, there was very limited use of musharakah (equity participation) by the two 
banks, as shown in figure (5.6). Musharakah comprised a constant share of 3% of the 
FIBE's domestic allocation of funds. The IIBID made as well a very limited use of 
musharakah as its share in its portfolio ranged from 0.7% in 1981 to 2.2% in 1988. 
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Musharakah as a risky long term form of finance was mainly used by the two Islamic 
banks in their own direct investments. In the case of the FIBE 73 % of musharakah 
funding was used in the bank's own projects, e. g. food processing, household products, 
investment and consultancy firms, private schools and hospitals, housing, pharmaceutical 
production,.. etc". The rest of this type of funding, 27%, was allocated in joint projects 
similar in their activities to the ones owned entirely by the bank. 
Generally the share of agricultural and industrial sector financing in Islamic banks funding 
was small. As shown in table (5.5) trade and services were favoured for their higher 
returns and shorter gestation periods. 
Table (5.5) 
Sectoral allocation of funding (%) 
Sector FIBE 
(1983-88) 
IIBID 
(1985-88) 
Trade and Services 56.5 25.8 
Foreign currency dealings 18.7 4.6 
Construction and housing 17.3 11.1 
Industry 6.7 - 
Agriculture I 
Unidentified markup finance - 58.5 
Source: Compiled from Kazarian-(1993), p. 171. 
The table shows the dominance of trade and services sector in the case of the FIBE where 
it comprise 56.5% of total domestic funding during 1983-88, while the industrial and 
agricultural sectors did not receive more than a share of 7.7%. Although it seems that the 
IIBID had less of its investments in these activities, in fact it was not too different from 
the FIBE. Given the characteristics of the unidentified markup finance of the IIBID that 
mainly relates to household durable goods and real estate, as discussed above, then most 
of the 58.5 % markup finance during 1985-88 can be classified under trade and services. 
71Annual 
reports of the FIBE (1994), pp. 16-17 and (1991), pp. 43-47. 
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(5.7.3) Islamic branches of conventional banks: 
As a response to the success of Islamic banks in attracting depositors, in their early years 
of establishment, many conventional banks formed Islamic branches. Bank Misr was the 
first conventional bank to set up an Islamic branch which started its operations in 1980.72 
Apparently the bank was concerned that the newly established FIBE would attract away 
some of its potential business as well as existing depositors. 
At the end of 1990 there were 62 Islamic branches of 23 conventional banks. Just 12 of 
these branches were of private while 26 of them belong to public banks and 24 to joint 
venture banks, i. e. owned partly by public banks. Total assets of Islamic branches 
reached £E 2.2 billion and the total of deposits was £E 1.82 billion. The size of these 
branches was small compared with the assets and deposits of the three major operating 
Islamic banks, Including Nasser Bank, which reached LE 6.1 billion and 5.1 billion 
respectively. 73 
Most of Islamic branches' depositors were individuals who used to have deposit accounts 
with the same bank74. They simply transferred their accounts to the Islamic branch of 
their bank for three reasons: first it offered the same return as the main bank, and in 
some cases even more. Second it had an Islamic image which fulfilled, according to the 
perception of these depositors, the religious aspect of the dealing. Third these branches 
were fully supported by their well established main branches, some of them, like Bank 
Misr, had had a good banking profile for more than seventy years, in contrast with the 
newly established Islamic banks or Islamic Investment Companies. 
72See Mayer (1985), p. 47. 
73Kazarian (1993), p. 135. 
74 
In an interview with Mrs Madeaha Gaber, the manager of the foreign department, at the Nile Bank which has two Islamic branches and 
fourteen other branches, on 1/5/1993 she confirmed this point. Also Kazarian (1993), p. 184, points out that 97% of Islamic branches' 
depositors interviewed by him transferred their accounts from a traditional branch to an Islamic one for the same reasons given above. 
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It is difficult to analyse the performance of Islamic branches as they do not have separate 
balance sheets or accounts as the outcome of their operations are integrated with the rest 
the activities of their parent banks". This problem however reflects the fact that the 
resources of these branches are mixed with the rest of the banks' funds and directed 
towards financing the banks' activities76. Even in the few cases where some of the Islamic 
branches were granted some autonomy in the allocation of their funds, in practice the 
branches found it difficult to utilise fully their resources. Not more than 20% of their 
deposits were allocated directly in the form of murabaha, the rest was deposited with 
main branches. Thus they did not comply well with the Islamic principles. 
Moreover Islamic branches did not share the features of Islamic banks in two important 
aspects from the religious viewpoint: first they did not have a board of religious scholars 
to verify the banks' operations and assure their compliance with Islamic law in all 
transactions, second they did not have a zakat account which emphasised the Islamic 
character of the intermediary. 
We argue that the establishment of Islamic branches of conventional banks is a form of 
product diversification. ' They, were established to benefit from the Islamic resurgence 
and avoid loss of customers to the growing Islamic financial institutions. The 
establishment of a limited number of Islamic branches of big conventional banks which 
had large network of branches and outlets, like Bank Misr, was not a part of a gradual 
Islamisation of the banks concerned, but rather it was meant from the beginning to keep 
the number of Islamic branches as small and symbolic as possible-In practice the Islamic 
75The 
Nile Bank, for example, in its annual report of 1992 did not mention any thing regarding its two Islamic branches apart from their 
names and locations. 
76In 
the Interview with Mrs Gaber she mentioned that her bank does not distinguish between its branches and all of them including the 
Islamic ones direct their funds to the bank's activities. 
77 In interviews with Mr Ali Nigm the former Governor of the CBE and Chairman of the Delta Bank and Mr Motaz Mansour, Managing 
Director of Misr Iran Development Bank, they supported this argument. 
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branch was not more than a branch without any significant difference from any 
conventional branches other than in name. 
We consider the very existence of these branches an evidence of the general confusion 
concerning what is Islamic and what is not, as far as financial transactions are concerned. 
The contradicting fatwas regarding interest and whether it is a form of usury, as discussed 
above, was responsible, inter alia, for this bewilderment. 
(5.7.4) Problems of Islamic banking in Egypt: 
1) The dominance of short term murabaha finance: 
As pointed out above murabaha, markup, finance dominated the portfolios of Islamic 
banks. We argue that this is a reflection of an inefficient allocation of funds, mainly 
because funds under this scheme are directed towards the purchase of, usually imported, 
durable consumption goods. This type of finance was favoured by Islamic banks along 
with ijarah wa iqtina, purchase-lease, contracts which do not differ in principle to 
musharakah and applied mainly in the purchase of real estate. The very dominance of 
such contracts make one sceptical about the claimed developmental role, usually stressed 
by Islamic banks in their bylaws and annual reports. 
Moreover musharakah finance, 78 in the way it is applied by Islamic banks, is considered 
controversial from the Islamic perspective. It is often described by Islamic economists as 
a device by which some 'Islamic' banks bypass the restriction on usury. 79 Interest rates 
are charged implicitly in the form of the predetermined cost of providing the funds by the 
78It 
seems that Islamic banks are not interested in revealing their murabaha bias. They used to aggregate all their funding operations under 
one item in the assets sides of their balance sheets called musharakah, mudarabah, commercial and productive murabaha and real estate 
investments, so it is difficult to know the relative importance of these different forms of funding from reading the balance sheets. Acquiring 
such information is difficult as it has to be obtained directly from the concerned banks or the Control Department of the CBE. Reasonable 
itemisation of the data is required for any careful analysis of the operations of Islamic Banks. 
79See AI-Najar (1993), pp. 589- 591. 
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banks. Moreover it does not differ from the same practice applied by conventional banks 
when they provide loans under lease or lease purchase schemes80 
2) The limited practical role of PLS contracts: 
Despite the emphasis given in Islamic financial literature regarding the importance of the 
mudarabah (trust finance) and musharakah (equity participation), in practice our enquiry 
within the banks found that the former was completely absent and the latter had a very 
limited presence in the portfolio of Islamic banks in Egypt. Similar problem was realised 
in other countries. " 
This problem can be attributed to the fact that these two forms of PLS finance require an 
extensive bank effort to ensure that the outcome of the projects are accurately reported. 
For example the prevalence of tax evasion in LDCs and the associated problem of double 
bookkeeping for firms make it difficult by the participating bank to find out the actual 
outcome of the project concerned. Even in the absence of the double bookkeeping 
problem the PLS contracts may be subject to a principal-agent problem arising from 
asymmetric information. Thus while profit sharing may increase bank efficiency as it 
separates administrative control from institutional interest rates, it generates more 
difficulties, at the same time, on its monitoring activities82. 
Nevertheless conventional banks are not themselves immune from such problems. If the 
profit outcome of a project is stochastic, this gives project managers an informational 
80 
The Economist magazine (6/8/1994), made a comparison between explicit borrowing from conventional banks and obtaining funds under 
murabaha. The Economist mentions that' The Koran says you cannot borrow $100m from the bank for a year at 5% interest, to buy the 
new machinery your factory needs? Fine. You get the bank to buy the machinery for you- cost $100m- and then you buy the stuff from 
the bank, paying it $105m from now. The difference is that the extra $5m is not interest on loan, [.. ]but your thanks to the bank for the 
risk it takes of losing money while it is owner for the machinery [.. ] Since with modern communications the bank's ownership may last 
about half a second, its risk is not great. " Thus there should not be a surprise that Muslim scholars reject this form of finance, alas, widely 
adopted by Islamic banks. 
81See 
for example Khan and Mirakhor (1990), Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987) and Anwar (1992) for a discussion of this problem in the two 
cases of Iran and Pakistan. 
82See 
Fry (1988), 266 and Goodhart (1992), p. 53. 
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advantage over the bank. S3 A solution for an Islamic bank can be through establishing a 
long term relationship, as argued in our comparison between bank-based and market- 
based financial systems, through equities in projects financed by the bank according to 
mudarabah or musharakah, they would then have - "insider's information" about the 
operations and outcomes of such projects. 84- 
As has been established recently, the Mudarabah contract between managers and the bank 
might act as an efficient revelation device, giving the bank more information about the 
project85. Further if the contract is designed to make the share of the entrepreneur in the 
outcome of the project, i. e. (1-6) in equation (4) above, a variable one depending on the 
level of effort instead of being a predetermined fixed share, this would reduce the 
incentive issue associated with the principal-agent problem. Indeed the practical solution 
for the problem lies in the hands of Islamic banks which had to abandon, or at least 
reduce, their concentration on short term financing under murabaha or markup contracts 
and enhance the role of PLS. 
3) Limited developmental role of Islamic banks: 
Our analysis of Islamic banks implies that their role in economic and financial 
development was limited. The reasons behind this can be summarised in the following 
factors: 
- First, their heavy concentration on short term credit in trade and services sector 
which had high and rapid return. Short-termism would result in an inimical effect 
on investment and growth. 
83Presley 
and Sessions (1994), p. 590. 
84 See Chapter (4) of this thesis and Goodhart (1992), op. cit., p. 53. 
85See Presley and Sessions (1994), pp. 587-595. 
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- Second, mainly because of the previous problem, Islamic bank investments are 
biased against the Agricultural and Industrial sectors whose projects tend to have 
longer gestation periods than trade and services. 
- Third, the share of small and medium size projects was modest as most of the 
banks' projects were characterised by being big and capital intensive86. 
- Fourth, the considerable share of foreign allocation of funds which were 
mobilised from the domestic economy. 
- Fifth, There is a problem of extensive financing of imported durable 
consumption goods through murabaha. I 
- Sixth, the concentration of their activities and branching policies87 in urban 
areas, already congested with bank branches, excluded a significant number of 
potential depositors by geographic filtering income filtering. On the other hand 
the determination of a deposit minimum excluded further number of depositors 
by income filtering. 
4) Violation of Islamic law: 
We have shown that the two banks dealt with interest as they deposited funds with other 
banks in the country and abroad., This clearly is a violation of shari'ah and a contradiction 
with the very reasons supposedly behind the establishment of such banks. In the case of 
an Islamic branch of a conventional bank without separate accounting or operational 
identity, the violation is a general situation not merely an exception. The carrying out of 
speculative activities was'another breach of Islamic law, and further it resulted in heavy 
losses. 
86See 
the list of the FIBE's companies in its 1991 report. The capital size of industrial and agricultural projects ranged from $ 0.6 to 23 
million. 
87See 
the branches lists of the two banks in their annual reports. In the case of the EIBE five out of its fourteen branches were established 
in Cairo, the rest were located in the capitals of few governorates. 
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(5.7.5) Reasons behind the problems of Islamic banks: 
The experience of Islamic banking in Egypt presents an aberration from the theoretical 
framework of Islamic finance and a clear deviation from its objectives. 
The gap between the theoretical foundations and practice can be explained mainly by two 
factors: lack of qualified management and limited application of Islamic banking; both, 
to a great extent, are of transitional nature. 
1) Lack of qualified management: Given the fact that the Islamic experiment was new 
in Egypt, it was hard to find skilful bankers who believe, at the same time, in the role 
of an Islamic bank. As indicated by several Islamic economists, " Islamic banks in their 
early years had to compromise. Thus most of the management can be divided in two 
groups; 'believers' in Islamic banking with limited banking skills, and professional 
bankers with lack of interest in Islamic banking. Very few had the skill and the 
conviction. Consequently mismanagement problems and violation of Islamic law occurred. 
2) Limited application of Islamic banking: Despite the growth of Islamic banks and 
'branches' during the 1980s, the banking system in Egypt was still dominated by 
conventional banks. In 1990 the number of branches formed by Islamic and conventional 
banks was 104 while the total branches of banks was 1034. The totals of deposits and 
assets of Islamic intermediaries were merely 10% and 8% of the deposits and assets of 
the whole banking sector respectively. Being governed by the same rules of the CBE like 
the rest of operating banks and considered as part of it, the Islamic banks found it 
difficult not to deal with the rest of financial system. Such dealings were not necessarily 
undertaken according to the rules of Islamic banks as a minority. 
88An interview with Prof Fathy Sakr on the 17th of April 1993; and see Al-Najar (1993). 
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An understanding of this problem can be obtained from the experience of labour-managed 
firms in the capitalist economies89. Many capitalist economies, including the British, had 
a version or more of labour-managed firms, e. g. cooperatives. These firms had different 
character and objectives from the capitalist firms. 90 However in economies dominated by 
profit-maximising firms, the labour managed firms ended up acting like the dominating 
ones or at least they tended to degenerate into quasi-capitalist firms. 91 Similarly, under 
the prevailing circumstances, Islamic banks could end up behaving like conventional 
banks, or at least degenerate into quasi-conventional banks. 
It is worth arguing however that even if such adequate support can be provided within 
the economy, it is difficult to maintain at the international level, as can be learned from 
the experiences of Iran and Pakistan. Despite these countries Islamisation of the whole 
banking system which minimised the violation of Islamic law, the two countries could not 
achieve the same with their international financial transactions which normally involved 
interest. Under a so-called financial globalisation, we argue that the maintenance of pure 
interest-free financial transaction would be more difficult even at the national level. 92 
15.8) The Case of the Islamic Investment Companies (IICs): 
The IICs are considered informal due to the fact that they escaped any form of regulation 
and did not come under the monetary authority's supervision or even company laws. 
Most of IICs' practices can be easily classified under the parallel and black markets 
activities of the informal sector93; for example, tax evasion, bribery, theft of state land, 
89For 
an analysis of labour-managed firms see Vanek (1970) and Ireland and Law (1982). 
90 While the capitalist firm is described as a profit maximiser, the labour-managed firm maximises income per worker over a planning 
period. 
91For 
a coverage of this point see Ireland and Law (1982), op. cit., 173-174. 
92 On the issue of financial globalisation see for example O'Brien (1992). 
93For 
further discussion of the concepts informal finance and a taxonomy of its activities see chapter (8). 
190 
violation of import restrictions, illegal foreign exchange dealings. Further, they adopted 
a pyramid scheme94 to pay outstanding dividends out of late comers' deposits. 
5.8.1) The rise of IICs: 
The IICs grew in a spectacular manner during the 1980s. 95 The estimated number of these 
companies was 105 at the end of 1988. As discussed further below, the exact number of 
these institutions, like the size of their deposits and the number of their depositors, has 
never agreed upon. However if we consider the latest official number of depositors of 
502,826 and given that the dependency ratio in Egypt is 5.6, this means that almost 3 
million people was affected directly by the activities of the IICs. Total deposits held with 
the IICs was estimated at LE 3.8 billion in 1988, i. e. 7.8% of GDP, the equivalent of 
17% of public commercial banks deposits and approximately 10% of total deposits of the 
banking sector. 96 Most of these deposits were collected in less than three years; from 
1985 to 1988. 
The flourishing of the activities of IICs, mainly collection of households' savings, is 
ascribed to several factors. 
" As in the case of Islamic banks these institutions managed to capitalise on the 
Islamic resurgence and its impact on public opinion regarding specific financial 
transactions that involve usury. They launched a massive advertising campaign 
assuring that they work in accordance with Islamic principles. Company names97 
were carefully chosen, with Islamic terminologies like mudarabah, trust 
94 Also known as Ponzi schemes, named after Charles Ponzi's financial ploy in 1919-20 in the USA. See Train (1985), pp. 11-16 for a 
historical background. 
95The 
first Islamic Investment Company was Al-Sharif. It was established in 1958 but did not go public until 1978, when it announced 
that it would open the door for the public to invest in the enlargement of the company's operations with promises of high returns in the 
form of dividends according to Islamic principles. 
96The 
figures of deposits and depositors are those published by the offices of the Attorney General and the Socialist Attorney after the 
collapse of the IICs in June 1988. 
97 
If we look at the names of some of the big companies, we would find that they meant to have an Islamic indication like Al-Rayan, the 
name of one of the doors of paradise, A] Huda: the right path, Badr: the first battle in the history of Islam. 
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financing, and musharakah, joint-venture, being employed to emphasize the 
claimed identity. 
" These institutions had a wide network of low operating cost branches, open 
almost 24 hours a day, reaching areas neglected by the traditional banks. 
Bureaucratic procedures were kept to a minimum and the process of depositing 
funds was simple and short for the convenience of uneducated depositors. 
" Depositors, particularly small savers, flocked to them, attracted not only by 
Islamic slogans but by the fact that the dividends distributed by the IICs were 
more than double the 12 percent rate of interest then offered by the conventional 
banks. These banks also seemed to provide a hedge against inflation, as it was 4 
percentage points higher than the official figure of inflation in 1988. 
" These companies innovated a new method for distributing dividends. They offered 
the depositors an average of 1.5 to 2 percent monthly return, on credit, until the 
accounts are settled at the end of the year. The idea was an appealing one to a lot 
of depositors who want to receive a specific monthly flow of money without any 
worries about fluctuations in expected return on funds invested according to profit 
and loss sharing ä la Islamic principles. The method attracted a range of 
depositors; pensioners, widows, persons on low income, ex-emigrants in the gulf 
states,.. etc. 
" Catering for small depositors was one of the factors leading to the success of 
these companies in attracting savings. This group of people has never been put 
seriously on the agenda of the formal banking system. Some of the banks set a 
minimum to open a deposit account which disqualified a large number of potential 
depositors. Other banks did not deal in domestic currency which disqualified a 
further number of potential depositors. Maltreatment of customers in some 
branches of public banks and insolent staff in some branches of foreign and joint- 
venture ones discouraged a significant number of potential depositors. 
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Under these conditions and with the prevalence of negative real interest rates at the time, 
different kinds of inflation hedges . would 
be a plausible alternative. IICs seemed to take 
account of these problems and managed to appear as a good substitute for other inflation 
hedges for small depositors. 
The increasing role of the IICs in the Egyptian economy in general and the financial 
sector in particular can be equally attributed to some other factors for which they were 
not responsible but managed to exploit. As shown in figure (5.7), Egypt at that time was 
witnessing a remarkable increase in the remittances of Egyptian workers abroad, 
primarily in the Gulf states. 
Figure (5.7) - 
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Source: World Bank, World Tables, 1991 and 1992. 
Moreover, various restrictions in the official foreign exchange market, the overvalued 
exchange rate of the pound, and the incapability of the formal financial sector, with its 
limited instruments, to cope with the requirements of those emigrants. Hence many of the 
emigrants preferred to deal in the foreign exchange black market. Many of the founders 
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of the IICs started as foreign exchange black marketeers98. They had plenty of cash in 
hand and found themselves surrounded by businessmen who could not finance imports 
through the formal channels. Furthermore, the government itself sought the help of black 
market traders in order to finance the imports of some essential goods. 
However, as a way of reducing risk involved in illegal transactions, setting up a 'legal' 
facade appeared then as a plausible idea. Hence, the first companies were established like 
Al-Rayan and Al-Saad. 99 The founders of both companies were at the top of the list of the 
55 main foreign exchange black market traders. 
The IICs emerged in a financially repressed environment with, effectively, a non 
functioning capital market and a malfunctioning banking sector. Potential investors faced 
several bureaucratic, legislative, and regulation difficulties when dealing with 
conventional institutions. In such circumstances, a significant number of potential savers 
and investors prefered to deal with these new companies for higher rates of return in a 
seemingly placid way. 
The experience of the IICs can be related to the two main arguments10° that are usually 
adopted regarding the reasons behind financial dualism and the very existence of the 
informal financial sector. The first argument considers the informal financial sector a 
response to the imperfections and weaknesses of the repressed formal sector. The tight 
regulation of financial intermediaries and various restrictions imposed on their activities 
push potential savers and investors to find other instruments of savings and sources of 
credit outside the formal sector. 
98 See Sadowski (1991) pp. 229-231. 
99 Two of Al-Rayan brothers and the chairman of AI-Saad were number 2,3 and 4 respectively on the interior ministry's list of the biggest 
foreign exchange black marketeers. 
100 See Germidis (1990) and Kitchen (1986). 
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The second line of argument states that the existence of the informal financial sector can 
be explained by inherent dualism in the economic and social structure of the whole 
society. In other words the informal sector would flourish when a significant part of the 
population is still attached to traditional values regardless of the condition of the formal 
sector. 
The case of IICs suggests a combination of the two arguments for an explanation of their 
existence. On the first hand, they support Goodhart's law"' by being the unregulated 
substitute for a heavily regulated formal financial sector. On the other hand they appeared 
as institutions working according to the dominating religious and traditional values. This 
clearly supports the second argument; an argument completely neglected by the western 
style financial intermediaries and not utilised effectively enough by the formal Islamic 
banks. 
Moreover, we argue that the IICs exploited the soft regulatory structure. These companies 
were allowed to be established and operate for almost a decade without coming under any 
recognised form of regulation or supervision. Thus the growth of the IICs was not only 
a response to financial repression but it was also a demonstration of the weaknesses of 
regulatory framework, in addition to the incompatibility of formal financial services with 
the needs of a significant segment of savers in Egypt. 
5.8.2) The size of IICs: 
Deposits held by IICs reached a figure estimated to be between £E 3.4 billion and £E 4.6 
billion in 1988. The number of depositors in the biggest 5 companies was 391,000 
according to one of the estimates, and 525,000 according to another. The total number 
101 
See Goodhart (1984), p. 96. 
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of IICs' depositors was estimated to range between 406,000 and 648,000102. The deviation 
in figures is quite compatible with the nature of informal sector establishments. Organized 
book-keeping, clear records and a reasonable degree of disclosure of information were 
never considered by the IICs. There was no need for that when there was no supervising 
authority to monitor their activities. 
These companies accepted almost any amount of money as deposits; from as small as £E 
100 to LE 2 million. 103 As shown in figure (5.8), in one of the biggest IICs, Al Huda 
Misr, we can distinguish between three main groups according to the average size of 
deposits. First 15,000 small depositors (Gi) with an average size of deposits of LE 2700, 
who made up 89 % of the total number of depositors and had a share of 22 % of the whole 
volume of deposits. Second a group of 1600 depositors (G2) who had an average size of 
deposits of LE 40,825 constructed 9% of total depositors and 36% of total deposits. The 
company also managed to attract in addition 400 big depositors (G3), with an average 
deposit size of £E 188,000, who formed 2% of the total number of 17,000 depositors, 
and held 42% of the total size of deposits. 
102 See Abdel Fadil, op. cit., pp. 15-17 for an estimate of the size of deposits and number of depositors. 
103 
See Al Jumhooryah newspaper 3/8/1993 p. 11. 
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Figure (5.8) 
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Source: Compiled from the published lists of depositors' shares in liquidation revenues. 
Thus the IICs appealed to different groups regardless of income. The occupations of 
depositors proves that they also managed to break through class barriers. The means for 
that were mainly religion and the high returns promised on funds deposited. 
A '' 
5.8.3) The IICs' adoption of pyramid scheme: 
The question that arises here is what sort of activities enable the companies to pay their 
depositors 24% per annum on deposits in local and foreign currencies? 
We argue that a pyramid scheme is the plausible explanation for the high rate of 
distributed profits of IICs. I°4 O'Connell and Zeldes (1988), define a 'rational' pyramid 
scheme as 'a sequence of loan market transactions with positive net present value to the 
borrower'. 'os Generally according to the pyramid scheme cash payments on debts, 
104 
And indeed it is the explanation for the current high interest rate paid by the government on treasury bills in Egypt. 
105See 
O'Connell and Zeldes (1988), p. 434. 
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deposits, are met mainly by increasing the amount of debt outstanding by fresh borrowing 
and debts are backed not by real assets but rather by future debts"'. 
Unquestionably, speculation and pyramid schemes, to a certain extent, might be a 
recognised feature of the operations of many formal financial institutions as argued by 
Minsky (1986)107. But speculation, in the words of Keynes (1949), may cause no damage 
as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But in the case of IICs the case was serious 
as they became 'the bubble on a whirlpool of speculations'101. 
The recent history of financial fiascos is full of examples of wide-scale pyramid schemes, 
from the Ponzi scandal in the early 1920s109 in the USA, to the MMM crash in Russia 
in 1994.110 In the two incidents, as in the case of the IICs, there was mispresentation and 
violation of implicit and explicit trust, if one uses the expression of Kindleberger. "1 
Moreover in the three cases of Ponzi, MMM and IICs there was a heavy reliance on slick 
advertising campaigns, in which a seemingly genuine activity appeared as a facade. In the 
case of Ponzi it was arbitrage opportunities in international postal coupons, in the MMM 
case it' was the trade in privatisation vouchers, and in case of the IICs, it was the 
establishment of holding companies involved in a variety of production and services 
activities as a smoke screen. 
106 
See Minsky (1986) p. 206-14 and Kindleberger (1978) p. 79. 
107 It is ironic to find that the annual interest yield on treasury bills reached 20%. T Bills interest rate was quite close to the rate of return 
in IICs. It seems either that the government was wrong when it restricted nominal interest rates in the first case and allowed the informal 
sector to benefit from that, or it was wrong when it provided such a high interest rate on T Bills in the second case, conceivably under 
a government backed pyramid scheme. Supposedly the government was wrong in both cases. 
108 See Shafik (1989) p. 303. 
109 See Train (1985), pp. 11-16. 
110On 
the MMM crisis see the two issues of The Economist, of 30/7/1994 and 10/9/1994. 
111 See the contribution of O'Connell and Zeldes (1992), in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance. 
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5.8.4) The fall: 
The IICs enjoyed no supervision or regulation until the symptoms of problems appeared 
on the surface after immense losses of some IICs in speculating on gold and foreign 
currencies in the international markets in November 1986. This was followed by a series 
of similar problems and concluded with the international financial crisis on black 
Monday in October 1987, marking the beginning of the fall of these companies. 
These problems along with others forced the government to intervene to regulate these 
companies. There were some cases of security problems when crowds of depositors 
marched on Al Rayan's branches to withdraw their deposits after the news of their losses 
in November 1986 and 1987. Al Rayan was rescued by an immediate liquidity transfer 
from a financial company in the Gulf"' and managed to cover all withdrawal requests, 
estimated at £E 25 million a day. But this drew attention to the importance of formal 
monitoring of these companies. 
These companies were accused of financing the Islamic candidates campaign in the 1987 
general elections, which made the government more interested in regulating them. 
However the government did not intervene quickly enough. The delay in intervention was 
due partly to the fear of accusation of being anti-Islamic and believing that a major run 
on the IICs would endanger banks and government agencies that had dealings with them. 
Further, at that time the government did not have even an approximate figure of the 
number of these companies or their depositors. In order to enhance their bargaining 
power with the government, IICs' managers claimed that there were around 575 operating 
companies with 15 million depositors. "' 
112 
Shohaib (1989) and several newspapers. 
113 
Al Shaab newspaper 21/6/1988. 
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Moreover IICs established a complex network of loyal journalists, government officials, 
former ministers and governors, police and army officers, and religious personalities. 
Many of them served the objectives of IICs by exploiting information they gained while 
they were in their powerful positions and abusing the confidence of the public in their 
views. This network delayed the government action against the IICs. In return for their 
services members of the network were allocated consultancy jobs in IICs with high 
salaries or paid higher returns on their deposited funds with the companies or both. "' 
It was clear that these companies escaped any direct control of any of these authorities 
by exploiting the two compliant Laws"' of 159/1981 and 43/1974 concerning joint stock 
companies and investment and other laws concerning limited liability companies and 
limited partnership companies. " Effectively, there was no law to regulate the IICs and 
hence there was no authority governing them. 
Meanwhile, some companies were unable to sustain their high dividends and faced a 
liquidity and solvency crises. An attempt was made by Al Rayan and Al Saad, two of the 
biggest IICs, to solve their problems by merger in what was known then as the merger 
of the giants"'. However, this merger was a violation of commercial law. The 
government capitalised on that and passed a feeble law no 89/1986 which was enforced 
and augmented after 2 years by law no 146/1988. According to the latter law investment 
fund business is restricted to joint-stock companies, a minimum capital standard was 
imposed and regulatory oversight was vested with the Capital Market Authority. 
114 A group of these consultants and advisors were known after the collapse of the IICs and revealing of some files as the group of the 
'lists of blessings', kushouf al-Barakah, as they were paid special rates of returns on funds deposited for them with the IICs. To the knowledge of the author the case was closed without adequate investigation. 
115See 
chapter (1) for a brief discussion of the background of the promulgation of these two laws. 
116 
For a legal discussion of the activities of IICs see Ahmad (1990) pp 77-79 and 91-95. 
117 
Al-Ahram Newspaper 17/4/1988 p. 18. 
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However this movement of the government was too late and did too little to reform the 
companies and help them adapt to the new rules. At the same time the government action 
might have contributed to their early collapse as they were heavily regulated and 
effectively denied access to fresh capital. 
After more than 5 years of regulation, and hence the collapse, of IICs in 1988, depositors 
in some companies received just 10% of their funds valued as at June 1988 according to 
a slow timetable managed by 2 legal authorities the Attorney General and the Socialist 
Attorney. Other depositors did not receive even the 10% as their companies' assets were 
difficult to liquidate or not adequate to cover any deposits. Those who had banked with 
big IICs learned that it would take years to recover their deposits, while those who had 
their deposits in the small IICs discovered that their funds not only had decreased in real 
terms, like those of big firms, but evaporated in nominal terms. Moreover the adverse 
experience of IICs has undermined the confidence of potential savers in collective 
investment institutions and has been hampering attempts to develop mutual funds in the 
Egyptian formal financial system ever since. 
(5.9) Concluding remarks: 
The theoretical framework of Islamic finance challenges some of the main fundamentals 
of mainstream thinking regarding the mechanisms of financial transactions. The rejection 
of a predetermined interest rate, as a form of the disallowed riba, implies a change to 
profit and loss sharing principle (PLS) in conducting financial intermediation. In this 
chapter we have provided a simple model to illustrate the difference between an Islamic 
bank and a traditional one. 
The analytic conceptualisation which has developed since the 1980s, has established that 
the Islamic financial system has several advantages over the conventional one, mainly: 
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" It is more equitable as it establishes a direct relationship between lenders and 
borrowers through which they share the outcome of the 'partnership' be it profit 
or loss. 
" There is a close and direct relationship between the return on savings and 
investment. 
" The Islamic system offers a flexible adjustment mechanism in the case of 
unanticipated shocks. 
" It ensures that the real values of assets and liabilities will be equal at all points in 
time. 
" The rate of return is determined by the real sector, and not by the financial 
sector. 
" It protects the exchange/transaction role of a banking system by limiting the risk 
on deposit balances 
However, further impartial analysis of the Islamic financial model is needed for a better 
understanding of its concepts, mechanisms and objectives. We argue that such analysis 
will not only develop the Islamic model to a more fully fledged one, but may offer as 
well some different-insights to the field of economics. 
In principle the framework provides Islamic banks with a variety of savings instruments 
and funding schemes. In practice Islamic banks in Egypt, as in other Muslim countries, 
performed relatively better in the mobilisation of funds than in their allocation. They 
suffered from a bias towards the controversial short-term murabaha finance concentrated 
in trade and services sectors, whereas the mudarabah and musharakah schemes were 
virtually neglected. 
The future of Islamic financial institutions in Egypt relies on their ability to learn from 
the problems of recent years and find answers for intricate questions mainly: 
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" How to innovate instruments to attract risk averse depositors? Under the current 
practice Islamic banks avoided this problem by distributing rates of return close 
to the prevailing interest rate and not declaring explicitly that depositors may lose 
part of their nominal principals in the case of loss. With more transparency 
required, under the financial reform programme currently adopted, can Islamic 
banks keep their risk averse depositors and attract potential ones? 
" How to overcome the dominance of short-termism and murabaha contracts in 
their portfolios? 
" What kind of training is required for their current and future personnel to ensure 
an efficient functioning of Islamic banks in accordance with their distinctive rules 
and constraints? 
" The case of the IICs emphasises the need for a prudential regulator and adequate 
supervision and rejects the calls for complete deregulation of the financial system 
or lenient monitoring. The question however is how to establish a suitable 
regulatory framework for Islamic financial institutions in a predominantly 
" 'conventional' financial system? 
0 Further to the previous point is what sort of relationship Islamic banks will have 
with the Central Bank, including the issue of 100 percent reserve requirements? 
" Should they be part of a deposit insurance scheme or is that another breach of 
Islamic law? 
" Finally, how to conduct their transactions with conventional banks and the 
international markets without violating their Islamic principles? 
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Chapter (6) 
Financial Repression in Egypt 1960-90: 
Causes, Measures and Impact 
"If as in the 18th century, the existing mercantilist economy 
seemed to be inefficient, then the prevalent mood was for greater 
freedom. If as in the late 19th century, the existing liberal 
economy was perceived not to have solved the problems of poverty 
and insecurity, then the mood was for intervention. If as today, the 
interventionist economy is perceived as having failed and 
governments having grown too large, then the mood is for 
liberalism. " R. M. Hartwell (1989)' 
(6.1) Introduction: 
The financial market in LDCs has always been subject to substantial government 
intervention. Such intervention is not always justified by regulatory purposes and/or 
intentions for correcting market failure. In most cases government intervention in LDCs 
can be considered repressive, as far as the financial market is concerned. Governments 
impose an array of measures that deviate the operations of the financial system away from 
the market discipline and result in various distortions. 
Financial repression can be explained by different arguments, such as the condition of the 
financial system in LDCs after independence, the impact of the dominating ideologies 
during the late 1950s and 1960s, and/or anti usury laws, but the main common cause for 
repression, we argue, was financing the budget deficit. 
Financial repression in Egypt took different forms such as setting ceilings on interest 
rates, high reserve requirements, directed credit schemes, ownership of banks, 
intervention in the portfolio composition of banks in addition to extracting revenues from 
the inflation tax. 
'Hartwell 
(1989), p. 118 
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In this chapter we analyse the causes of financial repression in Egypt over the period 
1960-90. We discuss the impact of the adopted methods of repressions and estimate the 
government revenues generated from particular repressive measures, like the inflation tax, 
seigniorage, interest rate ceilings. Moreover we discuss the main consequences of 
financial repression such as capital flight, money substitution, hoarding gold as an 
inflation hedge and informal financial transactions. 
(6.2) Reasons for financial repression in Egypt: 
(6.2.1) The Condition of the financial system after independence: 
One of the reasons behind the Egyptian government's intervention in the operations of 
the financial market can be attributed to a market failure problems and its negative effects 
on the efficiency of financial intermediation, i. e. the mobilisation of savings and the 
allocation of loanable funds. ' 
When Egypt started to modernise its economy in the 1950s, after gaining its political 
independence, the financial system was comprised of foreign owned commercial banks, 
with the exception of Bank Misr and some scattered Egyptian shares in some financial 
units. 3 The activities of these banks were concentrated in short-term trade and commercial 
credit. " There was also geographical concentration as most of the banks were established 
in Cairo and Alexandria with very few branches in other big urban centres. The financial 
system was segmented and shallow in the sense that either some financial services and 
instruments did not exist at all in some areas, like insurance services, or they existed but 
were in an inadequate form, e. g. agricultural credit banking. 
2See Killick, 1993, pp. 254-262, for further analysis of market failure problem and its impact on the financial system. 
3See 
chapter (3) of this thesis. 
4ibid. 
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Encouraged by segmentation and shallowness, operating banks behaved in an oligopolistic 
manner. This was facilitated by the absence of a formal legislator. The National Bank of 
Egypt, as an acting Central Bank, was not adequately empowered to exercise the known 
functions of a well established monetary authority in terms of supervision and regulations 
Asymmetric information, regarding both the services of the financial sector and potential 
borrowers, was a result of such oligopolistic environment and a cause for other problems, 
such as adverse risk selection and the application of non-price criteria for the allocation 
of credit, i. e. depending on the reputation of the borrower, political pressure,.. etc. " 
All these characteristics are symptoms of market failure which called for corrective 
intervention by the government. However the intervention, especially during the 1960s 
was not necessarily corrective as it was mainly driven by ideological motives, which left 
the entire financial system publicly owned and managed as discussed in chapter (3) above. 
(6.2.2) The impact of ideology: 
The repression of the financial sector was one of the components of overall interventionist 
policy embraced by the government in the 1960s under the conviction of socialist ideas 
as a remedy for economic problems. ' According to these ideas, the public sector was 
considered the engine of economic growth. Whereas the private sector was regarded as 
both economically inefficient, in undertaking the large projects of the ambitious 
development plans, and politically unreliable because of its close association with the 
former regime. Hence there was a series of Egyptianisation measures, de facto 
5ibid. 
6See 
Killick (1993), op. cit, p. 256. 
7The 
background of the adoption of socialist policies during the 1960s is discussed in our overview of the Egyptian economy in chapter 
M. 
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nationalisation, of foreign owned enterprises, including financial intermediaries in late 
1950s and the comprehensive nationalisation measures of early 1960s. 8 
Consequently publicly-owned banks comprised the entire financial system until 1975 and 
despite the allowance for some foreign and private banks to operate, public banks have 
been its dominant component afterwards, Although owning financial intermediaries by 
the state cannot be always considered a facet of financial repression, we argue that the 
way they functioned in Egypt, as in other LDCs, made them a catalyst for repression and 
a promoter for its unfavourable effects. In this environment the private sector found it 
hard to compete for credit, simply because credit is administratively allocated to the 
priority projects as discussed further below. 
(6.2.3) Regulations against usury: 
Imposing controls on interest rates were consistent with religious and political objections 
to high interest rates which are considered as usurious. Although Islam considers the 
charge of an interest rate, regardless of its level be it high or low or high, as a form of 
usury9, Egyptian authorities do not adopt this view. Rather they seem more influenced 
by the view that high interest rates are usurious while relatively low rates are not, hence 
their advocacy of interest rate ceilings. 
In addition to the religious rationale, usury laws were advocated for a long time by policy 
makers, who accepted the view of Adam Smith (1776) which stated that usury ceilings 
would direct loanable funds to 'productive investments' and away from 'poor-risk 
8See 
Chapter (3) and chapter (4) for further discussion of Egyptianisation and Nationalisation laws. 
9See 
our discussion of Islamic view on interest rate in chapter (5). 
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spendthrift' borrowers. 1° This view can be considered as an early precaution of today's 
ideas about adverse risk selection. 
(6.2.4) The influence of Keynesian ideas: 
Egyptian policy makers, like many others in the rest of the developing world, were 
influenced by Keynesian arguments during its heyday during the 1950s and 1960s. 
According to Keynes, excessive liquidity-preference pushed real interest rates historically 
above the full-employment equilibrium level. As a solution for liquidity-preference, 
described as "the outstanding evil [and] the prime impediment to growth of wealth"", 
Keynes proposed interest rate ceilings. This proposition was in accordance with his 
advocacy of the Gesellian stamp tax on money which was designed to reduce the demand 
for liquidity by raising the opportunity cost of holding money. 12 
Further, Tobin (1965) in his model of money and economic growth demonstrated that a 
higher return on capital relative to money leads to a higher capital/labour ratio, higher 
productivity of labour and improvement in per capita incomes. This necessitates either 
a reduction in deposit interest rates or taxing money ä la Gesell. " 
The views of Keynes and Tobin, among other economists, constructed a general wisdom, 
in most developed and developing countries including Egypt, that low nominal interest 
rates are necessary for }growth. This sat well with the notion of that time that physical 
capital accumulation was the critical element in successful development. Hence the 
widespread use of interest rate ceilings as a main tool for financial repression. 
10On 
the impact of usury laws on credit availability and allocation see Villegas (1989) and Blitz and Long (1965). 
11See 
Keynes (1936), p. 351. 
120n 
Gesellian Stamps and its support by Keynes see: Keynes (1936). pp. 353-8, Shaw (1973), p. 93. and Fry (1988). P. S. 
13For 
a discussion of this point see Fry (1988). pp. 5-6. 
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It is worth noting that repressive measures seemed to be working in some countries. For 
example, repressing the financial sector in S. Korea during the 1970s helped finance the 
budget deficit, in a non-inflationary manner, by imposing restrictions on money 
substitutes. Moreover, in time when the financial market was underdeveloped and in 
absence of reliable market information, the Korean government by owning financial units 
and controlling capital outflow, managed to influence favourably economic variables and 
achieved the maintenance of economic stability and reduced capital flight to a minimum, 
in periods of economic and political uncertainty, e. g. early 1980s. 14 
Moreover financial repression helped reducing the velocity of circulation, using M2, in 
Portugal from 1.5 in 1962 to 1.1 in 1973; and in Turkey from 5.3 in 1963 to 3.7 in 
1970.11 However, evidence does not suggest that Egypt achieved an equivalent success 
in controlling the velocity of circulation. It is also interesting to notice that figures for 
velocity of circulation show that it was higher during the period of 1960-74, which 
witnessed heavy government intervention in the financial sector, than it was during the 
partial financial liberalisation period, 1975-90. We argue that controlling the velocity of 
circulation was not the prime objectives of repressing the financial sector; financing the 
budget deficit was ° however the main objective. 
(6.2.5) Financing the budget deficit as a main reason for financial repression: 
As in the case of most LDCs, deficit finance in Egypt was considered for a long time as 
an acceptable financing tool. 16 The frequent use of deficit financing was justified by the 
insufficiency of private investment for several political, economic and institutional factors. 
Therefore augmenting the rate of net investment in the economy depended on 
14See Dornbusch and Park (1987), pp. 417-18 and on the different stages of financial development in Korea see Cho (1989), pp. 88-102. 
15See Fry (1988), p. 15 
16mingan 
(1986), p. 364, one of the widely used Development Economics textbooks in developing counties, describes deficit finance as 
the most useful method of promoting economic development in LDCs'. 
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government's efforts. But the Egyptian government lacked sufficient resources to finance 
public investment and spending, by using conventional taxation, hence it normally 
resorted to deficit fmance. '7 
Despite realising that deficit finance has adverse effects, e. g. its inherent inflationary 
potential, it was argued that such effects can be contained if deficit financing is used 
within safe limits: Such limits depend on different factors, e. g. the growth rate of the 
economy, the degree of monetisation in the economy, the extent of restrictions imposed 
on the close substitutes for government money. 1I 
However it was difficult to adhere to these limits, and recently budget deficits received 
much of the blame for mixed economic problems that troubled developing economies in 
the 1970s and 1980s. 19 Depending on the means of financing, i. e. printing money, 
domestic borrowing, and/or foreign borrowing, budget deficits show up in one or more 
of macroeconomic imbalances: inflation, foreign exchange shortages, crowding out of 
private investment and/or foreign debt crisis. 
In time these problems led to a call for revising the role of deficit finance, which was 
once seen as natural and even essential instrument for financing development. 20 Cutting 
budget deficits of LDCs has now become the sine qua non of stabilisation and structural 
adjustment packages proposed by the IMF and the World Bank. Moreover, the 
controversy among rival schools is not about the issue of keeping a high budget deficit 
17For further discussion of deficit financing and its role in economic development see Kulkarni (1966), pp. 16-37. 
18On 
the related issue of inflationary finance see Nichols (1974), pp. 423-30. 
19See for example: Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993), pp. 211-213. 
20Deficit 
finance and Keynesian economics were linked together fora long time because of the Keynesian proposition that output is driven 
by demand which can be altered by government action, via taxation and public spending. Despite such association it has been recently 
established that Keynes himself did not recommend government deficits as a tool of economic policy. See The New Palgrave (1988), pp. 
764-5 and Kregel (1985), p. 32. 
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or not, but mainly it is about two questions. First, what is the appropriate size of budget 
deficit in terms of consistency with stability? Second, how deficit cuts should be done 
with minimum negative effects? 21 Needless to emphasise that the perceived change 
regarding deficit finance is part of the whole review of the function of the state in 
economic development. 22 
(6.3) The development of the Egyptian budget deficit and its finance: 
In the case of Egypt several factors have contributed to the variation of the magnitude of 
the Egyptian budget deficit during the study period 1960-199023, which can be 
summarised as follows: 
" The instability of government revenues due to the fact that the main sources of revenue 
in the economy, to a great extent, are exogenously determined. These revenues are oil 
receipts, the Suez Canal dues, remittances of Egyptian workers abroad, and tourism, in 
addition to foreign grants. 
" The economy's exposure to external shocks, e. g. the worsening of terms of trades 
during the 1970s and 1980s, the increase in international interest rates in early 1980s. 
" The extent of government intervention in the economy and its control over expenditure, 
e. g. food subsidies. 
" The malfunctioning of the tax system, the accumulation of tax arrears and the relatively 
large length of collection lags. 
" The impact of political issues on the budget deficit are hard to neglect in any country 
as they may force the government to spend more than it should and/or tax less than it 
can. In Egypt political aspects influenced the size of the budget deficit further in the sense 
that they delayed, and even prevented, specific budget reform measures. For example the 
21See 
Dornbusch (1990), p. 29 and On the issue of deficit reduction and its effects see Taylor (1990), pp. 223-8. 
22See 
the World Bank (1988), pp. 43-54. 
23For further discussion of the problem of budget deficit in Egypt see for example Ahmad (1984), Carr (1990). Hosny (1986). 
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riots of 1977 prevented the government from proceeding with an IMF stand-by- 
agreement, aiming at reducing subsidies to control the budget deficit. 
" The method of financing the budget deficit had also an impact on the size of the deficit, 
i. e. the inflationary impact of money creation and the increase of vulnerability to external 
shocks associated with external financing. 
In this chapter we are concerned with financing the given fiscal deficits over the period 
1960-90 and its contribution to the repression of the financial sector. 
Figure (6.1) shows the development of the budget deficit in Egypt over the period 1974- 
90.24 The average budget deficit as a percentage of GDP was 21.8% and ranging from 
15.9% to 30.5%. As shown in the figure, data obtained from the IMF's Government 
Financial Statistics, which used different deficit definition from the one used by the 
county's statistical authorities, show lower deficits with an average of 12.5 %. But, as 
shown in figures (6.1) and (6.2), even according to these conservative figures, the 
Egyptian budget deficit was higher than that of Turkey, Brazil, Chile and Korea, and was 
high by most international standards. 
24Before 
1974, data on budget deficit appear in a form of index numbers. In this chapter we use actual figures, available from 1974, to 
show the development of the deficit as a percentage of GDP. 
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Figure (6.1) 
Egyptian budget deficit as a Percentage of GDP, 
according to two different sources 
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Figure (6.2) 
Budget deficit as a percentage 
of GDP in selected LDCs 
+ Korea *( Turkey- Brazil* Chile 
Sources: Data for figure (6.1) are obtained from the World Bank Country reports on Egypt 1988 and 1990, and 
from Ministry of Finance (shown as country data), and from the IMF Government Financial Statistics (shown 
as IMF). Data for figure (6.2) are from the IMF Government Financial Statistics. 
6.3.1) Methods of financing the Egyptian budget deficit: 
The extent of reliance on any of the methods of financing the budget deficit, i. e. foreign, 
bank and non-bank financing varied over the period of 1960-90. According to table (6.1) 
and figure (6.3) deficit financing was predominantly domestic. The government relied 
heavily on non-bank and bank financing, contributing respectively' by an average of 39% 
and 38% of the total budget deficit. Part of the financing came from borrowing abroad, 25 
especially during late 1970s and 1980s, and contributed by an average of 23 % during the 
study period. 
25 
On the external debt problem in Egypt see for example Kheir-El-Din (1988), Boutros-Ghali (1989) and Zaki (1984). 
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External and domestic financing 
as a percentage of total budget deficit 
1960/61-1990/91 
Table (6.1) 
Year External 
Financing 
Nun-Bank 
Financing 
Bank 
Financing 
1960/61 23.8 7.3 68.9 
61 /62 29.8 12.6 57 6 
63/64 9.5 19.5 71 
64/65 10.6 19.6 69.8 
65/66 10.7 40 49.3 
66/67 12.5 35.5 52 
67/68 21.8 73.5 4.7 
68/69 13.7 57.9 28.4 
69/70 9.8 54.3 35.9 
70/71 (0 62.8 27.2 
71 /72 11.3 54.4 34.3 
72/73 10.1 41.7 48.2 
1974 16.6 30.7 52.7 
1975 22.8 41.8 35.4 
1976 20.8 30.2 49 
1977 38.6 26.9 34.5 
1978 43 23.7 33.3 
1979 39.2 24.1 36.7 
1980/81 40.3 54.1 5.6 
81 /82 24.5 441 11.4 
82/83 25.8 361 38.1 
83/84 21.1 37.6 41.3 
84/85 33.9 33.1 33 
85/86 26.9 33.4 29.7 
86/87 26.5 32 3 41.2 
87/88 24.83 61.41 13.76 
88/89 37.04 53.68 9.28 
89/90 24.8 61.41 13.76 
1990/91 27 35.47 37.33 
Minimum 9.5 7.3 4.7 
Maximum 43 73.5 71 
Mean 23.4 38.99 37.65 
Figure (6.3) 
"EN. rn. Fsnenc, ng -'Nnn. Bank hn. ncI g Bank Financing 
(b"o 
5ý 
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Source: Compiled from IMF, Government Financial Statistics; and National Bank of Egypt, Various issues. 
6.3.2) A note on non-bank financing of the deficit: 
Domestic non-bank borrowing usually occurs when there is an unexpected shortfall in 
revenues or to cover emergencies such as defence requirements26. So it is argued that 
borrowing substitutes for increases in taxation and that the impact of domestic borrowing 
26See 
Ahmad and Stern (1989), pp. 1023-5. 
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is equivalent in terms of behaviour and welfare to that of taxation according to the 
Ricardian equivalence theorem. 27 
However in LDCs non-bank borrowing is often compulsory and governments rely on it 
extensively to finance budget deficits. In Egypt with an average of 39% of total deficit 
during the 1960-90 period it was the major source of finance as shown in table (6.1) and 
figure (6.3). 
The major sources of non-bank funds, channelled through the National Investment Bank 
(NIB)28, were according to relative importance as follows: ` 
(i) the surplus of social insurance funds which contributed by an average of 
65.8% of total non-bank finance. 
(ii) savings certificates which were issued by the NBE on behalf of the treasury 
in 1964/65 and contributed by 12.2% of non-bank finance. 
(iii) Post Office savings fund with an average of 4.0% of non-bank finance. 
(iv) The revenue of the 5% levied on the net profits of Joint-stock and limited 
partnership companies which contributed by an average of 3.9%. 
The NIB -provides these funds to the government30 at low, below market interest rates. 
For example while the bank lending rate was 15-17% in 1989 the NIB lending rate to the 
government including, public sector companies was 9.5%. 
270n Ricardian Equivalence see the seminal paper of Barro (1974), pp. 1095-1117 and on its relevance to LDCs see for example, Corden 
(1989), pp. 276-278. 
28The NIB, on paper is the largest financial institution with total balance sheet of more than LE 35 billion compared to LE 23 billion for 
the NBE the largest commercial bank. The reason behind such big size the monopoly of the NIB of social insurance funds and the rest 
of the revenues generated from the non-bank sources outlined above in addition to its issuance of development bonds and other sources 
of funding. The reason behind excluding it from the banking system is the fact that the NIB is far from being a financial intermediary. 
It is rather a large accounting unit of the Ministry of Planning responsible for directing funds and implementing the investment programme 
of the government and monitoring the progress of projects. 
29Figures 
calculated from data obtained from the NBE, Economic Bulletin various issues and Abdel-Lateef (1990). 
30Here 
government stands for central government, local governments, public services authorities (e. g. health and education, public utilities 
(e. g. water) and public companies (now called public business companies). 
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6.3.3) Bank financing of the budget deficit: 
Although the term bank financing is used in literature to indicate deficit financing through 
money creation, in practice there is a difference between the two. The Central Bank of 
Egypt (CBE), like any other central bank does not resort to money creation unless its 
reserves of liquid assets are not sufficient. The CBE accumulates these assets mainly 
through its imposition of reserve requirements ratios on the deposits held with the banks, 
which is discussed below, and by borrowing excess liquidity of commercial banks. 
Normally the central bank borrows from deposit banks at a lower rate of interest than the 
rate it receives from the government for purchasing its issued bonds. 31 
(6.4) Measures of Financial Repression: 
(6.4.1) Sei ng iorage: 
The Egyptian government revenue from money creation (seigniorage)32 was an important 
source for financing the deficit. Following Fischer (1982) we calculate seigniorage (S) 
as an incremental change of monetary base (M) 33 over a discrete period divided by the 
value of nominal GDP (19 over the same period. 
S= e M/ Y (1) 
31Noshy 
(1990), pp. 2-3. 
32For further discussion of seigniorage see Fischer (1982), Mankiw (1987) and Klein and Neumann (1989). 
33Note 
that for the value of M we use the end-of-year currency outside banks. 
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Figure (6.4) 
Revenue from seigniorage as a percentage of GDP: 
Egypt 1961-90 
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As shown in figure (6.4), seigniorage revenue varied considerably during the period 
under study. During the 1960s it was, on average, low and reached its highest levels in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. But generally the ratio of seigniorage to GDP is high by 
international standards as shown in table (6.2). 
Table (6.2) 
Average Revenues from seigniorage as a percentage of GDP 
in Egypt and selected LDCs 
Source: For Egypt: e author's own calculations; data obtained from IFS lines 14a, 64 and 
For the other LDCs: World Bank (1988), table 3.1, p. 61. 
Year Egypt's 
Seigniorage 
h LDC S i i i s, e gn orage Revenue and Inflation n ot er 
1960s 1.66 average for 1980-1985 
1970s 3.27 
1980s 2.99 
1961-90 2.69 
1980-85 Low Moderate High 
Egypt Korea Nigeria Mexico Turkey Argentina Bolivia 
Seigniorage 4.26 0.5 0.8 1.5 1.2 4.0 6.2 
Inflation 15.2 9 16 58 46 274 506 
Currency/GDP 25.1 4.3 7.2 3.7 3.8 3.8 6.1 
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The World Bank (1988) classified LDCs into three groups according to the level of their 
seigniorage revenues: low, moderate and high. Using the same method and data sources 
our results for Egypt show that it lies in high seigniorage group. It was second highest 
after Bolivia which had an extremely high inflation rate that exceeded 500%. . Further 
Egypt's seigniorage was higher than that of Argentina which had an inflation rate 
approximately 18 times higher. 
Generating a high seigniorage revenue with a relatively modest average inflation rate of 
15.2% is explained by the high ratio of currency holdings to GDP which had an average 
of 25.1 % during 1980-85 compared with 3.8 % and 6.1 % for Argentina and Bolivia. 
The impact of the relatively high monetary ratio to GDP on government revenues can be 
explained further by analysing the extent of reliance on inflation tax in Egypt over the 
period 1960-90. 
(6.4.2) Inflation tax: 
As *argued by Blanchard and Fischer (1989), inflation tax is "related but not necessarily 
identical to seignioragen34. Inflation tax as a loss of the value of real balances MIP can 
be presented as it MIP, where ir is inflation rate. While seigniorage is µ MIP where µ 
is money growth. Thus inflation tax and seigniorage can only be equal when ir = it 
which holds in the steady state, i. e. economic growth is zero, and not generally35. 
Thus we calculate the inflation tax for Egypt over the period 1960-90 as follows: 
I=M [7r/(1 +ir)] (2) 
34 
Blanchard and Fischer (1989), p. 198. 
35 ibid. 
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Where M is reserve money defined here as the monetary base, which consists of notes 
and coins in circulation outside banks + vault cash held by banks + banks' deposits with 
the CBE i. e. reserve requirements. 
ir is the change of the consumer price index CPI. Our results are presented in figure (6.5) 
and table (6.3). 
Figure (6.5) shows inflation tax as a percentage of GDP. Inflation tax with an average 
of 0.6%, was relatively low during the 1960s, with the exception of 1965 due to an 
increase in inflation rate. In 1962 and 1968 the inflation tax was surprisingly negative, 
because the change in the CPI during these two particular years was negative. 36 
36Although 
we accept that published figures on inflation suffer from a downward bias over the period under study due to technical and 
political reasons, we find that the negative inflation figures for 1962 and 1968 are really unusual in any economy especially if it is a 
developing one. One possible reason behind these irregular figures is the fact that the country suffered from some political drawbacks in 
the two preceding years 1961 and 1967. In 1961 there was the political and economic unrest because of the mass nationalisation measures, 
in 1967 there was the problem of the war. While we doubt that these two reasons had a lagged disinflationary impact on the economy, 
we argue that the data were used to give an impression of stability in the economy. However we had no choice but to use the published 
figures: Our data source is the IFS, 1990 and 1991 Yearbooks, line 64. 
Figure (6.5) 
The Inflation tax as a percentage of GDP 
1960-90 
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Because of a rise in inflation rates and the ratio of reserve money to GDP, the 1970s 
observed a rise in inflation tax but it was relatively moderate as its average was 1.9%. 
However the inflation tax did not reach its high levels until the 1980s. The average 
during this period, 6.1 %, was extremely high and reached its peak in 1986 at 9.5 % of 
GDP. 
Table (6.3) 
Average inflation tax revenue in Egypt 
1960-90 
Period Inflation tax / GDP % Inflation rate Reserve money / GDP % 
1960s 0.63 2.86 23.8 
1970s 1.93 7.78 25.5 
1980s 6.09 17.31 41.8 
1960-90 2.98 9.57 31.1 
Source: the author's own calculations; data obtained from es 14 , and9Ib. 
As shown in table (6.3) because the average of both of inflation rates and reserve money 
ratio were high during this period, this resulted in a high level of inflation tax. However 
it is the high ratio of reserve money which enabled Egypt to maintain high inflation tax 
at relatively low inflation rates. To clarify this point we make a comparison between 
Egypt and other LDCs. 
Table (6.4) 
Inflation tax in Egypt and selected LDCs as percentage of GNP 
Egypt Argentina Ghana Mexico Nigeria Peru Turkey Zaire 
Inflation tax/GNP 8.6 4.0 2.0 3.7 0.9 4.8 2.8 4.2 
Inflation rate 23.9 174.8 34.2 159.2 9.7 114.5 55.1 106.5 
Reserve money/GNP 44.8 6.3 7.9 6.0 9.6 9.1 7.9 8.2 
Jog' . rur rgyp[: me auulors own caicuiaulons; aaia ootainea from ii- ones 14, o4, ana Yya. 
For the other LDCs: World Bank (1989), table 4.5, p. 63. 
For comparison reasons we consider here the inflation tax as a percentage of GNP. From 
table (6.4) it is clear that Egypt had the highest inflation tax revenue compared to the 
selected countries. Further it exceeds the value of inflation tax in counties with 
substantially higher inflation rates such as Argentina, Mexico, Peru and Zaire. The 
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Egyptian authorities via tight control over domestic prices, including interest rates and 
exchange rates, as discussed below, extracted a high enough inflation revenue from the 
inflation tax without the need to increase money printing excessively and by that it did 
not experience a Latin American inflation rate. 37 
Even if we accept that inflation rate data are not necessarily accurate in Egypt, we realise 
that the most aggressive estimates did not exceed 50% in any year during the study 
period. It is indeed the wide inflation tax base in Egypt that enabled the government to 
extract a substantial revenue at relatively low inflation rate. As shown in the table (6.4), 
while Egypt had one of the lowest inflation rates among the selected countries, it had the 
highest ratio of reserve money at 44.8% which was approximately seven times higher 
than that of Argentina or Mexico. 
Clearly if the size of reserve money was lower in Egypt, the inflation rate required to 
reach the same inflation tax, should have been several times higher. It seems that there 
was an implicit contract between the holders of domestic money balances as a group and 
the government. Under this contract the latter keeps inflation under control and the 
former keep their deposits even under relatively low rates of interest. 38 
While the issue of how Egypt managed to keep such high ratio of money balances is 
discussed further in the following section, we show here what would happen if reserve 
money balances were lower. We provide a simulation for the inflation rates required to 
reach the actual inflation tax at different reserve money ratios in the corresponding years. 
We exclude the two years which had negative inflation rates and calculate the inflation 
rate ir, from equation (2), as r= (11M)/[1-(1/M)] (3) 
37See 
Dinh and Giugale (1991), p. 10. 
38It is observed that socialist economies which have administrative controls on the acquisition of goods and financial assets, tend to have 
high holding of money. For example Caprio and Honohan (1993), p. 527 report that Yemen PDR, China and Bulgaria had a M2/GDP 
ratio of 175 %, 65 % and 105 % respectively. 
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Where I is the inflation tax and M is reserve money. 
Figure (6.6) 
Inflation rate for alternative reserve 
money balances M 
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Over the period 1960-90, we find that at one-half the size of reserve money holding, 
inflation rates should increase from the actual average of 10.4% to 25% in order to 
extract the same inflation tax revenue. At one-third of reserve money, average inflation 
rate should rise to 45.7 %. In the fiscal year 1987, which had the highest inflation tax at 
an actual inflation rate of 23.9 %, at one-half and one-third of reserve money the inflation 
rate in this year would have been 62.8% and 137.4% respectively. 39 
(6.4.3) Interest rate ceilings: 
Unless a country faces unlimited supply of foreign finance, the budget deficit competes 
by one way or another for scarce domestic loanable funds. "' Egypt, like several other 
LDCs, adopted various measures to limit this competition. One of these measures was 
the imposition of interest rate ceilings, to keep the cost of its borrowing low. 
39This 
assumes a non-inflation sensitive money demand equation. Results would be different if we use, for example, a Cagan money 
demand equation. 
40 Fry (1992), p. 7. 
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For a long time, deposit interest rate in Egypt was controlled by a Civil Code which did 
not allow returns on deposits to exceed 7% per annum. In accordance with the Infitah, 
open door policy, the Central Bank of Egypt, in 1975, was exempt from applying the 
Civil Law regulations regarding the low maximum of 7%41. Nevertheless deposit interest 
rate, did not reach this figure until 1979, as a result of the CBE adoption a policy of 
gradual increase of interest rate as shown in figure (6.6). Gradual increase of nominal 
interest rate continued until 1982, but from this year to 1988 the rate was fixed at 11 %, 
and the rate reached its maximum at 12% in 1990. 
Source: The Central Bank of Egypt and the IMF, International Financial Statistics 
41This 
was possible after issuing law no. 120 for 1975. 
Figure (6.7) 
Nominal and real interest rates 
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Due to the exceptionally low inflation rates of the 1960s and the early 1970s real interest 
rate was positive in some years. 42 However real interest rates were mostly negative during 
the study period. The gradual rise of nominal interest rates, during the partial 
liberalisation period that accompanied the Infitah policy did not prevent the real interest 
rate from being negative and declining during the 1970s and 1980s. 43 It is interesting to 
find that real interest rates during the Infitah period of 1975-90 were generally lower than 
in the socialist period of 1961-74. 
This problem can be explained by several factors: First, the inflationary pressures that 
resulted mainly from external shocks, the devaluation of the pound, freeing the prices of 
some goods and services and reducing the volume of subsidies. Second the Infitah policy 
did little to the liberalisation of the banking system. As discussed above, despite the rise 
in the number of foreign and private banks, the public sector banks continued to dominate 
the banking system. Further, by law, public banks had shares in the capital and 
participated in the management of the newly established private and foreign banks which 
were only allowed to be established as joint ventures. Thus competition was extremely 
lenient. Third, price competition was not possible under the existence of interest rates 
ceilings. Hence the growth of nominal interest rate was far behind the accelerating 
inflation rate. 
42Real interest rate was surprisingly higher than nominal interest rate in 1962 and 1968 because of the unusual negative change of the CPI 
during these two years which is discussed above. 
43 We argue that real interest rates in Egypt were lower than what reflected in figure (6.7) and table (6), simply because of the downward 
bias of official inflation rates. Such bias is mainly due to two problems: first the exclusion of many items from the basket of goods and 
services used to calculate the CPI, many of these excluded items, e. g. leisure goods, private vehicles and their maintenance, private 
schooling and private health care, their prices changed drastically during the study period. Second the reporting only of the changes of 
administered prices and neglecting their actual change which occurs in the active black market. But as mentioned earlier the highest 
estimate for inflation in Egypt did not bring it near the Latin American figures and thus real interest rate were lower, but not substantially 
so, than the presented figures. 
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Figure (6.8) 
Real interest rates in Egypt and USA 
1960-90 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1990 and 1992 Yearbooks and the CBE annual reports. 
Figure (6.8) compares deposit real interest rate in Egypt and the USA, which can be 
considered a rough proxy for international interest rates. While real interest rates in the 
USA were positive in the most of the period 1960-90 as they averaged 2.03 %, they were 
mostly negative in Egypt and averaged (-2.91). Whereas real interest rates in Egypt were 
more volatile with a standard deviation of 4.45, in the case of USA standard deviation 
was just 2.13. Such variability of real interest rates has adverse effects on the preference 
of financial assets in savings portfolios as opposed to other substitutes like commodities. 44 
Table (6.5) provides a comparison between real interest rates in Egypt and selected 
countries for specific periods. During the period 1970-80 real interest rates for all 
selected countries, except Egypt, were lower than the 1980s. However the Egyptian 
figure, compared with that of Turkey, Peru and Uruguay, during the 1970s can be 
considered moderate. During the 1980s rising inflation with almost fixed nominal interest 
44 See Seck and El Nil (1993), pp. 1873-4. 
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rate resulted in the deterioration of the average real rate of interest in Egypt, while the 
rest of the selected countries witnessed increases in their real rates of interest. 
Table (6.5) 
Average real interest rates for selected countries 
Country 1970-80 1980-90 1985-90 
Egypt -3.8 -5.73 -6.06 
Turkey -21.67" -4.04 -3.7 
Chile - 8.23 4.68 
Korea 0.16 2.7 4.87 
Kenya -5.79 0.22 2.66 
Peru -17.13 - - 
Uruguay -15.71 - - 
UK -4.86 2.4 2.5 
USA 0.01 4.08 3.72 
Calculated form IMF, InternationälFinäncia Statistics Yearbooks, 1989-91; figures for Peru and Uruguay are 
from Hanson and Neal (1986). * Figure for Turkey is for 1974-80. 
By looking in the figures of financial savings during the period under study we realise 
from table (6.6) and figure (6.9) that a group of depositors was not deterred by the 
negative real interest rates. Figure (6.9) shows that financial savings in the form of 
domestic currency deposits continued to grow, with very few exceptions, despite the 
negative returns in the respective years. Table (6.6) provides average real interest rates 
and growth rates of financial savings during sub-periods. This phenomenon can be 
explained by one or more of these factors: money illusion, inflation as a motive for 
saving, a favourable return-risk relationship, lack of alternatives, and relatively moderate 
inflation rates, in addition to the so-called widow-orphan type of depositors. We discuss 
these factors in turn below. 
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Table (6.6) 
Rates of real interest and growth 
of domestic currency deposits in Egypt 
Period Real Interest Rates Growth of domestic 
currency Deposits 
1960s 0.19 12.5 
1970s -3.13 24.8 
1980s -5.17 28.8 
1960-90 -3.1 21.2 
Figure (6.9) 
Domestic currency deposits 
and real interest rates 1960-90 
Deposits (Billion Pounds) Real Interest Rate 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbooks, 1990 and 1992. 
(6.4.3. a) Reasons for keening bank deposits. despite their negative real return: 
While the relation between real interest rates and financial savings is analysed by 
econometric methods in the following chapter, we discuss here the factors that explain 
why an individual deposits his wealth in an asset that deteriorates in real terms, i. e. bank 
deposits. Further we discuss the alternatives that were available for those who wanted to 
avoid these losses. 
(i) Money illusion: 
A possible and simple explanation is that deposit holders suffer from money illusion, 
which in the words of Fischer the 'failure to perceive that the dollar, or any other unit 
of money, expands or shrinks in value'45. Thus the rise in nominal interest rate according 
to this argument may explain part of the increase in financial savings with the formal 
sector. But negative real interest rate is not a recent phenomenon in Egypt rather it has 
45Fischer (1928), p. 4. 
e 
Deposits- Interes 
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a long history. 46 So can we assume that all depositors, during all these years, were not 
informed about the negative impact of inflation on their deposits, i. e. they fall in the 
money illusion trap? It is clearly difficult to accept this assumption. But if depositors were 
informed why did they adopt this 'seemingly' irrational behaviour? While we do not rule 
the out the possible existence of some form of money illusion, the following factors may 
provide further explanation. 
(ii) Inflation as a motive for saving: 
As noted in Kitchen (1986) in description of financial savings development during the 
1970s, the size of deposits with banks rose even when real interest rates were negative, 
because saving for security rose as 'inflation itself is a cause of insecurity'47. People do 
save for security motives as well as gain purposes, and some may not know other way 
to save but banks. 
(iii) The return-risk relationship: 
We argue that the decision of selecting a particular asset is taken according to the 
relationship between its return 'and risk48. It seems that such a relationship in the formal 
sector satisfied a large number of depositors and hence they chose it. Since the 
sequestration of deposits that accompanied the Egyptianisation and nationalisation laws 
of the 1957 and 1961; the formal financial sector was stable and did not suffer any major 
crises. The monetary authority was quick to rescue ailing units and managed to contain 
the possible damages of failing banks, like in the recent case of the liquidation of the 
BCCI, under a notion of collective responsibility amongst all of the operating banks. 49 
46For 
a similar argument, see Giugale and Dinh (1990), pp. 12-15. 
47Kitchen (1986), p. 84.1 
48On 
the relationship between risk and return and their impact on financial decisions, see for example Brealey and Myers (1991) and Levy 
and Sarnat (1990). 
49An interview with Mr Abd Al Moneim Roshdy, former chairman of the NBE. 
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Under this implicit insurance mechanism and government explicit support of the banking 
system, bank deposits were associated with low risk which satisfied risk-averse savers, 
despite its relatively negative real returns. Further interest on deposits with banks was 
tax-exempt which attracted more depositors. 
(iv) Lack of alternatives: 
Related to the previous point, with the absence of an active capital market, as discussed 
earlier, bank deposits were the only available savings instruments for large number of 
savers. Those who took the risk and saved with the Informal Islamic Investment 
Companies during the 1980s, realised, when they collapsed in 1988, that they took the 
wrong decisionso 
(v) Restrictions on other alternatives: 
Only since 1980 was it possible to keep foreign denominated deposits with banks. Foreign 
deposit holders earned the LIBOR rate in addition to their gains of devaluation which was 
accelerating during the 1980s. However converting the Egyptian pound to foreign 
currencies in the heavily regulated official market was difficult. Thus only those who 
earned their incomes in foreign currencies, e. g. workers abroad. Obtaining foreign 
currencies in the black market was penalised and depositors were normally asked for the 
source of their hard currency which should be proved by formal documents. On the other 
hand transferring money abroad was restricted as well. This left a lot of savers, who 
abided by law and regulations, with no choice but to accept the negative real returns on 
domestic currency deposits. Nevertheless we do not imply that such restrictions 
eliminated the activities of the black market in particular or the informal market in 
general as discussed below. Rather we argue that such restrictions merely reduced the 
acceleration of dollarisation and increased the risk of informal transactions. 
50See 
our analysis of Islamic Investment Companies in chapter (5). 
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(vi) Moderate inflation rates: 
Low inflation rates can provide an explanation of depositors behaviour. Even of we take 
into account the downward bias in official rates, inflation in Egypt which averaged 9.57 % 
over the period 1960-90, is considered moderate compared to other LDCs. s' We argue 
that if the inflation rates were higher in Egypt, ceteris paribus, and real interest rates 
were as a result, substantially negative, the behaviour of savers regarding the selection 
of bank deposits would be much different. " 
(vii) Characteristics of some depositors: 
Of relation to the previous factors, is the fact that many of the formal sector depositors 
are without entrepreneurial skills or lack the ability to invest or manage their savings, 
even with the existence of alternatives. The standard example of such depositors are 
widows, orphans and pensioners. Regular predetermined returns that are offered by banks 
may suit these depositors better than any other form of savings which may suffer from 
irregularity or high variability. s3 
(6.4.3. b) Government revenue from interest rate ceilings: 
While there is no explicit tax levied on deposit interest rates, since 1981, the gap between 
the administered rate and the market rate can be viewed as a tax. 54 The government 
managed to extract this implicit tax revenue over the period 1960-90, by setting ceilings 
on interest rates below market clearing rates. When there is also a ceiling on lending rates 
additional implicit tax is levied. Depending on the availability of credit and the terms of 
borrowing from the banking sector, the private sector can obtain part of tax revenue in 
51See 
table (5) above for a comparison between inflation rates in Egypt and other LDCs. 
52EI-Sheikh (1986), in his study of financial asset holdings, reaches similar conclusions regarding the impact of moderate inflation in 
Egypt, that averaged 3.5%, on keeping time deposits over the period 1952-73. 
53See 
our discussion of this issue under our analysis of the household portfolio structure in chapter (8). 
54See Chamley and Honohan (1990) for a discussion of explicit and implicit taxation of the financial assets. 
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the form of a subsidised lending rate. However as noted in the works of McKinnon and 
Shawls, under the credit rationing associated with the distortion of interest rates, only few 
favoured borrowers share with the government in its implicit tax revenues extracted from 
ceilings on borrowing and lending rates. 
Constrained by the availability of data56, we focus here on the government revenue from 
financial repression through deposit interest rate ceilings. By adapting the method used 
by Giovannini and de Melo (1991), we calculate such revenue, as a percentage of GDP, 
by considering the difference between foreign and domestic real interest rates multiplied 
by the stock of financial savings held with the formal sector over the period 1960-90. 
Given that deposits denominated in foreign currencies, mainly US dollars, receive the 
LIBOR rate we exclude them and consider only those denominated in the domestic 
currency. 
Thus we calculate the revenue from repressing interest rates (RT) as follows: 
RT = D. (Öd - 3i + x); (3) 
where D is domestic currency deposits 
öd is real domestic interest rates 
bi is real international interest rates (returns on US T. Bills) 
x is the appreciation or devaluation of the Egyptian pound against the US dollar. 
Figure (6.10) shows the evolution of these revenues as percentage of GDP over the 1960- 
90 period. They were higher in the 1970s and 1980s than in the 1960s, for two reasons 
55See 
our literature review in chapter (2). 
56Ina 
study by Giovannini and de Melo (1991) they measured the government revenue from financial repression as the difference between 
the foreign and the domestic cost of borrowing multiplied by the stock of domestic government debt. They consider such difference as 
an implicit tax on government debt holders in an environment characterised by restrictions on the international flow of capital and different 
forms of financial repression. They put two criterions for the inclusion of countries in their analysis, first keeping a stock of commercial 
debt that exceeds $ 200 million. Second the availability of disaggregated data on the stock and cost of domestic debt. Egypt, which matches 
the first criterion, was not among the selected countries presumably because it failed the second criterion along with other 13 LDCs out 
of 38. 
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first the lower real interest rates during these two periods as discussed above, second the 
increase in the base of the implicit tax base, i. e. the domestic currency deposits. 
Figure (6.10) 
Government revenue from interest rate ceilings 
as percentage of GDP 
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Moreover adjusting interest rate differentials with the parallel market exchange rate 57 
produces higher revenues. Hence by imposing exchange rate restrictions and controls over 
the flow of capital, the government managed to increase its revenue from given size of 
deposits and interest rate ceilings. 
It is surprising to find negative revenue from repression in some years. For the non- 
exchange-rate-adjusted figures, this is attributed to the exceptionally high positive real 
interest rates, i. e. when the change in the CPI was negative in 1962 and 1968. For the 
57We 
use here parallel market exchange rate because they are more realistic than the official rates. See appendix (2) for parallel market 
exchange rate figures and sources. 
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exchange-rate adjusted figures, the negative revenue can be attributed to the same reason 
in addition to the appreciation of the pound during these particular years. 
Table (6.7) gives the average of government revenue from repressing deposit interest 
rates for different periods. The non adjusted figures give lower average revenues for all 
periods than the figures adjusted with the official and the parallel market exchange rates. 
Table (6.7) 
Government revenue from deposit 
interest rate ceilings as a percentage of GDP 
Source: Authors own calculations; data obtained from: The CBE annual reports and Economic Review and 
International Financial Statistics. 
We realise that the average revenue reached its highest levels during the 1980s which 
witnessed further decline in the domestic real interest rates and the adopted policy of 
devaluation. It is worth noting however that the official exchange rate-adjusted figures 
were higher than the figures adjusted with the free market exchange rates. This is 
attributed to the series of sudden official currency devaluation of the pound. So while the 
parallel exchange rate was decreasing gradually, the official rate decreased in an abrupt 
manner during the late 1980s and in 1990 until the gap between the two rates narrowed. 
At the end of the period the two rates were almost equal thanks to the foreign exchange 
market reform measures and the unification of the exchange rates in 1990/91. This was 
reflected in the adjusted figures of the repression revenue as shown in table (6.7). 
With appreciation of the difference of the implicit tax base in our study and that of 
Giovannini and de Melo (1991), we consider their results here as an indication for the 
Period Adjusted with free 
exchange rate 
Adjusted with official 
exchange rate 
Not adjusted 
1960-90 2.76 2.90 1.34 
1960-69 0.70 0.42 0.21 
1970-79 0.51 1.23 0.52 
1980-90 6.69 6.67 3.11 
1980-85 6.02 2.53 2.12 
1986-90 7.48 11.6 3.82 
significance of the financial repression tax. They found that the revenue of this tax, as 
233 
percentage of GDP, - ranging between 0 in the case of Indonesia to 6% in then case of 
Mexico and Zimbabwe. The unweighted cross-country average was about 2% of GDP. 
In our study which considers only one type of interest rate differentials, that of deposit 
interest rates, and one type of assets, i. e. bank deposits, the average was 2.76% of GDP 
for the 1960-90 period. The average revenue was much higher during the 1980s, reaching 
6.69%. Thus depending on the availability of data, if the wider approach of Giovannini 
and de Melo is used, we argue that the repression tax in Egypt would be among the 
highest in LDCs. 58 
While interest rate controls were the most formidable source of financial repression in 
Egypt, several other measures were in operation during the study period and considered 
below. 
(6.4.4) Reserve requirements: 
In most of the LDCs the use of reserve requirements against banks liabilities goes beyond 
their traditional role as a monetary instrument and a prudential measure. They have been 
used to control the quantity of money and credit; affect the liquidity of the banking 
system; tax financial intermediaries; and most importantly generate revenues to finance 
budget deficit. S9 Reserve requirements proved to be more flexible way of generating 
income than changes in taxation for example. 
However high reserve requirements decrease loanable funds available for investment by 
reducing the fraction of given volumes of deposits and by reducing the equilibrium 
58 See country results for repression tax in Giovannini and de Melo (1991), pp. 31-35 and also (1993), p. 960. 
59See Morris, et at (1990), pp. 44-45. 
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volume of deposits through decreasing the profit-maximising deposit rate. 60 Hence they 
are considered as a leakage in the intermediation process. 
Only under especial characteristics of the demand and supply-for assets and liabilities of 
banks, as shown in Courakis's partial equilibrium model, " the adverse effect of reserve 
requirements on the volume of deposits may not hold. The profit maximising deposit rate 
and hence the volume of deposits may increase with a rise in the required reserve ratio 
if the demand for loanable funds is interest inelastic relative to their supply. However this 
case is considered an exception. 
Reserve requirements, as one of the components of the monetary base, contribute to the 
government revenue from the inflation tax. On the other hand they reduce bank profits 
by the size of the difference between the interest paid on reserve requirements by the 
central bank and the opportunity cost. Further, depending on the elasticities of the 
demand for deposits and the demand for loans, the bank can pass part or all of the tax 
burden to depositors and borrowers in the form of a bigger spread between rates of 
deposit and lending. 
Reserve requirements carry a very low or zero interest rate in LDCs. Hence they are 
viewed as an implicit tax, and the higher the reserve requirement ratio, the bigger the 
distortion imposed on financial assets. They are set at high levels in many LDCs not 
mainly for prudential purposes but rather for financing the budget deficit. 
The magnitude of reserve requirements indicates whether they are used for prudential 
purposes and an instrument of monetary policy, or mainly for generating income for the 
60 See Fry (1988), p. 108 and Courakis (1987), p. 150. 
61See Courakis (1984) and (1987). 
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budget. In developed economies the ratios of required reserves are much less than LDCs. 
For example, as at of 1992, in the USA on the first $42.2 million the reserve requirement 
is 3 %, for amounts in excess of $42.2 the ratio is 10 %. For Canadian chartered banks 
the reserve requirement is 10% on demand deposits and the monetary authority has been 
considering a policy to phase out reserve requirements. 62 In the UK the bank of England 
imposes a reserve requirement ratio as low as 0.35% of deposits to finance its 
operations. " In contrast we realise that the reserve requirement ratios in most LDCs are 
much higher as shown in table (6.8). 
Table (6.8) 
Required reserve ratios in selected LDCs 
Country Year Ratio Remuneration 
Bahamas 1991 5 No 
Bolivia 1991 20 Yes 
India 1992 15 Yes 
Kenya 1993 8 No 
Paraguay 1993 30 No 
Peru 1991 15 Yes 
Sri Lanka 1992 12 No 
Tunisia 1992 2 No 
Venezuela 1993 12 No 
Source: Compiled from Hardy (1993), Appendix I, pp. 25-31. 
Reserve requirements in Egypt were imposed on both local and foreign currency deposits 
in the form of reserve balances with the CBE. While required reserves on the former 
were not remunerated, on the latter they were remunerated at the LIBOR. 
Required reserves were computed with the lagged accounting system widely practised in 
other countries. " Applying this system prevented banks from rushing to meet the end of 
the period Reserve requirements which may cause abrupt shifts in the inter-bank interest 
rates. The penalty for non compliance was twice the discount rate. 
62Champ 
and Freeman (1994), p. 121. 
63 See Hardy (1993), p. 10. 
64 
World Bank (1992), p. 22. 
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As shown in figure (6.11) the required reserve ratio was set by the CBE at a relatively 
low level in 1960 at 12.5 %, then in 1962 it increased to 17.5 % of deposits. During the 
period 1966-1978 it became 20% and then reached its high level of 25% during the 
period 1979-90. It is interesting to realise an increasing use of one of the financial 
repressive measures during' the Infitah period of the 1970s and 1980s more than the 
socialist period of 1960s. 
Figure (6.11) 
Actual and Legal Required Reserve Ratio 
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The actual required reserve ratios were higher in several years than the legal ratios, 
which were already high by international standards. While the average of the legal ratio 
was 21.1 % over the period 1960-90 the actual ratio was 23.6%. Moreover the latter was 
more variable as its standard deviation was 8.95 whereas the standard deviation of the 
legal ratio was 3.6 which added difficulties to the decision making of banks. 
While the contribution of reserve requirements to the Egyptian government revenue from 
the inflation tax is analysed above, we show here their impact on interest rate spread. 
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Following McKinnon and Mathieson (1981), in a perfectly competitive banking system 
in which profits are zero, the relationship between real lending rate i, and deposit rates 
Id is : 
i, = [1/(1-k)] id (5) 
where k is equal the required reserve ratio. 
Therefore from equation (5) the spread is: 
ii - id = [k/(1-k)] is (6) 
Hence the spread increases if k increases. Also if deposit rate rises so does the spread. 
Figure (6.12) below shows the evolution of real interest rates spread during the period 
1976-9065. Given the levels of real deposit rates and required reserve ratio, the average 
spread under zero-profit assumption, was 1.7 percentage points. However the actual 
spread was as high as 4.4. The difference between the actual and zero profit spread, 
which was on average 2.62, can be explained, in addition to bank profits, by high 
intermediation costs and/or banking inefficiency. 
Figure (6.12) 
Zero-Profit and Actual Spreads 
1976-90 
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65 Lending rates before 1976 are not available. 
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The spread in Egypt is high compared to other countries as shown in table (6.9). With 
the exception of Turkey, the spread in Egypt was higher than the rest of the selected 
countries, more than three times higher than that in the case of the USA. This can be 
considered a reflection of the reserve requirement implicit tax. 
Table (6.9) 
Real interest rates spreads in selected countries (1987) 
Country Real Spread 
Korea 0 
Portugal 4.4 
Singapore 3.2 
Turkey 15 
Japan 3.4 
UK 0.2 
USA 1.3 
Egypt 4.43 
Source: for Egypt is IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1992), 
for other countries Seck and Nil (1993), p. 1868. 
In the Egyptian case the required reserve ratio was reduced from 25 % to 15 % in 1991, 
in accordance with the recent financial reform measures, nevertheless this was not 
reflected in a significant reduction in the spread. As shown in table (6.10), the zero-profit 
spread decreased from 1.37 in 1990 to 0.61 in 1992 because the reduction in the required 
reserve ratio was higher than the increase in real deposit rate. The actual spread 
decreased as well to 2.78. 
Table (6.10) 
Zero-profit and actual spreads before and after reform 
Year Zero-profit spread Actual Spread Difference 
1976-90 1.78 4.40 2.6 
1990(before reform) 1.37 5.99 4.6 
1992 (after reform) 0.61 2.78 2.2 
Nevertheless the difference the actual and the zero-profit spreads at 2.2 in 1992 was 
significantly different from its average during the 1976-90 period. Such high differences 
between zero profit and actual spreads, before and after reform, are symptoms of lack 
of competition in the banking system and high intermediation costs. While the reform 
measures aimed towards improving some variables like increasing nominal interest rates 
and reducing the required reserve ratio it was not profoundly concerned with the 
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uncompetitive conditions of the banking system and its oligopolistic structure dominated 
by the big four public banks. 
(6.4.5) Intervention in credit allocation: 
Several LDCs's governments intervened in the allocation of credit, directly or indirectly, 
to specified sectors and large projects chosen by economic planners. In a sample of 
eleven Asian countries Fry (1992) distinguishes between six categories of intervention: 
Subsidised loan rates for priority sectors, differential rediscount rates, directed budget 
subsidies, credit floors, credit Ceilings and the proliferation of specialised financial 
institutions. Subsidised loan rates for priority sectors was the most extensively used 
instrument in all sample countries. 66 
The World Bank (1989) reports extensive use of directing credit in different countries 
through various schemes: In Pakistan 70% of new lending was targeted by government 
in 1986. In India 50 % of bank assets had to be placed in government bonds and 40 % of 
the remainder had to be directed to priority sectors at controlled interest rates. In Brazil 
the government in 1987 extracted 70% of the outstanding credit. In early 1980s in Turkey 
75 % of advances made according to government direction or preferential rates or both. 67 
Such intervention may restrict funds available to other sectors and raise the costs of the 
remaining loanable funds. If there is a use of ceilings on lending rates costs of borrowing 
will not rise but credit would be allocated according to non-price criteria i. e. quality of 
collateral, political pressures, reputation, loan size and possibly 'benefits' to credit 
officers. 
66The 
sample included Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Neal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand, Fry 
(1992), pp. 11-13. 
67World 
Bank (1989), p. 55. 
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Hence government intervention in the allocation of credit may result in the following: 
" Directing most of the available loanable funds to finance budget deficit and 
crowding out private investment. 
" The concentration of the remainder, of credit among the privileged groups in the 
society. 68 
0 Privileged recipients of credit may apply a round-tripping mechanism69 by 
exploiting the complex set of differentials in borrowing and lending rates. 
" The rest of credit applicants may be forced to resort to informal sector money 
lenders. 
" Further credit rationing may occur through the excessive use of non-price criteria 
as a form of credit rationing. 7° 
" Rent seeking behaviour on the part of credit officers may be encouraged in such 
environment. 
" Unless directed credit schemes are effectively and carefully managed they may 
affect adversely income growth and its distribution. " 
In Egypt intervention in the credit market took different methods according to a 
convention that market forces are not efficient allocators of resources.? 2 Credit control 
methods were used to augment other quantitative control measures that were in use, like 
the required reserve ratio. Further the use of some repressive measures necessitated the 
use of credit control methods to contain their adverse effects. For example interest rate 
ceilings made lending rates low and hence resulted in an artificial excess demand for 
68Killick (1993), P. 271. 
69Roe 
(1989)b, p. 79. 
70Fry 
(1988), p. 18. 
71For 
examples of successful directed credit schemes e. g. when there is a lack of venture capital, see World Bank (1989), pp. 57-59 
72For 
a discussion of selective credit controls in LDCs, see Coats and Khatkhate (1980), pp. 25-28. 
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credit. This problem called for the CBE's intervention through a rigid system of 
rationing on credit available for the private sector. 
From table (6.11) we can distinguish between two main instruments used to control 
credit. First an overall credit ceiling of 65 % of deposits until 1988, lowered afterwards 
to 60%. Second a supplementary method of sub ceilings on credit to the commercial 
private sector. 
Table (6.11) 
Methods of controlling credit expansion 
Year Method Comments 
1974-75 Maximum of the quantity of credit advanced. The CBE determined the size of credit available for the private, 
public and cooperative sectors. 
1976 Fixed loan-to-deposit ratio of 65%. The CBE adopted this method in 1976 without determining the 
sectoral share of credit. 
1977 Fixed change in credit-to-change in deposit of 40% Governmental sectors were excluded. 
1978 Fixed loan-to-deposit ratio 56% to the private sector. Private and joint venture banks were allowed a greater limit of 
75% for private sector loans. 
1981-88 Fixed loan-to-deposit ratio of 65% This instrument was supplemented by sub ceilings on credit to the 
commercial private sector of 12% and the household sector of 
10%. 
1988-90 Fixed loan-to-deposit ratio of 60% The instrument was supplemented by a maximum of 8% growth 
rate per annum for loans advanced to the commercial private 
sector. 
source: entrat tsanic of tgypt, various reports on credit and baniung developments. 
Moreover the government determined the structure of lending rates according to the type 
of the economic sector. The two main determinant factors of interest rate structure are 
first the social return on investment estimated by the Ministry of Planning and second the 
gradual increase in deposit interest rates i. e. the cost of funding. Table (6.12) shows the 
development of lending rates. 
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Table (6.12) 
Structure of interest rates on loans 
Sector 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1987 1989" 
1/4 1/6 
Agriculture & Industry 
One year - 11-13 13-15 One to two years to 12-14 14-16 
More than two years 13 13-15 15-17 
8 9 10 11 12 13 
Services to to to to to to 
One year 9 11 12 13 14 15 13 13-15 15-17 
One to two years to 14-16 16-18 
More than 2 years 15 15-17 17-19 
Trade 
One year 16 16- 18 
One to two years to 17- to 
More than two years - 18- - 
k-) uenows no upper or lower limit 
(*) The interest rate structure of 1989 continued till January 1991 when the CBE took a decision to liberalise 
interest rates leaving banks free to determine the interest rates on loans and advances as part of the recent 
financial reform programme. 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt, Economic Review vol 28 no. (2) and vol 32 no. (1) 
From 1977 to 1981 the CBE set specific floors and ceilings on lending rates to all 
sectors, leaving banks with limited range of one to two percentage points. From 1982 to 
1989 the CBE intervened further by determining interest rates for credit advanced for 
each sector according to maturity of loans, leaving banks with even more limited 
discretion regarding credit decisions. 
The distribution of credit between the private and public sectors reflects the government 
policy towards both sectors and their perceived role in development. Over the period 
1960-90 the private sector extracted an average 27.8% of bank credit while the rest, 
72.2%, was directed to the public sector. As shown in figure (6.13), in 1960 the private 
sector obtained 44.9 % of total credit but with the adoption of socialist interventionist 
policies from 1961-74 the private share in total credit deteriorated. 
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Figure (6.13) 
Private and public credit in Egypt 1960-90 
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbooks 1989-92. 
We notice that the government claims concerning the encouragement of the private sector, 
since the launching of Infitah measures, were not reflected in a significant improvement 
in the allocation of credit between the public and private sectors. 73 The private sector's 
share in loanable funds continued to decline until it reached a minimum of 15.5% in 
1980. It improved slightly during the 1980s but was far behind its pre-socialist period 
level. The impact of financial repression on the availability of credit to both the public 
and private sectors and investment is analysed in chapter (7). 
It is worth noting however that privileged private sector borrowers were subsidised by 
the difference between the repressed interest rate and the free market rate of interest. 
Moreover some of private sector borrowers were allowed to consider interest rate paid 
73 It is worth noting that the private sector's share of credit is not a sufficient evidence for crowding out. In a recent study it has been 
shown by using the error correction approach and the unrestricted dynamic modelling, that "the government did not crowd out established 
firms in the credit market and by maintaining artificially low interest rates, implicitly subsidised their borrowing.. land) made many inefficient investments financially profitable". See Shafik (1993), p. 94. 
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on loans as deductible expense, i. e. not taxable. This reduced further the real cost of 
borrowing below that of the free market. 74 
The intervention of government in the allocation of credit distorted competition amongst 
the public sector units and the private sector. Moreover they had adverse effects on 
innovation and efficiency of the banking sector. Bank managers, interviewed by the 
author, pointed out that credit decisions were hardly practised in the banking units. Credit 
officers were price takers in the sense that the interest rate structure was determined by 
the CBE and they had very limited margin to manoeuvre within. Banks to a great extent 
were working like post office savings funds. " 
Unless there is a need for corrective government intervention to overcome market 
imperfections, the elimination of directed credit system, is advocated for two main 
reasons. First, in order to improve the allocative efficiency of credit. Second, to improve 
the portfolio problems of banks that resulted from lending to projects irrespective of their 
returns or economic viability. 
Nevertheless we argue that a hasty abolition of direct controls on the allocation and the 
expansion of credit may have its detriments. If most of the credit officers are inadequately 
trained and lack experience in a credit market, which for a long time had its prices and 
quantities determined by the CBE, it would be critical to leave the allocation of credit 
suddenly to their discretion. On the other hand the credit market in Egypt requires more 
than sufficiently trained bankers, as discussed above it is hard to ignore the importance 
74See Harvey and Jenkins (1993) for a discussion of the issue of taxation and its implications for interest rate policy and financial reform 
programmes in LDCs. 
75Interviews 
with Mr Abd-Al-Salam Al Anwar General Manager of Hong Kong Egyptian Bank (5/5/1993) and Mr Hamdy Musa General 
Manager of Export Development Bank of Egypt (22/3/93). 
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of prudential regulation, monitoring and screening of credit transactions, given the costs 
of default, asymmetric information, uncertainty. 76 
(6.4.6) Regulations on the portfolio composition of banks: 
This is another widely used repressive measure. In the study of Hanson and Neal (1986), 
they emphasised that all countries in their seven representative low and middle income 
countries" applied this method to direct credit mainly to finance budget deficits and large 
projects. 
In Egypt banks were required to hold a minimum of government securities as one of the 
components of the compulsory liquidity ratio. The liquidity ratio of 30%, imposed on 
domestic and foreign currency deposits, was introduced in 1958 and did not change until 
1991 when it was reduced to 20% as part of the reform programme. The components of 
the liquidity ratio are defined as shown in table (6.13). 
Table (6.13) 
Components of the liquidity ratio 
Components of Numerator Components of denominator 
Cash Outstanding cheques, transaction 
Balances with the CBE drafts,.. etc. 
Gold 
Cheques, transaction drafts, coupons, securities and foreign currencies Banks' claims on others 
under collection 
Treasury bills Deposits 
Discounted commercial papers 
Government securities, gold, and government guaranteed securities Uncovered values of banks' letters of 
Others' claims on banks guarantee 
Although the minimum liquidity ratio did not change over the 1960-90 period and 
remained at 30% the actual spread was highly variable as shown in figure (6.14) and its 
average was 48.7% i. e. there was an average of 18.7% excess liquidity during the study 
period. In some years the actual liquidity was even more than the double of the minimum 
liquidity ratio. 
760n 
risk and financial fragility associated with credit markets see the comprehensive study of Davis (1992). 
77These 
countries were Bangladesh, Kenya, Nigeria, Peru, Thailand, Turkey, and Uruguay. 
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Figure (6.14) 
Minimum, actual and excess liquidity ratios 
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Excess liquidity in Egypt78 can be attributed to several factors that support the arguments 
of the financial repression school regarding the adverse effects of government intervention 
in the mechanisms of the credit market: - 
" First, the inclusion of government securities and bonds in the components of the 
liquidity ratio, to the extent that they became major items in banks' portfolios. 
Government securities and bonds are less risky than lending to the private 
economic sectors. 
" Second, the rising usage of treasury bills by the government to finance its budget 
deficit especially when the foreign credit market became more restrictive in the 
1980s. Banks were normally attracted to the risk-free treasury bills as they offer 
offer high, tax-free interest rates. 
" Third, the application of credit ceilings and restrictive policy of sectoral credit 
allocation imposed limits on banks' lending abilities. 
78For 
a discussion of the problem of excess liquidity in other LDCs see for example Nissanke (1993). 
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" Fourth, under asymmetric information banks, fearing to face problems of moral 
hazard and adverse risk selection, may choose not to raise interest rates, within 
the limits of CBE interest structure, when there is an excess demand for credit. 79 
" Fifth, like high reserve requirements, high liquidity ratios may reflect the 
monetary authority's concern regarding low capitalization and insolvency of some 
of the operating banks, and thus restore to this easy method, which in fact 
penalise the solvent banks, instead of requiring insolvent banks to improve their 
capital requirements and keep adequate provisions80. 
" Sixth, excess liquidity in banks portfolios can be a reflection of unstable economic 
environment and increase perceived risk on the part of investors and banks. 
" Lastly, excess liquidity may also reveal inefficiency in the intermediation process 
that force banks to hold relatively high proportions of liquid assets. 
(6.4.7) Government ownership of banks: 
The dominance of government-owned banks in developing countries are identified with 
familiar problems which take two forms: First, internal management problems resulted 
from lack of incentives, political interference, overstaffing and lack of managerial and 
banking skills. Second, the general economic environment and policy background 
according to which public banks are assumed to operate. " 
The conditions of government owned financial intermediaries in India which, more or 
less, describe prevailing conditions else where were summarised as follows: 82 (i) low 
resource mobilisation; (ii) low profitability; (iii) low capitalization ratios and insolvency; 
(iv) complicated bureaucratic procedures for loan processing and operating inefficiency; 
79See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
80See 
World bank (1992), p. 13. 
81Fry 
(1990), p. 15. 
82Cited in Fry (1991) from a study by Morris (1985) on the Indian financial system. 
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(v) allocation of resources on the basis of non-economic criteria; (vi) reduced autonomy; 
(vii) poor quality of personnel, overstaffing and weak management. 83 
Although the Egyptian banking system84 consists of 98 banks, as at 1990, the four large 
public sector banks accounted for 55 % of the total assets of the banking system, apart 
from their participation in joint venture and specialised banks. These banks through their 
relatively large networks of branches dominate the retail business. Public banks were 
protected by an array of regulations and preferential treatment85: 
" Branching by private banks was more restricted than branching of public sector 
banks. 
" Credit ceilings were set in a way that favours public banks. 
" Payment of interest on demand deposits was prevented to prevent private banks 
from attracting such deposits. 
" Private banks were denied the opportunity to provide certain financial service to 
the public sector companies without the acceptance of their public banks. 
" Pension funds of the public sector had to be deposited with public banks. 
" Private banks were denied to have stakes in public sector companies 
Public banks in Egypt like in other LDCs were more prone to government interference 
in credit and planning decisions than private banks. Consequently they had relatively high 
levels of nonperforming loans, most of them are theoretically government-guaranteed. 
Data on non-performing loans were not published and hence does not allow for analysis 
830n bank efficiency losses and rules for restructuring banks in transitional economies see Andrew Sheng (1990). 
84See 
chapter (3) for an analysis of the market structure of the financial system in Egypt. 
85For 
further details see World Bank (1992), pp. 1-41. 
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for the solvency of banks but they are estimated to range between 30%-45% of books 
loans. 86 Their portfolios were poorly diversified and suffered from excess liquidity. 
Although Egyptian banks in general, during the period 1986-90 report low operating 
ratios by international standards according to a World Bank study87, private banks were 
more efficient and profitable than public banks. 
Publicly-owned banks, as part of the whole state owned enterprises, had its profits and 
losses internalised in the state budget. Under this system the state and profit-making 
enterprises cross-subsidise the loss-making projects, in a way that discouraged efforts to 
maximise efficiency. 88 
Incentives to maximise profits, or even to minimise losses, barely existed. In the words 
of Flemming (1993) "If losses will be covered,..., why should management minimise 
them? If loss-making enterprises will be bailed out in the end why should bank manager 
discriminate on his lending between good and bad risks? "89 Thus non-performing loans 
and bad debts were accumulated to the extent that it was difficult to clean up the balance 
sheets of such banks. It is worth mentioning that this particular problem is one of the 
main reasons behind the reluctance of the government to privatise banks. 
Moreover public banks lacked managerial autonomy and like the rest of government 
sectors units in Egypt they had no effective power regarding staffing decisions. 90 Egyptian 
86The 
30% estimate is the World Bank's (1992), p. 36. with reference to other countries with similar structure to Egypt, the range 40-45% 
of total loans are personal estimates of some of the bank managers interviewed by the author. 
87See 
World Bank (1992), pp. 31-33. 
88For 
a similar argument in the context of transitional socialist economies, see Sheng (1990), p. 13. 
89See 
Flemming (1993), p. 9. 
90 See World Bank (1992), p. 37. 
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public banks had high staff per branch ratio of 38 while commercial banks carrying more 
extensive operations in the OECD countries had about 25 staff per branch. 
Nevertheless we argue that the remedy of such problems does not lie necessary in 
changing the ownership of banks. It is established that it is not the type of ownership per 
se which determine whether a bank would be an aspect of repression, it is rather the 
mechanism according to which public banks operate that emphasise the negative effects 
of repression and hinders competition. " Evidence from Canada, Sweden and the 
Netherlands show that state ownership can be compatible with low operating costs and 
high intermediation efficiency. 92 
As discussed above what the Egyptian banking system suffers from is the mixture of both 
the domination of public banks and the high degree of concentration which discourages 
competition on one hand, and the heavy barriers to entry which makes incumbent banks 
uncontestable on the other hand. Thus reform measures should be taken at two levels. 
First at the banking system level to enhance competition, make banks contestable and 
assure prudential regulation. Second at the bank level to maintain managerial autonomy 
and efficiency. 
(6.5) Impact of repressive intervention in the financial sector: 
Definitely not all savers in Egypt accepted the prevailing formal real interest rates and 
held bank deposits. We argue that the formal sector persuaded significant group of savers 
to search for alternatives. Such alternatives can be grouped under inflation hedges93 and 
informal sector dealings, in addition to capital flight. Thus, with the exception of 
91 Killick (1993), p. 272. 
92 See chapter (3). 
93An 
Inflation Hedge is described as 'an asset that enables households and other investors to reduce the risk of loss of purchasing power 
stemming from uncertainty about the prices of consumer goods'. Gold, indexed financial assets, commodities, real estates are considered 
forms of inflation hedges. See the New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance (1992), Vol 2, p. 405. 
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depositing money abroad, the portfolio selection model faced a saver in Egypt is 
comprised of similar categories of assets described by Tobin (1965) and adopted in the 
Neo-structuralist models94. We analyse the main alternatives to bank deposits below. 
Other effects of financial repression are highlighted in chapter (7) below. 
(6.5.1) The thriving of informal financial activities: 
The existence of the informal financial sector can be attributed to two main factors. The 
first factor can be explained by a broad application of Goodhart's law that states that 'any 
observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for 
control purposes'95. Thus the informal financial sector, being the unregulated sector in 
the economy, attracted several depositors for its higher returns on 'deposits'. The second 
factor can be ascribed to dualities in the economic, social and cultural structures. Hence 
informal transactions occur regardless the state of development or the conditions of the 
formal sector. 96 
The informal financial activities reached its peak in Egypt by the establishment of the 
Islamic Investment Companies (IICs) in the early 1980s. While the exact figures, by the 
very nature of informal activities, are not known estimates for the number of their 
depositors reached half a million, deposited approximately £E 4.5 billion in 1988, i. e. the 
equivalent of more than 12% of time and savings deposits held with the banking sector. 97 
However, the IICs are just part of the whole informal financial sector that include other 
agents and different activities: e. g. money lending, pawn broking, RoSCAs, .. etc. While 
it is not possible to know the exact size, significance and impact of such transactions at 
94For 
example Taylor (1983), Van Wijnbergen (1983) and Buffie (1984), see our review of the literature in chapter (2). 
9500odhart 
(1987), p. 96. 
96See 
chapter (9) of this thesis. 
97 See chapter (5) of this thesis. 
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the macro level we conduct a survey to help us to analyse informal transactions at the 
household and village levels. See our analysis of informal finance in rural Egypt in 
chapters (8) and (9). 
(6.5.2) Inflation hedges: 
In the absence or lack of savings instruments inflation hedges like gold, real estates and 
durable goods become substitutes. Even with the availability of savings instruments like 
bank deposits, the importance of such substitutes as saving instruments cannot be ignored. 
For example hoarding of gold continues in the presence of bank deposits for several 
reasons. First tradition may slow the transition to new forms of saving98. Second low 
and/or negative real returns of formal saving instruments, or unstable political and 
economic environment may keep gold as a viable store of wealth. Third, gold helps 
fulfilling other motives which can not necessarily met by keeping other assets. 
The private demand for gold is controlled by different motives". 
First, Saving motive. According this motive, gold can be liquidated at any time as it help, 
like any other saving instrument, smoothing consumption over time. 
Second, insurance motive. Following this motive gold can be only liquidated in the case 
of unexpected shock. 
Third, ostentation. According to this motive gold can be used as a indication of wealth 
and societal status. The satisfaction that stems from the possession and display of gold 
is hard to ignore especially in developing societies under what known as the psychic 
income. 100 
98See Kettel (1982), p. 119. 
99 Generally the demand for gold can be divided into industrial use of gold and speculative demand, see Lipschitz and Otani (1977) for 
an estimate for the demand of gold. 
100 See Drake (1980), p. 127. 
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Fourth, speculation. As in particular assets and commodities gold can be kept with a 
motivation that its price will appreciate in the future. 
Fifth, safekeeping. '°' Traditionally gold is purchased and hoarded as a way of 
safekeeping, especially when the banking habit is week, taxation is excessive and/or the 
financial system is not stable. 
Thus, negative real interest rates in Egypt contributed to hoarding gold as an efficient 
store of value. Where banking services were not adequately available, like in remote 
areas, gold again can play its traditional role. Even if banks were available, according to 
the view that dealing with interest rates is a form of usury, gold continued to be the 
'lawful' substitute. Egypt for a long time had an active gold market which added to the 
desirability for gold as store of wealth. Buy-back arrangements and pawnbroking were 
widely practised making gold highly liquid. "' However we argue that gold functions 
effectively within certain limits of wealth. If the accumulated wealth is so big to the 
extent that hoarding gold would be costly, unsafe and risky, savers move to other 
inflation hedges like real estate. Further analysis of gold and other inflation hedges is 
provided in chapter (8) under our analysis of household's portfolio selection in rural 
Egypt. 
(6.5.3) Currency substitution 
The case in which local residents hold part of their wealth in foreign money, is known 
as currency substitution. When there is extreme instability, e. g. high inflation, rapid 
devaluation, foreign currency may be used as a medium of exchange not just a store of 
value. "' 
101Kettel, 
op. cit., p. 119-121. 
102 Drake (1980), p. 126. 
103 Sachs and Larrain (1993), p. 237. 
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In Egypt while the return on domestic currency deposits was controlled by ceilings, 
foreign currencies deposits, introduced since 1974, received internationally competitive 
returns. Accounting for exchange rate depreciation shows that the return on domestic 
currency was significantly lower than foreign currencies. In this environment money 
substitution was active. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Yearbooks 1990 and 1992. 
Figure (6.15) shows that private sector holdings of foreign currencies deposits increased 
rapidly since 1980104 from 41.6% of total deposits to 52.9% in 1990. After 1985 the 
speed of money substitution increased due to further devaluation of the pound and decline 
in real rates of interest. The growth of money substitution, de facto dollarisation, during 
this period cannot be attributed solely to negative real interest rates as at it was in general 
a period of deteriorating financial and economic conditions. The economy suffered from 
inflationary pressures, worsening external position because of the burden of debt and 
greater political uncertainties. 'os Money substitution was possible because of the inflow 
104 
Figures for the 1974-80 period are not available. 
105E1-Erian 
(1988), pp. 92-93. 
Figure (6.15) 
Foreign and domestic deposits 1980-90 
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of remittances of Egyptian workers abroad, tourism and the increase of the number of 
foreign companies that pay salaries in foreign currencies. 
(6.5.4) Capital flight: 
Since the declaration of the Bank of International Settlements, BIS, in 1984 that total 
deposits of Latin American individuals ranged between 30-40% of the external debt of 
their countries, 106 the phenomenon of capital flight attracted significant interest in 
research. Nevertheless estimates of capital flight vary considerably, due to its nature and 
methods of estimation. 
To distinguish between normal capital movement and the phenomenon of capital flight the 
analysis should be undertaken in the context of the state of development of the economy 
and in consistency with the economic and policy question of the country concerned. "' 
The phenomenon of capital flight is influenced by several economic and political 
determinants. The degree of economic and political stability and the efficiency of policy 
management were some of the main determinants of the phenomenon. For example under 
the so-called the revolving door, Boyce (1992), shows that there is debt-driven and debt- 
fuelled capital flight. The first is when capital flees the country in response to economic 
circumstances that accompany the build up of external debt, e. g. artificial overvaluation 
of the currency followed by devaluation. The debt-fuelled capital flight is the case when 
debt provides corrupted officials with the resources needed for capital flight. 108 
106 See the annual report of the BIS (1984). 
107 
Pastor (1990), p. 2. 
108 
Boyce (1992), pp. 337-9. 
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Negative real interest rates provide savers with reasons for searching for alternatives for 
domestic bank deposits. Depositing money abroad is clearly one of these alternatives. 
Figure (6.16) shows the difference between international and domestic real interest rates. 
The difference is calculated as (S; - Sd+ x); where bi is real international interest rates 
(returns on US T. Bills); 6d is real domestic interest rates; and x is the appreciation or 
devaluation of the Egyptian pound against the US dollar. 
We have seen already that, in almost all years of the study period, real international 
interest rates were significantly higher than the Egyptian rates. On average the real 
interest rate in Egypt was lower by 5.21 percentage points. Adjusting interest rate 
difference with changes in foreign exchange, yielded higher gap as the domestic real 
interest rate was on average lower by 10.6 percentage points over the period 1960-90. 
Figure (6.16) 
Interest rate differentials 1960-90 
40 
30 ---------------- ---_-------------- ----------------------- ------ ----- 
20 ----------------------------------------------------- -- ----- ----------------- 
x 
-------------------- - ------ - --- 
xx xx 
-------------- 
0xx xx x x V, 
x 
"1 --- ------- --- ----------------- -----"-----------------"----- 
"1 60 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
I- Adjusted with FX Not adjusts 
Thus real interest rates differentials provided savers with an incentive to deposit their 
deposits abroad. However this incentive cannot fully explain the high capital outflow 
because, as mentioned above, foreign currency deposits with internationally competitive 
returns were introduced as part of the Infitah measures. Generally, political instability, 
gloomy expectations regarding the performance of the economy, lack of credibility in 
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government policies in addition to corruption can explain, along with interest rate and 
exchange rate mischievous policies, the high estimates of capital outflow. 
In one study the estimate of capital flight was approximately 34 % of external debt during 
the period 1976-82.109 The other estimate was approximately US$ 40 (£E 70.4) . billion 
in 1988 which was close to the total of the outstanding external debt. 11° 
Following Dooley et al. (1986), also Pastor (1990), we calculate capital flight for Egypt 
during the period 1980-90. 
CF = (&OD + FI) - (AC + &RS) (4) 
Where & OD is the change in outstanding debt, 
FI is foreign direct investment, 
AC current account deficit/surplus, and 
nRS is change in reserves. 
Figure (6.17) 
Capital flight from Egypt 1980-90 
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Source: Author's own calculations, data obtained from the World Bank, World Tables. 
109 See NBE (1988), p. 239. 
110ibid., 231. This estimate is close to an estimate given by a former prime minister of Egypt who was in office in mid 1980s. 
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We realise, from figure (6.17) that the accumulation of capital flight increased during the 
1980s reaching its maximum in 1989 with an estimated figure of LE 63.32 (US$ 32.6) 
billion. However due to a decrease in the outstanding debt in 1990, thanks to the Paris 
club negotiations and the writing of some of the debt by the USA and the Gulf states 
during the Gulf war, and an improvement in the current account deficit capital flight 
decreased. 
Table (6.14) 
Estimates of capital flight in Egypt and selected LDCs 
Source: For Egypt as in figure for the rest of the countries, Pastor . 3. 
From table (6.14) we realise that with the exception of Chile which had a negative capital 
flight. All countries experienced capital flight but with various magnitudes. Egypt had the 
highest ratio of capital flight to the change in external debt. Both Egypt and Venezuela 
had estimates of capital flight that exceeded the change in their external debt by 52% and 
32.1 % respectively. 
Given its estimated magnitude, we argue that the remedy for the capital flight problem 
in Egypt does not rely only on the improvement of real interest rates. This reform 
measure would be useless in the presence of distortions in the foreign exchange rate 
market, expectations for further devaluation and higher inflation rate, poor investment 
climate and/or corruption. Hence reforms are needed at both the economic and political 
levels to reduce the size of capital flight. Such reforms are required to bring confidence 
in the economy and credibility of the economic policy. 
Country Period of estimation Average capital flight in percentage of change in 
external debt 
Argentina 1973-87 61.3 
Brazil 1973-86 16.1 
Chile 1973-87 -19.3 
Mexico 1973-87 63.9 
Peru 1973-87 19.9 
Venezuela 1973-87 132.1 
Egypt 1980-90 152 
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(6.6) Concluding remarks: 
Not only was financial repression prevalent in Egypt over the 1960-90 period, the 
government had an incentive to maintain it given the large budget deficit which was main 
cause for repressing the financial sector. 
The bank financing of budget deficit took explicit forms like extracting revenue from 
money creation and the inflation tax. The average seigniorage revenue was as high as 
2.69 % of GDP during the 1961-90 period while the inflation tax averaged 2.98 % of GDP 
during the 1960-90 period. Both are substantially high by international standards. 
However Egypt managed to generate such high revenues at low inflation rates thanks to 
the relatively large monetary base. 
By imposing ceilings on deposit rates the government managed to generate additional 
revenue from financial repression estimated at 2.76% of GDP over the period 1960-90. 
The negative real interest rates did not prevent some growth of financial savings, 
attributed inter alia to different factors like money illusion, lack of alternatives and 
restrictions on substitutes. 
There was an extensive use of the required reserve ratio beyond its function as a measure 
of monetary policy and a prudential method, mainly to finance budget deficit. This 
resulted also in a relatively high spread. Government intervened as well in the allocation 
of credit and the composition of bank portfolios to fulfil the same objective, financing the 
large fiscal deficit. Moreover to facilitate its control over the credit market government 
owned some financial intermediaries through nationalisation. 
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Figure (6.18) compares government revenues extracted from the repressive measures 
analysed above with explicit, direct and indirect, taxes"" over the period 1960-90, as a 
percentage of GDP. It should be noted that the some of the financial repression do 
overlap, e. g. inflation tax and reserve requirements, hence caution is required when 
comparison is made between them. 
Figure (6.18) 
A comparison between government revenue from 
financial repression and taxation (% of GDP) 
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Source: Author's own calculations, where required res. is required reserves, taxes are direct and indirect taxes, 
infltax is inflation tax, seign is seigniorage and ceilings are interest rate ceilings. 
Financial repression had unfavourable consequences, such as the increase of hoarding 
gold, and the contribution to the problems of money substitution and capital flight in 
addition to the rise of informal financial activities especially those of the Islamic 
Investment Companies. It also adversely affected both the internal management of banks, 
their solvency and operating efficiency, and the condition of the banking system as a 
whole which suffers from lack of competition, high interest rate spreads, high ratio of 
non performing loans, in addition to various distortions in the credit market. 
111 Data on taxes are obtained from the World bank (1992c). 
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Given the conditions of the credit market, financial liberalisation would not be a remedy 
for the problems. Several measure should be taken prior to and along with liberalisation. 
Sound macroeconomic policies, expedient fiscal practice and controlling the budget deficit 
are items of one bundle of prerequisites. The second bundle includes prudential regulation 
and adequate monitoring and supervision without the interference with the managerial 
autonomy of intermediaries. Moreover institutional restructuring is required to support 
liberalisation, in addition to the improvement of managerial skills and staff training. 
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Chapter (7) 
An Econometric Analysis of the Impact of Real Interest Rate on 
Saving, Investment and Economic Growth In Egypt: 1960-90 
(7.1) Introduction: 
As the previous chapter has shown, the Egyptian financial system during 1960-1990 was 
repressed in the sense that the government intervened in its mechanisms by setting 
ceilings on deposit and lending interest rates, imposing a relatively high ratio of required 
reserves and determining the allocation of credit to particular projects according to 
economic plans. ' Since the mid 1970s, under partial liberalisation of the banking system, 
as discussed above, nominal interest rates have increased gradually, but the real interest 
rate has continued to be slightly negative. 
Despite the negative real interest rates, financial savings in the formal sector grew 
steadily by an average annual rate of 23.9%. 2 Such growth can be chiefly attributed to 
the windfall of foreign resources, i. e. the dues of Suez Canal, revenue of oil exports, 
remittances of Egyptian workers in the Gulf States, and earnings from tourism, during 
the 1970s and 1980s. It is worth noting however that the large amount of foreign 
currency denominated in thee total deposits contributed to this increase as their value in 
domestic currency rose alongside the gradual devaluation of the Egyptian pound. 
In January 1991, Egypt started, in accordance with the IMF and the World Bank, an 
economic reform programme with financial liberalisation as one of its central 
components., While it is still early to judge the outcome of these recent reform measures, 
an analysis of the financial repression period of 1960-90 should help to give an 
1See 
chapter (6) for an analysis of different forms of financial repression in Egypt. 
2Calculated 
from the IMF (1989) and (1990), International Financial Statistics, Year Books. 
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understanding as to whether the country is proceeding with the appropriate model for 
reform and what are the possible consequences. 
In this chapter we examine by econometric methods the determinants of financial and total 
saving, investment and economic growth in Egypt during the period of 1960-90. All 
regressions are carried out using ordinary least squares, and where necessary, the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is used to deal with first order serial correlation problem. 
The results of our estimation of the models, which takes a logarithmic forma, are 
presented in the form of a table. Different versions of the model are achieved by altering 
the combinations of explanatory variables, due to the multicollinearity of the variables. 
(7.2) A note on data: 
Undertaking any meaningful empirical analysis of a developing country like Egypt, that 
suffers from a dearth of reliable information, is a daunting task. Some of the essential 
information is not available as a complete series, while some can be found but, alas, is 
not consistent. This is probably the reason why Egypt is empirically under-researched. 
Main points on the data used in our estimates are discussed below. Further, our database 
with the relevant sources is provided in appendix number (2). 
. The only available indicators of the development of financial intermediation in Egypt, 
as in the case of other LDCs, are the intermediation ratios in financial assets. The 
aggregation of interest-bearing and non-interest bearing financial assets results in 
estimation problems that arise from the use of 'too broad' an index of financial 
deepening. 4 Thus following Gupta (1984) and Himani (1992) we consider the values of 
3Natural 
variables are used when the variable has negative observations as in the case of real interest rate (x) and interest rate differentials 
(Z), 
4See Gupta (1984), p. 11. 
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these two kinds of asset separately. Other indicators of the development of financial 
intermediation and deepening, like banking density, and other intermediation ratios as 
suggested by Goldsmith (1969) are not available for all the years under study. 
. The consumer price index, CPI, from which the inflation rate is calculated, as its 
percentage change, may not always be representative of actual selling prices in Egypt, for 
several reasons: first, sampling is not undertaken frequently. Second, administered rather 
than actual prices of goods and services are used. Third, politics may intervene, so an 
'adjusted' rather than 'actual' change of the index may be reported'. Thus we frequently 
find that there is more than one inflation rate in different official reports. 
. The interest rate used to calculate the real interest rate is the upper margin offered on 
fixed term deposits for less than one year. We used the same rate as a proxy for the cost 
of investment. While the lending rate may be a more relevant measure, it is not available 
for the whole series. Applying a sector-based interest rate structure in some of the recent 
years added to the difficulty of obtaining 
,a 
'unique' lending rate for the recent years. 6 
. Real interest rate calculated as: [(1+id)/(1+7r*)-1] where id and lr* are deposit interest 
rate and expected inflation respectively. We assume rational expectations, i. e. the 
expected rate of inflation equals the actual rate of inflation measured as the percentage 
change of CPI . 
. Rates on US treasury bills are used for the relevant years as a proxy for international 
interest rates. 
SIn 
some years, in the 1960s, we found a negative inflation rate, see appendix (2). 
6See 
the previous chapter for a discussion of this point. 
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. We used the parallel market exchange rate premium as a proxy for expected devaluation 
of exchange rate since proved to be more realistic than the officially determined exchange 
rate. 
. The measures of gross domestic product, GDP, and hence gross national product, 
GNP, for some years suffer from inconsistency with gross sectoral outputs, public finance 
and balance of payments statistics. ' 
. Measurement errors in savings figures are well known in LDCs, B and Egypt is not an 
exception. Saving being calculated as the difference between domestic investment and 
foreign saving, both of which are subject to measurement error, may result in misleading 
estimates. However we use the ratio of gross national saving in preference to other 
measures of saving for analytical and practical reasons. First, as argued by Fry (1988), 9 
national saving reflects the country's capability of mobilising savings at home and abroad, 
while domestic example would underestimate this effort as net factors income from is 
excluded from it by definition. Second the net value of national saving in Egypt suffers 
from inconsistent and arbitrary use of depreciation measures during the time series under 
research, so the gross value of national saving is used. Third, we found that the data on 
gross national saving is probably the most reliable and complete when compared to other 
measures of saving. 
7This 
problem was also alluded to in the IMF's (1992) country report on Egypt, p. 80. 
8 On the issue of measurement error of saving see for example Gupta (1984), p. 215 Gersovitz (1988), pp. 413-418, and Balassa (1989), 
pp. 17-18. 
9See Fry (1988), p. 133. 
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. Disaggregated data on credit are not available in a complete series, so we are not able 
to test the impact of interest rate policy on private and public sector separately or at a 
sectoral level. Moreover the impact of government intervention in credit policy, via 
allocation of loanable funds to different sectors and projects, is difficult to analyse due 
to the unavailability of data. 
. It is important to examine the effect of after-tax real interest rates1° on the 
macroeconomic variables considered in this analysis. However in the case of Egypt the 
return on all deposits has been exempt from taxes since 1981.11 Before 1981 various kinds 
of deposit accounts were also not taxable while others were not. In the case of borrowing 
some companies established according to the infitah laws were offered tax holidays from 
five to ten years. 12 Moreover some other borrowers were allowed to consider interest as 
a deductible expense, i. e. it was not taxable. Thus as there is not a universal tax rate on 
all interest earning, before 1981, and because of the discrepancy in the treatment of 
borrowers we were not able to include the 'effective' real rate of interest in our models. 
. Data on net national investment may suffer, as in the case of saving, from arbitrary use 
of depreciation allowances, so we use gross national investment. However it is only the 
impact of interest rate policy on the size of investment which is tested; the effect on the 
quality of investment, one of the powerful arguments of the financial liberalisation school, 
was not analysed because reliable data, even on the frequently used indicator of 
investment quality, i. e. the incremental capital-output ratio13, were not available. 
100n 
this issue see Boskin (1978) and Harvey and Jenkins (1993). 
11 See chapter (6). 
12 See chapter (1). 
13However 
there is a problem in the use of the ICOR under the assumption that the average efficiency of investment is montonically 
related to it. 
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We undertake this study bearing in mind the data limitations and constraints which require 
caution in interpreting the results of our estimations. 
(7.3) Models and estimation results: 
(7.3.1) The demand for non-interest bearing assets: 
The demand for non-interest bearing assets is estimated using the following equation: 
(M/Y)t= al + a2 (id-a)c + a3 (M/Y)t_1 (7.1) 
Where: 
M is currency outside banks and demand deposits 
Y is GNP 
(id-lr) is the real interest rate. 
In equation (7.1) the impact of financial liberalisation on non-interest bearing financial 
assets is measured through the inclusion of the real interest rate as a dependent variable. 
We notice that there are two effects in operation. First a higher real interest rate, 
according to the McKinnon-Shaw approach, would lead to a shift from non-interest 
bearing to interest bearing financial assets; second, a negative real interest rate would 
result in reducing financial deepening in all assets. Hence the sign of the coefficient of 
the real interest rate will be determined by the dominant factor. 
Table (7.1) 
Demand for non-interest bearing assets ln(M/Y) 
In is the natural logarithm. 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics. 
indicates significance at 99% confidence level. 
D-W is the Durbin-Watson test. Note that Durbin's h statistic14 is reported instead of D-W in the case of the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable in the model. 
As shown in table (7.1), the impact of the real interest rates on non interest bearing 
financial assets is positive but statistically insignificant. 
Eq. No. Constant (id-x) In (M/Y),., D-W R2 2 
F 
R 
LE 
1 -0.1435 0.0125 0.86 1.38 0.76 0.43 
(-1.055) (0.028) (7.511)° 43.257 
14Durbin's 
It statistic is computed using SHAZAM Econometric Program version (6.1). 
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(7.3.2) Financial saving and its determinants: 
We make a distinction between financial saving and total saving, noticing that the former 
is just one type of the latter and hence we test the impact of the real interest rate on them 
separately. 
To test the impact of the real interest rates on the demand for interest bearing financial 
assets, we consider the total of financial saving, as a ratio to GNP. In addition to the real 
interest rate (id-n) and per capita income (y) as independent variables, we also include an 
independent variable (Z) which equals The variable (Z) measures the 
difference between domestic real interest rate (id-ir) and international real interest rate (id- 
ä)' adjusted for expected devaluation (0) of the Egyptian pound. Again, under the 
assumption of rational expectations, the expected rate of devaluation equals its actual rate. 
As a proxy for the international real interest rate we continue to use the rate of return on 
US treasury bills. 
The demand for interest bearing financial assets takes the form: 
(FL/Y)1= a4 + a5 (id-nr)t + a6 (FL/Y), 1 + a7 Yl + a8 Zt (7.2) 
Table (7.2) 
Demand for Interest bearing financial assets ln(FL/Y) 
Eq. No. Constant (i`x) In (FUY), 
_, 
In y z D-W R2 R2 
F 
2 -4.9569 1.0987 0.63771 0.575 0.92 0.28 
(-24.080)' (1.007) (15.414)'' 165.37 
3 -1.1078 0.78209 0.15287 1.49 0.97 0.32 
(-1.993)' (6.905)' (2.188)b 463.33 
4 -1.2158 0.87529 0.77484 0.17629 1.51 0.97 0.37 
(-2.194)b (1.526) (6.928)' (2.478)` 318.16 
5 -1.3280 1.1231 0.73595 0.18132 -0.29354 1.75 0.97 0.44 
(-2.362)' (1.711)' (6.280)° (2.551)b (-1.077) 240.38 
in is me natural logarithm. 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics. 
', b, and ` indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively. 
D-W is the Durbin-Watson test. Note that Durbin's h statistic is reported instead of D-W in the case of the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable in the model. 
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Table (7.2) shows that although the effect of the real interest on financial saving is 
positive, as hypothesised by the M-S school, it is only statistically significant in one 
equation (6) and only at 90% confidence level. Though somehow surprising this evidence 
is consistent with our analysis in the previous chapter regarding the growth of financial 
saving, despite the negative real interest rate. " However a positive impact of real interest 
rate, if any, does not imply an increase in net saving in the economy, rather it might 
result from a portfolio shift from real assets and/or from assets held abroad. 
The coefficients of per capita income and lagged financial intermediation ratio have the 
expected positive signs and are statistically significant in all equations. Moreover we 
realise that the sign of the devaluation adjusted interest rate differentials (Z) is negative 
but insignificant. A possible explanation is that the outflow of capital was offset by an 
inflow in the form of workers' remittances. Another explanation might be that the holding 
of foreign currency denominated assets with internationally competitive returns, which 
is included in the value of FL in equation (7.2), leads to such a lack of impact from 
interest rate differentials on financial savings. 
(7.3.3) Total saving and its determinants: 
To test the impact of the real interest rates on saving we estimate the ratio of national 
saving as a function of the real deposit interest rate (id-lr), per capita income (y), the term 
(Z) which is defined as in equation (7.2). The two ratios of (M/Y) and (FL/Y), as 
measures for financial deepening, are used to test McKinnon's hypothesis regarding the 
positive impact of the degree of financial intermediation on saving. Further we include 
two dummy variables DUMLIB and DUM87. The first measures the impact of economic 
liberalisation policies started in 197416. We argue that such policies started to operate in 
15Chapter (6). pp. 223-226; see particularly figure (6.9) and table (6.6). 
16See 
our discussion of the economic liberalisation measures, which has started in 1974, in chapter (1). 
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1975, so DUMLIB takes the value of (1) for the years 1975-1990 and (0) otherwise. The 
second dummy variable (DUM87) represents the effect of the sharp fall in oil prices in 
1985, " and its accompanying decline in the main foreign revenues from the Suez Canal, 
remittances of Egyptian workers in the Gulf states and tourism. 
(S/Y)1= a9 + aio (id-7r), + «ll (M/Y)c + a12 (FL/Y)c + a13 (S/Y)c-i + a14 Zc 
+ «15 Yt + «16 DUM87+ a17 DUMLIB (7.3) 
Table (7.3) 
Saving functions ln(S/Y) 
In In in in D-W R2 R2 
Const. (i, -ir) (M/1) FLIY (S/Y),. 1 Z y DUM87 DUMLIB F 
6 -0.8643 2.081 -0.838 0.581 0.147 2.39 0.73 0.54 
(-0.43) (2.56)° (-1.89)' (3.8)' (0,59) 16.7 
7 -0.8766 0.068 2.087 -0.842 0.582 0.150 2.39 0.73 0.69 
(-0.420) (0.03) (2.45)` (-1.80)' (3.7)' (0.54) 12.8 
8 -0.9681 0.159 2.069 -0.860 0.577 -0.13 0.154 2.39 0.73 0.66 
(-0.43) (0.06) (2.34)° (-1.71)' (3.5)' (-0.1) (0.54) 10.3 
9 1.1554 -0.72 0.626 0.471 -1.646 0.898 1.76 0.91 
0.79 
(3.2)' (-0.5) (7.5)' (1.74)' (-6.7)' (4.4)' 52.2 
10 1.8347 -0.46 0.950 -0.095 0.569 0.439 . 1.658 0.732 1.80 0.93 0.82 
(1.47) (-0.4) (1.80)' (-0.33) (6.7)° (1.87)' (-7.0)' (3.2)' 41.3 
in is cne natural logarithm. 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics. 
a, b, and ` indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively. 
D-W is the Durbin-Watson test. Note that Durbin's h statistic is reported instead of D-W in the case of the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable in the model. 
The results of our estimation show that the sign of the real interest rate coefficient is 
positive, in equations (7) and (8) and negative in equations (9) and (10), is at all times 
statistically insignificant. Clearly the McKinnon-Shaw argument of a positive effect of 
real interest rates on saving is not supported. The sign on interest rate differentials is 
negative but also insignificant. 
17Note 
that although the drop in oil prices occurred in 1985, we consider the dummy variable for 1987 for two reasons: first because of 
the lagged effect of such external shock. Second, part of 1986 is included in the dummy as the fiscal year in Egypt starts runs from July 
to June. 
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Our findings regarding the insignificant effect of the real interest rate is consistent with 
the argument that "the offsetting income and substitution effects of increased interest rates 
imply that the net impact on saving must be ambiguous"18. Moreover our results are 
similar to those of several other econometric studies which found no real interest rate 
effect on saving. 19 
On the other hand, the estimates show that while the sign on the coefficient of non- 
interest bearing financial assets is positive and strongly significant, the sign on the 
interest-bearing assets is negative and significant, at a 90% confidence level, in equations 
(6), (7) and (8) and insignificant in (9). This cannot give us either firm support or 
rejection of the impact of the development of the two financial intermediation ratios on 
saving, which is hypothesised to be positive by the M-S school. On the other hand we 
note that the sign of the per capita income is positive in all equations but statistically 
significant only in equations (9) and (10). 
As in the case of financial saving equation, the impact of the devaluation adjusted interest 
rate differentials (Z) was insignificant. A study by El-Erian (1988) on currency 
substitution in Egypt also demonstrated that changes in the proxy for interest rate 
differentials were not significant. The reason given was that the repressed interest rate is 
'a poor indicator of available alternative returns to holding domestic balances'20. 
Examples of these available alternatives in Egypt during the study period are the foreign 
currency denominated deposits in the banking sector and funds held with the informal 
IICs as discussed above. 
18Dornbusch 
and Reynoso (1989), p. 205. For further analysis of this issue see Deaton and Muellbauer (1988), pp. 101-103. 
19See 
for example Giovannini (1983) and Warman and Thirlwall (1994). For a review of empirical evidence see chapter (2) of this thesis. 
20See 
EI-Erian (1988), pp. 98-99. 
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As expected, the sign of the overall economic liberalisation measures in the period (1975- 
1990) is positive and strongly significant. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this period 
witnessed the rise in government revenues from 'exogenous' sources in the sense that 
they were not necessarily related to the economic policy regime, like the rise in oil prices 
and workers remittances' and Suez Canal dues. However one may argue that a restrictive 
policy would have denied the country the benefits of such exogenous resources. 
Preventing foreign oil companies from undertaking exploration projects, not granting 
permission to potential workers in the Gulf states and imposing tight restrictions on the 
transfer of capital are examples of measures undertaken in the 1960s. These would have 
been sufficient, we argue, to deny the country the benefits of such exogenous sources 
should they have been in operation in the 1970s and 1980s instead of what is known as 
infitah, open door, measures. Regarding the impact of the international oil price shock 
of 1986/1987, our estimates show that it had an adverse impact on saving as its 
coefficient is negative and strongly significant. 
(7.3.4) Investment and the impact of the real interest rate: 
i) The real interest rate and credit: 
The impact of the real interest on investment works through indirect and direct channels. 
By indirect we refer to the impact of real interest rate on investment via the supply of 
credit. Thus in equation (7.4) we estimate the supply of total credit as a ratio to GNP 
(CRD/Y), as a function of the real interest rate (id-w), the ratio of effective reserve 
requirements (RR), and the overall liberalisation dummy variable DUMLIB. We estimate 
a similar equation (7.5) for the supply of private credit (PRCR). 
Total credit: 
(CRD/Y)1= a18 + a19 (id-lr)C + «20 (CRD/Y)t-t + «21 Y1 + «22 RR, + a23 
DUMLIB (7.4) 
Private credit: 
(PRCR/Y), = a24 + au (id-lr)c + a26 (PRCR/Y)t-i + an Yt + a28 RRt + a29 
DUMLIB (7.5) 
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Table (7.4) 
Total Domestic Credit Functions ln(CRD/Y) 
In In In D-W R2 R2 
Constant (i1-x) (CRD/Y), _, y RR 
DUMLIB F 
11 -0.912 0.6733 0.4944 0.1316 0.15535 1.91 0.97 0.43 
(-2.558) (1.553) (3.167)° (2.293)b (2.668)b 199.3 
12 -0.0386 0.5898 0.6314 0.1207 0.2707 2.01 0.97 0.39 
(-0.580) (1.330) (5.189)° (1.867) (3.441)° 187.3 
Table (7.5) 
Total Private Credit Functions: ln(PRCR/Y) 
in in In D-W R2 2 
Constant (id-? ) (PRCR/Y),., y RR DUMLIB F 
13 -1.1970 1.071 0.6503 0.1228 1.99 0.83 0.33 
(-2.839)° (1.319) (4.851)` (2.801)` 41.13 
14 -0.45577 1.3918 0.7091 0.0668 0.2396 2.23 0.84 0.41 
(-2.110) (1.675) (6.117)° (0.876) (3.0444)0 32.424 
in is one naLurai ioganmm. 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics. 
', b, and ` indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively. 
D-W is the Durbin-Watson test. Note that Durbin's h statistic is reported instead of D-W in the case of the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable in the model. 
Table (7.4) and table (7.5) show that the indirect impact of the real interest rate on total 
and private investment, measured respectively as a ratio of total credit and private credit 
to GNP, is positive but statistically insignificant. This finding indicates that the credit 
policy is not chiefly influenced by interest rate but rather by other measures, such as 
government intervention in credit allocation and subsidies, discussed in chapter (6). 
We also note that the reserve requirements ratio is positive, but significant only in the 
case of total domestic credit equation (12). The positive coefficients of per capita income 
and lagged credit ratios dominate the equations. The same goes for the positive coefficient 
of the overall liberalisation dummy variable. 
ii) The determinants of Investment 
The direct impact of the real interest on investment is estimated by two methods: the first 
by equation (7.6) and the second by a switching model described in equation (7.7). In 
equation (7.6) we consider the ratio of gross national investment to GNP (I/Y), as a 
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function of the real interest (i. -7r), the supply of credit (CRD/Y), the two ratios of 
financial intermediation (M/Y) and (FL/Y), and the two dummy variables DUM87 and 
DUMLIB. 
(I/Y)t = a30 + a31 (id-lr)t + a32 (I/Yc-1 + a33 (M/Y)c + a34 (FL/Y)t + a35 
(CRD/Y)t + a36 DUM87 + a37 DUMLIB (7.6) 
Equation (7.6) is used as well to test McKinnon's 'complementarity' hypothesis which 
assumes a positive relationship between the accumulation of cash balances and physical 
capital based on an assumption that the former should precede the accumulation of 
physical capital due to its indivisibility. " If the sign of the coefficient of (id-lr) is positive 
the complementarity hypothesis is accepted, while if it is negative the hypothesis is 
rejected, which means an acceptance of the 'asset-competing' effect with the well known 
negative relationship between investment and interest rate. 22 
Table (7.6) 
Investment functions ln(I/Y) 
In In in in D-W R2 -2 
Constant OCT) (I/Y)t-I M/Y CRD/Y FLIY DUM87 DUMLIB F" R 
15 -0.415 -0.633 0.7336 0.051 1.64 0.73 0.29 
(-1.74)° (-0.624) (5.01)° (0.47) 23.0 
16 0.023 -0.643 0.575 0.804 0.105 -0.129 1.65 0.79 0.43 
(0.052) (-0.69) (3.82)° (2.70)' (0.34) (-0.83) 18.9 
17 -0.578 -0.579 0.2468 0.882 -0.526 0.047 -0.3801 0.4662 1.82 0.87 0.48 
(-1.291) (-0.75) (1.43) (3.57)° (-1.58) (0.34) (-2.77)` (2.600)4 21.8 
18 -1.045 -0.848 0.953 -0.613 0.034 -0.3985 (0.644) 1.78 0.86 0.67 
(-3.34)° (-1.10) (3.86)0 (-1.8)° (0.24) (-2.86)° (4.88)° 24.0 
in is uie natural Iogaritnm. 
Figures in parentheses are t statistics. 
'" 
,, and ` indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively. D-W is the Durbin-Watson test. Note that Durbin's h statistic is reported instead of D-W in the case of the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable in the model. 
As shown in table (7.6) all equations show that the real interest rate is statistically 
insignificant. Thus McKinnon's complementarity hypothesis is rejected. This econometric 
21McKinnon 
(1973), pp. 57-61. 
22For 
a discussion of this point see Gupta (1984), pp. 12-18. 
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evidence adds to the scepticism, already present in the literature, 23 regarding the validity 
of M-S hypothesis on the positive effect of the real interest on investment. 
On the other hand, in equations (16), (17) and (18) we find that the ratio of financial 
intermediation in non-interest bearing financial assets is significantly positive but that of 
interest-bearing assets is not. Again we cannot accept the argued proposition of a positive 
impact of financial deepening on the quantity of investment. 
Moreover the insignificant coefficient of financial saving ratio, (FL/Y), raises doubt 
regarding the efficiency of the formal financial sector in the allocation of loanable funds 
in a way that augment investment. We realise that the positive impact of the real interest 
on financial saving held with the formal sector did not have the expected positive effect 
on investment. This casts some doubts on the proposed advantages of raising the real 
interest rate of the formal sector as put forward by the M-S school. Some of the possible 
results of an insufficiently high real interest rate regime in Egypt are the discouragement 
of investment, increasing the perceived default risks and worsening the problem of excess 
liquidity in the banking system that may force banks to indulge in imprudent decisions. 24 
We argue that a ceteris paribus increase of the real interest rate may be as deleterious as 
setting it too low. ' As clearly stated by several authors, determining the appropriate 
interest rate is dependent on the specific institutional, macroeconomic and financial 
conditions as well as the historical characteristics of the country concerned. 25 
23See 
for example Diaz-Alejandro (1985), Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989), Rittenberg (1991), Demetriades and Devreux (1992) and 
Warman and Thirlwall (1994). For a review of these studies see Chapter (2). 
24Because 
of the recent increase in deposit interest rates, after applying the financial liberalisation programme inJanuary 1991, commercial 
banks have had an excess liquidity problem. This problem pushed banks into ruthless competition to offer personal loans, mainly for 
consumption purposes. As reported by senior bank officials, in Al-Ahram Daily Newspaper, 14/8/1994, defaults have been due to 
imprudent credit decisions by banks anxious to overcome the problem. 
25 For analysis of the issue of the appropriate interest rate, see Roe (1982), pp. 214-219, Calvo (1990), pp. 7-14 and Rittenberg (1991), 
p. 164. 
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However the explanatory variables which appear to have an influence on investment are: 
lagged investment, in equations (15), and (16); the dummy variable of oil prices shock 
with its expected negative sign, and the dummy variable for overall economic 
liberalisation with its expected positive sign, as shown in equations (17) and (18). 
iii) A switching regime model for investment: 
This second method is used to analyse the determinants of the level of gross fixed 
investment during the period 1960-1990. As mentioned briefly above, Interest rate has 
two conflicting effects on investment; first it has an indirect positive effect through its 
impact on the mobilisation of financial saving. Second interest rate, as a cost of credit, 
has a direct negative effect on investment. 26 However, according to the classical theory, 
as shown in figure (7.1), if the real interest rate lies above its equilibrium level, 
investment is negatively correlated with interest but if the interest rate is below its 
equilibrium level, investment will be constrained by saving and become positively 
correlated with interest. 
26Warman 
and Thirlwall (1994), pp. 637-639 and Rittenberg (1991), pp. 154-158. 
Figure (7.1) 
Supply and Demand for Loanable Funds 
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Another explanation for positive correlation between investment and the real interest rate 
is attributed to the problem of imperfect information, a characteristic prevalent in most 
LDCs including Egypt. Because of this problem, as argued by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
the equilibrium interest rate may not necessarily be the rate which equates investment and 
the supply of loanable funds. Banks may not increase interest rates even if there is an 
excess demand for credit as banks' profits would fall if interest rates exceed an optimum 
interest rate due to higher defaults. 27 
Thus, from the above discussion, to calculate the net impact of the real interest rate on 
investment, the two opposing effects, as well as the relationship between interest rate 
regimes and equilibrium, should be determined. This suggests the use of a switching 
regime model as developed by Quandt (1958). 28 
Accordingly we estimate a linear spline investment function for Egypt, for the period 
1960-1990, which takes the form: 
I= ß1 + ß2 (00 + ß3 D+ ß4X+ E (7.7) 
Where I is gross fixed investment 
(id-w) is the real interest rate 
(ia-a)° is the equilibrium interest rate at the switching point 
D is a dummy variable which takes the value of (1) when (id-lr) > (id-1r)` and (0) 
otherwise 
X is a vector of other variables that affect investment 
E is the error term 
The vector X includes total supply of credit (CRD) and the lagged change of gross 
domestic product & (GDP), -, which 
is used to measure the accelerator effect on 
investment. ' Further the two dummy variables, DUMLIB and DUM87, are included as 
in the previous investment equation (7.6). 
27Rittenberg, 
op. cit., p. 157. 
28The 
same model has been recently applied by Rittenberg (1991) on Turkey and Warman and Thirlwall (1994) on Mexico. 
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By substituting in equation (7.7) for vector X, we obtain: 
I= ßl + ß2 (ld-? f) + ß3 [(ld-1r)-(id-7r)`] D+ B4CRD + B5(, & GDP),, + B6 DUMLIB 
+ ß7 DUM87 (7.8) 
The equilibrium interest rate was not known, so it was determined by a trial and 
error process, searching for the value of (id-wr)` which minimises the sum of squared 
residuals by fitting equation 6.8 to the data. A programme written in FORTRAN was 
used to do this process, see appendix number (1). A summary of the results is presented 
in table (7.7). 
Table (7.7) 
Values of Real Interest Rates and Sums of Squared Residuals 
Equilibrium real rate of 
interest (id-7r)° 
SSR 
-0.0250 0.6301718 
-0.0200 0.6301718 
-0.0150 0.4941985 
-0.0100 0.5655931 
-0.0050 0.4892879 
0.0000 0.6057563 
0.0050 0.7095131 
0.0100 0.7095131 
0.0150 0.7095131 
0.0200 0.7133105 
As shown in table (7.7) above, the value of (id-a)° which minimises the sum of squares 
is (-0.005). This value may seem low, but we should be aware that it represents the value 
of the equilibrium real deposit rate which is used a proxy for the cost of credit. The 
lending rate, given the relatively high interest spread in Egypt, should be several points 
higher. 29 Figure (7.2) shows that apart from a few exceptional years in the 1960s, the 
actual real interest rate was generally, though not substantially, negative and below its 
equilibrium rate. 
29Note 
that the equilibrium real rate of interest was also low in the two studies of Rittenberg (1991) and Warman and Thirlwall (1994) 
being zero for both studies, see Rittenberg p. 164 and Warman and Thirlwall, p. 637. 
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The estimated investment equation adopting Quandt switching model and using the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure to correct for the problem of first order serial correlation30, 
(t statistics in brackets). 
ln(INV)= 0.4904 - 0.9119 2.7189 [(i. -a)-(id-1r)°]D + 
(1.4949) (0.8953) (2.2497)b 
0.7305 In CRD + 0.05422 (nGDP)t-_1 + 0.3846 DUMLIB - 
(15.478)y (2.7781)b (3.767)c 
0.15275 DUM87 (19) 
(2.067)b 
', " and ` indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively. 
Number of iterations31= 7 at p =0.725 
D-W=1.86 F=70.2 R2=0.98 R2 =0.967 
30 See for example Maddala (1988), pp. 194-196, Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991), pp. 141.142 and Judge, et al (1988), pp. 392-393. 
31For 
this procedure we used SHAZAM Econometrics Program, (White et at (1989)). 
Figure (7.2) 
Actual and Equilibrium Real Rate of Interest and the 
Linear Spline 
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Equation (19) is well determined and shows that the coefficient of the real interest rate 
is negative but statistically insignificant. The sign of the coefficient of [(id-n)-(id-1)`]D is 
negative and significant. This again suggests a rejection of the complementarity 
hypothesis. Equation (19) also reveals that coefficients of the lagged accelerator effect 
(, &GDP)t_, and the supply of credit are significantly positive. The two dummy variables 
were also significant and have the expected signs, negative for the oil shock dummy and 
positive for the overall liberalisation dummy. Similar results have been obtained by the 
study of Warman and Thirlwall (1994) on Mexico, except that the sign on the spline was 
not significant32. 
Equation (20) gives an estimate of the investment function without the spline. The results 
are the same as in equation (19). 
ln(INV) = 0.4369 - 0.35989 (id-7r) + 0.7281 In CRD 
(1.4311) (0.7597) (15.695)c 
+ 0.0568 (, &GDP)t_, + 0.4146 DUMLIB - 0.1507 DUM87 (20) 
(2.691)' (3.853)° (1.819)a 
a, b and ` indicate significance at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence levels respectively. 
Number of iterations =8 at p =0.634 
D-W=1.93 F=86.7 R2=0.987 R2 =0.975 
Our finding of an insignificant role of interest rate on investment behaviour is realised 
in other empirical studies on both developed and developing countries. "uncertainty about 
internal rates of return, unsophisticated investment decision procedures, the long run 
decisions compared to short run fluctuations in interest rates, and the possibility that 
changes in borrowing costs are overshadowed by variations in demand"33 would be an 
explanation for the weak results for the cost of funds in empirical studies of investment 
determinants. 
32see 
Warman and Thirlwall (1994), pp. 639-640. 
33See 
Shafik (1992b), p. 92. 
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The insensitivity of investment to interest rate policy can be explained by the existence 
of other measures that subsumed its role as a market clearing device, which is already 
weak, in a financially repressed economy. Government subsidies to public investment 
projects, including subsidised credit costs, and administered allocation of credit may 
provide an explanation for the interest rate insensitivity of public investment. Regarding 
the insignificance of interest rate in decisions of private investment, a recent empirical 
study on Egypt, during 1960-1986, showed that there are demand and supply sides 
explanations. On the demand side there were the practice of mark-up pricing and the 
preference of internal funds for investment financing34. On the supply side banks, which 
had excess liquidity in most of the period under study, applied non-interest-rate criteria 
for the allocation of credit, such as the reputation of the applicant, the size of the loan or 
political pressure. 
(7.3.5) Real interest rate and economic growth 
Finally the impact of the real interest rate on real economic growth (g) is tested in 
equation (21). 
g=0.0536 + 0.2729 (id-lr) (21) 
(4.545) (1.258) 
D-W= 1.26 F=1.588 R2= 0.05 R2 =0.32 
The coefficient of real interest rate is positive but not significant. Further the relation 
between real interest and economic growth cannot be determined because the overall 
regression relation is insignificant. 
However this finding is consistent with several studies which found an undetermined 
relation between interest and growth. For example in a recent paper by Khatkhate (1988) 
34ibid., 
pp. 92-93 and Shafik (1992a), p. 275. 
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on a sample of 64 developing countries divided into two groups, below average and above 
average real interest rates, the main finding was that the real interest rate has little or no 
impact on economic growth. 35 
(7.4) Conclusions: 
Real interest rate is considered a central variable in the arguments of the financial 
liberalisation school and those of its critics. A rising positive real interest rate, as 
explained in chapter (2) of this thesis, is assumed to have a positive impact on the 
mobilisation of savings, - investment and hence economic growth. We have tested these 
assumptions for Egypt during the period 1960-1990. 
It is worth noting that the variation in the real interest rate over the 1960-90 period in 
Egypt are mainly attributed to changes in the inflation rate rather than the nominal interest 
rate. 36 The latter was kept constant for long periods of time under the imposition of 
interest rate ceilings as shown in the previous chapter. 
Apart from a very tentative evidence of a positive impact on financial saving, we find no 
evidence to support the argument that the real interest rate has a significant effect on the 
selected macroeconomic variables of total saving, investment and economic growth. 37 We 
argue that the impact of real interest rate on financial saving works through portfolio shift 
from tangible assets and/or from assets held abroad. The insignificant effect of real 
interest on the total saving ratio may be explained by the fact that the substitution and 
income effects are offsetting each other. 
35See 
Khatkhate (1988), p. 587. A sceptical view of real interest rate on growth can also be found in Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989), 
p. 206. 
36See 
chapter (6) for further discussion of this issue. 
37It is worth noting that the empirical studies, which found a significant effect of real interest rates on the macroeconomic variables were 
multi country studies in which there was a significant variation in the interest rate over time and/or across countries. Our data set however 
lacks such variation over the study period. For a review of the empirical studies, see chapter (2). 
281 
Further, the econometric results suggest that the real interest rate does not support the 
complementarity hypothesis, nor does it explain credit policy or investment behaviour in 
Egypt. This is explained by the extensive use of internal funds, existence of subsidies, 
Government intervention in credit allocation, and the non-price criteria adopted by banks 
in their allocation of loanable funds in a repressed environment in the presence of excess 
liquidity. The insignificant impact of financial saving, mobilised by the formal sector, on 
investment forces us to question the efficiency of this sector under financial repression 
in allocating resources. Finally we found that the relation between the real interest rate 
and real economic growth cannot be determined for Egypt during the period under 
research. 
Accordingly we argue that the problems of the Egyptian economy under financial 
repression cannot be simply solved by an increase in the real rate of interest, which 
would lead, inter alia, to a discouragement of investment and a further deepening of the 
problem of excess liquidity of the banking system, which, in turn, would force banks to 
apply imprudent activities. Further comprehensive institutional and policy changes are 
required; in the words of Shaw: "the quantum gain in stability must come from 
concurrent liberalisation of financial, fiscal and international policy"38. 
38Shaw 
(1973), p. 251. 
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Chapter (8) 
Formal and Informal Credit Markets in Egypt: 
A Survey of four Villages 
(8.1) Introduction: 
From December 1992 to mid April 1993, the author undertook a survey in four Egyptian 
villages. The survey was devised to investigate the following issues: household's (HH) 
portfolio selection in the surveyed area; the HH own valuation of different types of saving 
instruments; analysis of formal and informal transactions and their determinants; the 
importance of inflation hedges'; the role of collective arrangements through Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations (RoSCAs) in the four villages; the HH's reaction to the 
changes in the financial system and monetary policy after January 1991; the possible 
changes of spending and/or saving decisions as response to hypothetical changes in wealth 
or income. 
There are several reasons for adopting a household focus in the analysis. First, as 
mentioned above, macroeconomic data on the implications of the financial liberalisation 
programme of the formal financial sector has not yet been available. Second, due to the 
nature of informal financial transactions, there is little reliable and systematic evidence 
is available for detailed scrutiny, whereas it is more likely to get reliable information on 
informal finance through a household survey. Third, although the reform programme is 
mainly macroeconomic oriented, an understanding of the microeconomic mechanisms is 
essential for a better perception of the impact of the programme. The recent growing 
interest in the microeconomic foundations of macroeconomic policies, including structural 
adjustment lends support to this argument. Fourth, household survey data can provide 
direct measures of the impact of changes in economic policy, and highlight the 
IInflation 
hedges are defined as assets which enable households and other investors to reduce the risk of loss of purchasing power 
stemming from uncertainty about the prices of goods. See The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance (1992), p. 405. 
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household's reactions to these changes. Fifth, in an area still largely under-researched, 
particularly in the Egyptian context, a household based analysis may discover some 
important aspects and explore new areas for research. 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the concepts of informal finance and provides a 
taxonomy of informal financial transactions. Then it discusses the sampling method, the 
questionnaire and highlights the socio-economic characteristics of the four surveyed 
villages. The chapter continues by examining the household portfolio structure with an 
emphasis on the relative importance of different saving instruments. 
(8-2) Informal finance in LDCs: 
Different terms like parallel, black, underground, shadow, fragmented, unregulated, 
segmented, curb and informal have been used in the literature to describe miscellaneous 
forms of economic transactions that survive outside the officially regulated sector. ' The 
multiplicity of the terms has led to confusion about the meaning of them. This confusion 
has been attributed to the fact that these terms are often employed interchangeably, while 
they actually describe different features of markets in developing economies. 3 
Despite the abiding recognition that informal financial markets, (henceforth IFMs), exist 
on an extensive basis in developing economies, ' there is disagreement over their role in 
the development process. ' On the one hand there is the view that IFMs play a negative 
role in economic development; that they are dominated by usurious money lenders who 
exploit their market power; that they are fragmented and could be absorbed into the 
formal sector during the financial development process. This view has led to the 
2 See Montiel, AgBnor and Haque (1993), pp. 7-8. 
3 
See Jones, Lindauer and Roemer (1991), p. 11 and Peattie (1987), pp. 857-858. 
4See 
Besley (1993), pp. 15-17, for a discussion of the characteristics of financial markets in LDCs and the importance of informal finance. 
5 For a review of the arguments of the neo-liberals and neo-structuralists regarding the activities of IFMs, see chapter (2). 
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disparagement of the role of IFMs in the financial development literature and to an 
increasing emphasis on that of the official intermediaries'. According to this view, 
government policy should restrict the activities of IFMs. 
On the other hand, the opposing view claims that IFMs have played an important role in 
serving those who have fällen outside the purview of the formal financial sector, and that 
they maintain very low transaction costs because of their comparative advantage in 
information acquisition and lower administrative costs. Further, they are considered 
competitive and agile', improving the allocative efficiency of loanable funds. Hence, 
informal financial markets should be protected from excessive government intervention 
and regulation'. 
Much of this disagreement is due to the following issues: 
1. Informal financial transactions by their very nature occur outside the domain of 
the legal system. Thus little reliable and systematic evidence is available for 
detailed scrutiny. 
2. The activities of the informal sector are often defined in a residual manner, 
namely "all activity that lies beyond the pale of official regulation or control is 
considered to be informal in nature"9. Treating informal financial activity as a 
residual is, partly, responsible for the dearth of in depth analysis in the financial 
development literature. 
3. The understanding of the operation of IFMs is influenced by a limited number of 
empirical studies on informal finance that are dominated by research in the Indian 
sub continent. There has been a drift towards a generalisation of the findings of 
6 This is clearly realised in the works of Goldsmith (1969), Shaw (1973) and Mckinnon (1973). 
7 See Taylor (1983) p. 92 and our literature review in chapter (2). 
8 For further details of this view see for example: Pischke, Adams and Donalds (1983). 
9 Montiel, Agenor and Haque, op. cit., p. 8. 
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these limited studies, giving a possibly erroneous and inaccurate view of IFMs in 
essentially different economic and cultural environments. 
4. Labelling the informal financial sector by epithets like 'black', 'underground' and 
'hidden' has resulted in making this sector subject to ideological debate and 
ensued a difficulty in undertaking an impartial analysis of its role, growth or 
implications'o. 
(8.3) A taxonomy of informal finance: 
Informal financial transactions are heterogeneous and occur in several sub markets that 
make up the informal financial market. Indeed, some types of transaction are not 'market' 
determined, like private transfers and interest-free loans between relatives and friends 
which are governed not by market mechanisms but rather by social relations. I1 
However for the purposes of this study we distinguish between four categories of 
informal finance: (1) occasional lending; (2) regular lending; (3) interlinked credit, (4) 
finance through collective arrangements and (5) informal finance at a corporate level. 
(1) Occasional lending covers all direct intermittent loans by individuals with a 
temporary surplus of funds". This type of lending arises in the absence of personal 
consumer credit and small enterprise loans. Friends and relatives are the main source of 
such loans. Depending on the strength of the relationship with the borrower and the 
purpose of the loan, these loans are predominantly interest free for consumption purposes 
and are governed by the principle of profit and loss sharing in the case of production 
purposes. Generally they tend to be state-contingent with flexible terms and no collateral. 
10 ibid., pp. 8-9. 
110n 
non-market financial transactions see Cox and Jimenez (1990), and their role as an alternative to formal social security programmes 
in LDCs see Cox and Jimenez (1992). 
12 See Ghate (1992). p 23. 
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(2) Informal lending can take a regular form13. This requires the existence of specialised 
moneylenders or pawnbrokers. A typical money lender utilises his close knowledge of the 
borrower and often faces no competition in providing the service given this information 
advantage he possesses. Consequently loans obtained from this source tend to be 
relatively expensive, as the demand curve is inelastic. Such loans are considered by 
potential borrowers as a last resort14. Relatively high interest rates are charged and 
justified by the cost of acquiring information, monitoring and high default risk. 
Unless the loan is obtained from a pawnbroker, physical collateral is not of great 
importance in this type of informal finance. Informal lenders may substitute physical 
collateral by obtaining personal informal information and an enforcement mechanism that 
relies on a web of social relations, as shown below. A pawnbroker however lends against 
an asset, customarily a household good. The pawned item is forfeited to the pawnbroker 
if the principal and the interest are not paid at the agreed dates. The risk in the case of 
pawnbroking is limited to the skill in estimating the market value of the pawned item in 
the case that it is not redeemed by the debtor. 
(3) Interlinked credit occurs when two or more interdependent exchanges are 
simultaneously agreed upon in the form of a bundled deal's. The lender extends credit to 
the borrower against the latter's commitment to sell crops, in the case of trader-farmer 
relationship, or providing labour service, in the case of employer-worker. Under 
interlinked credit arrangements, the continuing relationship in the other market acts as a 
substitute for collateral and reduces transaction costs and default risk. 
13 See Timberg and Aiyar (1984) for an extensive analysis of this type of informal finance in India. 
14 See Montiel, Agenor and Haque, op cit, p. 13. 
15 
see Bell (1988) for a comprehensive analysis of interlinked transactions. 
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(4) Informal finance may take the form of collective arrangements. An example of these 
arrangements is credit unions in which a group of individuals regularly, or irregularly, 
deposit funds with a chosen leader. The pooled savings or a share of it is lent to the 
group members, and in some cases to non members, when they apply for a loan. 
Members are charged no interest or very low interest. The most common form of 
collective arrangements is Rotating Savings and Credit Associations which are known in 
the financial development literature by the acronym (RoSCA)16. 
RoSCAs have an extended history in developed and developing economies and are found 
in countries as diverse as Japan and India in Asia, Niger and Ethiopia in Africa and 
Bolivia and Mexico in Latin America". RoSCAs are considered to be one of the oldest 
financial innovations and they predate monetisation". RoSCA continues to be an 
important instrument of savings and a significant source of credit. 
(5) Informal finance can be in a corporate form. The so-called Finance Corporations in 
India provides an example of this form. These companies are widespread in several 
provinces in India and function as unregulated banks. A Finance Corporation can be a 
family or a business partnership, starts by utilising own funds for lending and expand by 
accepting deposits in the form of cash certificates and cumulative deposits for specified 
periods with relatively high interest paid on them. They normally lend to relatively high 
risk borrowers who do not have access to the formal intermediaries and those who are 
geographically remote from the domain of formal services. " 
16 The world Bank (1989) and other studies report different names of RoSCAs indifferent countries; e. g. fand in Mexico, chit in India, 
tontine in Niger, hagbad in Somalia, chilimba in Zambia, kou in Japan, pasanakus in Bolivia and gameyah in Egypt, see World Bank 
(1989) p 114 box 8.2; Adams and Canavesi (1989) p 223; and Mrak (1989) p 65. 
17 See Adams and Canavesi, op. cit, p 220; and Miracle, Miracle and Cohen (1980) pp 704-705. 
18 See Von Pischke (1991), p 14. 
19For 
a description of the activities of these companies in India, see Nayar (1982), pp. 5-39. 
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Finance and Loan companies in Korea are an example of this form of finance. These 
unregulated companies were established in the 1960s as a response to the then tight 
monetary policy. They apply a sophisticated system for risk evaluation and specialise in 
small credit for working capital to small retailers and consumption loans. 20 
Moreover the Islamic Investment Companies (IICs) in Egypt which flourished and, then 
collapsed, during the 1980s can be considered another example of informal finance at the 
corporate level. However there is a further difference in the case of IICs as their 
'depositors' were not aware of its informal nature which was based on a pyramid 
scheme. 21 In Egypt however the IICs were only informal borrowers as they directly 
'allocated' their funds while in Korea and India informal financial corporates were 
borrowers and lenders, i. e. full intermediaries. 22 
(8.4) Village Selection: 
The initial plan was to choose one Governorate in southern Egypt and another in the 
north to allow for inter-Governorate comparative analysis. Alas, the security problems 
in southern Egypt, during the period of the study, prevented that from happening. Thus, 
the decision was to focus on inter-Village comparisons and concentrate the research in 
one Governorate, that is the Kalyoubbiya Governorate, a rural province in the delta, 
located about 60 Kilometres north east of Cairo as shown in figure (8.1). 
20 See Hahm (1989), p. 17. 
21See 
chapter (5) for an analysis of theses companies. 
22 As shown in our analysis of the lICs, we should be careful with the term allocation of funds as they were mainly used in a pyramid 
scheme. 
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Figure (8.1) 
A map of the location of the Kalyoubbiya Governorate and 
the four surveyed villages 
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The population of the Kalyoubbiya Governorate was roughly 2.9 million in 199223, 
occupying an area of 1001 Km2. This makes the population density as high as 2897 
person/Km2, the fifth highest in Egypt. Approximately 43 percent of the population live 
in urban areas. Of the governorate's urban population, some 66 percent live in the 
southern industrial area, close to Cairo, where some firms were first established in the 
second and third decades of this century. Later in the 1960s, during a period of heavy 
industrialisation, this area became one of the main industrial locations in the country. The 
rest of the urban population lives in the Governorate's capital, Benha, and some other 
under-developed cities. 
23 Estimated for 1992 from 1986 Census 
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Kalyoubbiya, as shown in table (8.1) and like her neighbouring Governorates in the fertile 
delta24, is characterised by a high level of farm fragmentation and the prevalence of small 
landholding (less than one feddan)u. 
Table (8.1) 
Kalyoubbiya 1990: Distribution of Land Ownership 
Feddan Owners % Land (feddan) % 
Less than 1 133,594 74.1 44,522 21.8 
1- 18,718 10.3 24,365 11.9 
2- 13,149 7.2 27,010 13.2 
3- 4,486 2.4 18,056 8.8 
4- 4,526 2.5 19,542 9.5 
5- 3,235 1.7 17,634 8.6 
10- 1,616 0.8 19,935 9.7 
20- 751 0.4 17,534 8.6 
50- 131 0.07 8,152 4 
100- 38 0.02 6,931 3.4 
Total 180,244 100 203,681 100 
Source: CAPMAS (1992), p. 75. 
The problems of land fragmentation and small land ownership26 in Kalyoubbiya, as in the 
rest of Egypt can be attributed mainly to four factors: 
1. The land reform laws. The first law promulgated in 1952, limited the ownership 
of agricultural land to 200 feddans per family. The subsequent law of 1961 
reduced the ceiling to 100 feddans. 
2. The impact of Islamic law regarding inheritance which divides the inherited land, 
according to specific shares, among the inheritors. 
3. The slow progress in land reclamation projects which lags far behind the growth 
of population. 
24 See Commander (1987) p 46 for a description of the main similar characteristics of 3 other governorate in the delta. 
25 1 feddan - 24 qirats - . 43 hectares - 
1.038 acres. 
26It is quite ironic that in the beginning of the century Lord Cromer ordered the Bank of Egypt to forgive the impoverished debtors who 
own 5 feddans or less during a bad time in the cotton market. An order that led to the collapse of this once successful commercial bank. 
In contemporary Egypt this category of owners is 95.8% of the total number of land owners. Under the dominance of those who own less 
than 1 feddan, the owners of 5 feddans are called sarcastically today's feudal lords. 
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4. The scarcity of entrepreneurs with sufficient funds and interest in agriculture. 
This problem forces land sellers to fragment their land further in order to find a 
buyer. 
What the table cannot reveal is the fact that, traditionally, families tend to register their 
land ownership under the name of the person who looks after it. This practice is widely 
applied in order to facilitate servicing the land, obtaining credit and selling the product, 
especially in the case of the so called absent owners, i. e. those who live away in urban 
Egypt. 
However, the proximity of the Cairo market, which serves more than 10 million 
consumers, has led the agricultural sector of the Governorate to specialise in relatively 
high earning fruit and vegetable production and has recently, since mid 1970s, diversified 
into poultry production. 
During the last three decades several infrastructure projects were implemented to provide 
many of the inhabitants of the Governorate, especially those who live in the urban areas, 
with tap water, electricity, schooling, health centres and district hospitals and a reasonable 
network of roads. 27 As a result, in addition to the common categorisation of regions to 
urban and rural, many parts of Kalyoubbiya can be described as semi-urban or semi-rural 
depending on the level of urbanisation and type of activities of the population. 
27 Despite the bias in spending towards Cairo, Alexandria and the Suez Canal Governorate, Kalyoubbiya managed to get a relatively 
reasonable share of government spending on infrastructure projects, this could be attributed mainly to its proximity to Cairo. 
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After selecting the Governorate28, the next step was to select a district. This was the 
district of Kafr Shukr, a new administrative district established in 1963 and occupying 
the north east part of the Governorate29. The Damietta branch of River Nile draws its 
western boundary with Menoufiya Governorate, Sharkiya Governorate lies to the east and 
Dakahliya Governorate to the north of the district. Al Tawfeeky Canal runs through the 
district which is linked together with bridges and simple ferryboats. The district of Kafr 
Shukr consists of 24 villages including 'Kafr Shukr', which was given city status in 1968. 
(8.5) The Sample Size: 
In a textbook approach to the determination of sample size30 , the researcher works 
from 
a model of sampling errors to compute the expected sampling variance in relation to 
sample size and fixes this variance depending on the degree of precision required. 
However, in practice, this approach does not necessarily lead to very clear cut results 
because of the multiplicity of analytical objectives. 
Further, it has been realised that a better approach would be to start from resource 
constraints, e. g. cost and time. 3' The latter approach may determine a smaller sample size 
than that determined by the former. It is widely accepted that "a small well designed and 
executed study is superior to a large study that has been botchedn32. Thus, in an attempt 
to obtain high quality and comprehensive data on sensitive issues, researched under time 
28The 
Kalyoubbiya Governorate is administratively divided to Marakez (counties or districts), and the Marakez in their turn are divided 
to Qura (villages). This administration structure combines features of both local administration and local self government. There are two 
councils at each administrative level: an elected council and an appointed executive council. These councils do exercise some legislative 
power and perform a wide variety of functions in education, health, housing, public services and the distribution of subsidised food and 
goods. However the councils are directly and strongly controlled by the central government which funds their budgets, appoints the 
members of the executive council and influence the selection of the members of the 'elected' council. 
29 See map no (1). 
30 For a discussion of the determination of the sample size see for example Foreman (1991), Levy and Lemeshaw (1991), Babbie (1990). 
31 See Sudman (1976) pp 85 - 89 for a discussion of financial and non financial costs as constraints that face applied researchers with 
particular reference to the case of Ph. D dissertation and see Foreman op. cit. for a review of different issues affecting sample design. 
32 
Sudman op. cit. p9 
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and cost constraints, the number of villages and the size of the sample had to be kept as 
small as possible. 
The sampling unit, as mentioned above, is the household. The conceptual problem of the 
term 'household' is well known33. Two main concepts are usually used; the de jure and 
the de facto. According to the latter everyone who slept in the family home on the night 
before the interview is a household member. According to the former it is required that 
individuals sleep and take their meals in the household over a minimum specified period 
of time. 
Given the fact that actions taken by those who are only occasionally present in the 
household, apart from the household head, hardly influence its credit and financial 
decisions, the study rejects the de facto approach in favour of the de jure. 
The specified minimum period for a person to be a member of the household is six 
months. Due to the necessity of having information on the household's head, he or she 
is considered a member of the household, even if he or she was absent for more than six 
months. 
Thus, in this study the household can be one person or a group of people who live in the 
same dwelling, for at least the previous six month to the interview, eat from the same 
pot, and share resources for the purpose of pursuing their mutual well-being. 
Applying a two stage random sampling method" produced 200 households distributed in 
4 randomly chosen villages. At the first stage, the 4 villages were selected from a sample 
33 See Bryant (1990) pp 1-4 and Casley and Kumar (1988) p 60, for a discussion of the conceptual problem of household and Scott et 
al (1980), for a view on the possible consequences of the conceptual problem on the results of field studies. 
34 
For further details on multistage sampling, see for example, De Vaus, op. cit. pp 52-69; Jolliffe, op cit 27-57; Levy and Lemeshow 
212-244. 
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frame. The frame is a compiled list of the 24 villages in the district of Kafr Shukr. 
They are 'Al Menshat Al Kubra', 'Asneat', 'Kafr El Shahawy' and 'Kafr Shukr', 
henceforth Menshat, Asneat, Shahawy and Shukr respectively. Figure (8.1) above shows 
the locations of the four villages. 
The second stage was to take a sample of households from each of the four villages. This 
stage was rather difficult because the latest national census of 1986 was not available in 
a disaggregated form. Moreover, after six years, the census is considered out of date, as 
far as our research is concerned. Thus we had to find a more reliable sampling frame. 
In order to achieve this objective, we applied the following procedure: for the two 
relatively large villages of Shukr and Asneat we relied on the updated electricity board 
register which includes the names and addresses of not only those who already have 
electricity but also the names and addresses of those who apply for the service. Further 
we augmented this register with the list of parents of compulsory primary schools pupils. 
To form a sampling frame for the two smaller villages of Shahawy and Menshat we 
undertook a household count. Table (8.2) below shows the number of the randomly 
selected households for each of the four villages. 
Table (8.2) 
Population and sample size of the four villages 
* Source: CAPMAS, National Census 1986. 
** Calculated for 1992 with 2.2 net average population growth rate. 
*** Household sample size is approximately 4.9 for the Kalyoubbiya Governorate: CAPMAS National Census 
(1986). 
Shukr Asneat Menshat Shahawy 
Population (1986)* 15144 8911 5859 1922 
Population(1992)** 17257 11179 6676 2190 
Numberof Households''' 3522 2281 1362 446 
Sample Size 80 50 40 30 
Sample size / population % 2.27 2.19 2.93 6.72 
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It is worth noting that the household size in the rural areas is greater than the 4.9 average 
for the whole Governorate which includes rural and urban areas. In the urban areas the 
household size tends to be smaller due to several factors, including education, size of the 
dwelling, the influence of family planning programmes and the absence of the role of the 
extended family. In a recent study by CAPMAS on income and expenditure 1990/91, the 
average household size was 6.7 in the rural delta. In this study the average household size 
is 5.66. Thus, the Sample/Population % per village, in our study, is actually larger than 
the figures shown in table (8.2). 
(8.6) The Questionnaire: 
In order to accomplish the objectives of the study, a pre-coded questionnaire35 was 
designed to provide a complete picture of each household and its asset and debt status. 
The questionnaire was written in Arabic and consists of the following main sections, 
which are described in further details below. 
1. A household roster which provides a list of HH members, their sex and age. 
2. A record of the Household's members which provide data on marital status, 
education and employment. 
3. Standard of living component which shows the details of type of the dwelling, and 
its possession; water supply; fuel used, possession of a toilet inside the dwelling; 
a record of owned durable goods and the HH type of transport . 
4. Income level and main sources of income. 
5. An asset holding record contains agricultural land and non agricultural land, 
other real estate, livestock, farming equipments and other miscellaneous assets. 
6. Size of savings, and saving instruments already used by the HH and their relative 
importance. 
35 
The author benefited from the following references in constructing the pre-coded questionnaire: Fowler (1984), Babbie (1990), 
Grootaert (1986), Cody and Smith (1987), Delaine et at (1992) and de Vaus (1987). 
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7. Main details of deposit accounts with the formal sector, e. g. type of bank, deposit 
size, reasons for opening an account. 
8. Borrowing from the formal sector component which provides details of the loan, 
e. g. size, source, cost, collateral, duration, cases of default. 
9. HH reservations and views on the services of the formal financial sector. ' 
10. An inflation hedges component that provides information of the HH possession 
of inflation hedges, such as gold, foreign currencies, durable goods, hoarding of 
specific consumption goods, building materials.. etc. A record of the changes in 
inflation hedges, and reasons for keeping/liquidating them. 
11. An informal sector component that covers in details the borrowing and/or lending 
transactions. 
12. A component on the characteristics of collective financial arrangements through 
RoSCAs. 
13. A section on the effect of a hypothetical net increase of income and wealth on 
saving behaviour of the households. 
14. A section on the HH's reaction to the main changes of the formal sector services, 
and the impact of the increase of nominal interest rates on the portfolio selection 
of the HH. 
15. A record of the changes of the size of formal and informal loans since January 
1991. 
To test the reliability and consistency of the answers of the interviewees some additional 
questions were included in the questionnaire36. Moreover a pilot study of 30 HHs, in the 
research field, was conducted to test the relevance of the questions and discover any flaws 
in the questionnaire lest they affect the main study. The findings of the pilot study led to 
minor modifications in the initial version of the questionnaire. However, the pilot study 
36 
See the questionnaire number (1) and the list of variables in appendix number ( ). 
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was a good opportunity to examine the responsiveness and cooperation of the potential 
interviewees which were quite promising. 
All sample households were interviewed by the author37. An informed guide38 from each 
village was chosen. The guides' responsibilities were to allocate the addresses 
geographically, to inform the household head of the date and time of interviewing him 
or her and to introduce the author to the members of the households. 
The average interview lasted for around 2.5 hours. This normally included an 
introduction to the household members, serving tea and informal chat with the 
household's leader about the purely academic purposes of the study and some other 
issues. This was quite useful as a warming up session before starting the questionnaire. 
(8.7) Socio-economic characteristics of the four villages: 39 
Due to the coexistent urban and rural features of Shukr and Asneat, we consider the 
former as semi-urban, while the latter as semi-rural. Menshat and Shahawy, with 
insignificant urban features, are typical examples of a traditional Egyptian village. These 
classifications are reflected in the socio-economic indicators of the four villages provided 
in table (8.3). 
The mean HH size in the four villages was 5.66 and that of individual villages did not 
significantly deviate from this figure as it ranged from 5.45 in Menshat to 6.07 in 
37 On survey interviewing rules, see Fowler op. cit pp 107-122 and Babbie op. cit 187-201. 
38 As expected some of the villages' roads had no names and some of the buildings had no numbers, so it was essential to get the 
assistance of someone who knows the people by name and location. In the case of Menshat and Shahawy the guides were voluntarily 
selected by each village's chief, in the case of the other two villages, a guide was recommended by leaders of households who were 
interviewed in the beginning. 
39For 
further analysis of the socio-economic characteristics of rural Egypt and the main economic changes in it during the last three 
decades, see Abdel Fadil (1975), Adams (1985), Commander (1987). 
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Shahawy. The average age of the HH head was approximately 46 years, again without 
significant difference between individual villages. 
The different stages of urbanisation in the four villages are reflected in terms of education 
and occupation of HH heads. Shukr outperformed the rest of the villages in terms of 
lowest illiteracy rates and higher percentages of HH leaders with formal degrees. Only 
22.5 % of HH heads in Shukr were directly dependent on agriculture, i. e. landlords, 
agricultural labourers and fellahs40, while 31.3 of them were government or public sector 
employees. Agricultural labourers at 33.3% and 30% formed the biggest groups of HH 
heads in Shahawy and Menshat respectively. Government and public sector employment. 
was significant in all villages; its lowest figure was in Asneat at 16%. 
Unemployment rates ranged between 2.5% and 6% which in a country with 17.5% is 
remarkably low. Two factors are behind such low figures of unemployment in our 
sample. First unemployment is generally lower than average in rural Egypt. Second, and 
more importantly, the unemployment estimated here is that of the HH heads who belong 
to relatively high age groups (the mean age is 46 years). 
' We prefer to use the Arabic word fellah instead of farmer or peasant as it more describes the socio-economic characteristics of the 
Egyptian fellah. 
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Table (8.3) 
Main socio-economic indicators of the sampled villages 
Source: Survey data and the district council oarur. 
Encountering various problems in the process of collection and calculation of asset and 
income data is expected in a predominantly agricultural region. Most of the households, 
directly or indirectly earn their living from agriculture which is subject to seasonality, 
weather change, disease, and so forth, which increase uncertainty in yields and, even in 
Shukr Shahawy Asneat Menshat All 
villages 
Number of households 80 30 50 40 200 
Mean household size 5.71 6.07 5.5 5.45 5.66 
Average age of 
household's leader 46.5 46 45.8 45.2 46 
Education of the HH's leader (%): 
1. Illiterate 20 33.3 34 22.5 26 
2. Reads and Writes 28.7 30 26 40 30.5 
3. Below G. Certificate 17.5 10 18 12.5 15.5 
4. General Certificate 21.3 20 18 12.5 18.5 
5. University Degree 12.5 6.7 4 12.5 9.5 
Occupation of the HH's leader (%): 
1. Land Lord 5 3.3 8 5 5.5 
2. Agricultural Labourer 5 33.3 20 30 18 
3. Artisan 17.5 6.7 18 10 14.5 
4. Merchant 13.8 6.7 6 7.5 9.5 
5. Government/publicsector 31.3 20 16 22.5 24 
6. Private Sector 7.5 3.3 6 2.5 5.5 
7. Fellah (farmer/peasant) 12.5 23.3 18 15 16 
8. Unemployed 5 3.3 6 2.5 4.5 
9. Others 2.5 0 2 5 2.5 
Mean value of household's assets 246222 64838 88880 82377 146910 
Mean income of household per annum 7040 3950 5550 4600 5716 
Mean savings per annum 2061 745 1655 923.7 1535 
Land holding: (Feddan) 
1) can land ownership 3.31 0.71 0.99 0.69 1.82 
2) Mean rented land (from others) 0.08 0.19 0.36 0.14 0.18 
3) Mean rented land (to others) 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.08 
Available facilities 
Agricultural Bank (PBDAC) Main branch Agency Village bank Agency 
Commercial bank Yes No No No 
Medical centre Hospital No Centre Centre 
Primary school Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Preparatory school Yes No Yes Yes 
Secondary school Yes No Yes No 
Paved road Yes No Yes No 
Bakery Yes No Yes Yes 
Veterinary station Yes No No Yes 
Post Office Yes No Yes No 
41 We follow the classification of Commander (1987), p. 51. 
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the most stable periods, generate fluctuations in incomes. 42 Moreover the different 
intervals of earning income. While the receiving of regular wages and salaries is 
relatively easy to record and recall by respondents, irregular incomes such as in the case 
of agricultural labourers are more difficult to compute. 
Further some respondents may report false figures for incomes and assets, even if the 
true figure are known by them. For example a low income respondent may feel 
embarrassed to report his actual income and may overestimate it, while a high income 
respondent, fearing envy, avoiding questioning about the source and/or concern of 
taxation may underestimate his income, regardless of any kind of assurance given to him. 
However we attempted to minimise these problems by double checking the reported 
income and assets figures against expenditure items and a list of indicators of standard 
of living, such as durable goods possessed, means of transportation,.. etc, included in our 
questionnaire. 43 Moreover obtaining the information directly by the author and visiting 
the household dwelling enabled us to apply these checking procedures and assisted in 
obtaining better information than otherwise. 
Table (8.3) shows that the mean value of household's assets44 in the four villages was 
approximately LE 147 thousand. The figure reached £E 246.2 thousand in Shukr, which 
was higher than the general mean by 68 %, while the mean for Shahawy was less than the 
average by 56%. There was a remarkable difference in the three types of agricultural land 
42See 
Deaton (1992), p. 99. 
43See 
the translation of the main items in the questionnaire in appendix (#). 
44Assets 
value include the values of holdings of agricultural and building lands, dwellings, stores, shops, livestock, equipments and other 
assets. 
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holdings across villages. Shukr has the greatest mean of land ownership at 3.31 feddanas 
while Shahawy had the lowest mean at 0.71. 
The average income per HH for the four villages was LE 5716 per annum. 46 Shukr had 
also the highest mean income at £E 7040 per annum which was higher by 26.9 %, 53.0 % 
and 78.2% than that of Asneat, Menshat, Shahawy respectively. Accordingly Shukr had 
the highest mean savings per annum, as shown in table (8.3). However we found that 
the two low income villages had a better distribution of income than the high income 
ones. By using Lorenz curves47 for the individual villages, figure (8.2) shows that 
Shahawy and Menshat had a better distribution of income than Shukr and Asneat. 
Figure (8.2) 
Lorenz curves of the four surveyed villages 
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Source: Survey data. 
45 1n order to facilitate calculations we are using the feddan and not the qirat (1/24 feddan) as a unit of account for agricultural land. 
46According 
to our estimates per capita income was approximately LE 1009.9 which is 50.02 `& of the per capita income estimated from 
national accounts which was LE 2013, see IMF (1992). While we argue that such discrepancy may be partly attributed to conceptual and 
estimation procedures in the two different approach, it is worth mentioning that per capita incomes are lower in rural Egypt than the 
economy average. 
47On 
the size distribution of income and its presentation see Lambert (1989), chapter (2) 
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As shown in table (8.3), Shahawy is the least developed village with very limited facilities 
while Shukr is the most developed amongst the four villages. However in terms of access 
to agricultural credit we realise that the four villages had a fair access to the services of 
the Principal Bank of Development and Agricultural Credit PBDAC through its branches 
and representative offices. 
At the country level the PBDAC has 17 affiliated banks based in Governorates, including 
Kalyoubbiya, with a network of 800 village banks and 4300 agencies distributed all over 
rural Egypt. 
Figure (8.3) shows the development of total loans advanced by the PBDAC in the district 
of Kafr Shukr and number of borrowers over the period 1989-93. 
Figure (8.3) 
Size of agricultural loans 
and number of borrowers (1989-93) 
Loans (millions) Borrowers (thousands) 
a 
7, 
I TIO 11091 0 5.1 PI 
0 Loans Borrowers 
Source: The PBDAC branch in Kafr Shukr. 
(8.8) Household portfolio structure: 
In the absence of risk and transactions costs and the presence of perfect divisibility of 
assets which have exclusively a financial yield, there would be no need for holding nmulti- 
asset portfolios as acquiring a single asset would be sufficient. However these four 
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requirements for not holding a portfolio cannot be met except in a perfect imaginary 
world. In the real world there is a risk problem, there are various forms of transactions 
costs, assets may not be perfectly divisible and an asset may have additional non-financial 
yields such as the pleasure gained from owning a painting or a house. " Hence holding 
a single asset would not be sufficient and holding a portfolio of assets is essential to 
overcome these four problems including diversification of risks. 
In rural Egypt however we suggest that it is by happenstance more than deliberation that 
households 'select' their portfolios. This is attributed to various economic and cultural 
factors which are highlighted by examining the components of the household portfolios 
in the four villages shown in figure (8.4). 
Figure (8.4) 
Household portfolio selection 
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Source: Survey data. 
We asked the respondents to report all instruments used for saving purposes and rank 
them according to their importance in their portfolios. By focusing on assets classified as 
of 'main' importance in household portfolios we established the dominance of cash, 
48Baumol 
(1970), p. 3. 
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agricultural land, gold and livestock as principal assets which can be considered first 
category components. Possessing a formal deposit savings accounts, establishing a 
project, normally agricultural-related, participation in a RoSCA49 ownership of real estates 
and lending in the informal sector were also significant in the portfolios and form the 
second category. 
The insignificance of shares and bonds is expected according to our analysis of the 
problems of the Egyptian securities market in chapter (4). Mainly due to religious 
reasons, insurance policies were also very insignificant in the HHs' portfolios. Against 
a widespread view regarding the importance of durable goods as an inflation hedge in 
Egypt we did not find them significantly important. This is attributed mainly to the use 
of other inflation hedges such as gold and real estates in rural Egypt. Moreover none of 
the respondents who possess a car considered it a main asset in their portfolios and 
ranked as being of secondary or marginal importance. 
When we examined the portfolio composition at the village level we noticed that the 
relative importance of assets did not significantly change, apart from the fact that cash 
and not gold was the dominant asset in Menshat. Moreover shares and bonds were not 
present in the Shahawy and Menshat portfolios. 
(8.9) The importance of gold in HH portfolios: 
As shown in figure (8.4) gold was the third 'main' asset in HH portfolios, after cash and 
agricultural land, and the first asset if we include all categories. Traditionally Egypt 
maintained an active gold market which added to the desirability for gold as a store of 
wealth. Easily accessible markets, which facilitated purchase, sale, and pawnbroking 
arrangements were widely practised making gold highly liquid. The following description 
49A detailed analysis of RoSCA in Egypt is provided below. 
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of the activities of the gold market in Cairo summarises the importance of gold compared 
to other assets: 
"A visit to Cairo gold market, for instance during the daily rush hours.. is quite instructive 
to the economist. The fellahin of the villages arrive with their bank notes and return after 
a few hours with their choice of coined gold or gold jewellery. The motive of the hoarders 
is not just to substitute one form of wealth with another, but to increase the degree of safety 
of their savings without reducing the liquidity of this investment. Gold fulfils this purpose 
but also fits other purposes well. The custom has become established owing to satisfactory 
experience of many generations acting in the same way. For the same reason, appeals to the 
peasants to use banking facilities for their cash surplus have so far had only a limited 
effect" . 
'0 
Our survey shows that 87.0% of the 200 households possess some gold. As shown in 
figure (8.5) households normally distinguish between three main different purposes for 
keeping gold, namely showing off; saving and insurance. ' 
Figure (8.5) 
Main purposes of holding gold 
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Insurance against unexpected shocks was the primary purpose for hoarding gold, saving 
to smooth consumption over time comes second and showing off comes third. However 
keeping gold for a purpose does not prevent it from facilitating others, e. g. a gold item 
50 Bonne (1957), p. 198; quoted in Drake (1980), p. 126. 
51See 
chapter (6) for a discussion of the motives for keeping gold. 
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may be purchased mainly for showing off but may be liquidated to cover some 
unexpected expenses. 
Figure (8.6) 
Gold as an inflation hedge 
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Source: Gold price is the average retail price per one gramme of 18 qt. gold as published in Al-Abram 
Newspaper, at the last Monday of January of each year. Inflation is the annual change in the ('PI index obtained 
from the CBE; the 1994 figure is estimated. 
In addition to being a highly liquid asset, gold has to be an inflation hedge in order to 
accomplish these prescribed functions. Figure (8.6) illustrates that the real change in the 
price of gold during the 1985-94, with the exception of two years, was positive with an 
average of 6.05 %. Compared with the negative real interest rates on hank deposits, gold 
had a positive 'return' sufficient enough to attract households to owning it» Moreover 
from the Islamic point of view gold is considered a 'lawful' substitute for interest-hearing 
financial instruments given the abolishment of riba, usury, as analysed in chapter (5). 
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Chandavarkar (1961), pp. 139-40, argues that the role of gold as an inflation hedge in an under-developed economy is distinctly 
subsidiary. He contends that in a subsistent economy where incomes are generated from non-monetary activities households are protected 
from high inflation to the extent that they are not aware of costs and risks associated with inflation to seek a hedges against it, and even 
if they are aware they may not have the sophistication to do so. We argue that this view is not applicable in the case of Egypt for several 
reasons, first the Egyptian economy, as shown in the previous chapters, is highly monetised and in our surveyed region there a trivial role 
of subsistence economy. Inflation as shown in chapters (6) and (7) cannot be described as low and prices were highly unstable which called 
for provisions against the associated risk and cost. Third, hedging by purchasing gold does not necessarily require high skills and 
sophistication, especially, as we were informed by several households, gold owners do not follow the daily or even the monthly changes 
in the relative price of gold, instead they mark a specific time in the year, normally after harvest, to consider their selling, buying, or 
holding decisions. 
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Table (8.4) 
Purposes of liquidation of gold 
Purpose Percent 
Starting or expanding a project 25.0 
Contribution to daily expenses 20.7 
Medical expenses 15.2 
Purchase or renew dwelling I4.0 
Marriage expenses 7.6 
Purchase of a durable good 6.5 
Working abroad 4.3 
Buying a piece of land 2.2 
Depositing the value in a hank 2.2 
Other 2.2 
Source: Survey data. 
52.9% of gold owners reported that they liquidated some or all their gold during the two 
years that preceded the d»>e of the survey. As presented in table (R. 4), in most of the 
cases the liquidation of gold was for consumption purposes. 
(8.10) Interim Conclusion: 
In this chapter, we have provided a taxonomy of informal finance in LDCs, distinguishing 
between five main forms, namely, occasional lending, regular lending, tied credit, credit 
associations and corporate finance. Then the approach adopted in the analysis is outlined 
by highlighting the two stage sampling method, village selection, the sample size and the 
design of the questionnaire. 
Based on the survey data, we have discussed the socio-economic characteristics of the 
four villages. Moreover we have examined the household portfolio structure. A typical 
household portfolio in the surveyed region is dominated by cash and gold. The 
importance of gold can be attributed to traditional factors as well as the availability of an 
easily accessible and active gold market. The surveyed households distinguish between 
three main different reasons for keeping gold, namely ostentation, saving and insurance. 
In the following chapter we analyse the formal and informal financial transactions in the 
surveyed villages. 
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Chapter (9) 
Analytical Aspects of Formal and Informal Financial 
Transactions in Rural Egypt 
"Go with me to a notary, seal me there 
Your single bond, and, in a merry sport, 
If you pay me on such a day, 
In such a place, such sum or sums as are 
Expressed in the condition, let the forfeit 
Be nominated for an equal pound 
Of your fair flesh, to be cut off and taken 
In what part of your body pleaseth me. 
W. Shakespeare (1598) 
(9.1) Introduction: 
The coexistence of formal and informal credit markets is a widespread phenomenon in 
LDCs. As argued by Hoff and Stiglitz (1993): 
"There typically exists a dual rural credit market in developing countries. 
In the formal credit market, institutions provide intermediation between 
depositors (or the government) and lenders and charge relatively low rates 
of interest that usually are government-subsidized. In informal credit 
markets, money is lent by private individuals- professional moneylenders, 
traders, commission agents, landlords, friends, and relatives- generally out 
of their own equity". ' 
The coexistence of the two markets is attributed, in the financial development literature, 
to certain factors such as the degree of asymmetry of information between the formal and 
informal credit markets, the difference in the cost of loanable funds in each of the 
markets, and the heterogeneity of borrowers. 3 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the distinctive characteristics of the credit 
market in rural Egypt. We provide an empirical analysis of this market based on survey 
data collected for this purpose, as shown in chapter (8). We attempt to determine the 
1Shakespeare 
(1598/1967), p. 84. 
2Hoff 
and Stiglitz (1993), p. 33. 
3See 
Jain (1993), pp. 1-3. 
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relative size and importance of informal and formal transactions. Conditions of borrowing 
and lending in the formal and informal credit markets are also highlighted, i. e. size and 
length of loans, purposes, role of collateral and contracts, default problems.. etc. 
The chapter also highlights the case of RoSCA in Egypt as an example of informal 
finance through collective arrangements. We analyse its structure, mechanism and role 
in financial intermediation and discuss its limitations. 
The chapter continues by analysing the determinants of formal and informal borrowing. 
In order to do so, we construct two models with village dummy variables. The models 
are estimated using Tobit analysis. The chapter ends with an examination of the initial 
impact of the financial liberalisation programme on households' financial decisions and 
their asset and credit positions. 
(9.2) Informal finance in rural Egypt: 
(9.2.1) Relative size of informal transactions: 
Our survey reveals that 86 % of the 200 households in the survey did borrow and/or lend, 
in the formal and/or informal markets over the 12 months that preceded our survey. The 
rest of the households, 14 %, did not have any relation whatsoever with the two markets. 
Table (9.1) shows that households who had deposit and current accounts with the formal 
banking sector are just 22.5 % of the sample, while those who obtained loans from the 
same sector were 30%. The households who had borrowing and lending relations, 
simultaneously, with this sector were as low as 6%. Those who had no relation, 
whatsoever, with the formal sector were 53.5% of the sample. 
From the same table we find the informal sector was relatively more active than the 
formal one, as 69.5 % of the households lent and/or borrowed in the informal financial 
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market. Those who lent and borrowed, simultaneously, were 13 % of the sample, whereas 
27% of the households extended informal credit to others and 29.5% borrowed from 
others. Just 30.5 % of the households had no links at all with the informal financial sector. 
Table (9.1) 
Formal and informal transactions 
Formal Sector (100%) Informal Sector (100%) 
Borrowed Didn't 
Borrow 
Borrowed Didn't 
Borrow 
Lent 6 16.5 13 27 
Didn't Lend 24 53.5 29.5 30.3 
Note: Proportion of households -in eac ; n=200. 
Source: Survey data. 
Having some access to the formal credit sector did not prevent 46.7 % of the households 
from also obtaining some loans from informal sources. Moreover, 13.3 % of those who 
had deposit accounts with the formal sector borrowed from the informal credit market. 
12% of the households reported that they borrowed from- the formal sector and lent in the 
informal sector. Nonetheless there is no reason to believe that they used formal resources 
in informal lending, especially, as we shall see below, most of the informal loans were 
interest free. Further, the sample shows that 49% of the households neither lent in the 
informal nor the formal markets and 41.5 % did not receive any formal or informal loans. 
By focusing on the borrowing side we find that the relative size of informal credit 
obtained by the households was 30.6% of total credit. Taking into account that a single 
client in our sample received 34% of formal credit, by dropping this particular loan, we 
find that in the remainder of our sample the share of informal credit is approximately 
40.0% of total credit. 4 
4 Note that this figure excludes tied credit and RoSCA funds. 
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(9.2.2) Characteristics of borrowers: 
With reference to the socio-economic groups we find that none of the landlords in the 
sample borrowed. Agricultural workers and the unemployed were the most active in 
borrowing. 58.3% and 55.6% of them respectively obtained informal loans. Merchants, 
Fellaheen, 'government and public sector employees' and 'artisans and other manual 
workers' were active in borrowing as 52.6 %, 46.9 %, 45.6 and 44.8 % of their respective 
totals received loans from the informal credit market. In addition, 36.3% of those who 
are employed in the private sector borrowed from the IFM. Figure (9.1) shows the 
relative importance of the above 8 groups in the informal credit market as percentage of 
the totals of informal borrowers and lenders. 
Figure (9.1) 
Informal lenders and borrowers 
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Source: Survey data. 
The average size of a borrower's household (5.64 members) was no different from that 
of a non borrower household (5.68 members). However, it is worth noting that the 
households which are bigger in size did borrow more from the IFM; 58.3% and 66.7% 
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of the 7 and 8 member households, respectively, acquired informal loans while 31 % and 
39.5% of the 4 and 5 member households did. 
The IFM borrowers were dominated by those who had no formal education qualifications. 
While they were 56.5% of the sample they comprised 63.5% of the 85 1 FM borrowers; 
exactly half of them were illiterate. On the other hand the sample shows us that 31.6% 
of those who had higher education, 27% of persons with the Certificate of General 
Placement Examination or its equivalent and 48.3% of those who had primary or 
preparatory education obtained loans from the IFM. 
Table (9.2) shows that the mean income of the borrowers was £E 3365.9, i. e. 36% less 
than the mean income of the sample and half the mean income of those who did not 
borrow informally. The mean savings of borrowers was only 23.3% and 14.9% of the 
mean savings of the whole sample and non-borrowers, respectively. The borrowers' 
assets value, on average, was 26.7% of that of non-borrowers. 
Table (9.2) 
Differences between IFM borrowers and non-borrowers 
IFM Non IFM Sample 
Borrowers Borrowers 
Mean income (£E) 3665.89 7231.3 571( 
Mean savings (£E) 358.82 2403.9 1534.8 
can assets (£E 56924.7 213421 14691(1 
Mean owned land (Feddan) 0.52 2.77 1.91 
Mean rented land (Feddan) 0.15 (1.21) (). I8 
Source: Survey data. 
IFM borrowers average ownership of land was 0.52 feddan, i. e. 71 % less than the mean 
ownership of land in the sample as a whole. The mean owned land of non-borrowers was 
2.8 feddan, i. e. 5.6 times greater than land owned by borrowers. Mean rented land held 
by borrowers was 75% and 83.3% of the mean rented land held by non borrowers and 
the whole sample households respectively. Further, the sample shows us that 74.1 % of 
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1FM borrowers did not own agricultural land, 77% did not hold rented land and 57% 
were not landholders, i. e. with no hiyaza. 
More than half of the respondents who had tried to borrow from the banking sector and 
had their applications refused, managed to secure loans from the IFM. Needless to say 
that many of those who borrowed from the latter did not go initially to the formal sector 
because they assumed that their applications would be refused. 
Our data indicate that 60% of the applications refused by banks were not backed by 
adequate collateral. The purpose of the loan was the second greatest cause, 25%, of 
refusal, e. g. personal consumption lending was not allowed. Bad experience with the 
client was the reason in 15% of the cases for not extending new credit by banks. 
When asked about their views on the services of the formal financial sector, 56.5% of 
the IFM borrowers mentioned that the lack of collateral was the biggest deterrent. 
Cost of borrowing was another problem as 58.8% reported that high interest rates 
prevented them, among other things, from borrowing from the formal sector. 
Approximately 29.4% reject dealing with the formal banking sector on religious grounds 
and a further 27.1% mentioned that they are not quite sure if the banking sector is 
working according to the teachings of Islam or not. ' Based on a belief that information 
passes freely between different formal institutions, 27.1 % of the IFM borrowers reported 
their fear that obtaining formal loans would make them subject to taxation in the future. 
5 
When the author asked the branch manger of the Principal Bank of Development and Agricultural Credit in Kafr Shukr about this 
problem, lie presented a copy of the fntwo given by the Mufti concerning bank dealings and mentioned that he. just refers to it whenever 
someone argues with him about the issue of interest rate and whether it is a foram of usury which is prohibited in Islamic Law. It is worth 
mentioning that many of the scholars, including the Imam of AI-Azhar oppose the view of the Mufti and consider charging interest rate 
an explicit form of usury. It is ironic to find that when the government started to promote rural cooperative societies in the 1920s, the 
British obtained favourable opinions from the Mufti in Egypt and rulings from Malay sultans that the interest arrangements of cooperative 
credit did not contravene Islamic Law" see Von Pischke (1991) p 195. 
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(9.2.3) Sources of informal credit: 
Figure (9.1) above shows that landlords and merchants are the dominant lenders, forming 
23.5 % and 22.4 % respectively of the total number of lenders. Government and public 
sector employees account for 18.8 % of lenders, 11.8 % of lenders were fellaheen6 while 
11.8% were artisans and other manual workers. Lenders from the private sector made 
up 9.4%. Agricultural workers and the unemployed in general had no surplus to lend. 
However none of those who lend in the IFM should be considered as professional money 
lenders because the definition of the latter cannot be applied to them. Money lenders are 
defined as individuals who spend most of their time lending money' and the major source 
of their income is generated through this activity. 
In our survey we found that informal lending was intermittent. Lenders and borrowers 
are known to each other; 41.2% of the borrowers obtained loans from their relatives, 
friends or close neighbours and 36.5% received loans from individuals from the same 
village. When there was no close relation assistance from others in the form of 
recommendation to the lender was obtained from a relative or a friend,.. etc, in 28.2% 
of the cases. Help was given free, except in one case when the guarantor asked for a fee. 
(9.2.4) Purposes of loans: 
The purposes of formal loans were predominantly for production; 51.7% of the credit 
was for agricultural operations, 16.7 % for trade, 3.3. % for agri-industrial projects. The 
shares allocated to consumption and social events were 10 % and 6.7 % respectively. The 
rest of the credit, 11.7%, was classified under other purposes. ' From our own 
6 Plural of fellah. 
7 See Adams (1991), p. 31. 
8A 
possible reason why loans classified under other purposes are high, 11.7%. is that some borrowers from the formal sector may use 
the loans for different purposes than those declared in their application forms. 
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observation and inquiries most of these unclassified loans are used for building or 
renewing houses. 
The branches of the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC) 
were the main source of formal credit available to our sample of households, accounting 
for 80% of the loans, commercial banks participated with 5% of the loans and employees' 
funds were the source of 15% of credit. 
Figure (9.2) 
Purposes of formal and informal loans 
oc 
cy 
_. 
Öj 
80 60 40 20 0 10 20 30 411 50 
Percent 
Fermal Informal 
Source: Survey data. 
By contrast, spending on different consumption items and preparing for social events 
were the dominant reasons behind obtaining an informal loan. 40% of the households 
reported that they borrowed for the former reason and 22.4% for the latter. Informal 
credit was also a source of working capital, both for starting a new project and enlarging 
an existing project. 27.1 % of the households borrowed for these purposes. Financing 
emigration expenses accounted for 5.9% of informal credit. Thus we find that there is a 
consumption bias in informal credit, which is justified by several demand and supply 
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factors including: the nonexistence of formal personal credit designed for consumption 
needs, the limited role of the insurance market, lack of collateral, the fact that in many 
cases the amounts required tended to be too small to cover formal administrative costs 
and finally the costs of formal borrowing, which are considered high and/or usurious'. 
(9.2.5) Credit characteristics: 
The average size of formal loans was £E 4,927.17 with a minimum of £E 300 and a 
maximum of £E 100,000. Although the number of loans from the IFM was greater than 
those from the formal sector, the average size of an informal loan tended to be much less 
than formal one, with an average of £E 1,231.94, a minimum as small as £E40"' and a 
maximum of £E 20,000. Table (9.3) displays the differences in loan mean size according 
to the purpose of the loan from both sectors. 
Table (9.3) 
Sizes of formal and informal loans according to purpose 
Source: Survey data. 
Purpose of loan Informal Formal 
Loan mean size Cases Loan mean süc cases 
Production 2165.22 23 5%I. 6 41 
Consumption 539.71 34 I090.0 6 
Social events 1557.89 19 750.0 4 
Emigration 563. (1(1 S 0 Il 
All purposes 1231.94 85 4927.17 60 
As shown in figure (9.3), IFM loans were held, on average, for 6.7 months. 71.8% of 
the loans were for a period of less than 7 months. The IFM loans, therefore, both in size 
and duration were associated with relatively short term consumption and working capital 
needs. The mean length of consumption loans was 4.7 months, while production loans 
9Usury 
here follows the Islamic concept, i. e. any charge of predetermined fixed interest rate, see chapter (5) for a further discussion of 
this issue. 
10 
I have been told by some of the interviewees that they frequently borrow and/or lend small amounts of cash as low as five or ten 
Egyptian pounds but they do not record or recall them because of their insignificance. Given their frequent recurrence we presume that 
if such loans are included, the relative size of informal credit would be bigger than the figure reported above. However these small 
transactions are hard to trace, simply because they are overlooked by the respondents. 
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mean duration was by 2.2 months longer. The mean lengths of loans for emigration and 
social events were 10.8 and 8.4 months respectively. 
Figure (9.3) 
Length of loans obtained from the informal sector 
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Source: Survey data. 
Our sample shows that 90.6 % of informal loans were interest free, 6% were with a return 
determined according to a profit and loss sharing principle while for the remainder, 
3.6 %, the return was in kind. 
The dominance of interest free transactions and profit and loss sharing contracts is 
attributed to the strong Islamic prohibition on usury and the solid cultural view against 
it and those who deal with it. Allah the Almighty says in the Holy Qur'an: "Oh, you who 
believe! Fear Allah and give up what remains of usury if you are indeed believers, If you 
do it not, take notice of a war from Allah and his Messenger. " (2: 278) 
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The average return on profit and loss sharing contracts was 1.7% per month with a 
minimum of 0.3 % and a maximum of 2.6 %. This was more than the prevailing interest 
rate on formal deposits and less than loan interest rates which benefited both IFM lenders 
and depositors. However, as mentioned above, we found a few transactions in which the 
interest rate was charged implicitly. This occurred through taking a productive collateral 
from the borrower. 
In one case a portion of land was taken from the borrower who was an agricultural 
worker, until he returned the principal of the loan (£E 600) after 5 months. The loan was 
used for spending on some essential consumption items during illness. The realised 
interest rate received by the lender was 16.7 % during 5 months. In two other cases a cow 
was taken as a collateral. In the first case, the loan was for covering some consumption 
needs and its size was £E 150. The realised interest rate was 0.56% per day. In the 
second case the size of the loan was £E 240 and was also used for consumption. The 
realised interest rate was 0.18% per day. 
Usufruct loans", like these three, are used to limit the consequence of information 
asymmetries and increase the probability of repayment. They are used in different forms 
in many developing economies. In Thailand these loans are used to finance migration and 
the lender normally occupies the land until the borrower returns and pays the principal. 
In Nigeria similar transactions are called tree pledging as the lender has the right to 
harvest the borrower's trees. 12 
11 These transactions are known in The Egyptian Governorate of Menouffiya as Mougharaqa. 
12 See Adegboye (1983), pp. 269-275 for further details of the Nigerian case and Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) p. 243 for a brief discussion 
of the case of Thailand. 
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(9.2.6) Collateral: 
In formal credit markets secured loans are commonplace. They provide the creditor with 
a priority claim on a particular asset, i. e. collateral, in addition to a general claim on the 
other assets of the debtor13. Collateral has two main functions. First it shifts the risk 
involved in the transaction from the lender to the borrower and second it enhances the 
borrower's incentives to repay the loan. In other words it limits the moral hazard 
problem. 
In rural regions, the amount of loan a borrower can obtain is dependent on the size of 
land he owns. Given that land is the main source of income of rural households, they are 
reluctant to utilise it in loan transactions and tend to consider it as a last resort. 
Moreover land is not equally distributed and there is a significant ratio of landless 
households who may try to get loans. Thus other forms of guarantee appear as a 
substitute. 
It is remarkable to find in our sample that 92.9% of the informal transactions were 
undertaken without marketable tangible collateral. Similar evidence regarding the rare use 
of collateral in rural northern Nigeria was found by Udry14. In his study collateral was 
used in only 3 percent of the loans. 
However as shown in figure (9.4) promissory notes were used as a form of collateral in 
32.9% of the transactions. A promissory note has no market value, but it can be passed 
to a third party who may agree to take over the debt obligation specified in it, and it can 
be used if the lender wants to take a legal action in the case of default. Even if we 
13 See the New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, vol (1) pp. 381-383. 
14 See Udry (1990) p. 260. 
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include promissory notes, we realise that 60% of the informal credit was extended against 
no collateral whatsoever. 
Figure (9.4) 
Type of collateral used in informal borrowing 
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Source: Survey data. 
On the other hand, in 5 cases, i. e. 5.9% of loans, a productive collateral was taken. We 
discussed three such cases of them above under the issue of interest rates and in the other 
2 cases productive collateral, agricultural tools and equipments, was taken but not used 
by the lender. Gold jewellery was taken as a collateral in another case. 
Moreover, our sample shows that in 61.2% of the transactions no contract was written. 
When a contract was written, a collateral, including promissory notes, was also taken in 
94 % of the cases. 
The phenomena of limited use of collateral is attributed mainly to the following two 
factors: 
1. Information flows freely between lenders and borrowers in relatively small 
communities that occupy small geographic areas. We found in our survey that 
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77.7% of the loans were obtained from friends, relatives, neighbours or village 
co-residents. In the rest of the loans we found that some of the borrowers were 
known closely to their lenders. Accordingly there was an informational advantage 
available to lenders. In the case of having no direct relation with the borrower, 
a third party who possessed information about the borrower was used as a 
guarantor. Help was received in 63 % of the transactions when the borrower and 
the lender were not from the same village. Thus we can argue that tangible 
collateral was substituted by a "social collateral"". 
2. Enforcement mechanism is intact in informal financial markets. 16 The role of 
personal relations and societal links does not end when the borrower receives the 
loan. We argue that "societal governance" reduces the problem of screening and 
enhances the incentives of the borrower to repay the debt and establishes a direct 
enforcement mechanism. " Default would cause a tarnishing of reputation and a 
denial of access to future loans from the same lender and possibly from other 
lenders as well. 18 Hence a rational individual will try not to violate the implied 
social code of conduct unless there is a genuine reason behind default; in such a 
case the society would intervene to assist the defaulter by extending credit and/or 
period of repayment. 
(9.2.7) Default: 
Our sample shows that default occurred frequently as 55.3 % of the loans were not repaid 
on the agreed dates. But after allowing the borrower some more time for repayment there 
was a fall of default cases to 11.5 %. This emphasises the fact that loans in the IFM tend 
15This 
concept is introduced in Besley and Coate (1991). 
16Besley 
(1994) defines enforcement problem as "a situation in which the borrower is able but unwilling to repay". 
17 See Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) for a discussion of the problems of screening, incentives and enforcement. 
18Areetey 
and Udry (1994), p. 16, report that in some cases informal lenders have no effective means of dealing with those who default 
except making them "live with the stigma" of being known to be defaulters. 
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to be state-contingent. When insurance markets are absent or incomplete, informal credit 
markets play a significant role as they allow pooling of risk over time. Potential 
borrowers apply for loans more when they face an adverse shock. % 
Repayment depends on the state of their financial condition. State-contingency facilitates 
the pooling of risk as the current lenders may be future borrowers19. This is enforced by 
a complex nexus of personal relations, societal governance and the prevailing tradition 
and religion. Allah the Almighty says in the Holy Qur'an: 
If the debtor is in a difficulty, then grant him time, till it is easy for him 
to repay". (2: 280) 
Accordingly we find that in 70% of the 'default' cases the borrower was granted more 
time by the lender to assist him in repaying the loan in full. Some of the lenders, 6.4%, 
extended further credit to the borrower. Nevertheless we found that in 12.8 % of the cases 
the borrower had to obtain a new loan from another lender to repay the old loan. A legal 
action was taken in 10.6% of the default cases, i. e. in 5.9% of all credit transactions. 
Table (9.4) shows repayment and default cases before granting borrowers further time for 
repayment. It shows that writing contracts and/or obtaining collateral may help in 
reducing default, as 61.6% of default cases occurred in the absence of them. But one 
should state that 34% of default occurred even when the transaction was backed by 
collateral and specified in a contract and more than 52% of the fully repaid loans were 
obtained without taking a collateral or writing a contract. 
19 See Udry (1990) pp. 261-263. 
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Table (9.4) 
Repayment and Default (before time concession) 
Repayment (No Default) (44.7%) Default (55.3%) 
Collateral No Collateral Collateral No Collateral 
Contract 17.6 1.2 18.8 1.2 
No Contract 2.4 23.5 1.2 34.1 
Note: Proportions of households in each cell; n=85. 
Source: Survey data. 
(9.3) A note on Interlinked Credit: 
Interlinked arrangements reduce transaction costs, enhance borrower's incentives to repay 
the loan and limit moral hazard and monitoring problems20. 
The most recognised form of interlinked credit in rural Egypt is trade credit. 21 
Nevertheless, none of those who were involved in interlinked credit considered it as a 
loan of any kind. This may be due to the fact that the credit arrangement is incorporated 
in the trade contract to the extent that the two parties may not realise that they are two 
separate agreements. 
In our sample, under trade credit, buyers of land products made advances to producers 
to help them in financing agricultural operations. For example in the case of citrus fruit 
the contract is typically signed during the months of June and July. Upon signing it the 
wholesale trader pays the producers around 20% of the agreed value of the product. The 
rest is distributed in four equal instalments, 20% each, in the months of January, 
February, March and May. The trader normally starts selling the product, when it is ripe, 
by the beginning of October and may not get the full revenue of the trade before June of 
the following year. 
20 See Bell (1988), pp 798-803. 
21It is worth mentioning that sharecropping is not common in the surveyed villages and most rentals are in cash, which is the case 
elsewhere in Egypt as noted by Richards and Martin (1983), p. 4. 
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This transaction is not strictly a credit transaction but rather a forward sale motivated by 
the producer's need for credit during the period between June and October each year. The 
price at which the citrus fruit is valued will be less than the prevailing market price when 
the fruit is ready for sale. The difference is the implicit rate of interest, usually justified 
by the risk of losing some, or all, of the product during the waiting period, on average 
five months. 
We found that 18% of the households with owned and/or rented land were involved in 
tied credit arrangements. The mean owned land under tied credit was 9.3 feddan; almost 
five times more than the mean owned land of the sample as a whole. There are three 
reasons for this; first that tree products, such as citrus fruit, the main agricultural product 
of the region, are cultivated on relatively large land. Second, traders who are capable and 
willing to extend credit specialise in relatively large scale production. Third, most crops 
cultivated on a smaller scale had to be delivered to the government's marketing board and 
until quite recently it was a crime to sell them directly on the market. 
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(9.4) Informal finance through collective arrangements: The case of RoSCA 
Informal finance can take a form of collective arrangements. One of the examples of 
these arrangements is Rotating Savings and Credit Association known in financial 
development literature by the acronym (RoSCA)22. In this section we will try to describe 
the main characteristics of RoSCA in Egypt and analyse its structure, design, mechanisms 
and limitations. 
(9.4.1) Characteristics of RoSCAs: 
In a typical RoSCA individuals voluntarily construct together a club to pool regularly 
their savings in order to create loanable funds for the members of the club. The 
distinguishing feature of RoSCAs is the intermittent pooling of the deposits collected from 
members to be made available exclusively to each member in turn. When there are (n) 
participants, each contributes (x) at the beginning of the agreed period (t), normally a 
month or a week, where the number of periods should equal (n), and each one will 
receive, in turn, (x. n). At the end of the cycle, i. e. after (n) regular intervals, each 
member will have received (x. n) which is equal exactly to the sum of funds he or she has 
contributed with during the cycle of the RoSCA23. 
The above example shows RoSCAs in their simplest form, where no interest rate is 
charged, no compensation is paid to the organiser and no competitive bidding is 
considered for the fund. 
As shown in figure (9.5) below the first member in the cycle gets credit, interest free, 
from the rest of the members, while the last member in the cycle extends credit to the 
RoSCA members. Other members' positions alternate between borrowing and lending. 
22 The world Bank (1989) and other studies report different names of RoSCAs in different countries; e. g. tand in Mexico, chit in India, 
tontine in Niger, hagbad in Somalia, chilimba in Zambia, kou in Japan, pasanakus in Bolivia and gameyah in Egypt, see World Bank 
(1989) p. 114 box 8.2; Adams and Canavesi (1989) p. 223; and Mrak (1989) p. 65. 
23 See Bouman (1983), p. 262. 
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Figure (9.5) 
Lending and/or borrowing 
during a typical cycle of RoSCA 
(9.4.2) Merits of RoSCAs: 
1. The RoSCA practice enables a person with small savings to accumulate a greater 
sun as he has a clear awareness that his small periodic savings will eventually he 
accumulated into a relatively large lump sung. 
2. A RoSCA member manages to save such a lump sung in a shorter period than 
when saving on his own. We argue that even if he is allocated at the end of the 
cycle he may still reach that large sum earlier than he would otherwise have done, 
simply because the commitment of contributing regularly to the common fund 
would prevent him from spending it on trivial consumption items. Hence the 
saving behaviour of the individual may improve, ceteris paribus, due to the 
"RoSCA saving incentive". 
3. RoSCAs are responsive to the economic conditions and social requirements of 
their members in terms of the amount of each member's share, duration, order 
of rotation, consistency of rules and procedures with the prevailing 
socio-economic norms. 
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4. RoSCAs enjoy, like many other informal arrangements, low transaction costs, 
which may be close to zero in some cases. There are no administrative expenses, 
no information costs, and monitoring is left to strong social ties and pressure 
which effectively reduce cases of default. However, it is not reasonable to assume 
that transaction costs should be zero as RoSCA should bear some transactions 
costs in order to create economic value for its members24. 
5. In an environment of segmented capital markets, the establishment of a RoSCA 
is considered to be a Pareto improvement25. If the purpose of the RoSCA is to 
purchase an indivisible asset with a price equal to the amount of the common 
fund, then pooling of resource reduces waiting period for acquiring that asset. 
Following the example provided by Callier (1990)26; RoSCA reduces the average 
waiting period W= (n+ 1)/2n, i. e. as a fraction of the duration of the entire cycle 
of RoSCA, by close to 50% of the time needed by participants if they save 
individually. Note that Callier assumes that the saving behaviour of the individual 
is the same in RoSCA and outside it. However due to the RoSCA incentive 
highlighted in point (2) above, we argue that the saving behaviour may improve. 
Hence even the last one in the cycle would benefit from a reduction of the waiting 
period compared with autarky. 
6. It is clear from the previous point that it is not just the RoSCA members who 
benefit from the scheme, as those who are attached to producing and selling the 
indivisible product, e. g. durable goods, in the absence of credit schemes will 
benefit as well without bearing any form of risk. 
24 Von Pischke, op. cit., pp. 16-17. 
25 See Besley, Coate and Loury (1990) pp. 4-6 and Callier (1990) p. 274. 
26 
See Callier (1990) pp. 274-275. 
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7. RoSCAs do not only play a financial and economic role but also have some social 
benefits. Members get together regularly and at such meetings they may exchange 
views, contacts are strengthened and other transactions may take place. 
8. Nevertheless, accessibility of RoSCAs can be considered as the most important 
ingredient of its attainment. There are no excessive regulations or rules but those 
observed by the society, no collateral is needed, and no deposit minimum as one 
can participate at a level that caters for each individual's income and credit needs. 
If the' periodic share is still higher than one's saving ability, he may participate 
with another member in one share27. 
(9.4.3) RoSCAs in Egypt: 
i) Structure: 
According to our sample, 45 households, 22.5% of the sample, reported that they 
participated in a Gameyah, RoSCA. As can be seen from table (9.5) below, the average 
size of RoSCA was 10.82 members, with a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 20. 
The mean average age of members was 35 with a range from 26 to 45. The minimum 
average age may be higher than expected, but there are four reasons for that. 
1. First, the minimum age here is the minimum average age in each RoSCA so the 
minimum age for a member is lower than 26. 
2. Second, the commitment of contributing regularly to the common fund cannot be 
achieved unless there is a stable source of income that is sufficient to allow for 
monthly regular savings. Given the high unemployment rate among the youth in 
Egypt, obtaining such a regular and sufficient income is a privilege for only a few 
of them. 
27 See Bouman, op. cit., p. 263. 
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3. Third, one of the main reasons for joining a RoSCA, as shown below, is 
preparing one's home for marriage. However due to unemployment the age of 
marriage has risen recently. Even if a person is getting married early, it is still 
considered the responsibility of the family to finance most, if not all, of the 
marriage expenses. So parents may be the ones who join a RoSCA to help finance 
the expenses of the marriages of their children, which pushes the average age 
higher. 
4. Fourth, the purchase of durable goods, which is the main objective of joining 
RoSCA, is not related necessarily to age. 
Table (9.5) 
Characteristics of RoSCA in Egypt 
Item Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Number of Members 10.82 6 6 20 
Average Age 35.02 5.4 26 45 
Duration of the Cycle (month) 9.51 2.34 6 12 
Share Size 42.89 24.32 10 100 
Fund Size 474.22 353.27 90 1800 
RoSCA Fund to Income (%) 12.22 9.9 1.76 48 
Source: Survey data. 
In contrast to' the familiar view in Egypt which implies that the main participants of 
RoSCAs are women, the survey shows that just 8.9 % of RoSCAs were exclusive to them, 
while 22.2% were exclusive to men. However, 68.9% of RoSCAs comprise men and 
women with a significant participation of the latter. 
I have been told by several interviewees that in the past, RoSCAs were considered as 
women's clubs, but during the 1970s and 1980s this view has changed to the extent that 
we find men dominating them. We surmise that the reasons behind this change can be 
summarised by three factors. First, the purpose of RoSCAs is no longer limited to 
consumption reasons, as many persons join it for productive purposes as shown below. 
Second, the success they have achieved with very limited default cases has encouraged 
a lot of people to increase the shares and hence the funds. Taking the decision to increase 
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participation, necessitates the involvement of men directly in the activities of RoSCAs. 
Third, under the revival of religious influence, formal credit schemes are viewed as 
usurious and hence prohibited, "zero-interest-rate" RoSCAs appear as plausible substitute 
for such schemes. 
Our survey results indicate that 40% of the members are neighbours, while 35.6% of 
them are colleagues at work, 15.6 % are friends, 4.4 % are relatives, while 4.4 % have no 
relation with each other. According to our survey we realise that RoSCA was popular 
amongst government and public sector employees as 33% of the 45 RoSCAs were 
constructed predominantly by them. Getting their salaries in monthly terms and meeting 
each other regularly at the work place makes forming a RoSCA a feasible arrangement 
among these employees. Farmers and agricultural labourers come second, then private 
sector employees, then artisans and merchants. Landlords seem to have no interest in 
RoSCAs. There were no unemployed members in any of the 45 RoSCAs, possibly 
because they cannot meet the obligation of regular payments to the fund. 
It is worth mentioning that 91 % of the members had neither current or deposit accounts 
with the formal sector and two thirds of them did not borrow from the same sector. The 
third who had loans from the formal sector borrowed these from the Agricultural 
Development Bank i. e. the loans were limited to agricultural use. 62% of the members 
reported that they have religious considerations that prevent from dealing with the formal 
sector. 
ii) Purposes: 
Figure (9.6) below shows that purchase of durable goods, mainly television sets, washing 
machines, electric fans and items of furniture, was the dominant reason for joining a 
RoSCA, as 31.1 % joined RoSCA for that purpose. 20% of RoSCA members mentioned 
that preparation for social events like marriage and engagement ceremonies and paying 
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dowries was the reason behind their participation. The third most important reason 
reported by 17.8% of RoSCA members was the use of funds for meeting occasional 
expenses , e. g. purchase of wholesale food, paying bills, 
buying school uniforms and 
books. Accumulation of capital for starting a business or expanding an existing one was 
the fourth reason in importance for joining a RoSCA as 15.6% of members had this 
reason. Another 15.6 % of the members reported that they use of the funds for saving for 
a rainy day i. e. for insurance purposes. 
Figure (9.6) 
Purposes of RoSCAs 
ConsumptIon 
17.8 
Saving &Insurance 
15.8 
Durable goods 
31 
Trade and Business 
15.8 
Social events 
20 
Source: Survey data. 
iii) RoSCA design: 
The average cycle of the RoSCA, as shown in table (9.5), is 9.5 months with a minimum 
of 6 months and a maximum of 12 months. The Deviation between the number of months 
and the number of members is due to 2 reasons. First, more than one member 
participated in one share. Second, shares were collected weekly in 6.7% of RoSCAs 
while the rest were collected monthly. Weekly shares were generally paid by traders who 
joined RoSCAs for productive purposes. There were no daily shares. 
332 
Average share size was LE 42.9 with a minimum of LE 10 and a maximum of £E 100 
and the average size of the fund ranged from LE 90 to £E 1800. Obviously, such a big 
difference between the minimum- size and the maximum size is attributed to the 
differences in the number of members and the size of their contributions. Nevertheless, 
the purpose of joining a RoSCA is an important factor behind the size of the fund; the 
common funds of traders' RoSCAs tend to be much bigger than those established for 
consumption purposes. 
From table (9.5) it is evident that the average size of a RoSCA fund is 12.22% of the 
annual income of the households with a minimum of 1.76% to 48%. However, the 
importance of RoSCA as a saving instrument does vary from a household portfolio to 
another. However 53.3 % of RoSCA participants in our survey consider it of secondary 
importance in their portfolios, 35.6% report that it has a main importance, while it was 
marginal in 11.1 % of the cases. 
On the other hand, figure (9.7) below shows that, according to income classification, 
RoSCA members are mainly found among the (£E 2000 to LE 5000) income groups, with 
less members from the higher and lower income recipients. The biggest participation, 
however, comes from the (£E 5000 to £E 6000) income group as 50% of this group 
participated in RoSCA. while 31.8%, 24.2% and 27% of the three preceding groups, 
respectively, joined RoSCA. A relatively smaller number, 14%, of the lowest income 
group (£E 1000 to £E 2000), were members in RoSCA. Fewer number of high income 
earners did participate in RoSCA. 
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Source: Survey data. 
Given that the average income of the household is LE 5716, hence RoSCA can be 
considered an informal financial arrangement undertaken primarily among the middle 
income and low middle income groups. Low income groups may not have enough regular 
savings to participate with and high middle income and high income groups may have 
better access to formal credit, or undeniably, may not be in need for credit at all. 
iv) Determination of the rotation: 
Analysts distinguish between RoSCAs according to the way of determining the rotation 
of access to the pool of collected deposits. They distinguish between random RoSCA and 
bidding RoSCA. 28 
According to Besley, Coate and Loury (1990) and (1993), the rotation can be determined 
randomly. Members (n) put a fixed sum of money into a common fund (F) for each 
28 See for example: Besley, Coate and Loury (1993); Montiel, Ag6nor and Haque (1993). and Callier (1990). 
Figure (9.7) 
Participation in RoSCAs 
according to income groups 
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period of the cycle (t). Members meet regularly at agreed dates (t/n, 2t/n, 3t/n, ..., t) and 
at each meeting every member contributes a share of (F/n). Members draw a lot and the 
pooled contributions (F) are allocated to one of the members. The process is repeated in 
the beginning of the subsequent periods with the previous receivers excluded from the 
draw, until each member receives the lot and the RoSCA's life comes to an end. 
According to this type of RoSCA each member considers his turn in receiving the pot as 
a random variable, (r), with a uniform distribution on the set (t/n, 2t/n, 3t/n, ..., t). By 
forming a random RoSCA, without a change in their saving behaviour, all members, but 
one, raise their expected lifetime utilities as they manage to accumulate (F), t(n-1)/2n 
sooner than saving on their own. However if our suggestion of the improvement of saving 
behaviour under RoSCA is accepted then all members including, the last one in the cycle, 
would perceive this improvement in the expected utility over the life of the RoSCA. 
The second way of determining the rotation of the RoSCA is by bidding when the RoSCA 
is formed, i. e. at time (0). The potential member n,, indicates his demand for the common 
fund (F) in a specific date dE [O, t] by offering higher contribution in the future at a 
constant rate b(na). The member with the highest offer receives the common fund first 
and then the person with the second highest offer follows him in rotation and the cycle 
continues. In this type of RoSCA funds are usually linked to the market interest rate. 
However members of bidding RoSCAs, as in random RoSCAs receive the common fund 
only once. Thus, the bidding procedure just decides the priority of receiving the common 
fund29, as well as the effective interest rate. 
As with a random RoSCA a bidding one allows its members to utilise their savings more 
effectively than under autarky. However it is proved theoretically that a random RoSCA 
is more efficient than a bidding RoSCA. Bidding under the rule of making utilities of all 
29 See Besley, Coate and Loury (1990) op. cit., pp. 1-3 and Montiel, AgBnor and Haque, op cit, pp. 15-16. 
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member equal, results in saving at a higher rate by early recipients i. e. forgoing of 
consumption. As shown in figure (9.8), the utility allocation in a two-member random 
RoSCA is at point A if individual 1 wins the first pot or point B if individual 2 wins. But 
in a bidding RoSCA the utility allocation, in order to make utilities equal, has to be at 
the intersection point of the two frontiers, which is lower than A and B. 
Source: Adapted from Besley, Coate and Loury (1993), p. 801. 
However in our survey we have found that there is a third type of RoSCA common in 
Egypt, let us call it "non-random RoSCA". In this kind of RoSCA the determination of 
the rotation lies fully in the hands of the organiser. Different factors are considered by 
the organiser when deciding the rotation: the creditworthiness of the member; how 
desperate is he for receiving the common fund early; and his relation to the organiser. 
The most important factor of these is creditworthiness as the default risk problem begins 
once a member receives the common fund. 30 
30 See Christensen (1993), p. 726. 
Figure (9.8) 
Allocation of utility in a two-person RoSCA 
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In an environment where the absence of tangible collateral is not uncommon, the 
organiser has to rely on a substitute for collateral. Reputation of the potential member can 
be used as a form of social collateral. If he is not known directly by the organiser, then 
one or more of the members, who may possess better information about him may be 
considered as a guarantor and a peer monitor of the potential member31. 
Given that the utility of default is higher for early recipient members in the cycle, this 
has to be minimised by different measures. The first is to allocate members with high 
creditworthiness at the beginning of the cycle and vice versa. Second, to keep the number 
of participants small to lower the monitoring effort. The average size of a RoSCA in 
different countries is reported to be between 6 to 40 members32 and in the case of our 
survey it was 10 members. Third, to accept members who are known well by the 
organiser and/or other members of the association as a guarantee of their fidelity. Fourth, 
to keep share contributions small. 
Accordingly, in a standard non random RoSCA, the organiser usually takes the common 
fund first and priority is given to those who are frequent members to receive it after him. 
Those who join it for the first time are allocated at the end of the cycle. In the first 
meeting of the cycle, it is not uncommon to find that the members are 'bidding by their 
problems' to justify their demand for priority. However, many of these RoSCAs have 
more than one cycle. This allows for some form of compensation to the late receivers of 
the common fund in one cycle, by allocating them a better position in the following one. 
31 On peer monitoring and substitutes for tangible collateral see Stiglitz (1990) pp. 351-366 and Sarap (1991) pp. 167-188. 
32 See the World Bank (1989), op. cit., p. 114 box 8.2. 
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According to our sample, in 62.2% of the 45 RoSCAs, 33 the organiser received the pot 
first and it was him who decided, according to the three factors described above, the 
rotation of the cycle. In 6.7% of the RoSCAs the organiser received first and then a 
random procedure determined the position of the rest. It is worth noting that receiving 
the pot first was the only compensation given to the organiser for his effort. However, 
in another 6.7 % of RoSCAs, the one who participates with more than one share received 
the pot first, and then the rotation was determined randomly. It was interesting to find 
that in 24.4% of the RoSCAs, the person in most need of the fund received first, and 
then negotiations among the members determined their positions in the cycle. Bidding on 
the pot did not take place in any of the RoSCAs. Hence, the discretion of the'organiser 
and negotiations were the two main methods of determining the rotation of the RoSCA. 
It is worth noting that no interest rate was involved in any of the Egyptian RoSCAs. 
(9.4.4) Further remarks on RoSCAs: 
Built on trust, RoSCAs have proved to be a good example of the informal collective 
arrangements that rely on preestablished social relations and ties. However, when asked 
about their view on participating in RoSCA, the interviewees' responses were not entirely 
in favour. As shown in figure (9.9), just 20 of the 200 households had a very positive 
view about RoSCAs as an instrument of savings. 55 of them mentioned that they favour 
it. 27 households said that they were indifferent. Those who do not favour it were 60 
households and 38 reported that they strongly do not favour it. 
33Note 
that the number of RoSCAs may be less than 45 as some of the respondents may be members in the same RoSCA. 
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Source: Survey data. 
Thus the number of those who have reservations on RoSCAs was much greater than the 
enthusiasts. This can be attributed to the following factors: 
1. Lack of law enforcement in the case of default or disagreement. 
2. Lack of confidence in organisers and/ or members. 
3. Lack of compensation for the late receivers of the pot. 
4. The start of new credit schemes which allow increasing numbers of customers to 
buy durable goods by instalments with zero interest rate due to the recession. 
5. The occurrence of default cases in some RoSCAs in the past. In the 45 RoSCAs 
mentioned above. there was just 3 default cases. In one of them one member did 
not pay his last share after receiving the pot. The other two were in the form of 
a delay in payment of the share which the organiser did not manage to cover so 
2 members received incomplete funds. However, the reported 3 cases should not 
cause consternation among potential participants as the default cases are just 0.62 
per cent. But it seems that the collapse of Islamic Investment Companies34 which 
34 See our analysis of these companies in chapter (5). 
Figure (9.9) 
Respondents' views on RoSCAs 
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were built mainly on trust, discouraged a lot of potential members to engage in 
similar arrangements. Moreover one of the RoSCA organisers in the village of 
Menshat, received the pot and disappeared. This is reflected in the views of the 
households of this village on RoSCAs. This village had a low number of 
participants as 20 % of its households participated in RoSCAs, while in the village 
of Shahawy, which shares the main economic and social characteristics with 
Menshat, 36.7% of the households were RoSCA members. If anything this 
emphasises that the issue of confidence and trust goes both ways. 
Finally, a RoSCA can be considered a successful financial intermediary given the 
following conditions: 
- First, it has to be kept small and simple. Increasing its size will jeopardise its main 
ingredients of success, that is low transaction costs attributed to low costs of collecting 
information and monitoring. Larger numbers of participants would mean, in addition to 
greater transaction costs, an increasing need for measures against default risk, like the use 
of tangible collateral. This would exclude a significant number of potential participants 
and on the other hand would place RoSCAs in competition with formal intermediaries 
which are more capable of handling collateral-based transactions. 
An example of the evolvement of RoSCAs can be found in the development of building 
societies in the UK. In the 18th centuries these societies were simple clubs formed of 
groups of neighbours and friends "who saved regularly to finance the purchase of their 
own houses"35. Nowadays they become sophisticated financial institutions that do not 
significantly differ, from banks, with barriers to entry and regulations that limit 
accessibility. Thus, any attempt to make the RoSCA evolve into a large scale financial 
35 
Davies (1994), p. 326. 
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intermediary would result in a loss of its raison d'etre namely to serve those with no 
access to financial intermediaries, simply because it ends up acting like them. 
- Second, a simple zero-interest rate RoSCA has to operate in a low inflation 
environment. High inflation rates, when there is no interest rate involved to compensate 
the late receivers, would discourage participation. Similarly when there is a devaluation 
process applied in the economy, potential members will hesitate to participate, unless they 
choose a relatively more stable foreign currency or make the transactions directly in 
inflation hedges like some of the durable goods. For example in Bolivia a country with 
a high inflation rate, averaging 220% during 1980-92,36 an attempt to avoid the inflation 
obstacle, RoSCAs were conducted in US dollars. 37 
- Third, in the Egyptian context, we find that the launching of credit schemes to promote 
the sale of household goods has a negative impact on forming RoSCAs, which are 
organised primarily, as mentioned above, for the purchase of durable goods. However 
recent attempts by merchants, in various countries including Egypt, to use RoSCAs in 
promoting the sale of their goods, mainly durable consumption goods, may contribute to 
the forming of RoSCAs. This arrangement benefits the merchant by improving his trade 
and lowering monitoring costs, compared with conventional credit sale, as he exploits the 
enforcement mechanism of RoSCA in a way that reduces default risk. The arrangement 
also benefits the members of RoSCA, in addition to the usual advantages of RoSCAs 
discussed above, it provides them with bargaining power with the trader and ensures, 
under inflation and risk, that each member will receive the durable good that he is saving 
for. However finding the sufficient number of potential members who need the same 
36World 
Bank (1994), table 12, p. 184. 
37See 
Adams and Canavesi (1989), p. 225. 
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durable good, or one with the same price, is one of the possible problems of this type of 
RoSCA. 
- Fourth, like the rest of informal financial transactions, the operation of RoSCA relies 
upon the existence of different risk groups in the society as it caters for those considered 
by the formal intermediaries as high risk customers. Improvement in information 
collection in the formal sector and law enforcement on defaulters will have a negative 
impact on the significance of RoSCAs and their viability. 
- Fifth, economic development and urbanisation may not be encouraging to RoSCAs. The 
former would result in increase of income and better accessibility to credit markets"38 
While the latter would weaken social ties which is one of the main pillars of the 
foundation of RoSCAs. In Japan RoSCAs, or Kou, had a role to play till the beginning 
of this century, economic development, market integration39 and urbanisation resulted in 
their current disappearance. 
(9.5) An estimation of the determinants of formal and informal borrowing: 
(9.5.1) Specification of formal and Informal borrowing functions: 
We construct two models in order to estimate the determinants of formal and informal 
borrowing. In the first model we consider formal borrowing BF, as a dependent variable 
defined as the sum of loans received by the household from formal financial institutions 
over the 12 months before the survey. 
The model includes five categories of explanatory variables: (i) Village dummy variables, 
as a proxy for the effects of socio-economic and infrastructural differences between 
38 
It is established in a study by Besley, Coate and Loury (1992) that despite that a RoSCA allows for improvement in utilities compared 
with autarky, it does not, in general, provide a better allocation of resources than credit markets. The reason given is that credit markets 
are more flexible than a RoSCA which is constrained by simple structure. 
39 See Callier, op cit, p. 275. 
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villages. (ii) A vector of economic conditions of the HH which includes income, savings, 
volume of deposits held with the formal sector, land and non-land wealth and ownership 
of gold. (iii) A vector of social characteristics of the HH that includes the size of the HH, 
and age, education and occupation of the head of the HH. (iv) A vector of problems 
encountered with formal financial intermediaries, namely cost of borrowing, collateral 
problems and religious reservations. (v) Finally in an attempt to find a link between the 
formal and informal sectors, we include a dummy variable that indicates whether the HH 
borrowed from the IFM. 
BF= al + a2Dum, + a3Dum2 + a4Dum3 + a5Dep + a61nc + a7Sav + a8Ast + 
a9Lnd + a10Gld + asze + a12Age + a, 3Edu + a14OCC + a15COl + a16Cst + 
a17Rel + a18Inf (9.1) 
where 40 
Dum,, Dum2 and Dum3: Village dummy variables. 
Dep: Volume of saving deposits held with banks. 
Inc: HH income. 
Sav: HH savings. 
Ast: Non-land assets or wealth. 
Lnd: Land holding. 
Gld: Ownership of gold. 
Sze: Size of the HH. 
Age: Age of HH head. 
Edu: Education of the HH head. 
Occ: Occupation of the HH head. 
Col: Collateral problems with the formal sector. 
Cst: Cost of borrowing from the formal sector. 
Rel: Religious reservations. 
Inf. Informal borrowing. 
In the second model we estimate the determinants of informal borrowing. Defining 
informal borrowing simply as the amounts borrowed may produce bias41 and does not 
reflect the actual position of many households who engage simultaneously in borrowing 
40For 
a detailed definition of the variables see appendix (3). 
41See Iqbal (1983), pp. 69-70. 
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and lending in the IFM. 42 Hence we define the dependent variable B, as the value of loans 
received minus loans advanced by households during the 12 months before the survey. 
Moreover, to investigate links between the formal and informal sectors, we included in 
the explanatory variables Fdep which indicate whether the HH has a formal deposit 
account, and Fln which indicates whether a formal loan was obtained. Apart from 
excluding Dep and Inf from (9.1) the rest of the explanatory variables are the same. 
B, = ß, + f2Dum, + ß3Dum2 + ß4Dumj + ß5Inc + ß6Sav + ß7. Ast + f8Lnd + ß9Gld 
+ ß, 0Sze + ßAge + ß, 2Edu + ß13Occ + ß14Col + ß15Cst + ß16Rel + ßF'dep 
+ ß18Fln (9.2) 
The dataset consists of 200 observations for each variable. In the estimation of the two 
models we use Tobit analysis. The general formulation of the model" is usually given as: 
ß., xe, (9.3) 
y= 0 if y*50, 
Y= y* ýfy*>o. 
The results of the two models are shown in table (9.6). 
42That is excluding RoSCA funds and IICs deposits. 
43For 
an extensive analysis of Tobit analysis and Censored and truncated models see Amemiya (1984); Maddala (1983), chapter (6), and 
Greene (1990), chapter (21). 
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Table (9.6) 
Determinants of formal and informal borrowing 
Variable Formal borrowing/1000 Informal borrowing/1000 
Constant -15.475 (-1.626) -2.9922 (-1.844)' 
Shahawy dummy 2.8066 ( 0.788) 0.8761 ( 1.397) 
Asneat dummy 4.2498 ( 1.317) -0.8762 (-1.577) 
Menshat dummy 0.5665 ( 0.171) -1.5667 (-2.380)b 
Deposit volume/1000 -1.0079 (-6.385)` 
Household income/1000 2.1082 ( 2.839)` 0.7272 ( 6.722)` 
Savings/1000 -1.8442 (-1.180) -2.0374 (-6.480)` 
Assets/1000 0.0434 ( 0.987) 0.0064 ( 0.725) 
Land holding/1000 0.0209 (2.915)c 0.0024 (2.232)b 
Ownership of gold -2.5989 (-0.653) 1.6634 ( 2.657)° 
HH size -0.2542 (-0.408) -0.2217 (-1.978)" 
Age of HH head 0.1168 ( 1.099) -0.0211 (-1.060) 
Education of HH head 0.3440 ( 1.225) -0.0192 (-0.366) 
Occupation of HH head -0.4017 (-0.720) 0.0496 ( 0.476) 
Collateral problems -1.2923 (-0.363) -0.0385 (-0.061) 
Cost of borrowing -2.4403 (-0.692) 0.8314 ( 1.125) 
Religious factor -5.8703 (-2.311)" -0.0341 (-0.069) 
Informal borrowing 2.3740 ( 0.945) 
Possessing a formal deposit account -0.7019 (-0.878) 
Obtaining a formal loan 0.6457 (1.323) 
a 11.624 (10.514)` 2.319 (11.724)° 
Log-Likelihood -279.5842 -229.5916 
L-ranos are in oracKers. 
' indicates significance at 10% level. 
b indicates significance at 5% level. 
indicates significance at 1% level. 
(9.5.2) Estimation results: 
(I) Formal borrowing: 
The village dummy variables were not significant. This indicates that intervillage socio- 
economic and infrastructural dissimilarities were not strong to an extent that can be 
reflected in significant differences in loans obtained from the formal sector. After all, the 
formal sector services embedded mainly in those of PBDAC44, were available at almost 
the same level in all villages, in a way that its services were geographically accessible to 
44 
The Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit. 
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all villages, and non of the villages can be considered particularly disadvantaged because 
of its inferior infrastructural status or socio-economic characteristics. 
The coefficient on the possession of a saving deposit account, as expected, is significantly 
negative. Instead of borrowing at a higher cost from the formal sector the household can 
withdraw from their deposits to meet their consumption or production requirements. 
The positive sign on household income is some indication of the ability of the HH to 
return the principal of loan and to service it. Although the savings coefficient is not 
significant it has the expected a negative sign which may be explained by the same reason 
given in the case of formal deposits. Assets as an indication of wealth has a positive sign 
but again it is not significant. Most of HH assets consists of items which are not 
recognised by banks as collateral as it is difficult under the bankruptcy laws in Egypt to 
liquidate specific assets like houses. However holding agricultural land, owned and/or 
rented, is a significant determinant of borrowing from the formal sector which mainly 
advance loans for agricultural purposes as discussed above. 
The coefficient of ownership of gold is with an insignificant negative sign again because 
gold is not recognised by the formal sector as a form of collateral. Moreover the 
coefficient of the size of HH is insignificant. This can be explained by the fact that the 
size of the HH is not related to demand for formal credit which is essentially for 
agricultural purposes. Age, education and occupation of the HH head, that construct the 
rest of social characteristics vector, are also insignificant. 
The three variables of cost, collateral and religion that indicate whether HHs have 
problems with formal borrowing all appear with negative coefficients. However the only 
significant one among them is the religious factor. As discussed in chapter (5) obtaining 
a formal loan which involves interest rates payment, is considered as a form of the 
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prohibited usury in Islam. Thus the religious factor with a significant negative sign. The 
dummy variable of informal borrowing is positive but insignificant. This finding does not 
help us in determining the type of interaction between the formal and informal sector. 
(II) Informal borrowing: 
Turning to the determinants of net informal borrowing, with reference to table (9.6) we 
find the following. Only the coefficient of Menshat dummy variable is significant and is 
negative. While Menshat shares with Shahawy the main characteristics which can be 
captured with the dummy variables, they are different in a main aspect that is the stronger 
links with a more affluent village which Shahawy enjoys. Many of the Shahawy HHs 
informal transactions were carried out with borrowers and lenders from Asneat. Lack 
of equivalent access to an active IFM may be the reason for limited informal transactions, 
as shown in figure (9.10), and hence the negative coefficient of Menshat which indicates 
that its households are less likely to be involved in informal borrowing despite their 
similar conditions to those of Shahawy. 
Source: Survey data. 
Figure (9.10) 
Cases of lending and 
borrowing in the IFM (percent) 
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As in the case of formal borrowing, income has a significant positive coefficient 
indicating the ability of the borrower to honour the obligations of the loan. Savings has 
an expected negative coefficient which, by contrast with the case of the formal 
borrowing, is strongly significant. A possible explanation for this difference is that formal 
loans tend to be bigger in volume than informal ones, as shown above. Hence while 
savings may be sufficient to cover expenses, mainly consumption, that may be otherwise 
met by informal borrowing, they cannot, given their small size, fully substitute for the 
expenses, mainly production, that are covered by formal borrowing. Assets and land 
holding have positive coefficients, but the former is not significant while the latter is. The 
same reasons given under formal borrowing apply. 
Ownership of gold, as an acceptable collateral in the IFM, is a positive determinant of 
net informal borrowing. On the one hand, gold is an indication of the ability of the 
borrower to repay his debts. On the other hand, a gold owner may prefer borrowing 
against his gold instead of liquidating it, either to avoid the loss of part of its value in a 
quick sale or because of non-price value of the gold item or both. 
There is a significant negative relation between HH size and net informal borrowing. 
Although it is expected that an increase in the size of the household implies a rise in 
family obligations, which in turn may increase the needs for informal borrowing; it is 
actually the demand, and not the mere need, for loans which is considered in our 
analysis. As discussed above, even in the informal sector, demand for loans, in order to 
be effective, should be supported by factors that fulfil the requirements of a successful 
loan applications. It may be the case that some bigger HHs cannot fulfil these 
requirements, e. g. social collateral. Another explanation can be considered under the 
familiar arguments of demand for children who can be, after a specific gestation periods, 
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a source of income in extended families. " Therefore the rise in the HH size may not 
necessarily be accompanied with an increase in its informal borrowing requirements. 
The coefficients of HH head's age, education and occupation are not significant. This 
result however support our analysis of the characteristics of borrowers in the IFM, which 
demonstrates that informal borrowing passes through socio-economic boundaries. 
Moroever the dummy variables included to display link with the formal sector, were 
insignificant which suggests that there is no simple correlation between obtaining a formal 
loan and an informal one. 46 
45 See for example Bauer (1991), pp. 25-26. 
46Similar 
findings, regarding the undetermined relation between the formal and Informal sectors, were obtained in Mohieldin and Wright 
(1994) by using a Probit and bivariate Probit analyses. 
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(9.6) The impact of financial liberalisation: some early reflections 
Since January 1991, i. e. 23 months before undertaking the survey, some liberalisation 
measures have been introduced in the Egyptian banking sector. Perhaps the most 
important of them was lifting interest rates ceilings. However our survey which was 
conducted approximately two years after the launching of the new 'reform' measures does 
not show a positive response to them. 
" 81 % of the households reported that their views regarding the unsatisfactory 
services of the formal financial sector did not improve. 
" Just one household mentioned that he opened a new account with the banking 
sector during the period between 'reform' and the survey. 
" In terms of financial savings we found that 42.2% of formal sector depositors 
reported that they saved more to benefit from the increase in interest rate on 
deposits, but 22.2% mentioned that they spent more, thanks to the high interest 
rates. 35.6 % witnessed no change in their saving behaviour. This finding supports 
the view that arguments which take as axiomatic that saving responds positively 
to interest rates have an ambiguous empirical basis. Changes in interest rates 
generate income and substitution effects that offset each others and the net impact 
on savings by rise of real interest rate is ambiguous47. 
Although these 'short run' responses to the reform measures might be disappointing to 
the financial liberalisation advocates, we find them compatible with the saving behaviour 
of rural household highlighted in our discussion of their portfolio selection in chapter (8). 
Moreover this is reflected in the answers of HHs to a group of questions included in the 
questionnaire to investigate the HH likely response to a supposed net increase in income. 
47 See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), pp. 101-103. 
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Figure (9.11) 
Households' response to net increase in income 
Source: Survey data. 
As shown in figure (9.11), the HHs' show a preference to spending on consumption 
goods, including the durable items and pilgrimage if they witness a net increase in 
income. Financing emigration to work abroad was rejected by 75% of the respondents; 
this was primarily because they had no reason to emigrate, having already achieved an 
increase in income. 
Establishing own projects, and buying agricultural land were favoured as forms ot' 
productive spending. While buying gold was only rejected by 30.5% of the Illls, 
depositing funds in the formal sector, was rejected by 45% of them, despite the then high 
interest rate, of approximately 18.5%. Clearly there are issues additional to a mere 
increase in nominal interest rates that are required to make the formal sector more 
attractive to potential depositors in rural areas. As shown above they may have other 
savings and hedging instruments available to them, which may not necessarily be the case 
for urban households. 
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However we suggest that the finding which may cause some alarm is possibly related to 
the farmers' reaction to the increase of the cost of agricultural loans. We found that: 
" 15.3% of farmers continued to borrow from the PBDAC the same amounts of 
loans as before the increase of interest rates from the formal financial sector. 
" 6.3% started to obtain their required funding from the IFM. 
" 59.5 of the farmers reduced the size their borrowing and obtained supplements 
from autonomous sources, friends and other informal sources. 
" 1.8% of the farmers reported that they changed the types of crops they used to 
grow to relatively low production cost crops, which were with the inferior 
economic value. 
" 17.1 % of the farmers were not affected as they never obtained loans from the 
PBDAC branch. 
Moreover several farmers anticipated the return of usurious moneylenders, Al muraboon, 
if the cost of borrowing remained as high. Professional moneylenders were quite active 
in Egypt until the 1930s when they started to disappear with the growth of the short term 
subsidised loans provided by the Credit Agricole d'Egypte established in 1931 and 
developed' to be an agricultural cooperative bank in 1948. 
Despite the repressed financial system, farmers in Egypt managed to obtain their funding 
from the PBDAC, at a subsidised interest rate. 48 However with the PBDAC starting in 
1991 to charge 'commercial' interest rates on agricultural loans, problems of arrears and 
defaults began to increase. Historically the PBDAC had an excellent record in debt 
recovery with an average of 99% over 1987-92. However this ratio decreased upon the 
initial rise in interest rate in 1991 to 94% and is expected to decline further, 49 with 
48 0n the role of PBDAC and its subsidised credit see Arcand (1992) and Sadowski (1991), chapter (6). 
49World 
Bank (1993), pp. 65-6 
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estimates showing that arrears in payment ranged in 1992-93 between 30 %-45 %. 50 In turn 
this made the bank more fastidious about the collateral required for new loans. As the 
PBDAC became closer in its lending to commercial banks, it started to loose its 
distinctive features as a specialised development bank. 
It should be noted however that the only development in the supply of agricultural credit 
was merely its rising cost. The PBDAC remained almost a sole provider of agricultural 
credit in rural areas despite the existence of other banks which had a minimal 
involvement. In 1991 it provided 75 % of total lending to agriculture I with a higher share 
in lending to small land holders. Hence competition as one of the main pillars of 
liberalisation was effectively absent in the agricultural credit market. 
The PBDAC did not enhance its institutional structure. It did not make significant effort 
to lower transaction costs, innovate methods for the mobilisation and allocation of funds, 
or improve the skills of its personnel. S2 The bank continued in its old approach keeping 
a low profile in saving mobilisation and relying on the government for subsided funding. 
But with the withdrawal of government it obtained credit from commercial banks with 
relatively higher cost which increased the interest rates charged. 
Given these developments, the IFM may flourish with the revival of the old activities of 
professional moneylenders which vanished in the past because of the establishment of 
agricultural banks. " Rising default and collateral problems with the formal sector would 
provide professional moneylenders with potential clients. 
50The 
governmentrealised that default started to increase and bankruptcy was inevitable in several cases so intervened by forgiving parts 
of some of the debts and rescheduling others. However this remains a temporary solution. 
51See 
World Bank (1993), p. 65. 
52See 
Yaron (1992) for a discussion of the ingredients of a successful agricultural bank even in the absence of government subsidies. 
53See 
chapter (3) for a discussion of the background of the government intervention in agricultural credit. 
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It is empirically evident that informal finance flourishes under both repressive and liberal 
financial policies. 54 However our concern is about the type of informal activities in the 
Egyptian context would thrive under liberalisation. 
(9.7) Concluding remarks: 
In this chapter we have analysed different aspects of formal and informal transactions 
with an emphasis on the latter. The formal and informal credit markets are active in the 
surveyed four villages as 86% of the 200 HHs reported that they did borrow and/or lend 
in the formal and/or informal markets over the 12 months that preceded the survey. 
However we realise that, in terms of the number of participants, the informal sector was 
relatively more active than the formal one as 69.5 % of the 200 HHs lent and/or borrowed 
in the informal financial market, whereas only 46.5 % of the HHs had borrowing and/or 
lending relations with, the formal sector. Nevertheless the average size of a formal sector 
loan was approximately four times greater than the average informal loan. Moreover 
informal sector loans were associated with relatively short term consumption and working 
capital needs. 
Formal loans were predominantly for production purposes as banks were constrained to 
provide consumption credit. Interlinked credit was not significantly recognised in the four 
surveyed villages. The closest transactions to this kind of credit are found in wholesale 
trade of citrus fruit. However these transactions are not strictly considered as credit 
transactions but rather forward sale. 
Informal transactions in our sample can be classified as intermittent mainly, undertaken 
amongst friends, relatives, and neighbours. It is remarkable to notice that 90.6% of the 
54See Aryeetey and Udry (1994), p. 8. 
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informal loans were, implicitly and explicitly interest free, which is attributed mainly to 
the strong Islamic prohibition on usury and the solid cultural view against it. It is also 
interesting to find that 92.9% of informal transactions were undertaken without 
marketable tangible collateral. 
Rare use of collateral can be explained by the free flow of information between lenders 
and borrowers and the fact that the informal financial market is governed by a complex 
nexus of personal relations which establish an effective enforcement mechanism in the 
case of default. 
In this chapter we have also highlighted the case of RoSCA in Egypt as an example of 
informal finance through collective arrangements. 45 households reported that they 
participated in a RoSCA during the previous year to the survey. These households belong 
mainly to the middle and low middle income groups. The average number of RoSCA 
participants was approximately 10 with a mean age of 35 years. Members were mainly 
colleagues at work and friends. The average RoSCA fund was approximately 12% of the 
member's income. 
The dominant reason for joining a RoSCA was the purchase of a durable consumption 
good. Preparation for social events, e. g. marriage, saving and accumulation of capital for 
production purposes were also reported as reasons for participation. The type of RoSCA 
which we found common in the surveyed villages is what we call a "non-random" 
RoSCA. In order to continue its role in informal financial intermediation RoSCA we 
argued that it has to be kept small, otherwise default risk would increase. Moreover we 
argued that free-interest rate RoSCAs such as the ones found in Egypt need to operate in 
a low inflation environment. If inflation accelerates, members allocated at the end of the 
cycle have to be compensated. 
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We also found that 4.5 % of the sample households had deposit accounts with the Islamic 
Investment Companies (IICs). SS In terms of occupation 6 of the 9 IICs' depositors were 
from the group of government and public sector employees, 2 landlords and an artisan. 
The average size of their deposits was relatively small, LE 22,111, i. e. 63% of the mean 
size of the sample deposits at the banking sector. 33.3 % of the IICs' depositors stated that 
the high return was their main motive for dealing with these companies. However 66.7% 
of the depositors mentioned that three factors of compatibility with religion, high return 
and the uncomplicated procedures, combined together are the reasons for their dealing 
with the IICs. Dealing with the IICs did not prevent 77.8% of the households to hold 
deposit accounts with the formal banking sector. 
Thus informal finance in our surveyed region took three main forms, namely, occasional 
borrowing from friends and relatives.. etc, participation in RoSCAs and dealing with the 
IICs. 
To investigate the determinants of formal and informal borrowing we have estimated two 
models, with village dummy variables,. using Tobit analysis. In the case of formal 
borrowing the village dummy variables were not significant which indicates that inter- 
village socio-economic and infrastructural dissimilarities were not strong to an extent that 
can be reflected in significant differences in loans obtained from the formal sector. 
If we focus on the significant coefficients we realise that land holding, owned or rented, 
is a positive determinant of borrowing, explained by the fact that the formal sector, in the 
surveyed region, mainly advances loans for agricultural purposes. The coefficient of HH 
income was also positive which is some indication of HH ability to repay the loan. 
Deposit at the formal sector had a negative coefficient indicating that instead of borrowing 
55See Chapter (5) for an analysis of these companies. 
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at a higher cost the household can withdraw from their deposits to meet their production 
or consumption requirements. The religious factor also had a negative coefficient which 
reflects the rejection of obtaining a loan with an interest rate, which is considered a form 
of usury. The type of interaction between the formal and informal sectors could not be 
determined as the relevant coefficient was not significant. 
In the case of informal borrowing we have found that the coefficient of the dummy of the 
relatively poor village of Menshat was significant and negative. This indicates that the 
HHs of this village are less likely to be involved in informal market transactions. 
Although Menshat shares the village of Shahawy a lot of socio-economic characteristics, 
the households in the latter enjoy a greater accessibility to the active IFM market of the 
more affluent village of Asneat. Both income and savings, have significant coefficients. 
However the former is positive, as in the case of formal borrowing, while the latter is 
negative. Land holding, as in the case of formal borrowing, has a positive sign. 
Ownership of gold as an acceptable collateral in the IFM is a positive determinant of 
informal borrowing. 
The relationship between HH size and net informal borrowing was negative in our 
estimation. There are two explanations for this unexpected relationship. First, in our 
model we estimate the actual demand and not the mere need for informal loans and it may 
be the case that some bigger HHs cannot fulfil the requirements for a successful loan 
application despite their need, e. g. lack of social collateral. Second given that children 
can be a source of income in extended families, the HH size need not always be 
associated with an increase in informal borrowing requirements. Again, as in the case of 
formal borrowing, the dummy variables included to display links with the formal sector 
were not significant which indicates that there is no simple correlation between obtaining 
a formal loan and an informal one. 
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Our findings regarding the households response to financial liberalisation measures do not 
suggest a positive response to them. Households' views regarding the unsatisfactory 
services of the formal sector did not improve and there was not either any meaningful 
improvement in their relation with this sector. Moreover we argue that if the rise in the 
cost of formal borrowing continued to be the main change brought by liberalisation, the 
IFM will continue to exist in Egypt, but with a change in its structure, rules, scope and 
mechanisms. 
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Chapter (10) 
Summary of Principal Results and Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has dealt with the issue of financial development in Egypt at the sectoral, 
macroeconomic and household levels over the period 1960-93. First at the -sectoral level 
we have analysed the structure and performance of the banking system, securities market 
and the formal and informal Islamic sectors. Second at the macroeconomic level we have 
investigated the causes, measures and impact of financial policies and tested the effect of 
the real interest rate on saving, investment and economic growth. Third at the household 
level we have analysed financial transactions in rural Egypt and the impact of formal 
financial measures on the households' borrowing and lending decisions in both the formal 
and informal credit markets. Egypt has provided an interesting case study in which the 
formal and informal financial transactions coexist, with a significant Islamic influence on 
both sectors. 
In chapters (3) and (4) we have analysed the development of both the banking system 
and the securities market in Egypt with emphasis on their institutional structure, 
regulation and performance. We have highlighted the fact that the partial liberalisation 
measures of the infitah policy, which was adopted from 1974 until the start of the current 
economic reform programme, did not result in significant change in the structure or 
regulation of the banking system. Its impact was merely to increase the number of 
operating banks and their branches which did not bring a significant change in the 
behaviour of financial intermediaries. The formal credit market continued to operate in 
an oligopolistic manner within a repressive environment. 
After a series of interventionist measures, the securities market was near official closure. 
The reform attempts undertaken since 1971 did not succeed in reviving the market whose 
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performance continued to lag behind its pre-nationalisation level. We argued that the 
problems of the securities market lie mainly in the supply side. 
Our analysis in chapters (3) and (4) emphasised the importance of prudential regulation 
and the need for the restructuring measures of the financial sector. These are necessary 
steps which should be implemented before the undertaking of financial liberalisation and 
then maintained during its process. 
In chapter (5) we have highlighted the main differences between Islamic and conventional 
finance by constructing a simple model for this purpose and presenting the distinctive 
characteristics of Islamic financial intermediation. Islamic finance, through the application 
of PLS principle, has several advantages over conventional funding schemes. It is more 
equitable in the sense that it establishes a direct relationship between lenders and 
borrowers who share the outcome of the partnership, be it profit or loss. The rate of 
return is determined by the real sector and not by the financial sector. There is also a 
close and direct relationship between the return on savings and investment. The Islamic 
financial system ensures that the real values of assets and liabilities will be equal at all 
times. Moreover the PLS offers, at the macroeconomic level, a flexible adjustment 
mechanism in the case of unanticipated shocks. 
However the practice of Islamic banking lags behind its promising theoretical framework. 
In Egypt, as in other Muslim countries, Islamic banks performed relatively better in funds 
mobilisation than in their allocation. In the case of the two private Islamic banks there 
was a significant bias towards the controversial short-term murabaha finance, which was 
concentrated in trade and service sectors. Mudarabah and musharakah finance were 
virtually non-existent. Moreover there was some evidence of breaches of Islamic 
regulations in the form of dealing, implicitly and/or explicitly, in interest rate in both the 
international and domestic markets. 
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The fast rise and the sudden fall of the IICs, which adopted a pyramid scheme, during 
the 1980s emphasise the presence of three main problems in the Egyptian financial system 
during this period. First, the soft regulatory structure which allowed these companies to 
be established and operate for almost a decade without coming under any recognised form 
of regulation or supervision. Second, the problem of financial repression which, 
according to Goodhart's law, pushed a significant number of depositors away from formal 
banks and their controlled negative real interest rates to an unregulated substitute, in this 
the IICs. Third, the insufficiency of formal Islamic banks and the incompatibility of the 
interest-based saving instruments, in the formal sector, with the requirements of a large 
segment of savers who were encouraged to look for an alternative. The case of the IICs 
stresses the need for prudential regulation, liberalised financial sector and a compatible 
financial system with the cultural environment. Alas, the last issue, despite its 
importance, is often neglected. 
We argue that the future of Islamic financial intermediaries in Egypt relies primarily on 
their ability to overcome several critical problems. First, they have to deal with the 
dominance of short-term contracts and murabaha schemes in their portfolios. Second, 
there is a need to innovate instruments to attract risk averse depositors. Third, the 
relationship between Islamic banks and the central bank has not been adequately settled. 
Whether Islamic banks should be subject to the fractional reserve requirement system, or 
be part of a deposit insurance scheme are two important questions which have not been 
addressed in the Egyptian case, where Islamic banks are treated like conventional ones. 
Fourth, in a world dominated by conventional banks, Islamic banks should decide how 
to conduct their transactions with other banks without violating their Islamic principles. 
In chapter (6) we have shown that five main reasons can explain the state intervention 
in the financial market in Egypt, namely market failure, anti-usury laws, the impact of 
the socialist ideology during the 1960s, the influence of Keynesian arguments and, more 
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importantly, the financing of the budget deficit. State intervention was not corrective but 
repressive in the sense that the financial market was distorted in several ways. Financial 
repression took several forms namely: interest rate ceilings, high reserve requirements, 
a high liquidity ratio, ' directed credit schemes, regulation on the portfolio composition of 
banks and government ownership of banks. In addition the government extracted high 
revenues from seigniorage and inflation tax, albeit at relatively low inflation rates thanks 
to the large monetary base. Through these measures the government managed to impose 
high implicit taxes on the financial sector and direct significant amounts of loanable 
founds to finance the budget deficit and priority projects. 
Despite the negative real interest rates, financial savings in the form of domestic currency 
deposits continued to grow over the period 1960-90. We attributed this phenomenon 
mainly to money illusion, inflation as a motive itself for saving, lack of alternatives to 
bank deposits, relatively modest inflation rates, a favourable risk-return relationship, in 
addition to the existence of the widow-orphan type of depositors. 
However the repression of the financial sector resulted in several unfavourable 
consequences including capital flight, the resurgence of informal financial activities 
especially those of the IICs, currency substitution and the increase of the hoarding of 
gold. Moreover the banking profession was adversely affected by financial repression in 
the sense that interest rate ceilings and government intervention in the allocation of credit 
for more than three decades left the banking sector without adequate credit officers, both 
in terms of number and quality. 
Chapter (7) has been concerned with the impact of real interest rates, as a central 
variable in both repression and liberalisation policies. A rising positive real interest rate, 
according to the McKinnon-Shaw school, as discussed in chapter (2), is assumed to have 
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a positive impact on the mobilisation of savings, investment and hence economic growth. 
We have tested these assumptions for Egypt over the period 1960-1990. 
We have found that the real interest rate had a very tentative positive impact on financial 
saving, possibly through a portfolio shift. However we have found no evidence to support 
the argument that the real interest rate has a significant positive effect on total saving. 
The insignificant effect of real interest on total saving ratio may be explained by the fact 
that the substitution and income effects are offsetting each others. 
Further our results point towards the rejection of the complementarity hypothesis. 
Moreover real interest rates changes did not explain credit policy or investment behaviour 
in Egypt. The insignificant impact of financial saving, mobilised by the formal sector, on 
the volume of investment raises some scepticism regarding the efficiency of this sector 
under financial repression in the allocation of loanable funds. Finally we have found that 
the relation between the real interest rate and real economic growth cannot be determined 
for Egypt. These results emphasise that more than the mere increase in real interest is 
required to reform the financial sector. They also highlight the importance of 
comprehensive institutional measures and credible policy changes. 
In Chapters (8) and (9) we have dealt with the issue of the coexistence of formal and 
informal credit markets. In chapter (8) we have provided a taxonomy of informal finance 
in which we have distinguished between five main types of informal transactions, namely 
occasional lending, regular lending, interlinked credit, finance through collective 
arrangements and finally informal corporate finance. In our analysis of financial 
transactions we have used household survey data collected for the purpose. We have 
adopted a two-stage random sampling which produced 200 households in four villages in 
the Kalyoubbiya province in the Egyptian delta. 
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We have shown in chapter (8) that the HH portfolio structure in the four surveyed 
villages is dominated by gold and cash. The importance of gold can be attributed to 
traditional factors as well as the availability of an easily accessible and active gold market 
in Egypt. The surveyed households distinguish between three main different reasons for 
keeping gold viz. ostentation, saving and insurance. The last factor was the primary 
reason for hoarding gold. 
In chapter (9) we have analysed different aspects of formal and informal transactions with 
an emphasis on the latter. The formal and informal credit markets are active in the 
surveyed four villages. 86% of the 200 HHs reported that they did borrow and/or lend 
in the formal and/or informal markets over the 12 months that preceded the survey. 
In terms of the number of participants, the informal sector was relatively more active than 
the formal one as 69.5% of the 200 HHs lent and/or borrowed in the informal financial 
market, whereas only 46.5 % of the HHs had borrowing and/or lending relations with the 
formal sector. Nevertheless the average size of a formal sector loan was approximately 
4 times greater than the average informal loan. 
Moreover informal sector loans were associated with relatively short term consumption 
and working capital needs. Formal loans were predominantly for production purposes as 
banks were constrained to provide consumption credit. 
Informal transactions in our sample can be classified as intermittent mainly, undertaken 
amongst friends, relatives, and neighbours. It is remarkable to notice that 90.6% of the 
informal loans were, implicitly and explicitly interest free, which is attributed mainly to 
the strong Islamic prohibition on usury and the solid cultural view against it. It is also 
interesting to find that 92.9% of informal transactions were undertaken without 
marketable tangible collateral. 
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Rare use of collateral can be explained by the free flow of information between lenders 
and borrowers and the fact that the informal financial market is governed by a complex 
nexus of personal relations which establish an effective enforcement mechanism in the 
case of default. Default ý cases at 11.5% of total transactions were relatively low, 
compared to the default rate in the formal banking sector. Informal lending and 
borrowing in our sample tends to be state-contingent, as in many cases, borrowers were 
granted more time by their lenders to assist them in repaying the loans. In some cases 
borrowers obtained new credit from their lenders before repaying the existing loan. 
We argue that the informal financial market has its own barriers to entry which implies 
that entry is restricted, particularly in the case of borrowing, for those who do not satisfy 
certain requirements, e. g. social collateral. This casts some doubt on the claim that the 
informal financial market acts as a safety valve in countries with repressed financial 
systems. Moreover even if accessibility to the IFM is secured, this does not mean that 
loan applicants will get what they demand as the IFM does not have an unlimited supply 
of funds and does have its own credit constraints. Hence claiming that the Informal 
financial market can be a safety valve or a 'lender of last resort' for those rejected by the 
formal sector is not self evidently correct in the case of Egypt. 
In chapter (9) we have also highlighted the case of RoSCA in Egypt as an example of 
informal finance through collective arrangements. 45 households reported that they 
participated in a RoSCA during the previous year to the survey. These households belong 
mainly to the middle and low middle income groups. 
The dominant reason for joining a RoSCA was the purchase of a durable consumption 
good. Preparation for social events, e. g. marriage, saving and accumulation of capital for 
production purposes were also reported as reasons for participation. The type of RoSCA 
which we found common in the surveyed villages is what we call a "non-random" 
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RoSCA. In this type of RoSCA the determination of the rotation lies fully in the hands 
of the organiser. Instead of bidding or randomly determining the rotation of the RoSCA, 
the organiser in the non-random RoSCA decides the order of the recipients of the fund 
according to the creditworthiness of the member, how desperate is he for receiving the 
fund and his relation to the organiser. In a standard non-random RoSCA the organiser 
usually takes the common fund first and priority is given to those who are frequent 
members. 
For a RoSCA to be successful in financial intermediation it has to be kept small. Larger 
numbers of members would mean, in addition to greater transaction costs, an increasing 
need for measures against default risk. This would exclude a significant number of 
potential participants and place RoSCA in competition with formal intermediaries which 
are more capable of handling collateral based transactions. Further free-interest rate 
RoSCAs such as the ones found in Egypt need to operate in a low inflation environment. 
If inflation accelerates, members allocated at the end of the cycle have to be compensated; 
alternatively RoSCA should be linked directly to a durable good or denominated in a 
foreign currency as an inflation hedge. 
To investigate the determinants of formal and informal borrowing we have estimated two 
models, with village dummy variables, using Tobit analysis. In the case of formal 
borrowing the village dummy variables were not significant which indicates that inter- 
village socio-economic and infrastructural dissimilarities were not strong to an extent that 
can be reflected in significant differences in loans obtained from the formal sector. 
If we focus on the significant coefficients we realise that land holding, owned or rented, 
is a positive determinant of borrowing, explained by the fact that the formal sector, in the 
surveyed region, mainly advances loans for agricultural purposes. The coefficient of HH 
income was also positive which is some indication of HH ability to repay the loan. 
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Deposit at the formal sector had a negative coefficient indicating that instead of borrowing 
at a higher cost the household can withdraw from their deposits to meet their production 
or consumption requirements. The religious factor also had a negative coefficient which 
reflects the rejection of obtaining a loan with an interest rate, considered as a form of 
usury. The type of interaction between the formal and informal sectors could not be 
determined as the relevant coefficient was not significant. 
In the case of informal borrowing we have found that the coefficient of the relatively poor 
village of Menshat was significant and negative. This indicates that the HHs of this 
village are less likely to be involved in informal market transactions. Although Menshat 
shares the village of Shahawy a lot of socio-economic characteristics, the households in 
the latter enjoy a greater accessibility to the active IFM market of the more affluent 
village of Asneat. Both income and savings have significant coefficients. However the 
former is positive, as in the case of formal borrowing, while the latter is negative. Land 
holding, as in the case of formal borrowing, has a positive sign. Ownership of gold as 
an acceptable collateral in the IFM is a positive determinant of informal borrowing. 
The relationship between HH size and net informal borrowing was negative in our 
estimation. There are two explanations for this unexpected relationship. First, in our 
model we estimate the actual demand and not the mere need for informal loans and it may 
be the case that some bigger HHs cannot fulfil the requirements for a successful loan 
application despite their need, e. g. social collateral. Second given that children can be a 
source of income in extended families, the HH size need not always be associated with 
an increase in informal borrowing requirements. Again, as in the case of formal 
borrowing, the dummy variables included to display links with the formal sector were not 
significant which indicate that there is no simple correlation between obtaining a formal 
loan and an informal one. 
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Our findings regarding the households response to financial liberalisation measures do not 
suggest a positive response to them. Households' views on the unsatisfactory services of 
the formal sector did not improve and there was not either any meaningful improvement 
in their relation with this sector. Moreover we argue that if the rise in the cost of formal 
borrowing continued to be the main change brought by liberalisation, the IFM will 
continue to exist in Egypt, but with a change in its structure, scope. and mechanisms. 
According to our survey we can distinguish between four factors that explain the 
coexistence of the informal and formal financial sector. The first factor is the condition 
of the formal sector. IFMs are regarded as a reactive disequilibrium phenomenon since 
they occur as a result of exogenously imposed restrictions on the formal financial sector. 
If the formal financial sector is heavily regulated, repressed and inefficient this will leave 
a leeway in which the informal sector will flourish. Potential depositors would find that 
dealing in the informal sector brings a higher return on their funds. Potential borrowers, 
once rejected by the rationed formal credit market, may obtain their required credit, albeit 
at a higher cost, from the informal sector. Therefore, through substitutability, the 
informal financial market will coexist with the formal one as a parallel market. 
The second factor is attributed to transaction costs. Even if the formal sector is liberalised 
and efficient there will still be a space for the informal sector to work in. For example 
it may not be economically viable to extend the branches of the formal sector to remote 
and underpopulated areas with potentially few customers. High marginal monitoring costs 
for providing particular customers with credit may be a deterrent to the formal sector. 
These high costs may be due to the high risk involved or an incomplete information set 
that is costly to improve. Hence, even in the absence of the distortions mentioned under 
the first factor, transactions in the IFMs might result as an equilibrium phenomenon. 
Accordingly, we argue that through complementarity, informal financial transactions, 
which are universally demand driven, would coexist with formal ones. 
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The third factor is the cultural environment. The role of religion and tradition may 
discourage potential customers from dealing with the formal sector. Western style 
financial intermediaries may not necessarily be adequate in relation to the requirements 
of other societies. For instance, the Islamic ban on usury is one of the major reasons 
behind the abandonment of the formal sector in many Muslim societies. Thus informal 
financial activities as a market response of economic agents to their cultural background 
would have an active role. 
The fourth is the lack of credibility in the political and economic system as a whole. 
Several developing societies have witnessed frequent changes in regime that have had an 
adverse negative effect on their confidence in formal institutions. The confiscation and 
freezing of funds held in the formal sector, retrospective taxation of returns on deposits, 
sudden bankruptcies, and the unanticipated devaluation of national currencies are, inter 
alia, behind this lack of confidence in the formal financial sector. Credibility problems 
lead to the shifting of transactions outside the formal sector. 
Further, we argue that there is a "critical minimum" of informal financial transactions 
which will always exist in developing and lagging economies irrespective of the condition 
of the formal sector. This will vary between countries'depending on the above mentioned 
factors. The level of informal activities will peak if all four factors are in operation. But 
improvement in the efficiency of the formal sector, a positive attempt by the formal 
intermediaries to cater for the different financial requirements of the less developed 
economies and an increase' in the credibility of the regime will push this level down to 
its critical minimum. This critical minimum can be ascribed to the complementarity and 
cultural factors mentioned above. Whilst we argue that the critical minimum can be 
reduced through perceptive economic and social development programmes, it will never 
be eliminated. 
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Accordingly, financial liberalisation, by eliminating interest rate ceilings can, ceteris 
paribus, reduce some of the reactive parallel financial transactions of the informal sector. 
Other measures designed to improve the efficiency of the formal financial sector and 
monetary management may reduce the reactive informal transactions further. Nonetheless 
'reform' measures that lead to high real interest rates without a realised change in the 
accessibility to the formal credit market would result in a resurgence of usurious 
moneylending and hence an increase in reactive informal transactions. It requires more 
than liberalisation to limit the problem of transaction costs. Moreover, financial 
liberalisation can have no effect on the cultural environment or the credibility of the 
regime. 
In conclusion, this thesis highlights the importance of a liberalised financial system for 
economic development in Egypt. However it argues that financial liberalisation, on its 
own, is not a sufficient remedy for the problems encountered in the financial sector. 
Macroeconomic stability and prudential regulation are considered to be essential 
prerequisites for liberalisation. In addition the thesis strongly emphasises the need for the 
restructuring of the financial system and the ensuring of its compatibility with the cultural 
environment to enable the full realisation of the benefits of financial liberalisation. 
Future research on the Egyptian financial market could investigate the impact of the 
recent financial liberalisation programme on the structure, condition and performance of 
the market. The effect of financial liberalisation on the efficiency of intermediation of the 
operating units and their viability could also be analysed. The analysis of the impact of 
the recent changes in prudential regulation and supervision, including the introduction of 
an explicit deposit insurance scheme on the behaviour of financial intermediaries and their 
performance, in addition to the stability of the financial system as a whole would be of 
considerable value. 
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The prospects of Islamic finance in Egypt under financial liberalisation including the 
relation of Islamic banks with the monetary authority could also be addressed. 
Should financial liberalisation alter the characteristics of Egyptian financial system which 
have been identified by the 'seemingly symbiotic' coexistence of formal and informal 
financial sectors is also an interesting area for research which has to focus on the 
microeconomic foundations of the financial market. A larger household survey, than the 
one undertaken in this study, is required to extend the analysis to cover different areas 
in Egypt and allows for inter-regional comparisons. A panel survey would be 
considerably useful in examining the changes over time in the households' financial 
decisions in response to different measures of financial liberalisation and to analyse the 
possible variation in the relative size, structure and mechanisms of the formal and 
informal credit markets in Egypt. 
The new advances in the endogenous economic growth theory could be utilised, subject 
to the availability of data, to address the issue of the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in Egypt. Whether financial liberalisation improves 
the quality of investment is also an important topic. The intended improvement in the 
Egyptian economic database associated with the current economic reform programme may 
permit the analysis of some or all of these proposed topics in the future. 
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Appendix (1) 
A FORTRAN Programme to determine 
the Equilibrium Real Rate of Interest 
which minimises the Sum of Squared Residuals 
double precision x(100,6) 
$, re, z, b(30), yssq, essq, betahat(10), DET, y(100), 
$ xx(100,10), 
$ chk(5,5), a(5,5), ainv(10,10) 
integer i, j, t, NZ, ID, d(50), n, ir, k, lr 
COMMON/NR/Z(30,30) 
DIMENSION NEX(30) 
open(50, file='tryl. dat', status='unknown') 
open(60, file='tryl. out', status='unknown') 
print*, ' input # of ind. var 
read*, k 
print*, ' input nobs =' 
read*, n 
do 1000 t=1, n 
read(50, *) y(t), (xx(t, i) ,i=1, k) 
x(t, 1) = 1.0 
1000 continue 
print*, ' input range 
read*, lr 
do 9561 jr = -lr, lr 
re = real (ir) /200 
do 40 j=1, n 
if ( (xx(j, 1) - re ) le. d(j) = 0.0 
else 
d(j) = 1.0 
endif 
x(1,2) = xx(', 1) 
x(ß, 3) = d(j}) 
40 continue 
do 70 i=4, k+2 
do 75 t=1, n 
x(t, i) = xx(t, i-2) 
75 continue 
70 continue 
do 110 i= 1, k+2 
do 120 1=1, k+2 
130 
120 
110 
150 
140 
call 
C 
C 
C 
c124 
c123 
c 
c 
c 
C 
Z(i, j) = 0.0 
do 130 t=1, n 
z(i, j) = z(i, j) 
continue 
a(i, j) = z(i, j) 
continue 
continue 
do 140 i=1, k+2 
b(i) =0 
do 150 t=1, 
b(i) = b(i) + 
continue 
continue 
0.0 ) then 
+ x(t, i) * x(t, j) 
n 
x (t, i) * y(t) 
mxinv(k+2, det, nex, ID) 
continue 
continue 
do 200 i=1, k+2 
do 201 = 1, k+2 
chk(i, j) = 0.0 
do 202 t=1. k+2 
check I 
do 123 i=1, k+2 
do 124 j=1, k+2 
ainv(i, j) = z(i, j) 
372 
c chk(i, j) = chk(i, j) + a(i, t) 
ainv(t, j) 
c202 continue 
c201 continue 
c200 continue 
c do 400 i=1, k+2 
c write(*, 1) (chk(i, j), j=1, k+2) 
c400 continue 
cl format (5 (f8.4,3x) ) 
yssq=0.0 
do 160 t=1, n 
yssq = yssq + y(t) * y(t) 
160 continue 
do 170 i=1, k+2 
betahat(i) = 0.0 
do 180 j=1, k+2 
betahat(i) = betahat(i) + z(i, j) * b(j) 
180 continue 
170 continue 
essq = 0.0 
do 190 i=1, k+2 
essq = essq + betahat(i) *b (i) 
190 continue 
essq = yssq - essq 
print*, re, essq 
write(60, *) re, essq 
9561 continue 
end 
Matrix inverse 
subroutine mxinv(nz, det, nex, ID) 
DOUBLE PRECISION Z, DET, ZERO, TEMP, BIG 
INTEGER I, K, J, NZ, NBIG 
COMMON/NR/Z(30,30) 
DIMENSION NEX(30) 
det=0.0 
ZERO=DABS(DET) 
DET=1.0 
DO 10 I=1, NZ 
BIG=0.0 
NBIG=O 
DO 11 J=I, NZ 
TEMP=DABS(Z(J, I)) 
IF(BIG-TEMP) 12,11,11 
12 BIG=TEMP 
NBIG=J 
11 CONTINUE 
IF(BIG-ZERO) 13,14,14 
13 DET=0.0 
RETURN 
14 IF(NBIG-I) 15,17,15 
15 DO 16 K=1, NZ" 
TEMP=Z (I , K) Z (I, K) =Z (NBIG, K) 
16 Z (NBIG, K) =TEMP 
DET=-DET 
17 NEX(I)=NBIG 
DET=DET*Z(I, I) 
TEMP=1. /Z(I, I) 
Z (I , I) =TEMP DO 20 J=1, NZ 
IF(I-J) 21,20,21 
21 Z(J, I)=-TEMP*Z(J, I) 
20 CONTINUE 
DO 30 J=1, NZ 
DO 30 K=1, NZ 
IF(I-J)31,30,31 
31 IF(I-K)32,30,32 
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32 Z (J, K) =Z (J, K) +Z (J, I) *Z (I, K) 
30 CONTINUE 
DO 40 J=1, NZ 
IF(I-J)41,40,41 
41 Z(I, J)=TEMP*Z(I, J) 
40 CONTINUE 
10 CONTINUE 
I=NZ+1 
50 I=I-1 
IF(I)56,56,52 
52 J=NEX(I) 
IF(I-J)51,50,51 
51 DO 55 K=1, NZ 
TEMP=Z(K, I) 
Z(K, I)=Z(K, J) 
55 Z (K, J) =TEMP 
GO TO 50 
56 RETURN 
END 
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Appendix (2) 
Real and Financial variables of Egypt 
1960-1990 (£E Million) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Year M1 Quasi M2 M3 Population GDP GNP Gross 
Money Investment 
1960 405 80 485 531 25.92 1373 1376 192 
1961 455 86 541 589 26.58 1459 1461 229 
1962 443 134 577 642 27.26 1513 1513 263.9 
1963 516 173 689 758 27.95 1685 1679 325.8 
1964 621 179 800 883 28.66 1888 1881 372.7 
1965 655 197 852 943 29.39 2214 2199 414 
1966 684 181 865 960 30.1 2403 2381 415.9 
1967 707 210 917 1006 30.91 2481 2457 363.9 
1968 722 223 945 1033 31.69 2533 2497 330.2 
1969 746 253 999 1089 32.5 2696 2652 367.2 
1970 783 270 1053 1147 33.33 2971 3059 426.6 
1971 846 239 1085 1186 34.08 3146 3417 428.7 
1972 989 266 1255 1368 34.84 3337 3403 418.3 
1973 1205 331 1536 1662 35.62 3757 3634 500 
1974 1503 497 2000 2147 36.42 4190 4085 975 
1975 1863 567 2430 2595 37.23 4886 4738 1741 
1976 2239 822 3061 3249 37.87 6276 6409 1910 
1977 2943 1160 4103 4306 38.79 8210 8643 2434 
1978 3553 1659 5212 5453 39.82 9788 10765 3101 
1979 4354 2490 6844 7140 40.98 12610 13395 4173 
1980 6775 3589 10364 10716 42.29 15470 17231 4539 
1981 7646 5920 13566 14008 43.47 17150 18462 5111 
1982 9552 8240 17792 18385 44.67 20881 21327 6250 
1983 10933 10884 21817 22570 45.92 24834 26051 6944 
1984 12443 13486 25929 26800 47.5 27886 30605 7834 
1985 14696 15980 30676 31739 47.8 32516 35892 8838 
1986 15973 21129 37102 38322 48.2 36039 39397 9093 
1987 18241 26637 44878 46440 49.8 45249 46818 8150 
1988 20579 33970 54549 56318 51.4 54553 56122 13187 
1989 22471 41623 64094 66118 52.9 65577 70101 15269 
1990 26205 56303 82508 84631 54.4 78907 80907 17276 
Columns 1,2,3,4,6, and 7 are obtained from the IMF Financial Statistics Year 
Book, different issues. 
Column 8 is obtained from The World Bank, World Tables. 
Column 'S is from the National Bank of Egypt, Economic Bulletin. 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Year Fixed Gross National Domestic Private CPI Nominal Parallel 
Investment Savings Credit/ GNP Credit/ GNP Interest Exchange 
Rate Rate EEt$ 
1960 171 186.3 0.3942 0.186 15.6 0.0275 1.96 
1961 226 177.2 0.4199 0.179 15.7 0.0275 1.45 
1962 251 165.8 0.4579 0.192 15.2 0.03 1.24 
1963 300 201.3 0.4948 0.189 15.4 0.03 1.25 
1964 372 264 0.4896 0.175 15.9 0.03 1.2 
1965 358 306.7 0.4673 0.154 18.3 0.03 1.15 
1966 377 324.7 0.4785 0.140 19.9 0.03 1.1 
1967 359 262.7 0.5032 0.132 20.1 0.03 1.3 
1968 292 200.7 0.5113 0.144 19.7 0.035 1.2 
1969 333 233.1 0.4963 0.150 20.4 0.035 1.09 
1970 353 235.1 0.4952 0.129 21.2 0.035 1.1 
1971 405 251 0.5168 0.122 21.9 0.035 1.15 
1972 462 243 0.5284 0.125 22.3 0.04 1.31 
1973 462 308 0.5171 0.113 23.5 0.04 1.54 
1974 643 282 0.5780 0.144 25.8 0.04 1.44 
1975 1228 707 0.7293 0.186 28.3 0.04 1.42 
1976 1385 1278 0.6527 0.179 31.2 0.04 1.35 
1977 1825 1673 0.6200 0.178 35.2 0.05 1.43 
1978 2638 1878 0.8444 0.166 39.1 0.05 1.34 
1979 3707 2835 0.8277 0.179 43 0.06 1.33 
1980 4062 3404 0.9105 0.126 51.8 0.07 1.22 
1981 5108 2767 1.1108 0.230 57.2 0.085 0.99 
1982 5469 3198 1.1384 0.260 65.7 0.1 0.89 
1983 6399 4919 1.1573 0.264 76.2 0.11 0.87 
1984 6596 4848 1.1869 0.269 89.2 0.11 0.8 
1985 7158 4149 1.256 0.283 100 0.11 0.65 
1986 7209 3331 1.1798 0.327 123.9 0.11 0.53 
1987 8050 - 629 1.1668 0.318 148.3 0.11 
0.47 
1988 13037 2036 1.1634 0.309 174.4 0.11 0.42 
1989 15029 1533 1.1612 0.291 211.5 . 0.117 
0.37 
1990 16916 1251 1.2675 0.302 246.9 0.12 0.31 
.. vlunuls y, 1i, 14 are oDLainea Lrom Lne 1Mr, 1nternaLional rinancial SLaGisLic$, 
Year Book, different issues. 
Columns 10 is obtained from the World Bank, World Tables. 
Columns 11 and 12 are calculated from the IMF, International Financial 
Statistics. 
Column 15 is obtained as follows: 1960-1980: Scobie, G. (1983), table 17, p. 52; 
1981-1990: Pick's Currency Yearbook, various issues. 
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Appendix (3) 
The Household Survey Questionnaire: 
Description of variables 
The questionnaire was designed to provide a complete picture of the household's 
demographic characteristics, income, assets, living standard, 'portfolio' selection, 
preference of savings instruments, financial transactions in the formal and informal 
sectors. In addition, specific sections in the questionnaire were designed to analyze the 
activities of ROSCAs, the importance of inflation hedges in the 'portfolios' and to test 
the net effect of the increase of income and wealth on the saving behaviour of the 
households. Part of the questionnaire was designed to examine the main changes of the 
households relations with the financial sector since the launching of the liberalisation 
programme. Finally, an attempt was made to assess the main changes in the volume of 
formal, informal and agricultural loans. 
A description of the variables included in the questionnaire is provided below. Note that 
some of the variables are considered for examining the reliability and consistency of the 
answers of the interviewees. 
1. HHCode: Household code; 3 digits starting with the village code. 
2. Occup: Occupation of the leader of the household; 1 digit (from 1 to 9). 
3. HHSize: Size of the household (de facto defined) from 1 to 12. 
Household ( HH) Roster 
4. LRltnl: Relation to the leader of the HH; from 1 to 9. 
5. Sex 1: Sex of the first member of the HH; 1 or 2. 
6. Age 1: Age of the first member. 
7. Educl: Education of the first member of the HH; from 1 
8. Socl1: Marital status of the first member from; 1 to 5. 
9. Empl1: Employment condition of the first member; from 
10. LRltn2: 40. LRltn7: 
11. Sex2: 41. Sex7: 
12. Age2: 42. Age7: 
13. Educ2: 43. Educ7: 
14. Soc12: 44. Socl7: 
15. Emp12: 45. Empl7: 
16. LRltn3: 46. LRItn8: 
17. Sex3: 47. Sex&: 
18. Age3: 48. Age8: 
19. Educ3: 49. Educ8: 
20. Socl3: 50. Soc18: 
21. Empl3: 51. Emp18: 
22. LRltn4: 52. LRltn9: 
23. Sex4: 53. Sex9: 
24. Age4: 54. Age9: 
25. Educ4: 55. Educ9: 
26. Socl4: 56. Soc19: 
27. Empl4: 57. Empl9: 
28. LRltnS: 58. LRItn10: 
29. SexS: 59. Sex10: 
30. AgeS: 60. Age10: 
31. Educ5: 61. Educ10: 
32. Soc15: 62. Socl10: 
33. Emp15: 63. Emp110: 
34. LRItn6: 64. LRItnll: 
35. Sex6: 65. Sexll: 
36. Age6: 66. Age11: 
37. Educ6: 67. Educ11: 
38. Soc16: 68 Soclll: 39. Empl6: . 69. Empl11: 
to 6. 
1 to 12. 
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Living Standard 
70. Hous: Type of dwelling; from 1 to 6. 
71. Posn: Possession of the dwelling; from 1 to 6. 
72. Watr: Water source; from 1 to 4. 
73. WC: Toilet in the dwelling; from 1 to 3. 
74. Elec: Electricity; from 1 to 3. 
75. Durbl1: Possession of a Cooker (1 or 2) 
76. - 2: Coloured TV 
77. - 3: B&W TV 
78. - 4: Refrigerator 
79. - 5: Video Player 80. - 6: Washing Machine 
81. - 7: Immersion Heater 
82. - 8: Electric Heater 
83. - 9: Electric Fan 
84. Comm(1): Possession of telephone 
85. - (2): Private car 
86. - (3): Motor-Bicycle 
87. - (4): Bicycle 
Income And Assets 
88. Income: HH income per annum; from (less than 1000) to (more than 30000). 
89. Sourcl: Main source of income; from 1 to 8. 
90. Sourc2: Secondary source of income; from 1 to 8. 
91. LivStd: An index of the HH standard of living obtained; from 70 to 90. 
92. OwnLnd: 
93. RntLndTO: 
94. RntLndFrm: 
95. OwnLndV: 
96. RntLndTV: 
97. RntLndFV: 
98. B1dLnd: 
99. Houses: 
100. Stores: 
101. Shops: 
102. LivStck: 
103. Equip: 
104. OAssets: 
105. Total: 
HH owned land in feddans and qirats (1 qirat is 1/24 and 1 feddan 
is 1.038 acre= 0.42 hectares= 4200.83m2 
HH Rented Land to others in feddans and qirats. 
HH Rented Land from others in feddans and qirats. 
Value of owned land in £E. 
Value of rented land (to others) £E. 
Value of rented land (from others) £E. 
Value of non agricultural land in £E. 
Value of owned dwelling. 
Value of owned stores. 
Value of owned shops. 
Value of livestock. 
Value of owned equipments. 
Value of other assets. 
Total value of assets. 
106. Savings:. Savings during the last 12 months (from 0 to more than 10000) 
HH Portfolio Structure: 
107. Cash: Importance of cash in the portfolio (1/2/0; Main/Secondary/Zero) 
108. Gold: Gold 
109. DpstA/C: Deposit accounts 
110. Bnk: Type of the Bank (1/2/3) 
111. Currency: Local or foreign currency. 
112. Shr/bnd: Shares and/or bonds 
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113. Post: 
114. ROSCA: 
115. Lending: 
116. Invstmnt: 
117. Blvstck: 
118. Agrlnd: 
119. REstat: 
120. Durbles: 
121. Car: 
Post office account. 
Participation in a ROSCA. 
Lending in the informal sector. 
Investment in a project. 
Ownership of livestock. 
Ownership of agricultural land. 
Real estate. 
Durable consumption goods. 
Ownership of a private car(s). 
Personal ureference of the HH to the following. 
From 1 (strongly favoured) to 5 (strongly not favoured) 
122. Vcash: 
123. VGold: 
124. VF/Curr: 
125. VDurabl: 
126. VCars: 
127. VDpstA/C: 
128. VPost: 
129. Vlnsrnc: 
130. VShr/Bnd: 
131. VROSCAS: 
132. Prtcpt: 
133. Estblsh: 
134. VBlnd: 
135. VRAsset: 
136. VLvStck: 
Cash 
Gold 
Foreign currency 
Durable goods 
Cars 
Bank deposit account. 
Post office account. 
Insurance policies. 
Shares and bonds. 
ROSCA. 
Participation in a project. 
Establish a project. 
Building land. 
Real estate. 
Livestock. 
Deposit accounts 
137. When: The year of opening the account. 
138. Vol: Volume. 
139. Occasn: Reason for opening the account. 
Formal loans 
140. Floan: Formal loans obtained. 
141. FSourc: Source from 1 to 4. 
142. FPrpos: Purpose from 1 to 7. 
143. FSize: Volume of loan(s) during the last 12 months. 
144. Flntrst: Interest paid (nominal) 
145. FClltrl: Collateral from 1 to 7. 
146. FHlp: Assistance received from a friend or others to get the loan. 
147. FRpay: Repayment of loan and interest. 
148. FRfus: If an application for a loan was refused. 
149. Freasn: Reason for refusal. 
Reasons for not dealing with the formal financial sector 
(1,2 or 3) 
150. Relign: 
151. Dstanc: 
152. Trtmnt: 
153. Burcrac: 
154. Cost: 
155. Collatrl: 
156. Bnkrpcy: 
157. Confisc: 
Religious reasons. 
Distance from the financial intermediary. 
Treatment of the staff. 
Bureaucracy. 
Cost of borrowing. 
Collateral problems. 
Fear of bank bankruptcy. 
Fear of confiscation. 
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158. Taxes: Fear of being taxed. 
159. Noneed: Noneed for dealing. 
160. Othr3: Other reasons. 
Inflation hedges 
161. OwnGld: Ownership of gold. 
Reasons for ownership of gold: 
162. Shw: to shaw off from 1 to 3. 
163. Savng: saving from 1 to 3. 
164. Time: hedging against risk from 1 to 3. 
165. Othr4: Other reasons. 
166. whnBy: Occasion of buying gold 
167. Pwn/Cllt: If it was used as a collateral or pawned. 
168. Liquid: If it was liquidated. 
169. For: Reasons for liquidation from 1 to 11. 
170. FCurr: Ownership of foreign currencies. 
171. REst: Ownership of real estate. 
172. Hoard: Hoarding of consumption goods. 
173. B1dMat: Storing of building material. 
174. DurCon: Ownership of durable goods. 
175. Sell: Selling any of the above inflation 
interest rates. 
176. Chang: If a decision to buy an inflation 
increase of interest rates. 
hedges after the increase of 
hedge was changed after the 
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The Informal sector 
177. ITwzF: 'Deposits' with Islamic investment companies. 
178. DepSize: Volume of the 'deposit'. 
179. Rsn: Reason for dealing with them (from 1 to 5). 
180. ILend: Lending in the informal sector 
181. ISize: Size of the loan. 
182. Durtn: Duration 
183. Reltn: Relation with the borrower. 
184. IHelp: Assistance received by the borrower to get the loan. 
185. FPaid: Charged for this assistance. 
186. IBOccup: Occupation of the borrower. 
187. IPurpos: Purpose of the loan. 
188. lInterst: Interest paid. 
189. IntVal: Nominal value of the interest paid. 
190. Contra: Contract written. 
191. ColtVld: Valuation of collateral. 
192. ColtTkn: Collateral taken. 
193. ColtKnd: Kind of collateral. 
194. ColtUsd: Collateral used. 
195. IRpay: Repayment of the loan. 
196. INtRpay: Action taken in the case of default. 
197. IBBrrow: Borrowing from the informal sector 
198. IBSize: Size of the loan. 
199. IBDurtn: Duration. 
200. IBrltn: Relation with the lender. 
201. IBHlp: Help received to get the loan 
202. IBPaid: Charge for that help. 
203. IBOccup: Lender's occupation. 
204. IBPurpos: Purpose of the loan. 
205. IB intrst: Interest paid 
206. IBintval: Nominal value 
207. IBcntrct:. Contract 
208. IBVColt: Collateral valued. 
209. IBTCo1t: Collateral taken. 
210. IBKColt Kind of collateral. 
211. IBUColt: Collateral used. 
212. IBrpay: Repayment of the loan 
213.. IBFalr: Action taken by the lender in the case of default. 
Rotating Savings and Credit Association 
214. PROSCA: Participation in a ROSCA. 
215. Number: 
216. AvgAge: 
217. M/F: 
218. RRltn: 
219. Duratn: 
220. instlmnt: 
221. Val: 
222. RReason: 
223. Intrst: 
224. Prvlg: 
225. Knd: 
Number of members. 
Average Age of members. 
Sex of members. 
Relation between members. 
Duration of the association. 
Instalments per month, week, other. 
Value of the instalment. 
Reason for participation. 
Interest paid. 
Privilege to any of the members. 
Type of the privilege. 
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226. Othr5: Comments. 
The effect of net increase in income or wealth 
227. Spend: Increase of spending. 
228. BDurbl: Increase of buying durables. 
229. Plgr: Pilgrimage. 
230. Prjct: Starting or developing a project. 
231. BGld: Buy gold. 
232. SveFrml: Saving in the formal sector. 
233. Mrrge: Marriage. 
234. Blnd: Purchase of land. 
235. Torsm: Tourism. 
236. Immgrt: Immigration. 
237. Othr6: Others. 
238. Intst9l: The net impact of the increase of the nominal interest rate on 
savings and consumption for those who have a deposit account. 
Main changes of the services of the financial sector and their impact on the HH 
239. Brnch: Increase of branch numbers. 
240. Encourg: Encouragement by the financial sector. 
241. A/C: Account(s) opened since January 1991. 
242. Vchng: Change of views towards the financial sector. 
The impact of the increase of nominal interest rates on the portfolio selection of the 
HH. 243. Liquid: Liquidation of inflation hedges. 
244. InfReluct: Reluctance to lend in the informal sector. 
245. Trans: Effects on private transactions (Non Market financial 
transactions). 
246. Hedges: Change in a decision of buying an inflation hedge. 
247. Durabl: Change in a decision of buying a consumption durable good. 
248. ROSCA/i: The effect on participation in a ROSCA. 
Change in the size of loans since Jan 1991. 
249. FrmLoan: Change in the volume of formal loans after Jan 1991. 
250. InfLoan: Change in the volume of informal loans during the same period. 
251. AgrLoans: The impact of increase on nominal interest rates on Loans 
obtained from the Agricultural bank. 
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Appendix (4) 
Descriptive Statistics of the Household Survey Data 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum N 
OCCUP 4.47 2.10 1.0 9.0 200 
HHSIZE 5.66 2.02 1.0 11.0 200 
LRLTN1 . 00 . 00 .0 .0 
200 
SEX1 1.04 . 20 1.0 2.0 200 AGE1 45.98 12.41 21.0 79.0 200 
EDUC1 3.55 1.31 2.0 6.0 200 
SOCL1 3.05 . 51 2.0 5.0 200 EMPL1 2.97 1.64 2.0 10.0 200 
LRLTN2 1.30 . 73 1.0 6.0 199 SEX2 1.96 . 20 1.0 2.0 199 AGE2 38.64 12.93 12.0 83.0 199 
EDUC2 2.98 1.15 2.0 6.0 199 
SOCL2 3.01 . 47 1.0 5.0 199 EMPL2 8.70 2.88 1.0 11.0 199 
LRLTN3 2.52 1.54 1.0 9.0 191 
SEX3 1.49 . 50 1.0 2.0 191 AGE3 20.95 14.06 1.0 70.0 191 
EDUC3 3.42 1.39 1.0 6.0 191 
SOCL3 1.95 . 96 1.0 5.0 191 EMPL3 7.08 4.31 1.0 12.0 191 
LRLTN4 2.86 1.73 2.0 9.0 171 
SEX4 1.56 1.08 1.0 14.0 171 
AGE4 16.20 10.52 1.0 60.0 171 
EDUC4 3.30 1.35 1.0 6.0 171 
SOCL4 1.66 . 81 1.0 5.0 
171 
EMPL4 7.27 4.43 1.0 12.0 171 
LRLTN5 2.64 1.27 2.0 7.0 142 
SEX5 1.49 . 50 1.0 2.0 142 AGE5 13.92 12.60 1.0 80.0 142 
EDUCS 2.88 1.48 1.0 6.0 142 
SOCL5 1.53 . 83 1.0 5.0 142 EMPL5 6.65 4.67 1.0 12.0 142 
LRLTN6 2.66 1.52 1.0 7.0 104 
SEX6 1.46 . 50 1.0 2.0 104 AGE6 13.03 10.90 1.0 69.0 104 
EDUC6 2.76 1.34 1.0 5.0 104 
SOCL6 1.53 . 75 1.0 5.0 104 EMPL6 7.02 4.68 1.0 12.0 104 
LRLTN7 2.92 1.76 1.0 7.0 64 
SEX7 1.48 . 50 1.0 2.0 
64 
AGE7 14.97 13.29 1.0 80.0 64 
EDUC7 2.77 1.21 1.0 6.0 64 
SOCL7 1.66 . 86 1.0 5.0 
64 
EMPL7 7.69 4.35 1.0 11.0 64 
LRLTN8 3.07 1.91 2.0 7.0 29 
SEX8 1.48 . 51 1.0 2.0 
29 
AGES 17.52 18.39 1.0" 70.0 29 
EDUC8 2.76 1.24 1.0 5.0 29 
SOCL8 1.86 1.13 1.0 5.0 29 
EMPL8 7.10 4.66 1.0 11.0 29 
LRLTN9 2.89 1.71 2.0 7.0 18 
SEX9 1.61 . 50 1.0 2.0 18 AGES 16.72 18.77 1.0 80.0 18 
EDUC9 2.56 1.29 1.0 4.0 18 
SOCL9 1.89 1.08 1.0 5.0 18 
EMPL9 5.94 4.80 1.0 11.0 18 
LRLTN10 3.67 2.06 2.0 7.0 9 
SEX10 1.56 . 53 1.0 2.0 9 AGE10 15.78 24.84 1.0 80.0 9 
EDUC10 2.44 1.33 1.0 5.0 9 
SOCL10 1.78 1.39 1.0 5.0 9 
EMPL10 5.67 4.92 1.0 11.0 9 
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LRLTNII 5.80 1.64 4.0 7.0 5 
SEX11 1.20 . 45 1.0 2.0 
5 
AGE11 11.40 10.04 2.0 24.0 5 
EDUC11 2.00 1.00 1.0 3.0 5 
SOCL11 1.80 . 84 1.0 3.0 
5 
EMPL11 7.00 5.52 1.0 12.0 5 
DWLL 2*. 37 . 98 1.0 5.0 
200 
POSN 1.33 . 84 1.0 6.0 200 WATR 1.47 . 84 1.0 4.0 200 WC 1.19 . 47 1.0 3.0 200 ELEC 1.00 . 00 1.0 1.0 200 COOKER 1.30 . 46 1.0 2.0 200 TVC 1.66 . 48 1.0 2.0 200 BW 1.50 . 50 1.0 2.0 
200 
FRG 1.50 . 50 1.0 2.0 200 VID 1.91 . 29 1.0 2.0 200 WSH 1.28 . 45 1.0 2.0 
200 
BWAT 1.63 . 48 1.0 2.0 200 EHET 1.69 . 46 1.0 2.0 
200 
EFAN 1.43 . 50 1.0 2.0 200 TELE 1.78 . 41 1.0 2.0 200 CAR 1.90 . 29 1.0 2.0 200 MBIK 1.84 . 37 1.0 2.0 200 BIK 1.37 . 49 1.0 2.0 200 INCOME 5716.00 8859.90 1000.0 80000.0 200 
SOURC1 3.12 2.03 1.0 8.0 200 
SOURC2 2.14 2.33 .0 8.0 200 PERCAP 1207.09 2340.33 125 23333 200 
OWNLND 1.82 11.18 . 00 150.00 200 RNTLNDTO . 08 . 48 . 00 5.00 200 RNTLNDFM . 18 . 41 . 00 2.50 200 VOWNLND 100600.00 659071.77 .0 9000000.0 200 VRNTLNDT 2326.25 13990.62 .0 150000.0 200 VRNTLNDF 3702.75 8037.53 .0 38000.0 200 BLDLND 4520.00 13381.14 .0 100000.0 200 HOUSES 24062.50 35058.74 .0 300000.0 200 STORES 1168.00 4960.00 .0 40000.0 200 SHOPS 1972.50 9201.84 .0 100000.0 200 LIVSTCK 1803.25 4814.21 .0 60000.0 200 EQUIP 4282.50 22105.70 .0 270000.0 200 OASSETS 2472.50 17263.49 .0 200000.0 200 TOTAST 146910.25 710748.16 .0 9585000.0 200 SAVINGS 1534.75 4609.21 . '0 40000.0 200 CASH 1.11 1.01 .0 3.0 200 GOLD 1.72 . 97 .0 3.0 200 DPSTA C . 25 . 51 .0 3.0 200 BNK - . 41 . 80 .0 3.0 200 CURRENCY . 25 . 48 .0 2.0 200 SHR BND . 04 . 34 .0 3.0 200 INSUR . 11 . 55 .0 3.0 200 POST 
. 17 . 56 .0 3.0 
200 
ROSCA -. 39 . 80 .0 3.0 200 LENDING . 69 1.13 .0 3.0 200 INVSTMNT 
. 63 . 98 .0 . 
3.0 200 
BLVSTCK . 72 . 99 .0 3.0 200 AGRLND 1.10 1.17 .0 3.0 200 RESTAT 
. 69 1.07 .0 3.0 
200 
DURBLES . 22 . 69 .0 3.0 200 CARS 
. 26 . 78 .0 3.0 
200 
VCASH 2.12 1.37 1.0 5.0 200 
VGOLD 2.16 1.21 1.0 5.0 200 
VF CURR 3.10 1.41 1.0 5.0 200 
VDURBL 3.74 1.14 1.0 5.0 200 
VCARS 3.64 1.07 1.0 5.0 200 
VDPSTA C 2.94 1.52 1.0 5.0 200 
_ VPOST 3.71 1.24 1.0 5.0 200 
VINSRNC 3.88 1.00 1.0 5.0 200 
VSHR BND 3.93 . 96 1.0 5.0 
200 
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VROSCAS 3.20 1.30 1.0 5.0 200 
PRTCPT 2.54 1.35 1.0 5.0 200 
ESTBLSH 1.71 1.27 1.0 5.0 200 
VAGRLND 1.84 1.21 1.0 5.0 200 
VRASSET 2.41 1.45 1.0 5.0 200 
VLVSTCK 2.65 1.52 1.0 5.0 200 
FRMLA C 1.78 . 42 1.0 2.0 
200 
WHEN 11.49 6.92 1.0 30.0 45 
VLM 34702.22 64210.04 600.0 300000.0 45 
OCCASN 3.76 1.92 1.0 7.0 45 
FLOAN 1.70 . 46 1.0 2.0 200 FSOURC 2.25 . 77 1.0 4.0 60 FPRPOS 2.67 2.25 1.0 7.0 60 
FSIZE 4927.17 14524.53 300.0 100000.0 60 
FINTRST 19.02 5.12 4.0 30.0 60 
FCLLTRL 2.27 1.25 1.0 7.0 60 
FHLP 1.90 . 30 1.0 2.0 
60 
FRPAY 1.30 . 46 1.0 2.0 
60 
FRFUS 1.71 . 46 1.0 2.0 68 FREASN 1.90 1.29 1.0 4.0 20 
RELIGN 2.23 . 86 1.0 3.0 200 DSTANC 2.86 . 42 1.0 3.0 200 TRTMNT 2.78 . 53 1.0 3.0 200 BURCRAC 2.63 . 72 1.0 3.0 200 COST 1.87 . 97 1.0 3.0 200 COLLATRL 2.15 . 96 1.0 3.0 200 BNKRPCY 2.60 . 68 1.0 3.0 200 CONFISC 2.57 . 71 1.0 3.0 200 TAXES 2.49 . 78 1.0 3.0 200 NONEED 2.71 . 69 1.0 3.0 200 OWNGLD 1.13 . 34 1.0 2.0 200 SHW 1.60 . 67 1.0 3.0 174 SAVNG 1.56 . 68 1.0 3.0 174 TIME 1.32 . 61 1.0 3.0 174 WHNBY 1.36 . 48 1.0 2.0 174 PWN CLLT 1.95 . 21 1.0 2.0 174 LIQUID 1.47 . 50 1.0 2.0 174 FOR 6.01 2.95 1.0 11.0 92 
FCURR 1.93 . 25 1.0 2.0 200 REST 1.71 . 45 1.0 2.0 200 HOARD 1.70 . 46 1.0 2.0 200 BLDMAT 1.96 . 21 1.0 2.0 200 DURCON 1.98 . 12 1.0 2.0 200 SELL 1.97 . 16 1.0 2.0 200 CHANG 1.81 . 39 1.0 2.0 200 ITWZF 1.95 . 21 1.0 2.0 200 DEPSIZE 22111.11 25741.23 5000.0 80000.0 9 
RSN 3.33 1.00 2.0 4.0 9 
ILEND 1.60 . 49 1.0 2.0 200 ISIZE 913.88 1896.09 10.0 12000.0 80 
ITRANS 1.41 . 81 1.0, 6.0 
80 
ITVOL 945.75 1885.65 20.0 12000.0 80 
DURTN 4.49 4.75 1.0 24.0 80 
RELTN 2.03 1.16 1.0 6.0 80 
IHELP 1.95 . 22 1.0 2.0 
80 
FPAID 2.00 . 00 2.0 2.0 4 ILOCCUP 4.82 2.09 1.0 9.0 80 
IPURPOS 2.28 . 75 1.0 4.0 
80 
IINTERST 2.77 . 64 1.0 3.0 
80 
INTVAL 
. 06 9.29 -70.0 22.0 
80 
CONTRCT 1.70 . 46 1.0 2.0 80 COLTVLD 1.94 . 24 1.0 2.0 
80 
COLTTKN 1.68 . 47 1.0 2.0 
80 
COLTKND 3.00 . 00 3.0 3.0 26 COLTUSD 2.00 . 00 2.0 2.0 
26 
IRPAY 1.53 . 50 1.0 2.0 
80 
INTRPAY 2.33 . 93 1.0 3.0 
42 
IBBRROW 1.58 . 50 1.0 2.0 
200 
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NTRANS 2.25 1.19 1.0 6.0 85 
IBSIZE 1231.94 2762.30 40.0 20000.0 85 
TVOL 1537.24 2708.13 80.0 20000.0 85 
PROP 27.86 40.09 .7 254.5 . 
85 
IBDURTN 6.72 6.82 1.0 30.0 85 
IBRLTN 2.49 1.16 1.0 4.0 85 
IBHLP 1.72 . 45 1.0 2.0 85 IBPAIDý 1.96 . 20 1.0 2.0 
24 
IBOCCUP 4.85 3.36 1.0 11.0. 85 
IBPURPOS 2.38 1.23 1.0 5.0 85 
IBINTRST 2.85 . 50 1.0 3.0 
85 
IBINTVAL 4.67 23.97 .0 204.4 85 IBCNTRCT 1.61 . 49 1.0 2.0 
85 
IBVCOLT 1.87 . 34 1.0 2.0 85 IBTCOLT 1.60 . 49 1.0 2.0 85 IBKCOLT 2.74 . 75 1.0 4.0 34 IBUCOLT 1.76 . 43 1.0 2.0 34 IBRPAY 1.55 . 50 1.0 2.0 85 IBFALR 1.57 1.02 1.0 4.0 47 
PROSCA 1.78 . 42 1.0 2.0 
200 
NUMBER 10.82 3.07 6.0 20.0 45 
AVGAGE 35.02 5.40 26.0 45.0 45 
MF 2.47 . 84 1.0 3.0 45 RRLTN 3.24 . 93 1.0 5.0 45 DURATN 9.51 2.34 6.0 12.0 45 
INSTLMNT 1.13 . 50 1.0 3.0 
45 
VAL 42.89 24.32 10.0 100.0 45 
RSUM 474.22 353.27 90.0 1800.0 45 
RREASON 3.31 1.79 1.0 6.0 45 
INTRST 2.00 . 00 2.0 2.0 45 PRVKND. 1.76 1.05 1.0 4.0 45 
SPEND 1.82 . 94- 1.0 5.0 200 BDURBL 2.21 1.25 1.0 5.0 200 
PLGR 2.11 1.28 1.0. 5.0 200 
PRJCT 1.87 1.14 1.0 5.0 200 
BGLD 2.52 1.41 1.0 5.0 200 
SVEFRML 3.00 1.37 1.0 5.0 200 
MRRGE 2.27 . 94 1.0 4.0 200 BLND 2.25 1.57 1.0 5.0 200 
TORSM 4.00 1.32 1.0 5.0 200 
IMMGRT 4.12 1.34 1.0 5.0 200 
INTST91 1.93 . 89 1.0 3.0 45 BRNCH 1.58 . 50 1.0 2.0 200 ENCOURG 1.70 . 46 1.0 2.0 200 AC 2.00 . 07 1.0 2.0 200 VCHNG 1.81 . 39 1.0 2.0 200 LIQUI 1.94 . 24 1.0 2.0 200 INFRLUCT 1.80 . 40 1.0 2.0 200 TRANS 1.80 . 40 1.0 2.0 200. HEDGES 1.85 . 36 1.0 2.0 200 DURABL 1.81 . 40 - 1.0 2.0 200 ROSCA I 1.79 . 41 1.0 2.0 200 FRMLOÄN 1.70 . 46 1.0 2.0 200 INFLOAN 1.67 . 47 1.0 2.0 200 AGRLOANS 1.66 1.73 .0 5.0 200 
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